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I can therefore say that the Absurd is not in man (if such 
a meta phor could have a meaning) nor in the world, but 
in their presence together.—Albert cAmus, The Myth 
of Sisyphus and Other Essays
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But one day when I was sitting quiet and feeling like a motherless child, which I 
was, it come to me: that feeling of being part of every thing, not separate at all. I 
knew that if I cut a tree, my arm would bleed.
— Alice WAlker, The Color Purple
I no longer think of religion as a quest for complex subjectivity.1  There is some-
thing under neath the quest for complex subjectivity that prompts par tic u lar 
patterns of thinking and  doing. Hence, the quest for complex subjectivity is 
a second- order arrangement— that is, patterns of thinking and  doing— but 
 there is something  behind it (prior to it) that constitutes religion proper.
Mindful of this, I now understand religion as a technology (or one might also 
reference it as a religious technology, although I prefer the former). In using 
this term, I am not appealing to the mechanics of scientific advancements 
marking life in the twenty- first  century; I am not attempting to highlight new 
economic and social capacities that entail a new understanding of produc-
tion and the  human. Rather, in using the term technology, I mean to identify 
a method of interrogation and exposure, with an archaeological quality to it. 
Put differently, I am arguing that religion is a technology; it is a method of interroga-
tion and exposure. And this interrogation takes a variety of forms— such as exploration 
of places, pre sen ta tion of the per for mance of activities, noting of the positioning and 




finds through the exploration of cultural production, for instance. Again, this 
is a push against a sense of religion as a “ thing”— a set of beliefs, practices, 
and/or institutions.
On Religion and Technology, and Religion as Technology
I should clarify what I mean by religion and by religion as a technology, and 
it might be helpful to do so through contrast—by briefly discussing alternate 
framings of  these two concepts.
A relationship between technology and religion is pre sent in a variety 
of texts, including work by Susan George and Jacques Ellul.2 For George, 
the primary concern is the “synergistic” relationship between religion and 
technology— that is, the manner in which religion is enhanced by technol-
ogy and how technology is informed through exposure to a range of socio-
cultural considerations. Regarding the former, George has in mind the ways 
in which technology enhances (or transforms) how, for instance, the reli-
gious gather— such as virtual churches. Furthermore, regarding the latter, 
George repositions the conversation regarding the impact of technology 
on  human life by arguing technology, such as artificial intelligence (Ai), 
could benefit from theological considerations, theological frameworks 
by means of which Ai is equipped to better understand the nature and 
meaning of the  human identity and humanity— both of which are funda-
mental to the workings and intent of Ai. And so, both facets considered— 
technology’s influence on religion and religion’s influence on technology— this 
synergistic relationship connotes for George a complex enhancement of the 
form and dynamics of life.3 In presenting this argument, George suggests re-
ligion and technology are similar if for no other reason than both promote 
modalities of “transcendence”—or a push beyond current arrangements and 
circumstances.
While the terminology is the same— religion and technology—my mean-
ing is significantly diff er ent.4 George acknowledges that religion is difficult 
to define and tends, therefore, to speak more generally about religion as often 
considered to reflect “a social construction, as wish- fulfillment, and as alien-
ation.”5 She highlights a concern for meaning and meaning making but implies 
a somewhat standard attention to religious traditions— for example, Chris-
tian ity— and their vocabulary.6 In this way, at least implicitly, religion is un-
derstood in terms of traditionally recognized markers such as doctrines 
and institutions. Its relationship to embodied beings connotes a standard 
mode of transformation and “transcendence” by means of ritualized per for-
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mance. My aim is to challenge such perceptions of religion as pointing to a 
distinct material- spiritual real ity arranged in time and space. Hence, I push 
for theorization of religion as a hermeneutic of sorts (a mode of interpreta-
tion or interrogation)— not a “substance” but rather an approach, a par tic-
u lar framing. And with re spect to technology, George has in mind “applied 
knowledge that impacts daily life.” This understanding is discussed in rela-
tionship to four possibilities.  These are (1) “information and communication 
technology . . .  providing the infrastructure upon which other technologies 
can sit, (2) Ai— artificial intelligence” meant to act in the  human world, (3) 
“ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence” promoting flow of “infor-
mation and communication between the  human and computer world, and 
(4) virtual Ai, enhancing internet iCt with intelligence and sophistication, 
merging with ubiquitous computing to make a world where the interface 
between the virtual and real are continually blurred.”7 Technology as dis-
cussed by George certainly has impact and importance, but what I mean 
by technology  here is not tied to modalities of scientific engagement; 
rather, technology speaks to a more theoretical consideration. My aim, put 
another way, is not to apply the categories traditionally associated with the 
religious— for example, God, salvation, and sin—to a secularized and (tech-
nologically) enhanced world. Nor is my concern to bring to religiosity a clear 
and consistent engagement with scientific development. The theorization 
of religion and the framing of technology undergirding Interplay of  Things 
does not involve  either of  these approaches.
Jacques Ellul has a more expansive sense of technique/technology by which 
he names more than machines, pointing instead to something that extends 
at this point in history well beyond mechanics.8 For Ellul, technology better 
describes any means used to render “rationalized” and “deliberate” be hav ior 
once ill- defined and sporadic. In this way, it describes a formal concern with 
the development of greater effectiveness for any task, greater pro cesses for 
achieving any task related to all areas and realms of life.9 In his words, it 
“does not mean machines, technology, or this or that procedure for attain-
ing an end. In our technological society, technique is the totality of meth-
ods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given state of 
development) in  every field of  human activity.”10 It is an intellectual posture 
or method, a framing, organ izing par tic u lar pro cesses; machines are more 
 limited in scope in that they produce and depend on technique for refinement 
of their work. Conceived as such, then, propaganda serves as an example of a 
 human technique; but also of concern  here is orga nizational technique that has 
to do with the administration—in some sense containment—of life activities and 
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circumstances.11 Diff er ent names are used, but related methods are geared 
 toward the same goal— efficiency.
 There is with this definition— related to technique as a general method but 
more particularly with re spect to orga nizational and  human techniques— a 
sense of technology having impact on  human engagement with the world, 
with other beings, and with structures. This means to enhance what Ellul 
categorizes as increased motivation for and attainment of “success” in our 
activities and ventures. And in a sense, all  things related to or interacting 
with technique become machines— that is to say, primed for greater effi-
ciency. In so  doing,  human life is altered, framed by distance or estrangement 
from anything that does not promote greater efficiency in general or success 
in par tic u lar. Technique serves to bring  things together, or to harness all. 
In a word, while  humans and machines might be distinguishable—of dif-
fer ent substances— technique working on the intellectual level serves to link 
embodied  humans with this general scheme of efficiency. In so  doing, tech-
nique when considered within sociocultural and po liti cal realms might be 
said to or ga nize existence, which is to say that technique coordinates activi-
ties and be hav iors so as to make activities more efficient and rational. A con-
sequence of this is the loss of distinctiveness— that is, recognition as valuable 
what cannot be easily cata loged as promoting the terms of a technological 
pro cess.12
 There is with Ellul’s definition of technique a sense that the  human is pen-
etrated (or impacted), so to speak, by mechanisms meant to enhance and 
streamline pro cesses of collective life. I share some of this concern; yet for 
Ellul, technique, which is related to science but distinguishable from it (as sci-
ence is dependent upon technique), entails a refined and refining pro cess of 
 doing—an all- consuming quest for better ways of  doing, a quest that takes 
on a transcendent quality based on its per sis tence and all- encompassing 
reach. My use of the concept of technology speaks not to  doing but to ex-
amining—of exposing what is beneath and what informs pro cesses of organ-
ization. As I intend to employ it, the concept of technology has  little to do 
with naming increasingly effective ways of achieving tasks, but rather with 
interrogating the very nature of  those tasks and arrangements and what they 
say about the relationship between  things. The former understanding of 
technology, for example, has meaning in terms of politics in that technology 
perceived as the push for pro cesses of excellence/efficiency seeks to rule out 
all that hampers such pro cesses. However, my concern is with that which 
undergirds  these moves and countermoves.
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Religion—by which Ellul means typical pre sen ta tion of traditions marked 
by institutions, doctrines, rituals, and personalities— does not fall outside the 
reach of technique. Keep in mind that for Ellul, technique impacts all spheres 
of collective life. The Technological Society argues that during the fourth to the 
tenth centuries in the West  there was a “breakdown of Roman technique 
in  every area—on the level of organ ization as well as in the construction of 
cities, in industry, and in transport.”13 Chris tian ity during the period held 
technique, as it related to “judicial and other technical activities” suspect— 
preaching and theologizing against it.14 Yet, according to Ellul,  after this 
period of technical decline it is also the case that religious traditions from 
the East served to revive par tic u lar modalities of technique. With shifts in the 
theological sensibilities and accompanying ethics of Chris tian ity over time 
came a par tic u lar metaphysical framework— including a more accommodat-
ing theological anthropology— making pos si ble appeal to technique framed 
in terms of a benevolent deity committed to the prosperity and well- being 
of the elect.15
This cautious encounter with technique was played out for the most part 
within the realm of mechanisms— think, for instance, in terms of oceanic ex-
ploration that transported Eu ro pean Chris tian ity beyond its initial borders, 
or the printing press that altered the availability and reach of the Bible. Yet 
a sense of efficiency, or the larger framing of technique, would have to over-
come a more transcendent concern with the  will of God as mea sure of activity 
and a theological sensibility casting a shadow over rationalizations. In general, 
religion had  little to offer. For Ellul, more “secular” movements and a general 
optimism served to spark a shift  toward more technique.16 The rigid codes 
for thinking and  doing advanced through religious commitment did  little 
to aid technique in its broad meaning. Moral sensibilities frowned upon any 
advancement, any change, that could not be accounted for through the ar-
rangement of church doctrine and creeds.17 In a word, “technique was held 
to be fundamentally sacrilegious.”18 It is only as  these moral codes and theo-
logical suspicions give way to alternate modalities of religious thinking and 
living that the relationship between religion and technique is altered.
George speaks of a relationship between technology (by which she means 
for the most part machines and scientific advancements less expansive than 
in Ellul’s meaning) and religion that involves mutual engagement and shared 
alteration. And this involves an understanding of religion and technology as 
separate realities engaging, which is not the sense of religion and technology 
I intend. Ellul shifts to an understanding of technique that is expansive and 
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that deals more with attitudes and intellectual postures, but it is distinct 
from religion. In fact, it is hampered by religion— which has often served as 
an opponent for technique. Still, like George, Ellul has a sense in which re-
ligion is understood in traditional terms (e.g., institutions, doctrines, theo-
logical frameworks and rituals) and is brought into conversation concerning 
structuring or framing of production— either material or intellectual.
For Ellul, technique involves an all- encompassing method seeking ad-
vancement, a pro cess for refining methods of life. I understand technology 
differently, as a hermeneutic— a tool rather than a pro cess for/of refining 
life practices. Technology, as I understand it, observes intellectual and me-
chanical pro cesses; it does not constitute a naming for  these pro cesses. The 
Technological Society claims, “Technique has taken over the  whole of civiliza-
tion.”19 My framing of technology might suggest that it shapes how we view 
and hence understand civilization but, mindful of this, Ellul and I could not 
mean the same  thing if we  were both to talk about technique/technology 
taking over civilization. The Technology Society reacts against technique and 
what it seeks to do to and through  humans regardless of our assumed intent. 
Technique is supreme.20 Even his reference to spiritual techniques entails a 
relationship to the structures of production, of life— a par tic u lar type of ef-
ficiency desired— that I do not mean to suggest. Ellul’s concept of technique 
involves “something” that does more and perhaps means more than what I 
have in mind when discussing technology. In short, my aim in speaking of 
religion as a technology is not captured by discourse on religion and technol-
ogy as represented, for instance, by George and Ellul.
My use of technology entails a loose borrowing from, but not strict adher-
ence to, Michel Foucault’s conceptual framework.21 I mean it as a pattern of 
practices related to examination— a “technique” by means of which  humans 
interrogate experience and knowledge of experience.22 While using his con-
ceptual framework, I alter it a bit— highlighting, for example, interaction 
between con temporary and multiple  things, and  doing so in ways that chal-
lenge assumptions concerning the “solid” and “sealed” nature of  things. I 
privilege a triadic and interrelated structuring of technology over against his 
four- pronged structure. In relationship to the four types of technology ad-
dressed by Foucault— “production,” “sign systems,” “power,” and “self ”23— 
what I propose most strongly resembles a synergistic relationship between the 
impetus of production, sign systems, and self. The omitted technology of power 
better relates— although the  others can certainly bend in this direction—to 
what I reference in this book as the psycho- ethical impulse to the extent that 
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it involves application on bodies for sociopo liti cal and economic ends re-
lated to confinement in certain forms.24
More on that  later, but for now it is impor tant to offer a point of clarifica-
tion: Religion as a technology involves a “technique” of observation, but it 
is not synonymous with the manner in which the technology of power uses 
surveillance to control and justify the rendering docile of problematic bod-
ies. Religion as a technology’s observation is more consistent with exposure 
without the po liti cal discursive tactics and intents of the technology of 
power. However, like technologies of production, religion as a technology in-
volves interaction (creation, placement, use) of  things. Like the technology 
of sign systems, religion as a technology relies on structures of recognition 
and naming (what Foucault might call “signs, meanings, symbols, or signi-
fications”). Fi nally, like technologies of the self that “permit individuals to 
effect their own means or with the help of  others a certain number of opera-
tions on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, 
so as to transform themselves,” by its very nature religion as a technology 
focuses on the flexibility and porous nature of  things in (inter)action.25
In depicting the mechanics of vari ous technologies, my concern is less in 
a strict sense with the surface content of interaction and more with what 
interaction or interplay between  things tells us about the nature (i.e., open-
ness) of  things. Although highlighting diff er ent connotations and contexts 
of expression, my sense of technology does maintain something of Foucault’s 
sense that technologies are tied to methods of “modification,” I  here argue that 
religion as a technology—in its hermeneutical function— exposes and further amplifies 
the openness, porousness and interaction of  things.26 Furthermore, my applica-
tion of religion as a technology is not interested in, as a primary move, the 
manner in which interaction improves or diminishes a subject— for example, 
makes us better  people. I am most intrigued by challenges to “habitual” (to 
borrow another word from Foucault) assumptions of  wholeness and inte-
grated selves exposed by the observational activity of this par tic u lar technol-
ogy. Yet I do not intend a large- scale understanding of social dynamics and 
power relations, nor a type of embodied structuring of cultural forms and skills 
discussed by figures such as Pierre Bourdieu through the category of “habi-
tus.” Religion as technology does not entail content— for example, “cultural 
capital”— rather, it provides a means by which to view  these dimensions of 
life in vari ous forms and manifestations. By extension, what I reference as 
this technology does not entail what Bourdieu might label a “feel” for the 
circumstances shaping life. In and of itself, this hermeneutic offers less in 
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that how it is used might be influenced by sensibilities developed over time, 
but this technology does not connote  those sensibilities. In this sense, re-
ligion as technology does not entail a type of “know how” enabling one to 
maneuver through the world, but rather it is simply an external mechanism 
for isolating and examining the world— not an internal set of acquired com-
petencies.27 Furthermore, my interest in interaction points in the direc-
tion of concern with understanding openness, the gap, and not in how one 
might configure the whole—or  things together. In this way what I aim to 
describe is not “assemblage”—an ontological mapped, chaotic arrangement 
or relationship of  things constituting an oddly functioning collective.28 The 
very ability to influence and affect expressed in Foucault’s pre sen ta tion 
of the technology of the self, for instance, surfaces the concern for me: the 
openness— porousness and penetrated— nature of  things. And this openness is 
the “disclosure,” so to speak, offered by means of religion as a technology.29 In this way, 
religion as technology pushes under neath patterns of thinking and  doing. 
This, however, is without metaphysical claims emerging as a consequence and 
outside a pro cess of meaning formation.30 The idea  here is that religion is a 
 human technology, that is to say it is a mechanism, a technique—or range of 
operative strategies— for interrogating  human experience.
By way of this shift I want to highlight the inclusive nature of this inter-
rogation and also privilege the manner in which religion simply serves as a 
“mechanism” for inquisition into the cartographies of life. Yet more than 
this, I needed to name this theory of religion through focused attention to 
what it, as a technology of interrogation, reveals. In other words, interroga-
tion of interplay between  things can be a religious  matter. And so rather than at-
tempting to show the presence of the religious in cultural production, this 
book uses religion as a technology to interrogate cultural production and 
thereby say something concerning the nature and meaning of  those “ things” 
making up our cultural worlds.
While my defining of religion as a technology, a type of hermeneutic, es-
capes certain prob lems associated with the pre sen ta tion of religion as “spe-
cial” with privileged ele ments such as rituals and doctrines, I understand 
that my thinking comes with its own set of issues— for example, the implica-
tion that certain sociocultural developments have greater importance than 
 others. True, in isolating par tic u lar dimensions of  human experience for inves-
tigation, one could suggest it encourages, or privileges, attention to certain 
historical moments and constructions— and makes something unique of 
what is encountered. However, I mean to simply say that this se lection pro-
cess connected to religion as technology is a  matter of circumstantial context 
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and social location without any necessarily “deeper” meaning. Other appli-
cations of this technology within other sociocultural contexts  will yield a 
diff er ent set of materials. What holds together the ele ments of experience 
targeted by this technology is their existence as  human, as dimensions of a 
network of “relationships,” lodged within  human history. Furthermore, I want 
to position the last several chapters of this book as an effort to trou ble reifi-
cation of experiences as having increased value and by extension increasing 
the importance of par tic u lar “ things” associated with  those experiences.31
My definition seeks to point out the very historical and socially specific 
nature of religion— the manner in which religion as a technology points 
out connection to cultural- historical circumstances and understands the 
“work” done by religion tied as a type of “precondition” to the vocabulary 
and grammar of  these cultural- historical circumstances.32 Religion points 
out and focuses on by highlighting. And so rather than producing meaning, 
religion, as I understand it, involves the uncovering of such assumptions—or 
interrogation of such assumptions’ historical arrangement, thereby exposing 
the frameworks that undergird them. It is impor tant to keep in mind that 
this pointing out emphasizes concern for par tic u lar developments or activi-
ties. But this does not require a next step of assuming that what is uncovered 
is all  there is. Again, religion as a technology works within par tic u lar socio-
cultural contexts and by means of par tic u lar historical circumstances. What, 
then, is highlighted is conditioned yet informative. Furthermore, something 
about religion as a technology suggests concern with language and social 
sensibilities. Yet I am not arguing that religion is first an arrangement of 
“practice, language, and sensibility set in social relationships rather than as 
systems of meaning.”33 And so religion is not a  matter of “what and how 
 people live,” but rather what  people view and what moments of experience 
they isolate for consideration and importance. How they “live” in light of this 
pro cess, for me, is beyond the category of religion as such and instead involves 
a system of affective and ethical responses.
Religion as a technology offers no par tic u lar set of commitments or re-
sponses to what it uncovers; that is left to moral and ethical interventions 
extending beyond this hermeneutical work. In this way, religion is not the 
 things observed, but rather the very pro cess of observation defines it. My 
concern is to recognize this sense of the religious and to interrogate the 
“ things” observed.34 In this manner it can be applied to any modality of 
 human experience ( here I privilege historical- cultural experience). This is 
not to say  these areas are religious, but rather that they can be interrogated 
using the methodological tool of religion as  human technology.35 This is not 
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a special technology, but rather a par tic u lar technology— one that exposes 
contextualized concerns and patterns embedded in the workings of the social 
world, not unique “domains” or worlds.
So understood, it is only useful in a localized manner to think about reli-
gion as connected with par tic u lar doctrines, creeds, and ritualization asso-
ciated with world- recognized (and  those not so noted) traditions. In certain 
ways,  these traditions represent what remains—as a type of epistemological 
residue— when religion as a technology is no longer applied. This is the same 
way snow is not the blizzard but rather constitutes what remains once the 
blizzard has done its work. Religion in this manner is not a system of prom-
ises related to the  human condition, but rather it is a means of categorization 
and interrogation that promises and assumes nothing in par tic u lar regarding 
the  human condition other than offering acknowl edgment that tools exist 
for interrogating the history of  these individual and collective experiences.36 
By exposing the nature of  things, religion as a technology pushes below the 
surface of activities, to the  things involved in that interaction.  Here, then, I 
am concerned to explore the ele ments, the “princi ples,” so to speak, at work 
in what religion as a technology pre sents.
My objective is to discuss vari ous modalities of the arts so as to highlight the  things 
exposed through religion as a technology. To put it another way, while much of 
the existing scholarship on religion and the arts involves uncovering religion 
within popu lar culture through the presence of symbols (e.g., the cross), fig-
ures (e.g., Jesus), or the expression of doctrines and creeds,37 this book is con-
cerned with the application of religion as a technology to art so as to expose 
what art says about the nature of “ things” and their interaction.38 And so the 
point is not that cultural production expresses  human concerns using the vo-
cabulary and grammar of Chris tian ity and other traditions, but rather that ex-
amining cultural production using religion as a technology tells us something 
about the nature of the embodied  human’s interaction with other  things.39
 Things Under neath
To highlight my basic point: I am concerned with the importance and inter-
play of  things exposed through application of religion as a technology. But 
to further interrogate their placement in time and space as well as their “ac-
tivity” within time and space highlighted by religion as a technology, I have 
renamed, or better yet, reconceptualized them.
This rethinking allows me to enhance the nature of bodies, for example, 
and it does so by pushing beyond the assumption of clear distinctions and 
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“integrity” the concept of a body can easily assume. In a word, through con-
versation with  thing theory and grotesque realism among other theoretical 
frameworks, I want to understand bodies as  things.
For the sake of clarity, it is impor tant to say that this is not to reduce them 
to objects and in this way to accept certain forms of disregard I have spent 
de cades arguing against. Rather, they are  things, but  things understood as 
vital and vibrant— impactful. And while I use religion  here as a way to think 
through the nature of  humans and other forms, the primary contribution 
of religion so conceived is not a reframing of the  human in relationship to 
other forms of life so as to disrupt a hierarchy of being. What I offer does 
not qualify as a sustained interest in or wrestling with— a type of interven-
tion into— what Rosi Braidotti calls “the basic unit of common reference for 
our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this 
planet.”40 While what I have in mind pushes against a “nature- cultural” bi-
nary that calls into question the distinctive nature of the  human, I am less 
concerned with an intervention into thinking about the structure of living 
beings.41 Instead, I am more interested in the interaction between forms— for 
example, not with the Anthropocene but rather a more general interrogation 
of openness/boundaries not  limited to any par tic u lar actors. Furthermore, 
although not existing in opposition to such concerns if for no other reason 
than my context as a racialized being, Interplay of  Things does not engage in 
debate over humanism, and my primary motivation is not a posthumanist 
concern with “elaborating alternative ways of conceptualizing the  human sub-
ject.”42 Subjectivity certainly comes up in the following pages, but mapping 
out alternate modalities of subjectivity is not the first concern  here. This is in 
part the case  because I want to shy away from the implicit assumption within 
posthumanism that the  human can speak for and about all other  things. This 
epistemological orientation, I argue, is held over from Enlightenment human-
ism; but rather than its concern being the positioning of the  human over 
against  others, it is within posthumanism a positioning of other beings in rela-
tionship to  humans. The naming may blur lines, but the linguistic and epis-
temological assumptions betray continuity with humanistic thought.
Within the following chapters, some attention is given to the manner in 
which social coding such as race impacts openness. Yet what I propose offers 
 little advice on how  humans and other  things might better interact, in a gen-
eral sense, but rather focuses on the mere existence of that interaction as al-
ways and already— despite curious efforts to state other wise. My concern  here 
is not isolation of the psychological dimensions of  human experience, or the 
discursive grid or imaginative structuring of humanized experiences, and so 
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I make only  limited appeal to the work of figures such as Julia Kristeva. When 
employing her thought it is to clarify some of my language. And in this vein, 
I want to mention a par tic u lar concept as a way of highlighting something of 
what I have in mind regarding the  human as a  thing. One might think of the 
body—to borrow from Kristeva—as a “naming”  thing (a play on her notion of 
the “speaking being”).43 I use this as one of the characteristics of the ( human) 
body as  thing, but rather than simply speaking—as other animals speak— I 
highlight the  human as a bodied naming- thing (a type of “more”  thing) 
thereby again turning to the importance of naming as it relates to religion 
as a technology.44 I amplify not only the manner in which the  human speaks 
but also the ways in which speaking involves connection to and interaction 
with other  things. I am concerned with how religion as a technology exposes 
the bodied naming- thing’s interactions with other bodied naming- things as 
well as non- naming- things or what I  here call thing- things. In this way I seek 
to give some attention to the manner in which bodied naming- things create 
and/or shape other  things as well as how bodied naming- things are  shaped 
and altered. This interplay, in turn, points out bodied naming- things as 
open, porous, engaged, and flooded by other  things.
This bodied naming- thing is not meant to suggest a sense of the  human 
“as the mea sure of all  things”—as some humanists have defined the  grand sub-
jectivity of the  human—so as to point out a robust valuation of humanity 
over against other modalities of life.45 In distinguishing the ( human) bodied 
naming- thing for investigation, I am not implying a ranking of naming- things. 
I am not providing this renaming so as to suggest a par tic u lar metaphysical 
quality of being. Rather, I use it simply to point out the “thingliness” of the 
 human— the porous and open quality of embodiment without pronounced 
attentiveness  toward how this has come to be or what this means regarding 
any transcendental framings of  human knowing and being. To be a bodied 
naming- thing is a shared arrangement, or put differently, it entails moments 
of not quite amalgamation— but rather short- circuiting the pretense of 
bound aries. The so- called individual is give and take, so to speak, a micro- 
and macro- confluence of presences.46 I want to highlight the significance, 
primarily through description, nestled in openness and porousness. By open-
ness and porousness, I mean to point out more than an emotional and 
aesthetic sense of openness, as an ac cep tance of the value of this touch. But 
rather, I mean openness in a more expansive manner that is affective and 
material in nature.
In making  these claims,  there remains a distinction: I do speak of naming- 
things and other  things, and in this way this proj ect does not wipe out 
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difference, or what might be called vari ous modes of activity associated with 
 things. Instead, it neutralizes it (e.g., no advocated hierarchy of importance 
with re spect to interaction) to some degree by amplifying the manner in 
which difference does not serve as a firm boundary and does not, therefore, 
suspend interaction. And the ability to name is not all that “ matters.”47 On 
one level, for instance, what I propose  here maintains difference between 
 humans and other animals— although both are  things, and this situation con-
tinues with regard to “other”  things with which  humans and other animals 
are in relationship (i.e., interaction or exchange).48 And so one might argue 
that binaries remain  here, and  there is something to this, but  these are not 
stable distinctions when one considers  there is already and always interac-
tion, exchange, and influence between  things.
 These  things are active, impinging, informing in significant ways. Such is 
not the case only for naming- things, although the geography of this inter-
action is described and presented from the vantage point of  these naming- 
things. In a word, I have no interest in parsing out types of  things along the 
lines of what Jane Bennett describes as the “habit of configuring the world 
of  things into dull  matter (it,  things) and vibrant life (us, being).” Of more 
interest is what Bennett calls “vital materiality”— recognition of a world 
filled with “animate  things rather than passive objects.” My sense of inter-
play bears similarity to Bennett’s animation by which she means the “capacity 
of  things— edibles, commodities, storms, metals— not only to impede or block 
the  will and designs of  humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with 
trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.”49 I would not disagree 
with her assertion that  there is something to be said regarding the manner 
in which the “ human being and thinghood overlap” and “slip- slide into each 
other,” and so “we are also nonhuman and that  things, too, are vital players 
in the world.”50 Yet while sharing this conceptual ele ment, my motivation 
is primarily to recognize, document, and describe using art as the nature of 
this interplay.
Attention to race and gender at the end of the book suggests a concern 
with ways in which interplay is problematized, but, unlike Bennett, I frame 
the conversation in terms of a rethinking of religion and offer  little attention 
to how this descriptive proj ect might lend itself (through attention to this 
interplay) to the politics of new ways of living— such as consumption and 
conservation.51 In addition, whereas new materialism can be seen to suggest 
rethinking the condition of certain  things— such as despised populations— 
through an interrogation of subject- object thinking producing a greater sense 
of mutuality and collective well- being,52 my position (in light of my turn to 
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W. E. B. Du Bois and Albert Camus) trou bles any assumption concerning 
the ability to fundamentally change the positioning of the despised.53 And so 
my goals are more modest: pre sen ta tion and examination of openness— the 
point of convergence between no  thing and multiple  things— exposed through 
the interplay of  things.
The above, brief discussion points to the manner in which this book shares 
some sensibilities with new materialism while departing from some of its gen-
erally assumed concerns (e.g., grounding in a posthumanist or antihumanist 
philosophy as replacement for humanism and, in some cases, a more biologi-
cal focus, as well as broad geopo liti cal mappings).54 I am mindful of mate-
riality, and Interplay of  Things centers on the dynamics and significance of 
materiality. Yet I am less concerned with exploring materiality so as to chal-
lenge the assumptions, for example, concerning language and subjectivity 
and in this way champion the significance of materialization.55 On the level 
of social realities, I am a member of a group, African Americans, who have 
not had the luxury of forgetting their materiality. In this case, to be a racial-
ized “other” at work in the world is to be a materialist of a kind. And so 
whereas some materialists are concerned rightly to point out that the agency 
of  matter beyond the  human is significant and complex, for some groups the 
idea that they have agency is still a fight to be fought. With this said, as a 
 matter of contextualization, my implicit concern involves attention to the 
relationship between  things so as to point out the absence— the points of 
openness— and what recognition of  those points of no- thing and  things at 
the same time has generated with re spect to social difference.
Put another way, my concern involves an effort to wrestle with the nature 
and meaning of openness by way of the “art” of  things. My name for this in-
terplay between  things— presence together—is drawn from Camus. Expressed 
more fully, he writes, “the absurd is essentially a divorce. It lies in neither of 
the ele ments compared; it is born of their confrontation. In this par tic u lar 
case and on the plane of intelligence, I can therefore say that the Absurd 
is not in man (if such a meta phor could have a meaning) nor in the world, 
but in their presence together.”56 He uses this phrase as a way to pre sent re-
lationship between the  human and the nonresponsive world. I broaden it 
out as a way of “naming” the interplay— without resolution or production of 
wholeness— between the naming- thing and other  things (of which the world 
is a par tic u lar constitution). And I argue in relationship to this investigation 
that interplay between  things is presented by religion as the basic structuring 
of life. Hence, it is to this interplay that all strategies— social, cultural, po liti cal, 
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and so forth— respond.57 Religion strictly as a technology offers nothing be-
yond interrogation—no “liberation,” no “freedom,” no “transformation,” no 
exaltation— and no teleological sense of encounter and exchange.58
 After Religion: Psycho- Ethical Impulse
What I have elsewhere described as rituals of reference attempts to en-
dorse closure of certain bodies, to end the porous or open nature of  these 
bodies.59 This is  because awareness of openness can foster discomfort as it 
brings into question all that social networks assume (or consume?) concern-
ing subjectivity— that is, bound aries, integrity, and distinctiveness: subjects 
of history, not objects of history. In other words, interplay is often perceived 
as a prob lem— a network of relationships that vari ous systems of knowledge 
(e.g., capitalism and democracy) would rather keep hidden. A strategic and 
common response to openness is to attempt the filling of gaps, to work to 
(discursively and materially) close off bodies. Within the context of certain 
social settings, this can entail inscribing social codes such as race, gender, 
and class that safeguard  those who control the means of placement and dis-
play. Openness, as I hope  will become clear over the course of this book, is 
the real ity that sociopo liti cal coding, for instance, is meant to deny or to 
close off for the sake of existing arrangements of life. I frame this openness 
as a  matter of Mikhail Bakhtin’s grotesque realism.60 This is not to dismiss as 
 viable other approaches. Rather, for the purposes of this proj ect, in turning 
to Bakhtin I gain a sense of the irreverence marking pre sen ta tion of open-
ness that lends itself to an understanding of the artists I engage. In addition, 
Bakhtin’s theorization of encounter also points in the direction of sociocul-
tural and po liti cal context in a way that helps shed light on the consequences 
of openness as I attempt to pre sent them late in the book.
My aim is to suggest a general theoretical framework marking out the nam-
ing of the moment of interplay. Only then do I see it as feasible or useful to 
sketch the psycho- ethical sequence or modality of response. I say this  because 
the response is contextualized in that in practice not all  these naming- things 
are the same— understood as constituted and placed in the same manner and 
with the same sociocultural, po liti cal, and economic connotations. And while 
 there are numerous ways in which openness/restriction play out in significant 
ways depending on the coding attached to par tic u lar naming- things, I am 
concerned  here with the manner in which openness and closure are informed 
and influenced by the combination of gender and class in connection to race. 
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It is only as a consequence of this par tic u lar framing of restriction that atten-
tion is given to how whiteness as a source of both openness and restriction 
informs and impacts  those naming- things configured as white.
African Americans— and the same would hold for bodies bounded by other 
modes of coding— strugg le against this closing off at least in socioeconomic 
and po liti cal terms. Some naming- things reject closing off with re spect to race, 
gender, and class, for instance; but this is not to say they strugg le to remain 
open. They simply do not want that closing off to limit full engagement—or, 
in other words, to limit how, when, and where they interplay with thing- 
things and other naming- things. They resist restrictions on how they are 
closed and for what purpose they are closed. Yet this re sis tance is still mod-
eled on bound aries; marginalized bodied naming- things simply resist par tic-
u lar types of restrictions— such as  those that deny them certain markers of 
status. This is certainly one way to explain homophobia, for example, within 
African American communities, or sexism exhibited by marginalized men. 
Openness, while I understand it as a positive (and as I  will demonstrate in  these 
pages), is resisted.61 This is not to say  there are no instances in which bound-
aries are of benefit. But my concern is not with bound aries in a general sense; 
rather, again, as  will become evident through most of this book, I am inter-
ested in the function of race (often connected to gender and class) as a type 
of boundary against openness as well as the ways in which certain naming- 
things respond to this mode of restriction.
It is not the case that religion as a technology is the only technology to ex-
pose the openness of  things. From the biological sciences to philosophy and 
psy chol ogy, other technologies suggest the same.62 However,  there is some 
distinction at least in terms of the psycho- ethical response prompted by re-
ligion as a technology. For instance, while the “natu ral” sciences maintain 
openness of the body, and philosophy typically articulates it, many psycho- 
ethical responses understood within theological contexts propose deep (and 
at times eschatological) punishment for efforts to challenge the legitimacy—
if not necessity—of this closer. For example, in theological terms, Adam and 
Eve and the “apple” can be read as suggesting this interplay between  things 
as problematic. The goal of Genesis’s angry God is to prevent a par tic u lar type 
of lucidity, to prevent a certain type of engagement between naming- things 
and other  things. Of course, this requires a reading that is not popu lar in all 
circles. And so the study of religion has pushed away from more explicit de-
nouncements of the “natu ral” body and in fact has given rise to embodied 
approaches to the study of religion— for example, body theologies. None-
theless, something remains of this negative impulse or reversion against 
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“ things” and the interplay between  things to the extent the theological body 
is typically without body functions and capacities. It is, for the most part, a 
thought body— one  free of the more disturbing (disgusting?) markers of life- 
death.63 Or perhaps it is even a corpse, a body that does not consume or expel. 
I intend to privilege, and center, theorization of religion around this seldom 
approached body (i.e., naming- thing)— the one marked by abuses born (and 
living) between urine and feces, as one church  father put it.64
For the sake of clarity, in discussing theology in this context, I am not 
implying that theology alone attempts to push  toward  wholeness, or even 
that all modalities of theology push  toward closure.65 This desire for clo-
sure, for containment, is a feature of numerous discourses and structures of 
thinking and  doing. It is not alone in fostering ways to desire closure or in the 
pre sen ta tion of rewards for closure. Po liti cal discourses— for example, cer-
tain modalities of nationalism—do this as well, and the list goes on. Rather, 
I mention theology  here to provide an example, not an isolated indictment. 
In a more general sense, I reference theology at points in the book  because 
theology— particularly within racialized contexts—is a dominant vocabulary 
and grammar for discussing the nature and meaning of naming- things. And 
making my argument at times requires attention to how theological dis-
course has worked in this regard.
My goal, by extension, is to detangle the study of religion— a sense of the 
body’s place in theorization of religion— from the shadow of restrictions by 
means of which interplay is held suspect. Furthermore, I mean to contribute 
to the study of religion in general and the study of African American religion 
in par tic u lar a way to think about key issues of embodiment and justice that 
go deeper—to a more fundamental arrangement— than sociopo liti cal and 
economic markers of injustice typically highlight. In this way, for example, 
my attention to religion as technology and restriction/openness offers Afri-
can American religious thought a sense of embodied bodies occupying time 
and space outside their presence in po liti cal discourse marked by arguments 
concerning civil rights. Instead, I want to raise questions concerning what re-
ligion tells us about the activities and anx i eties undergirding  these po liti cal 
considerations. In addition, this proj ect pushes against the manner in which 
African American religious thought and ethics is typically restricted to an 
understanding of “other”  things (nonhuman  things) as objects of utility, 
and in this way reinforces restrictive notions of agency, solidarity, praxis, and 
so on.
Religion as a technology does not relieve the trauma resulting from 
acknowl edgment of openness. Much of religious studies— particularly 
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so- called progressive and liberation- minded theological discourses— has 
been preoccupied  either with subject/subject relations by means of which 
they seek to advocate for the full recognition of a par tic u lar group as fully 
 human couched in language of the cosmic Other, or with a  matter of the 
subject articulated through the language of stability— such as economic and 
po liti cal equality, or liberation. I am not interested in this framing. Instead, 
I am concerned with the general receptive nature of this interaction— most 
notably as presented by artistic expression.
Rather than reading art through religion, as is often done, my aim is to interrogate 
interplay of  things (exposed by the religion as a technology) through vari ous modalities 
of artistic production. In this way, I mean to isolate the frameworks through 
which religion as a technology engages  human experience— that is, bodied 
naming- things and other  things. Artistic work lends itself to an examination 
of the per for mance of interaction between naming- things and other  things 
as a type of material- mancy. This is not simply ritualization— a repeating of 
what has been before.66 No, in a significant way it is the articulation of ar-
rangements, a fostering of connection and the implications of connection 
that is new each time. The naming- thing and other  things relate to and in-
form each other.
Unpacking  Things
The first two chapters constituting the first section of this book attend 
to the nature of  things, and they do so with re spect to three categories: 
 thing- things, naming- things, and the “art” of  things. The goal of  these two 
chapters is to pre sent and explain the context in which the technology of 
religion is applied— for example, the subjects of interrogation. Each of  these 
chapters benefits from my conversation with  thing theory and grotesque 
 realism as well as absurdist moralism. My concern in the first chapter is to 
unpack and theorize what is meant and constituted by “ thing” and to high-
light the manner in which life in a general sense organizes interplay between 
 things. The second chapter outlines the ways in which religion as a technol-
ogy explores art as “arrangement” by means of which openness is made ap-
parent and named. Agreeing with theorists such as Mikhail Bakhtin, I note 
that some of the “content” and “form” of this interplay is best expressed 
through the language, vocabulary, and grammar of artistic production— visual, 
literary and performed (or lived) art.67
The second section moves from the “naming” of  things to examination of 
the interplay between  things through modalities of visual pre sen ta tion. The 
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first of three chapters examines the visual art of Angelbert Metoyer. A Hous-
ton- and Rotterdam- based artist, Metoyer understands his work to employ 
created and found  things (the waste of life), arranged and presented together 
in such a way as to urge a rethinking of the nature of  those materials.68 This 
rethinking pushes viewers to understand materials (and themselves) as tran-
sitional. Through this motion viewers uncover something about the nature 
and meaning of the  human condition.
The next chapter explores the interplay between  things but gives greater 
attention to  things connected to/with the naming- thing— for example, blood. 
The open nature of the naming- thing is heightened through per for mance art-
ists who penetrate the bodied naming- thing or in other ways traumatize the 
bodied naming- thing through graphic penetration. Through attention to fig-
ures such as Ron Athey and Clifford Owens, the open nature of  things is 
amplified as readers are introduced to both naming- things and thing- things 
altered, shifted, and changed through aggressive contact. Hence, the line be-
tween naming- things and thing- things is blurred, and the naming- thing is 
left exposed or altered through sign/symbol and physical transformation, for 
example, scars produced by a thing- thing (knife). The “look” of the naming- 
thing is altered in a lasting manner, and thereby distinction is troubled. What 
is more, the style or custom by which some per for mance artists make use of 
body fluids points out the consistent and per sis tent relationship of the bodied 
naming- things to (other)  things. Put differently,  these artists force a ques-
tion: Is blood (i.e., a  thing) external to the bodied naming- thing, or still of it?
This question and its ramifications for understanding the open nature of 
 things are pushed in the final chapter of this section. That chapter addresses 
per for mance art’s articulation of openness through the use of shit. As I ex-
plain in that chapter, like its employment by Dominique Laporte and  others, 
my use of this term is not a crude pronouncement— although discomfort 
(and a bit of playfulness) resulting from its use is part of the desired mode of 
engagement and thereby lends itself to the social connotations of the sub-
stance.69 Still, as some in waste studies have noted, terms such as “waste” are 
inadequate in that they are too inclusive. My concern  here is to explore the 
manner in which a par tic u lar mode of waste— shit— highlights openness but 
also speaks to the way in which the bodied naming- thing remains in relation-
ship to that which it expels.
The final section explores the psycho- ethical impulse through the exam-
ple of racialization used to close off naming- things so as to safeguard social 
and cultural codes of belonging. In other words, as Judith Butler has noted, 
some marginalized groups are transformed into shit. In saying this and as a 
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basic positioning of my intent in  these final chapters, it is impor tant to note 
that my attention to restriction late in the book and my framing of this in 
relationship to racialized naming- things is not to imply that  there is a uni-
versal notion of the  human against which this restriction works. Openness 
is always challenged, and porousness is  limited. While I give some attention 
to a sense of restriction in  earlier chapters, I reserve a much fuller discussion 
 until the end in order to situate the discussion within a larger set of asser-
tions regarding the nature of  things and the practice of art, and also to high-
light the manner in which  those considerations move from theorization of 
religion and openness to what I argue is an ethical response. I aim to provide 
a sense of two sides of restriction— the effort to trou ble closure (chapters 3–5) 
and then to trou ble openness (chapters 6–8). Through this arrangement, I 
work to make apparent situations in which I believe power relations (always 
pre sent) between naming and being named are most graphic.
Chapters 6 and 7 pre sent the work of Romare Bearden and Jean- Michel 
Basquiat for what they offer concerning response to the attempted fixing and 
sealing off of racialized naming- things. Both say something about the rela-
tionship between naming- things and thing- things in ways that point out the 
manner in which both are “penetrated” by the other: in/between. What is 
most graphic about their work is the relationship of naming- things placing 
thing- things in time and space and what this says indirectly about naming- 
things.  There remains a space of separation between the two despite their 
creative impulse relationship— for example, the ability of naming- things 
to promote new awareness through the manipulation and pre sen ta tion of 
thing- things. Yet both artists promote a diff er ent sensitivity to naming- things 
and thing- things, highlighting their flexibility and fluidity of movement, but 
this does not require a shift concerning the hierarchy of cultural action: 
naming- things using thing- things made. Naming- things act on and alter 
thing- things, and in the pro cess perception and “placement” of naming- things 
is also affected. Thing- things— for example, Bearden’s pieces of material used 
to make collages or Basquiat’s taming of language and signs through applica-
tion on alternate surfaces of display/communication— are left altered, but 
naming- things are “touched” also through a shifting of signs and symbols of 
pre sen ta tion and repre sen ta tion, or more physically through muscle mem-
ory that leaves a shadow of the movement needed to make the work. The 
same could be said of Metoyer, whose work with the layering and pre sen ta-
tion of altered thing- things, while having its own integrity and intent, is akin 
to that of artists such as Basquiat. With Bearden or Basquiat, the relationship 
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between naming- thing and thing- thing highlights awareness through util-
ity and manipulation of thing- things.
The final chapter rethinks and repositions W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Souls of 
Black Folk. I want to avoid any assumption that my turn to this par tic u lar 
text is meant to suggest that Du Bois’s substantive work ends with this popu-
lar volume, or that his thinking does not change.70 I am aware of his other 
significant contributions to theorization and description of race within the 
United States. However, I see in The Souls of Black Folk a framing of racializa-
tion in relationship to issues of thing- ness (e.g., his question “How does it 
feel to be a prob lem?”) that helps to clarify the ways in which naming- things 
strugg le against restriction. In this way, attention to The Souls of Black Folk of-
fers an intriguing way to pre sent the psycho- ethical impact of effort to close 
off and thereby to foster bound aries against certain bodied naming- things.71 
This is done by arguing that his underexplored question— How does it feel to 
be a prob lem?— lends itself to a mode of interrogation concerned with the ef-
fort to fix blackened naming- things and in the pro cess to render them  things 
of a diff er ent sort. That is to say, like Camus, Du Bois offers a way of speaking 
about the limitations to openness— for example, in light of the racialization 
and impoverishment of certain naming- things. Both Du Bois and Camus pro-
vide a way to think about the power relationships entailed in naming and 
being named, and the final few chapters of the book speak to such issues in 
both implicit and explicit ways. Mindful of Butler, Du Bois’s question could be 
rephrased: How does it feel to be cast a diff er ent  thing, to be made shit?
The book ends with an epilogue meant to do two  things. First, it offers 
readers, who might be interested in context for this book, a way to connect 
presence together to my  earlier thinking on the nature and meaning of religion. 
Second, it explores the psycho- ethical impulse presented in section 3, and it 
does so using Camus, Nella Larsen, Richard Wright, and Orlando Patterson 
to argue for the benefits in guarding openness as the proper positioning of 
 things.72 My concern is to read openness through absurdist moralism and in 
this way to push against bound aries and fixity as a mode of “unity,” which ties 
bodied naming- things to delusion and disregard.73 As  these authors reflect, the 
compelling psycho- ethical response is a position that seeks no ungrounded 
certainties and assurances but simply strugg les to maintain openness to and 
with the world.
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 “Things”— the word designates the concrete yet ambiguous within the everyday.
— bill broWn, “ Thing Theory”
Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is.
— Albert cAmus, The Rebel
Having provided in the introduction some attention to key concepts and 
the pre sen ta tion of an intellectual map for this proj ect framed in light of the 
work with which it might be assumed connected, in this chapter I tackle 
dimensions of materiality— types of  things. This attention to  things is high-
lighted  here and discussed as representing two fundamental mechanisms at 
work in my understanding of religion.
 Things
As Daniel Miller rightly reflects, materiality figures into our systems of reli-
gion as a benefit or a prob lem to solve.  Either way,  matter  matters. But  there 
is a difference worth stating for the sake of context. For Miller in what he 
frames as the “humility of  things,” the significance of  things and their im-
pact on us is most forceful when we do not see them. “The less we are aware 
of them,” he writes, “the more powerfully they can determine our expectations 
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by setting the scene and ensuring normative be hav ior, without being open 
to challenge.”1 With re spect to materiality, this points to something Foucault 
says regarding the “power” of discourses found in the disappearance of 
discussion— imposing par ameters, shaping and controlling bodies without 
being spoken.
My sense of  things is diff er ent in that I want to highlight what I believe 
takes place when  things are noticed, when we are confronted by  things con-
sciously arranged in selected time and space. And within this interplay I 
want to highlight the flexibility of  things, which points out the “thingliness” 
of  things.2
Thingliness— having something to do with “duration and presence” rec-
ognized and encountered—is not, for me, another way of speaking simply 
about  human intentionality.3 Sure,  humans create and display  things, arrange 
them, and name them— and in this way the  human body- thing of concern 
 here is a “naming”  thing over against  things named.4 But  there is something 
about this placement in time and space often against the assumed utility of 
 these  things (e.g., chairs not for sitting) that calls to the fluidity of  things 
beyond our first observation of them, or in other words our first creation/
placement and learning of them.5 All of this points to  things as opposed to 
objects in that the latter might be understood as pertaining to that which 
is “relatively stable in form.”6 Objects, in this case, are materials metaphysi-
cally flat and lacking dimension in terms of their connection to  human life. 
 Things, unlike objects, have a pedagogical quality to them.  Things have an 
interactive, connected quality. As a way of pointing to this “activity” or 
“presence,” I use “ thing” as opposed to “object.”7 Furthermore, in speaking 
of the naming- thing, it should be noted that my concern  here is not with the 
ontology of the  human— what the  human is. Rather, I am concerned with 
the body, which I want to understand as a par tic u lar type of  thing.8 Unlike 
the function of  things celebrated by religious tradition systems, religion as 
a technology, as I define it, does not point to some metaphysical some thing 
beyond the reach of our historical grasp.
The thingliness (or openness) of  things is the stuff of religion as a technolo-
gy’s use of  things.9 Put another way,  things, by means of religion as a technol-
ogy’s interrogation, are pushed beyond them/themselves— beyond what we 
first notice about them—and offer opportunity to train a diff er ent awareness 
as this is encouraged by recognition of their openness (i.e., their presence 
together, to borrow from Camus). What do  things push us to do, to think, 
to sense? They are invested by us (with us) in the same way a speed bump 
“is not made of  matter, ultimately; it is full of engineers and chancellors 
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and law makers, comingling their  wills and their story lines with  those of 
gravel, concrete, paint, and standard calculations.”10 The thingliness of a  thing 
is constituted in an impor tant way by its ability to push on bodied naming- 
things—to urge a par tic u lar set of questions and concerns about the world as 
we think we know it, encounter it, and want it to be.
For Bill Brown,  things are objects imbued with “a metaphysical dimen-
sion.”11 I do not want to go that far. While this might be the intent within 
the framework of traditional religious systems, again, my concern is with the 
working premise that religion is not a system as such but a technology and, 
hence, does not invest  things with deep meaning. Still, what Brown and 
 others associated with  thing theory posit is of value  here in that it offers a 
lens by means of which to observe what takes place when religion as a tech-
nology engages.
The thingliness of a  thing is the  thing active and impinging beyond its physi-
cal space— oozing or seeping beyond the bound aries we had hoped to set for 
it. This openness of  things involves a disruption by means of which mate-
rial is reconfigured, combined, and put to a work not necessarily intended 
in the material’s borrowed form.  Things are also sticky in that they connect 
beyond themselves;  there is fluidity to their interactions marked by an abil-
ity to shape change— which is not a quality pre sent in objects despite what 
importance they might have in the daily workings of  human life. “So  things,” 
writes Ian Hodder, “are connected by the fact that they work together. . . .  In 
all  these ways the material world is connected to our bodies, to other  things, 
to society, to the other parts in the complex networks.”12  Things, therefore: 
(1) force a confrontation with ourselves in that we are connected to, related 
to  these  things with which we have a shared history; (2) prompt us to won-
der if  there is more to this relationship: Do  these  things urge other consid-
erations and scopes? Do the production, arrangement, and interrogation of 
 these  things tell us all I can know about  others, the world?  These questions 
have to do with what we perceive as the fragility but also durability of  things 
over against the par tic u lar limits of bodied naming- things in motion.
Observing  Things
 Things and/with/against/for naming- things:  There are numerous formula-
tions of this relationship. For example,  there are the vari ous ways Heidegger 
represents  things: “present- at- hand” or “ready- to- hand,” which give a sense 
of  things, including utility. But  there are also  things thinging as a way of fram-
ing the  human’s (i.e., Dasein or “being  there”) relationship to  things. And 
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as numerous scholars have pointed out,  there is a growing move from a 
strict functional concern with  human use of  things to some consideration 
of  things as  things.13 I conceptualize the relationship by thinking in terms of 
the naming- thing (i.e., the  human as bodied thing/being/doing) and  things as 
 thing being  thing (or thing- thing for short). Over the course of the book, what 
I mean by and intend to perform by means of this conceptual framework  will 
become clearer.
More  will be said on art and  things in chapter 2. For now, I want to further 
clarify the nature of  things within the context of artistic work. In exploring the 
technology of religion’s potential relationship to the arts, I highlight par tic u lar 
genres and moments of artistic pre sen ta tion, in part  because art as discussed 
 here is a wide scope in that it incorporates into it other strategies (e.g., other 
 things meant to speak about naming- things such as written texts, images, stat-
ues, wood, stones, and  music). In offering this argument, I am making a dis-
tinction between the technology of the artist and religion as a technology. I 
am not concerned fundamentally (although this  will come up at times) with 
the specifics of the development of artistic work— the mechanics of putting 
together an exhibit, for example; instead I refer to artistic production examined 
through religion as a technology, arguing that this pro cess of exploration does 
not require the status of, say, a preacher (artist as religious leader), but rather 
the artist as a naming- thing interacting with thing- things offers opportu-
nity for a par tic u lar type of analy sis and interrogation of our circumstances. 
Encounter with circumstances (e.g., the world) is inevitable as a type of “spew-
ing forth” marking the naming- thing- human condition, but par tic u lar modes 
of encounter and par tic u lar expressions of that encounter are not.14
This is not to suggest that  things beyond their creation do not impact the 
naming- thing. To the contrary, naming- things are influenced and affected by 
all sorts of materiality.15  There is a mutual orientation and impact between 
naming- things and thing- things. They are open and, as the title of the book 
claims, marked by presence together. I do not want to push this point of mutual 
influence too far in part  because my concern with art means a limit on conver-
sation to  those things- things manipulated and placed by naming- things; and 
this might include  things not created by naming- things but rather simply 
placed in alternate spaces (e.g., rocks and wood). In this way, I also give atten-
tion  here to  things not necessarily created by naming- things but impacting 
naming- things as they (thing- things) are pulled into artistic expression.
Through artistic production and pre sen ta tion, I mean to highlight the 
plasticity, the nonfixed quality, or the openness of  things so as to better 
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understand the activity of  things.16 Use a chair in this way, or wear a pair of 
pants that way, and so on is lost as the logic of interaction is shifted by the 
artist and the placement of  things.17 What naming- things know and under-
stand about thing- things is shifted, and this fosters a productive dissonance 
by means of a deeper awareness of openness to  things. Art, then, involves a 
particularly useful mapping of the relationship between naming- things and 
thing- things that shows at one time something about both. Art that high-
lights what we understand as ordinary  things— things that we encounter dur-
ing the course of mundane dealings— provides an impor tant lesson related to 
the significant linkages between naming- things and thing- things.  There is 
something impor tant in the effort of figures such as Antony Hudek to dem-
onstrate “the artist’s privileged role in rerouting, recycling, deviating, trans-
forming and deturning . . .  the object.” And Hudek continues, “This role is far 
from one of mastery of ‘subjectivity’; rather it hints at a capacity to inhabit 
the object world, to engage with and translate it for the benefit of other 
objects and subjects alike.”18 I would make a modification to this assertion, 
one in line with the work of  thing theorists such as Bill Brown, and that is to 
note the manner in which objects become  things—in this context through 
the arts.19 By means of artistic production,  things are exposed to themselves, 
naming- things, and to circumstances, and this takes place without the abil-
ity of the artistic exhibit location to limit significantly the impact of this 
scope of openness.20
What Arthur Danto says when reflecting on Andy Warhol’s Hammer and 
Sickle and other work such as Campbell’s Soup in a general sense speaks to what 
I mean by the work of  things. According to Danto, “His soups are in sacra-
mental cele bration of their earthly real ity, simply as what one might call 
one’s daily soup, as what one eats day  after day. . . .  If this sacramental return 
of the  thing to itself through art is the energy which drove him as an artist 
to bring into the center of his work what had never,  really, been celebrated 
before . . .”21 I end this section with this incomplete thought  because it is 
sufficient to frame my point. Religion as a technology often employs artistic 
production to highlight the thingliness—or openness—of  things, and in 
this way makes pos si ble through interrogation of  things in time and space 
greater awareness of our circumstances (i.e., world) and our place in  those 
circumstances. It provides no answers, just clarity, or what one might call 
deeper awareness regarding the connotations of our circumstances as naming- 
things in a world of other  things. Before offering more detail regarding art and 
 things, it is impor tant to further explicate what I mean by naming- things.
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Other  Things
 There are types of  things.  Here I offer some distinction between  things by 
giving attention to what I above referenced as naming- things. In so  doing, 
the general theme of  things presented previously obtains greater detail 
through this somewhat rough categorization of  things in the form of thing- 
things and naming- things.22 While the potential scope is expansive, in this 
book I limit myself to a par tic u lar naming- thing— the bodied naming- 
thing.23 Through attention to the bodied naming- thing, I mean to highlight 
a par tic u lar structure of the naming- thing (i.e., body) and its relationship 
to other  things.24 In this way I provide a discursive mechanism for framing 
the interplay between  things that undergirds chapters in the remaining two 
sections of the volume. I entertain the perception of the body as signify-
ing or “naming”  thing akin to what John Frow has in mind when arguing, 
“Persons, too, count or can count as  things. This is the real strangeness: that 
persons and  things are kin; the world is many, not double.”25 And recogni-
tion of— perhaps even naming of— circumstances (i.e., world) and human/
circumstances amounts to a moralistic awareness or lucidity in relation to 
the conditions of life.26 Hinted at  here, but more fully expressed  later, is the 
notion of  things— including bodied naming- things—as “open.”27
Naming- things are bodied, and other  things— still other  things. They have 
“form,” but they ooze into each other, inform each other. “Abjection,” one might 
say, works in the shadow of an assumption, an assumption of a difference 
as pos si ble— cleanliness, for instance.28 This said, and in light of the scope 
of my argument, the most compelling depiction of bodied naming- things 
and their interplay is found in Mikhail Bakhtin’s theorizing of grotesque 
realism.29
On the Grotesque
Before addressing what Bakhtin’s sense of the grotesque offers my thinking 
on open- bodied naming- things, I provide contextual comments on what I 
consider a negation of a Bakhtin sensibility. This negation takes place through 
a theological taming of the grotesque that reduces it to ser vice on behalf of 
a theistic sensibility tied to immaterial hope. In offering this discussion, 
I am not suggesting all theology works in this manner and produces a desire 
for closure framed by an energetic appeal to transformation in the form of 
 wholeness or  union with something greater. I am not interested in grotesque 
as a theological category—or even aesthetic category— but rather as a way of 
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theoretically capturing the nature of the open body— the body put on view 
by religion as a technology. And so my purpose is not a critique of theology 
per se as if it uniquely lends itself to  matters of wholeness— for example, clo-
sure through bounded life. Rather, I use this discussion in a more  limited 
fashion as a helpful counterpoint in that it also provides a direct reading of 
Bakhtin in light of a traditional definition of religion (e.g., highlighting insti-
tutions, doctrine, and ritual). And by means of this contrast I offer a way to 
further mark out and clarify my application of his theorizing of the grotesque 
in line with my sense of religion as a technology and over against traditional 
notions of religion. To make this point, I turn to Wilson Yates’s reading of 
Rabelais and His World.30
The open body, Yates acknowledges, is for Bakhtin a vital and vibrant 
body— whose eating, pissing, and defecating is not to be denounced or hid-
den.31 “The grotesque,” writes Yates, “refers to aspects of  human experience 
that we have denied validity to, that we have rejected, excoriated, attempted 
to eliminate and image as a distorted aspect of real ity.”32 Yet he narrows the 
scope of the grotesque by reading it through the “perspective of the Christian 
mythos” and in light of a series of questions: “Does the grotesque take on a dif-
fer ent meaning for one who creates and looks at it from within a faith stance 
and from within a world already well- formed by its own mythos? And . . . 
what does the grotesque have to say to us about basic Christian perspectives 
such as the nature of creation, the  human condition, the possibility of trans-
formed life?”33  These questions posed and, more to the point, the answers 
Yates provides entail a taming of the grotesque—an effort to confine its reach 
and implications for the messy nature of life. Yates forgets the context of car-
nival—of an antichurch moment in certain re spects— within which Bakhtin 
finds and celebrates the grotesque. The grotesque is not simply physical de-
formity, monsters, as Yates seems to think. Bakhtin pre sents it as a descrip-
tion of the state of being porous, open, exposed.
Some of what Bakhtin has in mind, I believe, has been demonstrated re-
cently in exhibits by Tori Wrånes (Ældgammel Baby) and Ovartaci (Ovartaci 
and the Art of Madness), both at Kunsthal Charlottenborg in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.34 The former involves several rooms set apart and marked off by 
darkness except for a few dedicated lights illuminating vari ous objects ac-
companied by the haunting sound of a voice. Projected on the walls are fig-
ures wearing bright- colored outerwear and with  faces disturbing in their 
proportions, colors, and exaggerated features that resemble the extremes of 
the grotesque discussed by Bakhtin. They are suspended in space and seem 
to come  toward the viewer. In another room is a figure without a head, with 
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shoulders penned to the ground and legs outstretched, with another char-
acter balancing with one foot atop the bottom figure’s foot. The body seems 
in motion, but this is not the odd component. Instead, the grotesqueness is 
expressed through the replacement of much of the top figure’s face with two 
birds emerging from/as the face of the figure. This is not a monster, but rather 
the blending of “ things,” pointing to the porous nature of bodied naming- 
things. Ovartaci provides an even more graphic depiction of this porousness 
giving way to blending. This is captured through the pre sen ta tion of figures 
that intermingle vari ous life- forms and in the pro cess create something 
novel, something new— such as an eye in the palm of a hand or the head of a 
“creature” whose large eye is composed of (or  houses) smaller creatures and 
whose other orifices contain bodied  things that have penetrated the head.35 
Neither artist rejects penetrated and penetrating figures; instead, they seem 
to endorse or assume the normative status of such open  things.
The mimicking of the bodied naming- thing through technology can 
further create dissonance- prompting recognition of the blending of  things 
(e.g., video, plastic, and the characteristics of the naming- thing) as a sign of 
mutability. Ed Atkins’s Ribbons, part of the Louisiana Museum (Copenhagen, 
Denmark) Being  There exhibit, provides a graphic example of what I have in 
mind.36 In a room,  there are three large video screens with the avatar Dave 
speaking (in the voice of the artist), drinking, farting, urinating, bleeding, 
“all signifiers of a physical body leaking with imperfection.” And while the 
artistic statement calls into question the ability of technology to capture a 
“physical being’s vulnerability and imperfection,” I would suggest the dis-
comfort fostered by Atkins’s use of technology to ape the bodied naming- 
thing is enough to suggest the nature of this naming- thing is without clear 
bound aries; it is without an integrity that prevents disruption.37 That is to 
say, it can be aped, and through technology the aping renders the limits and 
vulnerabilities of the bodied naming- thing perpetually pre sent.
Returning to my read against Yates, the porous and penetrated nature of 
the bodied naming- thing (with all the accompanying sights, smells, sounds, 
and activities) is not rescued by the myth of salvation premised on the lin-
gering image of God contained in and by that bodied naming- thing. Yates 
claims his depiction does not cause the grotesque to lose its edge. But to use 
a musical analogy, Yates positions the grotesque as a hymn of sorts complete 
with a desire for closure from the world, while I argue that a more useful 
framing involves the grotesque sung through the blues— for example, the 
graphic and celebrated interaction with and exposure to the workings of life. 
In other words, Yates sees the grotesque as a condition of life to be resolved 
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through faith and the workings of divine forces.38 According to Bakhtin, and 
I follow his lead  here, nothing is gained by attempting to overcome grotes-
query; to think so is to paint it as a negative and to fail to recognize the na-
ture of embodied life. This is not to say that values are missing from  human 
thinking and  doing; they are pre sent. However,  there is no reason to assume 
such values bend to the  will of Christian doctrine. Rather,  these values 
might just signify doctrinal- theological assumptions concerning embodied 
and material life. They are bluesy values that relate porous  thing to porous 
 thing, rather than porous body to its “fix” called “god.”
For Yates, the grotesque speaks a theological language framed by a gram-
mar of “sin” and “judgment.”39 Hence, grotesquery might on the surface 
disturb or create a certain type of dissonance, but according to Yates, “the 
horrifying character they take can itself speak, both to and out of the context 
of the church.”40 Yates notes that the grotesque upends “our world view and 
moral codes,” but he does not have in mind the worldview and moral codes 
of the religious in relationship to the church. Yates means unproductive— 
nonfaithful moral codes and worldviews— codes or values that  will not 
bend to staid Christian doctrine and that refuse priority of the church over 
against the “folk.”41 He wants to understand the moral codes and worldview 
 under threat as being  those that do not point in the direction of the  will 
and eternal truths of the divine. The grotesque, he would have us believe, 
is a rejection of efforts to turn  humans into gods.42 I would not assert divin-
ity as the agenda for Bakhtin; no, the goal is to render  humans more fully 
material— porous and unfixed. This is what Bakhtin means by the value of 
the degraded. Grotesque realism is content with this world and proj ects 
 little concern for unseen realms populated by more perfect beings. This is 
 because it refuses to see oozing, defecating, urinating bodied naming- things 
as a prob lem to solve. With Yates’s Christianization of the grotesque a wager 
is established: one can have one’s theology or one’s bodied naming- thing.
Yates fails to note that the activities— the defecating and pissing in public— 
Bakhtin’s sense of the grotesque highlights (without judgment)  were roundly 
condemned by the Christian church as oppositional to its theological- ethical 
sensibility. He believes imagery of the grotesque “in the drama of religious 
life” takes us “out of everyday life and provides us with a diff er ent way of see-
ing the center— the center in its demonic manifestation and the center as 
the place alone where we can know the grace of God.”43 However, it is the 
stuff, the activity of everyday life, that is highlighted by the grotesque in that 
 these are the activities pointing to the porous and open nature of the body 
and thereby its capacity for mutuality. Chris tian ity, to the contrary, seeks 
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to seal off the body for the love of God and only allow its penetration (on 
special occasions) by the divine. The Christian tradition, among  others, is 
notorious for its suspicion concerning the body— preferring the clean soul to 
bodies so easily soiled. Mindful of Bakhtin’s pre sen ta tion of the defecating 
body, what Coco Fusco says concerning the “West” (i.e., the West as a pos-
ture or mindset as opposed to geographic location) in general is applicable to 
the religious “West” in par tic u lar: “Excrement derives its subversive power 
within the history of Western art as the least abstractable substance in a soci-
ety with a prevailing modernist aesthetic that privileges transcendence over 
the material.”44 Yates truncates the body whose openness is addressed, and to 
some extent ended, through relationship with God: communion, pain, and 
suffering (as exemplified by the Cross) resolved through hope and redemp-
tion. In this sense theodicy, sacrology, and eschatology are intertwined. And 
in this theological framework, religious tradition and practice are in fact a 
betrayal of religion to the extent it turns a technology into a substance.
So much religious studies and theological work assumes the body and 
claims a paradigmatic attachment to embodied bodies. Yet this is visual, meta-
phoric, and symbolic in nature. Yes, in some cases it is acknowledged that 
 these bodies eat, they cum— but they do not defecate or piss without shame. 
To the extent traditions like Chris tian ity dominant through a figure of excel-
lence (i.e., Christ) that evacuates waste only in the form of ethical sin, how 
could it be other wise? To the extent body waste is “eliminated” from dis-
cussions of bodies in theology and religious studies, they are discourses 
of mythic bodies addressing a range of ideas but without sufficient material 
grounding and premised on a rather sterile logic—an idyllic Christian formu-
lation of life and embodiment honoring a shadowy figure of Christ. Follow-
ers of the figure expel waste, but their Christ does not— although he eats and 
drinks. He is the fulfillment of the law, as they note, but not with re spect to 
its acknowl edgment of  human waste and other fluids.45 This has had con ve-
niences for a Christian sense of bodies: “And that he died for all, that they 
which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which 
died for them, and  rose again. Wherefore henceforth know we no man  after 
the flesh: yea, though we have known Christ  after the flesh, yet now hence-
forth know ye him no more. Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new 
creature: old  things are passed away; behold all  things are become new” (2 
Corinthians 5:15–17). Through Bakhtin, imago Dei is exposed as a lie. The 
 human body, unlike the exemplar Christ, is known to be porous— with open-
ings that expose it.  Human waste, for instance, announces the deception 
of the life of imago Dei. Christ did not defecate, although  those in his line of 
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descent, as the Hebrew Bible points out, did. Artists have pointed out this 
open and grotesque body whereas so many religious thinkers have attempted 
to overcome it.46
As Yates demonstrates, the effort to posit a Christianized grotesque theol-
ogy loses something. It loses the “realism” in Bakhtin’s grotesque realism and 
pushes for an altered perception of the bodied naming- thing— one that loses 
its openness through a fixed imago Dei perception of being. Thereby the more 
graphic and earthy dimensions of this grotesque body, as Bakhtin pre sents it, 
are sanctified. Rather than being degraded (in Bakhtin’s sense of the word—
e.g., materiality and integration into the world), the  human body—as I read 
Yates—is exulted and freed from the urine and feces between which it is 
born, according to St. Augustine, and through which it speaks to the life- 
death binary that is its frame of reference. Yates and  others working within 
traditional theological discourses might agree with Bakhtin that the  human 
is “becoming,” but they would mean something diff er ent by that statement. 
Bakhtin points to the dualism of life- death, food- waste, and so forth, fram-
ing the movement of the grotesque body. For some theistic theologians, on 
the other hand, this is a becoming that pushes in a cosmic direction with the 
intent of freeing the bodied naming- thing from more troubling dimensions 
of that porous status.47 This, according to  these theologians, entails a verti-
cal dynamic of growth and increasing closed- ness. For Bakhtin, the better 
read involves openness to horizontal development by means of which the 
embodied (and oozing) nature of embodied life is not lost but is amplified.48 
In terms of the role of religion in this: religion as a technology probes and 
turns back on the bodied naming- thing and exposes its grotesque nature.
Maintaining a focus on Rabelais and His World, I now want to offer a dif-
fer ent read of the grotesque, one less constrained by the theologized body of 
Christ and traditional framings of religion.
Grotesque Realism
The folk practices of carnival— intriguing to Bakhtin— undercut the author-
ity of the church, belittle its awful proclamations, and highlight  those activi-
ties of the body long held with distain by many Christians.49 Think in terms 
of carnival’s rejection of “ grand unity” of any kind that pushes beyond what 
is tangible about the world: “it,” in fact, “was hostile to all that was immortal-
ized and completed.”50 For instance, carnival replaces ritualized penetration 
by the divine with the open naming- thing defecating in public. Grotesque re-
alism, a  grand theory of collective engagement emerging out of the practices 
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of embodied “folk culture,” is for the open- bodied naming- thing a safeguard 
against theological efforts to pretend the integrity of bound aries. The 
church, and what Yates wants to claim from the grotesque (salvation for 
the individual soul), works against the very nature of the grotesque: it rejects 
efforts  toward individualization that cut off naming- things from other open 
naming- things and thing- things. Instead, grotesque realism arranges mate-
rial life in terms of groups—of collectives.51
Such framing of life in terms of the “ people” gives the activities of 
naming- things a more significant presence, which is difficult for theological 
organ izations and their teachings to undo. Grotesque realism by means of 
a carnivalistic impulse is something of an existential centripetal force re-
sulting in the centering of the defecating naming- thing exposed to and in 
the world. For Bakhtin, eating and drinking are two of the most significant 
illustrations of the naming body as open. It is through  these activities, for ex-
ample, that the world is taken into the body whereby “the body transgresses 
 here its own limits: it swallows, devours, rends the world apart, is enriched 
and grows at the world’s expense.”52 And of course, this open naming- thing 
pushes itself back into the world as it urinates and defecates. This is not 
to suggest that the naming- thing has no distinctiveness; rather, it is to say 
this distinctiveness is superseded and countered by its openness and by its 
“points of intersection.”53
Whereas Christian theologizing cannot resist a grammar of transcendence, 
the grotesque represents a diff er ent register in that “the essential princi ple of 
grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is high, spiri-
tual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of earth 
and body in their indissoluble unity.”54 Degrading in the theological language 
of thinkers such as Yates is a negative, but for Bakhtin it is a positive: it con-
notes a reminder of flesh, that the earth is the naming- thing’s place, and it 
is a reminder that the naming- thing that eliminates waste is significant and 
the openings that allow for the oozing of thing- things are to be celebrated. 
In crude terms, degradation means acknowledging without shame the im-
portance of the mouth and the anus. How could Christian theologizing do 
this when it finds it hard to even acknowledge that the figure of Jesus had a 
penis? If that organ cannot be named, what is to encourage belief that the 
anus can be named? Both the penis and the anus mark openness in and to 
the world, and the interplay between the bodied naming- thing and other 
 things gets expressed in  human waste. Is this proper church talk? It certainly 
verbalizes a claim beyond “We are born between feces and urine.” The latter 
encourages movement away from both; the grotesque embraces them: “The 
things 37
grotesque body is not separated from the rest of the world. It is not a closed, 
completed unit; it’s unfinished, outgrows itself, and transgresses its own lim-
its. The stress is laid on  those parts of the body that are open to the outside 
world, that is, the parts through which the world enters the body or emerges 
from it, or through which the body itself goes out to meet the world.”55 This 
is the nature of interplay in that the naming- thing which “swallows the 
world . . .  is itself swallowed by the world.”56
Bakhtin gives to the material world and its functions a type of sacred 
emphasis that destroys the sacred as an individualized and individualiz-
able revelation or specialness.57 In this case, that status involves recogni-
tion of incompleteness, porousness. One might frame it as a type of lucidity 
geared  toward the protecting, safeguarding, or fulfilling of the naming- thing. 
Through this grounding in naming- thing thingliness, circumstances are 
brought to earth and thereby are resolved through the workings of mate-
riality and not left to the vague cosmic claims of theological traditions. As 
Bakhtin notes, folk culture and grotesque realism stem the flow of “cosmic 
fear” resolved through abstract theological claims and religious ritualization 
that isolate the individual.58
The grotesque is often referenced as a way (within artistic production, 
for example) to outline a challenge to normative notions of beauty and life, 
thereby rendering the familiar unfamiliar. It centers a par tic u lar “disjuncture 
and shifting,” or “lack of fixity,” as well as “unpredictability and . . .  instabil-
ity” as awakened through a privileging of what was once despised or at least 
hidden and reassessing its context and content.59 Abject/abjection speaks to 
a discomfort and effort to remove openness or in- between status, whereas the 
grotesque seeks to amplify this openness. The grotesque body is the quin tes-
sen tial open naming- thing entangled and entangling the world of  things. It 
is a naming- thing content to be exposed and to be penetrated while it pen-
etrates. It is associated with the stuff— the  things—of life and death.
I am intrigued by that moment when the bodied naming- thing and thing- 
thing fain affrication.
The naming- thing through this pre sen ta tion of openness is “purged” of its 
illusion of stable distinctiveness, the pretense of being bounded and closed. 
Again, the bodied naming- thing defecates! The public pre sen ta tion of this 
body function is not  limited to the world described by Rabelais and cele-
brated by Bakhtin. For example, Yoko Ono alludes to this pro cess through 
the “Toilet Thoughts Film No. 3,” which includes a close-up shot of a but-
tocks poster to be hung in public toilets and then photographed over the course 
of time. Images  were shot of the poster in public rest rooms in vari ous stages 
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of disarray.60 Or one might think in terms of the song “Sympathy for the 
Devil” (Beggars Banquet  album)— with which the Rolling Stones celebrate, so 
to speak, the “degraded” and ethically alternative dimensions of historical 
engagement— attached to an (rejected by Decca)  album cover containing 
the image of a soiled and well- used toilet against a wall marked (penetrated?) 
by written sayings and images.61 And while  these— Yoko Ono’s art and the 
rejected cover image of the toilet— are not the same graphic arrangement of 
public defecating pre sent in Bakhtin’s description of openness, they none-
theless highlight and normalize the removal of waste and in this way high-
light, both through the image and the location of the image, the relationship 
of naming- things to thing- things.
The grotesque appeals  because it rests in the moment of interplay, and in 
this way it maintains the playful and played- out intersectional nature of bod-
ied naming- thing and thing- thing engagement.62 This moment of interplay 
is an “undoing”— pointing out the organ izing deception; the subject is not 
 whole, guarded, and fully distinct. It is never bounded  because it is porous 
and marked by fractures and fissions by means of the vari ous normativities 
“arranging” the socially situated and coded (e.g., race, gender, class) bodied 
naming- thing.
The naming- thing is framed in accordance with an open system of move-
ment, geography of activity, and pro cesses, as the cultural and social codes 
shaping and guiding discourse of an epistemological, existential, and onto-
logical nature shift and change. Furthermore,  there is entailed  here a system 
at work, in action— the flow of blood, the shifting of chemical languages, the 
development and death of cells, and so on. Naming- things involve movement, 
and they move. Religion as a technology assumes this movement, depends 
on this movement, informs and is informed by this movement in that the trail 
of this bodied naming- thing’s flow constitutes the  human experience manip-
ulated by religion as a technology.
Brief Examples of the Grotesque
To further clarify what I have in mind, I want to give some attention to a 
reading of Nella Larsen and Richard Wright through Bakhtin.63 I do this in 
part  because I perceive a similarity of insight in Bakhtin’s sense of a carni-
valistic viewpoint and the moralist (Larsen and Wright) sense of lucid rebel-
lion. Hence, art—in this case lit er a ture— provides a description (to play off 
Bakhtin) or a dynamic cartography of sorts regarding the interplay between 
naming- things and thing- things.64
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In making this argument, I highlight Nella Larsen’s Quicksand, a novel 
published in 1928— shortly before the  Great Depression but during the 
reign of “Jim and Jane Crow,” as popu lar and deadly restrictions on the life 
circumstances of African Americans meant to reinforce the power of white-
ness  after the end of formal structures of dehumanization in April 1865.65 
It tells the story of Helga Crane, a mulatto moving between the southern 
and northern United States and Eu rope. Yet it is not the typical story of the 
tragic mulatto. While the racialized and gendered pro cess of being named is 
certainly in play, circumstances framing life for her are beyond traditional 
markers of social identity and instead reflect issues of a metaphysical qual-
ity.  There is, of course, what one might expect regarding critique of social 
status, class dynamics, educational attainment in a racist- sexist society, and 
many of the other troubling circumstances of life for African Americans— 
particularly  those whose light skin color places them between worlds. But 
 there is more to Crane’s story than this. Through a pro cess of signification 
and performance— such as offering alternate naming for  things and alternate 
relationship to other  things— she resists the limitations of Harlem classed in-
teractions and refuses to be the “exotic” other in Eu rope. Instead, she signi-
fies all expectations by surrendering to a religious force and marrying an 
unlikely “suitor” in a southern preacher. He takes her from Harlem to the 
South, where she encounters a radically diff er ent environment— yet one like 
the  others in which even her best efforts did  little to break down her outsider 
status. She, as a naming- thing, is impacted, altered, and shifted. In certain 
ways her ability to name as a naming- thing is reduced through contact with 
other  things. Religious doctrine fails to provide resolution to her metaphysi-
cal concerns and instead tries to seal her up in a framework of racial and 
sexual restriction. And the demands of her home life eat away at her physi-
cal being. She is consumed; child  after child has sapped her strength, and 
a husband who values only her ability to please him has robbed her of dig-
nity. Combined,  these forces bring her to a breaking point— a point at which 
she denounces transhistorical assumptions of aid and instead plots for her 
well- being, which does not come. But still she rebels— pushes against circum-
stances despite circumstances.
Richard Wright’s “The Man Who Lived Under ground” shares Larsen’s 
sense of the manner in which naming- things naming and being named 
can have deadly connotations regarding openness and closure.66 And, as in 
Larsen, Wright’s main character moves through a pro cess of performed re-
bellion. This short story is from a collection titled Eight Men— each “man” 
representing a par tic u lar narrative.67 Initially published in 1961 (a year  after 
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Wright’s mysterious death), this collection reflects Wright’s rehearsal of ra-
cialized life in the United States from his self- imposed exile in Paris. While 
many of its themes reflect his philosophy of life graphically expressed in best 
sellers like Black Boy and Native Son, it has received  little of the recognition and 
commentary reserved for  those books published while Wright was immersed 
in the turmoil of life as a U.S.- despised and blackened named naming- thing— 
impacted and named in relationship to economic, sociocultural, po liti cal, 
and psychological “ things.”68 Yet Wright also speaks to the manner in which 
all naming- things (not just blackened naming- things) are impacted by cir-
cumstances;  things interact with  things, often in unaccepted ways. Or as Paul 
Gilroy describes the text, “Wright,” for instance, “demonstrates that some of 
the supposed beneficiaries of white supremacy are no less likely to be un-
hinged by its operation than its black victims.”69 Furthermore, the interplay 
of  things— the grotesquery of this interaction—is performed in this collec-
tion through Wright’s attention to the proximity of  things.70 Racial disregard 
and its mechanisms of deployment might suggest distance, but the actions 
and the thinking of Wright’s characters suggest that interaction— impact of 
 things—is an ever- present dimension of collective life, a marker of power 
dynamics often at play in the arrangement of  things. This is surely the case 
with the main character in the story I highlight in this chapter, where even 
in the relative isolation faced, he is always exposed to and mindful of the 
ways in which he encounters other  things— things that have consequence 
for his understanding of himself and his relationship(s) to the larger world. 
Even segregation, or more generally confined space, as Wright reflects in this 
story, entails a particularly antagonizing mode of encounter. In describing 
an underworld of decay and darkness, Wright crafts literary situations pulled 
from lived circumstance that involve the grotesque as per for mance of the im-
possible possibility of openness—as, if nothing  else, a defiant signification.
Bakhtin highlights the folk realm of carnival as a location where the gro-
tesque body takes center stage. Of course, it is not the only context for the 
pre sen ta tion of the grotesque. In “The Man Who Lived Under ground,” 
Wright offers the sewer as another, urban, locale. Having gotten away from 
the police who tried to hold him for a crime he had not committed, Fred Dan-
iels makes his way to the sewer, where “he snatched the cover far enough off 
to admit his body. He swung his legs over the opening and lowered himself 
into watery darkness.”71 Inside the sewer his body is confronted with thing- 
things. The world is turned inside out, and its ele ments penetrate him, af-
fecting and influencing him— demonstrating the manner in which he as a 
naming- thing is unfixed and exposed. The  water washes against him, urging 
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the question of life or death.  Water is significant in religious culture, per for-
mance, and teachings— but this is diff er ent. Daniel’s interplay with  water 
seems a mode of degradation whereby  going down into the sewer, as Bakhtin 
might explain, involves an entering into flesh. It is a pushing into the world 
through denouncing its codes and structures. Bakhtin, in discussing Rabe-
lais, remarks on the manner in which traditional religious thought on bodies 
tends to position them as down ( toward hell) or up ( toward heaven). He 
rejects this normalizing narrative, as does Fred Daniels, for whom down is 
life. He vertically enters into the sewer, but vertical entering points to a hor-
izontal real ity of material place occupied by bodied naming- things. Daniels 
leaves the “upperworld,” where restrictive encounters question his human-
ity, and enters the lower world of penetrated material being; the underworld 
enters Fred as he fills “his lungs with the hot stench of yeasty rot.”72 Life 
gains a diff er ent materiality for Daniels in the sewer; even time is knowable 
through materiality. As Wright narrates, “He heard the noise of the current 
and time lived again for him, mea sur ing the moments by the wash of  water.”73 
Every thing revolved around the interplay of him as an exposed naming- 
thing with other  things found within the waste passages below the city.
This situation promoted for Daniels a diff er ent perspective, one which 
might be named a kind of grotesque realism: living and  dying occupy the same 
space, and this space is a location marked by life in fleshy bodies that are open 
to the world. For instance, smoking points to this openness— the manner in 
which a thing- thing penetrates and infuses while also being expelled:
[Daniels] crept down and, seeing with his fin gers, opened the lunch pail 
and tore off a piece of paper bag and brought out the tin and spilled grains 
of tobacco into the makeshift concave. He rolled it and wet it with some 
spittle, then inserted one end into his mouth and lit it: he sucked smoke 
that bit his lungs. The nicotine reached his brain, went out along his arms 
to his fingertips, down to his stomach and over all the tired nerves of his 
body.74
Wright also spends time describing the proper use of the mouth. And he does 
so in a manner I argue would appeal to Bakhtin. The mouth marks penetra-
tion, the movement of food into the naming- thing— the extension of the 
grotesque body beyond itself. Daniels, continuing to devour the food he had 
stolen, “ate the other sandwich and found an apple and gobbled that up too, 
sucking the core till the last trace of flavor was drained from it. Then, like 
a dog, he ground the meat bones with his teeth, enjoying the salty, tangy 
marrow.”75 This is interplay with  things that heightens materiality. In so 
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 doing, flesh is privileged in a way  those in the church he overheard could 
not muster. The failure to recognize this embodied, fleshy, open body on the 
part of church  people he hears singing songs of “Zion” constitutes misuse 
of the mouth and denial of the rest of the body.76 The same is the case for 
 those in the theater, whom he watches denying degradation as they “ were 
laughing at their lives.” This, if one follows Bakhtin, is a misuse of laughter in 
that it closes off the body rather than conquering fear. This is not laughter of 
the grotesque body— a laughter that “degrades and materializes,” but rather 
the whimper of  those who refuse to embrace the unimaginable who “ were 
shouting and yelling at the animated shadows of themselves.”77
Daniels’s is the grotesque body (i.e., the open, bodied naming- thing) that 
takes in from the world and expels a bit of itself into the world. Wright, like 
Bakhtin, sees body waste as a sign of this interplay; regarding that, Wright 
describes the following as Daniels breaks through the sewer into a room:
He went to the sink and turned the faucet and  water flowed in a smooth 
 silent stream that looked like a spout of blood. . . .  His bladder grew tight 
[ after drinking the  water]; he shut off the  water, faced the wall, bent his 
head, and watched a red stream strike the floor. His nostrils wrinkled 
against acrid wisps of vapor; thought he had tramped in the  water of the 
sewer, he stepped back from the wall so that his shoes, wet with sewer 
slime would not touch his urine.78
The notion of the grotesque body played out in Wright’s story is also high-
lighted through the blending of forms— naming- things and other  things in 
a state of mutuality: like the old man comfortable in the dark like a sightless 
worm. Into the room— entered through the sewer— where Daniels has located 
himself, the old man enters to shovel coal into the furnace but he does not 
turn on the light. Wright says, “The old man had worked  here for so long 
that he had no need for light; he had learned a way of seeing in his dark 
world, like  those sightless worms that inch along under ground by a sense of 
touch.”79
At the end of the story, Daniels leaves the sewer to confront the police 
and bring them into his “truths,” but instead they murder him and throw him 
back into the sewer. This time, rather than encountering life, he “sighed and 
closed his eyes, a whirling object rushing alone in the darkness, veering, toss-
ing, lost in the heart of the earth.”80
Helga Crane, the protagonist of Larsen’s Quicksand, also knows  water— the 
way in which it penetrates the open body, exposes it, but is also exposed by 
it. In fact, the major transitional moment of her life, the point at which one 
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might say she is most aware of the grotesque nature of her body as open 
to the world and penetrated by the world, takes place  after an encounter 
with  water. She stumbles into a church lured by the sounds but also want-
ing to get out of the heavy rain. In that loud room,  there are moving bodies, 
penetrating bodies involved in what Larsen describes as a per for mance that 
“took on an almost Bacchic vehemence.”81 That is to say, the church scene is 
a display and interplay of bodies marked by riotous energy and excitement—
as if in honor of Bacchus, the god of wine and revelry. If read in light of 
Bakhtin, Crane encounters a carnivalistic gathering marked by blending of 
 things (i.e.,  women slithering on the floor like reptiles) and a general height-
ening of the flesh. The consequences are the same for Rabelais and Larsen— 
the flesh is highlighted, and the body is known for its openness. Like the 
“folk,” Crane embraces this situation: “She remained motionless, waiting, 
as if she lacked the strength to leave the place— foul, vile, and terrible, with 
its mixture of breaths, its contact of bodies. . . .  And as Helga watched and 
listened, gradually a curious feeling penetrated her; she felt an echo of the 
weird orgy resound in her own heart; she felt herself possessed by the same 
madness she too felt a brutal desire to shout and to sling herself about.”82 
She was penetrated by a sensibility that pulled her from the city to the rural 
world— where the smell of manure lingered and sweat on bodies confronted 
her.83 She was a preacher’s wife, having married the minister from the car-
nivalistic gathering. And while the openness of her body brought her into 
the collective, the social codes within that collective sought to close her off. 
Church could not accept this openness despite its efforts to co-opt it. Her 
body had to be consumed, just as she was told Christ had surrendered his for 
her salvation.84
Sadly, this is not the degradation Bakhtin writes of and celebrates. The reli-
gious tradition— practices, rituals, theological formulations and so on— that 
points beyond the  human to some cosmic mystery or comfort is actually 
a shortsighted surrender by means of which the unity of a being without 
pores and openings—or at least its potential—is desired. Bakhtin claims that 
laughter opens to this realization of shortsightedness. Perhaps something of 
the embodiment of this laugher is found in the defiant impulse undergirding 
Crane’s embodied rebellion against herself, other bodies, and the world.  There 
is an impulse to render material that typically has been situated as abstract 
or above. This is certainly the case with Crane, whose body is ravaged by 
 children. Crane discovers the deception with each child she delivers: The 
body is not  whole, fully formed, fixed, and nonporous. It is porous, open to 
the world, open to itself, and prone to release itself in such a manner that the 
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 things produced are both of the naming- thing and foreign to it. This is the 
realization that with each birth she is pushed closer to death.
In  either case, Daniels or Crane, the grotesque nature of the bodied 
naming- thing is highlighted, and its interplay with other  things is performed. 
As Bakhtin reminds us, it is within this context of mutuality, the realm of 
“presence together,” as Camus might name it, that naming- things are most 
vibrant.
The meaning, if I have it right, is philosophical, and internally related to its view-
ers. It [art] put their lives in perspective. It tells them what,  really, they already 
know.
— Arthur dAnto, The Abuse of Beauty
Having given attention in chapter 1 to the nature of  things in relationship 
to the conceptual framework of grotesque realism, I mean in this chapter to 
provide a sense of the relationship between  things and art through the pro-
cess of construction or creation and to do so by first briefly reflecting on 
Robert Fuller’s sense of bodies reconstituted. In Spirituality in the Flesh, Fuller 
explores the body by means of an interdisciplinary perspective with a par tic-
u lar aim in mind. He writes, “I am exploring the intriguing thesis that many 
aspects of religion can be understood in terms of the body’s efforts to recon-
stitute real ity as part of its ongoing adaptation to the environment.”1 Fuller 
is concerned with the biological nature of the body and what that means for 
understanding religion. While related to a certain degree, my concern is with 
the mechanics of the naming- thing, not its constitution as such other than 
to say it might be framed as a “ thing” or as Hans Belting names it, “a living 
medium” that speaks to the fact that  these naming- things relate to, if not 
produce, other  things that interplay in/with naming- things.2 Furthermore, 
while the bodied naming- thing is vital in this pro cess, the  things created and 
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arranged by  these naming- things have fundamental importance. One might 
think of this in a rough sense as entailing the making of absurd circumstances 
familiar—or our “metaphysical servant” (famulus).
The Situation
The bodied naming- thing is not fully known, but that is of  limited con-
sequence in that it remains historically felt, and the consequences of its 
movement inform and influence what we have come to call identity, com-
munity, society, and so on. In a certain way, one might consider this sense 
of the bodied naming- thing to constitute a “living media . . .  by pro cessing, 
revising, and transmitting images.”3 Along  these lines, traditional theories 
of religion that point to a fixed “something,” to a sense of the religious as sui 
generis (and to the body as closed off ) might be categorized as  those hold-
ing to the praxis of the image. Hence, they posit a “something” represented 
by the image, while this “something” seeks to point beyond itself.4 Again, as 
noted  earlier, my concern is not with the economic value or the tradability of 
 things. I am concerned with  things as  things “constructed” and arranged by 
other  things. Naming- things so understood do something; they forge, they 
make, they produce and reconstitute  things. And they are affected and influ-
enced by thing- things.
My goal  here is not a discussion or study of material as such. But when 
viewed by means of religion as a technology, what are  these  things forged 
by  these bodied naming- things (as well as  things encountered but not made by 
naming- things)? What does the “creation” and placement in time and space 
of  things tell us about embodied naming- things as represented by their rela-
tionship to other  things?
 Humans are naming- things, and we interact with other  things, place them 
in time and space, and have them “speak” to, for, and through naming- things. 
Connection and distance mark the naming- thing’s relationship to other 
 things, and this mirroring urges a range of deep questions we cannot answer 
but that in asking afford greater awareness and lucidity of our circumstances 
without curing our existential- ontological ills. One might extend what 
Belting says regarding images and the body: “It is through the vast array of 
images to which humanity accords meaning that the  human being proves 
himself a cultural being, a being that cannot be described solely in biological 
terms.”5 Of importance  here are not the image- picture pro cesses related to 
meaning making noted by Belting, but rather in a more general sense I call at-
tention to the bodied naming- things and other  things (objects turned  things) 
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shadowing his remark.  There is “substantial” (as in substance) overlap  here 
in that the bodied naming- thing can be conceived of as a  thing and also as a 
container holding some thing.6 The naming- thing stores other  things— for ex-
ample, organs and blood—as well as a range of cultural and social codes. Fur-
thermore, the naming- thing as  thing is connected to other  things through 
the pro cess of creation, movement, and attachment (physical as in artificial 
limbs, psychological as in security blankets, or emotional as in pictures). In 
another way, the bodied naming- thing uses other  things to extend itself fur-
ther into the world, and in the pro cess both thing- things and naming- things 
are affected and influenced.7 This is  because the bodied naming- thing can be 
physically and culturally penetrated, altered, shifted in time and space; and 
interaction with thing- things serves as cartography of this characteristic.
According to Bill Brown, “The body is a  thing among  things.”8 For Brown 
this remark pushes  toward a critical discussion on the nature and meaning of 
 things— those objects we have tended to “look through” in order to discover 
a deeper meaning and purpose. Their “thingliness,” he remarks, is pre sent 
to us best when  things no longer offer an opportunity to discover more, to 
unpack meaningful meaning. All this, from his perspective, says something 
about the  human relationship to  things.9 Naming- things are always and al-
ready in the presence of other  things. Mindful of this, and prompted by the 
previous chapter’s argument, I end this section with a question: What does 
the arrangement and impact of  things suggest? As  will become clear, artistic 
production provides a useful way of mapping and exploring this question. I 
begin with the visual arts in order to mark out a par tic u lar way of framing 
artistic production’s highlighting of naming- thing and thing- thing inter-
play. This is not to suggest an interest in only the visual arts; rather, the 
framework suggested throughout this discussion carries over to other mo-
dalities of the arts addressed  later in the volume.
Art
I am concerned with art developed from the twentieth  century to the 
pre sent, and I am most intrigued in this regard with art not of a Modern-
ist mindset. That is to say, I am not concerned with art that seeks to de-
voutly represent or duplicate images of the world. Privileged in this volume 
is work (from a variety of genres) that calls into question that duplicity 
and instead seeks to challenge clean perception. As Arthur Danto notes, 
“ Today art can be made of anything, put together with anything, in the 
ser vice of presenting any ideas whatsoever.”10 Yet he tries to center on the 
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concept of embodied meaning— the “thought of the work,” which is expressed 
“ nonverbally”—as a characteristic, a definition of art that captures its nature 
across genres and forms.11 For Danto, this meaning provides par tic u lar and 
intimate information connected to each viewer, and in this way the work of 
art “tells them what,  really, they already know.”12 While I disagree with the 
ele ment of repre sen ta tion and instead think in terms of art as posing a chal-
lenge, I find significant Danto’s recognition of art as drawing from anything 
and being constructed of anything. Still, I have to offer a shift in perspective 
in that art as a grammar (or one might call it a strategy) does not give infor-
mation but rather is significant precisely  because it offers no answer in the 
form of “truths” or even right feeling. Instead, art prompts awareness of our 
circumstances and our place within  those circumstances without resolution.
Danto has argued that the nature and meaning—or definition—of art 
changed during the twentieth  century when it could no longer be assumed 
to imitate real ity or to promote beauty and taste. Par tic u lar art movements 
of the twentieth  century— such as Dada and Pop Art— push beyond a fram-
ing of art and art history guided by  those assumptions in ways that trou ble 
what we can be and what should be categorized as art. Still,  there is for Danto 
something compelling about art, something that distinguishes it. Hence, 
“ there is  really nothing like it when it comes to stirring the spirit.”13 It is this 
perception, this take on art that is of par tic u lar interest to me  here. This thick 
relationship motivates questions and pushes forward concerns. The referenc-
ing of Dadaism and the highlighting of Pop Art point to a tragic perspec-
tive, a mea sured realism that signifies specialness as a quality of thought and 
being is significant for me in that it suggests the need for an alternate vo-
cabulary and grammar for exploring the significance of cultural production.
Danto is interested in the manner in which Pop Art blurs the line between 
art and real ity, as he puts it, and the questions promoted by that dissonance. 
I find that intriguing, and initially it is why I turned to Danto and continue 
to read him. However, my interest in artistic production has more to do 
with the thingliness of  things and what that troubling of perception does to 
 human experience. That is to say, I turn to art  because art provides insight 
into incompleteness. Put differently, the placement of  things in time and 
space constituted by art urges viewers to see something they might other wise 
ignore, but this is a temporary situation. It is a condition that tells us equally 
about our limitation and our promise. It points to bodied naming- things’ 
strugg le against the world while being deeply enmeshed in the world and 
using resources from the world (cultural and “natu ral”) to interrogate the 
world. More to the point, artistic production provides an invaluable means 
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by which to isolate and interrogate the interplay between  things— that is 
to the extent it recognizes rather than hides the thingliness of  things.14 Put 
differently, “perhaps,  after all, it takes art to bring out the thing- li- ness of 
 things.”15 Materials are combined to make  things, and the artist then further 
manipulates  these materials to create  things that  will urge us to think about, 
but more importantly, think within what is represented to what they offer 
as a prod  toward awareness of the world and our circumstances. In saying 
this I remain human- centered over against what some call for as a thing- 
centered perspective.16 Still, I appreciate in this work the manner in which 
 things speak beyond fixed status and, in  doing that, inform and influence a 
range of relations. Hence, I am not concerned with a guiding logic of beauty 
or a politics of aesthetic respectability; rather, I am concerned with explor-
ing art that is attuned to circumstantial arrangements of life and their vari-
ous sociocultural codes. If nothing  else, they urge the naming- thing to speak 
questions and existential considerations.
Art both requires something and surrenders something. It shows the 
complexity of  things— the multidirectional nature of their influence and 
impact— and the thick nature of the naming- thing’s connection to other 
 things. As Danto argues and I have noted numerous times in  earlier work, 
if Warhol’s Brillo Box could not be distinguished physically from the Brillo 
boxes at the grocery store, what then?17 “Warhol had brought art and real ity 
to such a point,” writes Danto, “that it’s only a  matter of ingenuity to try 
and think of circumstances  under which any masterpiece and something 
identical to it could have come into existence,  under conditions in which one 
would and the other  wouldn’t have been a work of art.”18 The difference has 
something to do with thingliness— with the ability of the former to prompt 
certain considerations that are not achieved through the latter. And this must 
be in relationship to conscious placement in time and space that pulls  things 
beyond status as objects and thereby exposes their porous nature. In a word, 
Pop Art and other con temporary art movements speak to the ability of this 
modality of expression, of placement of  things (which is similar to the im-
portance Danto gives to the exhibition as conveyer of meaning) to foster the 
types of questioning and insight religion as a technology exposes. For instance, 
take Danto’s question— “Why do  things look the way they look?”19 This is not 
a question of aesthetics as beauty in that  there is no assumption regarding 
the centrality of issues of  wholeness embedded in this work. While  there 
might be something resembling animosity  toward beauty in Dada (which re-
jects the certainties and assumptions that made world war pos si ble),  there is 
in Pop Art something more akin to disinterestedness in beauty as a marker of 
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“art.” No, such questions encourage depth of exploration, including existential 
considerations but also epistemological and ontological considerations all re-
lated to fundamental concerns. Pop Art pushed for integration of what is 
“real,” and in so  doing it urged an interrogation of  those realities that shape 
the manner in which the naming- thing touches and is touched by the world; 
such interrogation claws at our metaphysical frameworks. The blending of 
art and the “ordinary” became an invitation to explore. Naming- things and 
thing- things anchor both art and the “ordinary.”
Keeping in place the theme of the Brillo Box produced by Warhol that is 
so very similar to the Brillo boxes designed by artist James Harvey and used 
in stores to transport Brillo pads, I suggest that the importance of art for my 
proj ect, over against art for Danto, involves the tragicomic quality inher-
ent in this re/pre sen ta tion. Harvey, who provided the initial material and 
inspiration for Warhol’s work, is practically forgotten for this connection 
to both  things— Brillo Box and Brillo boxes.20 It is the tragicomic quality to 
relationship with  things that points in the direction of what I intend to sug-
gest through awareness rather than meaning vis- à- vis the placement of  things.
The naming- thing selecting and displacing other  things is impor tant not 
so much  because of the  things themselves but for that to which the interac-
tion points.21 As Dada artist Marcel Duchamp exemplifies with his “ready-
mades,” discussed at vari ous points in this volume, it is not simply the 
 thing that is of vital importance, but rather it is the se lection and placement 
of the  thing that is meant to motivate deeper thinking.22  Things point be-
yond themselves— pushing  toward their thingification and away from objec-
tification. For instance, as Danto notes, Warhol’s boxes meant to “subtract 
the perceptual differences between art and real ity.”23 I would phrase it a bit 
differently in light of the intent of this book and say that Warhol’s boxes, like 
Duchamp’s readymades, push viewers to encounter.
What can be said about the  things that play this role? And what is to be 
made of the bodied naming- things that construct  these  things? Meaning 
found, produced, or assumed is not the correct response to such questions. 
Meaning is too firm; it renders static or fixed what is pliable, flexible, and mu-
table. It is to view circumstances from only one vantage point.
Art prompts through an intentional manipulation of time and space, and 
secondly (but not secondarily) through the intentional positioning of  things 
so as to urge viewers  toward their thingliness.24 On this score the worst an 
artist can do is demand her intent, as if it is a signifier that must be carried 
forward. And the curator’s note highlighted typically in writing on the wall 
introducing the “meaning” of the work is not much better in that it, like the 
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artist’s statement, works to restrict the openness of the work once moved 
from the artist’s mind to a selected time and space. Perhaps this is why Andy 
Warhol often gave  limited insight into what his art was meant to achieve. To 
do so would have been to end his art.
The prompt proposed by artistic work is the only  thing transhistorical 
about art, for which that language remains vital. Still, it is more accurate 
to say that art points us  toward ourselves, that it holds us at that station 
and urges us to examine a naming- thing’s condition and its relationship to 
other  things’ conditions.  There are no restrictions to what this art can prompt 
in the viewer, and  there is no one dimension of our openness— such as senses— 
through which it demands we pro cess  these offerings. Beauty— one way of 
thinking about aesthetics—is not the focus of art so conceived, at least not 
more traditional framings of aesthetics and art. However, this is not to say 
that beauty or  wholeness is rendered unimportant. Aesthetics is transformed 
from being a way to mea sure art, and instead aesthetics becomes another 
way of describing  things in their thingliness. Art exposes a  human’s effort to, 
on some level, in the words of Albert Camus, be other than she is. So pre-
sented, art then is an utterance of  human interaction with other  things 
staged in a par tic u lar time and space.25 Art has been referenced as something 
of a question without firm resolution. Or as Camus remarks, “Art is the 
activity that exalts and denies si mul ta neously.”26 Still, I depart a bit from 
Camus, privileging a diff er ent moment in art history without mimetics in 
that I argue that what is left with art is the essence of characterization as 
interplay made pos si ble. All this entails what I see as art’s motivation  toward 
openness maintained.
Danto raises a question: “How to distinguish between art and real  things 
that are not art but that could very well have been used as works of art?”27 At 
one point he decides to think of art as “wakeful dreams” that can be shared 
and discussed and that can be effective beyond the private world of the 
“dreamer.”28 He noted in 2013 that at a point he had thought of the intersec-
tion of art and real ity as the end of art, the inability to discern a difference. Yet 
he had changed to posit that the difference might be invisible but substan-
tive and might have to do with diff er ent modalities of embodiment.29 In a 
word,  there is something that gives art its difference from the “ things” it 
interrogates, or symbolizes, or explores.  There are ways in which this issue 
shades what interests me about religion as a technology: it marks out the dif-
ference not as essential or necessary but rather as a  matter of consideration 
and pre sen ta tion. And this technology of religion isolates par tic u lar arrange-
ments of “ things” and thereby stimulates.
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I would say art prompts a tackling of experience, a repositioning of some 
of its pieces and forms, so as to urge difference of thought that encourages 
nothing more than lucidity— greater awareness of our circumstances and our 
desperate place within  those circumstances.30 Works of art symbolize a de-
sire, the configuration of this desire, but they provide no answers. If any-
thing, it is this moralistic awareness—of our circumstances and our place in 
 these circumstances— that constitutes the gain made.
Art, then, becomes a par tic u lar geography in which and by means of which 
religion as a technology does its work.
Why and Where Art?
Other arrangements of  things seek to accomplish this same work; that is the 
nature of cultural production. Yet I suggest the multiple codes and strategies 
of communication represented by the arts as a general category of expression 
provide perhaps one of the most compelling of such strategies. This is not 
to suggest, as did figures such as W. E. B. Du Bois, that art is po liti cal and 
must serve the purpose of advancement on sociopo liti cal lines. Such a fram-
ing of art’s function is too preoccupied with outcomes, with easily marked 
out transformation.  There is some of that in my  earlier theorizing of religion, 
but  here I prioritize the pro cess of engagement, the putting in play of par tic-
u lar techniques of interrogation and arrangement of experience as opposed 
to the existential and ontological outcomes of that pro cess.
Art, in connection to religion as a technology, poses a question/comment: 
“Look through and think . . .” And though this yearning to examine experience 
(i.e., the interplay of  things) is a part of our  human nature, to do so through 
the mechanics of religion is to select a par tic u lar theoretical- methodological 
tool for this “natu ral” cross- examination of sorts. Mindful of this framing, 
and thinking with moralist Camus, what we have  here is the dreadful invita-
tion to contemplation— not resolution, not answers, nor meaning found or 
held, but simply contemplation, which in fact keeps alive  those  things that 
concern us.31 And along the way we place markers, or  things in relationship 
to  things, that urge more contemplation, more strugg le, and at our best a bit 
of moralistic awareness and lucidity of circumstance.
 There is no hope embedded in this pro cess, but rather the location— the 
gallery, for instance— does not provide final containment or a type of fixity 
of possibility beyond impingement. That is to say, it prompts a par tic u lar time 
and space for contemplation through  things that are not just  things. This pull- 
and- push dynamic I am describing is similar in effect to the “resonance” and 
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“won der” phenomenon described by Stephen Greenblatt. He argues that 
exhibits can be arranged along two pos si ble effects. The first, resonance, al-
lows the displayed object to pull viewers beyond that par tic u lar object and 
into a larger context. And won der points the viewer in the direction of what 
is unique about that par tic u lar object.32 For Greenblatt this seems to en-
tail a relationship between distinct materials— the  human viewer and the 
object viewed. A dimension of this involves an economic consideration of 
owner ship, which, he suggests, is both encouraged by but prohibited by the 
museum’s displaying of the goods.33 The economics of pre sen ta tion is not 
my concern. Still, although the flexibility of  things in Greenblatt’s formula-
tion implies something of their thingliness, the relationship he describes is 
 really about the bodied naming- thing observing  things in ways that speak 
to other  things. I suggest in my depiction the possibility of something more 
taking place, something that entails an interaction between naming- things 
and thing- things on a more fundamental level.34
I want to say more concerning the gallery as confinement but also as 
 things— for example, building materials, light, sound, and art—in move-
ment, in flux before moving on. Danto says the gallery is the new church, 
and for Duncan Cameron it is a  temple (when it is not a forum). In addition, 
Carol Duncan notes the manner in which the museum is premised on  earlier 
models such as “classical  temples, medieval cathedrals, Re nais sances palaces,” 
and in this way represents a multilayered experience revolving around the 
architecture of the space meant to accommodate the interaction of vari ous 
items as “secular ritual.”35 I find such thinking intriguing in that it blurs the 
line between notions of the sacred and secular, and the line between the place-
ment and pre sen ta tion of  things (bodied naming- things and thing- things). 
Still, this alone does not capture enough. What if we  were to think about the 
gallery space, the exhibit hall, any location consciously arranged in terms of 
art the way we think about other  things? What if we refused a rigid distinction 
between the gallery as  thing and other  things— such as the naming- things and 
thing- things with which it interacts— and instead saw them as interacting 
and thereby shifting and changing each other?  There is something organic 
about the gallery space (or any space of artistic production or performance— 
which by function could be said to constitute an intended gallery space) in 
that it holds connections in terms of substance and cultural codes with the 
 things (e.g., works of art) connected to it and growing in and out of it.
One gets a sense of the interactive quality of  things in time and space (and 
in relationship to the gallery) through a Pope.L exhibit at the Museum of Mod-
ern Art (NYC)— member: Pope.L, 1978–2001. Meant to highlight the manner 
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in which multidimensional artist Pope.L uses his body and other mundane 
 things to pre sent and wrestle with a range of sociopo liti cal and economic 
questions, the exhibit included some of his more well- known pieces of body 
art– performance art. However, in addition to Eating the Wall Street Journal, 
for example, the gallery space includes cut- out sections of wall, a play on 
Pope.L’s “Hole Theory” (as curator comments suggest), exposing the inner 
workings of space and disrupting a “superficial” gaze by calling attention to 
multiple dimensions of space and contact— internal and external. With one 
par tic u lar cut- out, next to the hole, is the Sheetrock turned inside out and 
attached to the wall. On that surface Pope.L has drawn a ghostlike figure (pre-
sent but not known fully, pre sent but without bodily detail— with one large 
black eye and another eye, black but smaller), with a thought  bubble above 
it, a bit smudged but asking, “What do art works talk about when you 
leave the room?” Next to it is another ghostlike figure with similar eyes, 
and above its head is a thought  bubble holding the answer to the question: 
“Us.” This sentiment— the notion that  things “speak,” interact, impact other 
 things—is written elsewhere in the exhibit, also through a ghostlike presence 
drawn with a thought  bubble: “Exhibition.” Above this word and to its right 
is this saying: “I was standing next to this and it began to speak to me.”36 Art 
demands something; as Pope.L notes, it resists objectification and instead 
draws us beyond viewer status. Art observes and queries naming- things; art 
entails graphic agency. Time and space fail to reify, to fix, content.  Things 
amplify themselves in relationship to other  things. As Daniel Miller remarks, 
“Before we can make  things, we are ourselves grown up and matured in the 
light of  things [understood as a collective rather than in terms of individual 
items]. . . .  These unconsciously direct our footsteps and are the landscapes 
of our imagination, as well as the cultural environment to which we adapt.”37
The gallery enables and restricts. This has to do with content (naming- 
things and thing- things) but also context as the latter relates to the manner 
in which the sociopo liti cal and cultural sensibility of curators and  others 
shape exhibits.38 Limiting focus to what is pre sent while also encouraging 
thinking and engagement beyond the thinglinesses of the gallery as such, I 
argue, is what the gallery does. And this is not determined by  factors such as 
the location or the economic resources of the gallery. I am describing the gen-
eral nature of gallery space when it is space set aside and apart for the work 
done by art. Seeing naming- things and/or thing- things outside the gallery 
may spark par tic u lar reactions that pull  toward or seek to push away from 
body- thingliness. However, the pro cess of placing  these same  things— such 
as a chair, a cut-up magazine image, or the body of a body- thing—in the 
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spatially conceived particularity of the gallery fosters a diff er ent view and an 
altered connection. Svetlana Alpers’s comments regarding Re nais sance altar-
pieces are appropriate in the context of my argument: “When objects like 
 these are severed from the ritual site [or initial space associated with use], 
the invitation to look attentively remains and in certain re spects may even 
be enhanced.”39
Artistic expression— whether paintings, per for mance, dance, or song— 
consciously  causes attention to the vis i ble and invisible content of time and 
space in ways that urge introspection. And something about this introspec-
tion vis- à- vis art brings to the fore questions of significance.
 There is a string of connection or concern between bodied naming- 
things that produce and arrange, and other  things. Both bodied naming- things 
and things- things push against static and truncated perceptions of circum-
stances and prompt a sense of space as fluid and bound aries as porous. Forms 
of art at the “end” of this rethinking of  things point out which assumptions 
concerning the nature and meaning of art are disbanded. Forms of art also 
spark recognition of the relationship between  things with/in naming- things 
as well as the perception of this porousness. And in the pro cess, they demand 
a new vocabulary and grammar for such engagement with  things. In short, 
recognition of the thingliness of  things points to the manner in which art 
articulates openness.
This page intentionally left blank
interplay
part ii
This page intentionally left blank
How does our outside real ity reinvent itself ?
— Angelbert metoyer, in conversation with the author
 Humans and  things are symmetrically involved.
— iAn hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships  
between  Humans and  Things
With the claim that art articulates openness established and discussed in 
chapter 2, I want to now give some attention to the arrangement of  things 
associated with this openness. And I want to do so by turning attention to 
the work of an artist, Angelbert Metoyer, for whom  things are not always what 
they seem. That is to say, thing- things defy static categorization. They shift 
between locations and alter existential assurances as they challenge any 
sense of a closed system, or of stability and clear bound aries regarding con-
tent and form.
Artistic Context
Drawing from  family history and the larger history of  peoples of African de-
scent, Metoyer pre sents what I have called rituals of reference (i.e., practices 
and symbols meant to restrict racialized bodies), but he tames them by exposing 




their illogical and truncating intent.1 In vari ous ways, his art pieces speak to 
and about his wide- ranging experiences in moving between vari ous points 
in the United States, experiencing China for two years, and living and work-
ing between Rotterdam and Houston. His paintings and installations draw 
personality and posture from  family members, friends, and neighborhood 
figures associated with his years growing up in Houston. His aesthetic—by 
which I mean a certain “touch,” a rhythm of expression and a par tic u lar pro-
cess for selecting and placing  things in time and space— has shifted and 
changed from his start as an artist in 1994, with work done in two rooms given 
him by Proj ect Row House, to the pre sent.2 Early work led to exhibits and to 
interest among collectors as he, a bodied naming- thing, encountered other 
bodied naming- things and thing- things in vari ous cultural contexts.3
 There are reflections of his vari ous artistic influences and his formal training 
(Savannah College of Art and Design in Atlanta), but all bends to his concern 
with rethinking what we can learn about and from  things that shift awareness 
of our circumstances (i.e., world) and our place within  those circumstances.4 
He is sensitive to the manner in which the brutality of racial difference has 
marked “epistemologically and ontologically blackened” naming- things, 
seeking to render them inert objects by means of which whiteness is rein-
forced as metaphysical truth. By naming them, bodied naming- things, he 
seeks to focus their significance as open, and in so  doing he creates a space 
for rethinking embodied life and its inner workings that shadows and in-
forms us. All this takes place within the context of the gallery space, but it is 
not  limited to that arena in that the viewer is invited to continue that prob-
ing in other times and spaces.
Abp What is the role of the artist in society?
Am It depends on what’s needed. I feel as if the artist should be an 
insider and an outsider. The studio practice involves understand-
ing real ity, an in- between space, articulated in between worlds.5
Pieces selected speak of travel, of relocation; they hold a vocabulary and gram-
mar of what he references as the “sacred” and point to dynamics of embod-
ied life as already and always complex, layered, and in search of and  toward 
“More.” This search is not simply more material goods, more status, but 
rather a deeper and robust sense of relationship to other “ things.” All this is 
marked by a vibrant yearning both internally and externally manifested as 
well as represented in and by the colors, signs, symbols, shapes, and configu-
rations that code the exhibit and shape its spatial language. It is a language 
to which naming- things respond— and this is a type of thingified language 
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to the extent it encompasses and is encompassed by  things. This language is 
read on and through  things; this is certainly part of what Metoyer portrays 
through self- portraits and mirrored surfaces that populate many of his in-
stallations and exhibits. Self- described as an abstract expressionist— also 
having what might be referenced as “Afrofuturistic” tendencies to explore 
past, pre sent, and  future in ways that challenge assumptions concerning the 
nature and meaning of bodied naming- things—he wrestles with issues of 
ontological development and integrity over against modes of technological 
advancement.6 He pulls from history and thereby brings together fragments 
and “scraps” of remembered selves, and in this way he explores strategies for 
self- understanding in relationship to the signs and symbols that mark up and 
amplify collective life. Space has significance in this regard  because it becomes 
(or perhaps has always been) the arena for movement, for transitions, and for 
overlap— the scope of confinement as intentional and floating locales occupied 
by vari ous  things. Metoyer draws from his personal encounters with the world 
to shape a general sense of what it means to travel across time and space—to 
effect both and be affected by both. This pro cess, as he explores and explains 
through par tic u lar pieces and their arrangement, is always embodied.
The  temple, and the self- reflection it affords, is meant to challenge this 
construction, to offer opportunity and ritualized pro cesses by means of which 
to dis/cover, or to rename, by fi nally seeing ourselves and ourselves in rela-
tionship to other  things. This is the intent, but not a necessary outcome 
to be sure. Yet it is a potentiality Metoyer means to highlight through the 
talismanic qualities of his work waiting to be probed and perhaps employed. 
Art, then, as Metoyer means to develop it, fosters a framework or moment 
of Camusian lucidity. It is an embodied awareness, a pulling, and an urg-
ing reconsideration of what we think we know about ourselves, about each 
other, and about the world in which we live. In short, it is awareness re-
garding the interplay of naming- things and other  things. For Metoyer, the 
key to this pro cess of mutuality involves the construction and pre sen ta tion 
of passageways— openings that suggest shifts and changes made pos si ble 
through cartographies of time marked out by complexities and uncertainties 
associated with the presence together of  things.
Wrestling History
 There is much about  things moving through time and space that defies the 
ability of words to capture, control, and tame. It is consideration of an alter-
nate vocabulary and grammar for envisioning existence as interplay that is 
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so compellingly presented in the work of Metoyer, such as the exhibit titled 
Wrestling History: Points along a Journey of Dis/covery Hidden in the  Temple.7 As 
curator for this exhibit, I provided the following description. While  there is 
a grammar of spirituality in the description, I call attention to the practice 
of  things to which it also refers:
Metoyer turns to life meaning(s) that surge up and out of encounters with 
the self,  others, and world. All this is played out in shapes, colors, and 
forms of artistic expression. Paint  isn’t simply composition that covers a 
surface, and objects  aren’t simply “ things.” In the space of the gallery as 
 temple they are used to pre sent and decode knowledge and being.  Here 
one enters a space framed, arranged, and outfitted with works meant to 
foster transformation. Bringing into contact images, signs, and symbols 
from an African past and con temporary markers of cultural meaning, ob-
jects become the equivalent of a “Vévé”— markings that point to conflu-
ence of powers, locations where worlds merge. One might alternately 
think of “crossroads,” where worlds open, collide, and where opportuni-
ties and challenges pre sent themselves.  Here, at the point of convergence, 
one finds spheres of activity and cultural me(an)ing.
Each piece contributes to vocabulary and grammar of the sacred shap-
ing spatial language. Together they speak discovery of the world as the artist 
encounters, interprets and communicates it. Still this is only one dimen-
sion of that ritualized encounter presented in that it also involves cover. 
This covering entails layering of experiences as the viewer reads herself 
through the artist’s pre sen ta tion of life domains. Altars, totems, mirrors, 
images, and idols all point to the questions that surround our existence— 
questions that have such profound significance that we isolate them and 
make them more than ordinary.
From self- portraits to pieces urging introspection, this exhibit prompts 
a confrontation with history and offers tools for rethinking the embodied 
and “spiritual” nature of  human existence. In such a space the rituals of 
life are noted, expressed, and interrogated for what they say about the em-
bodied and more ephemeral dimensions of our existence— occupation of 
and movement through time and space.8
Metoyer’s approach involves a turn to the workings of bodied naming- things 
that surge up and out of encounters with the self,  others, and the world— and 
all this is played out in shapes, colors, and forms that emerge on canvas. In 
charting this pro cess, and as I note above, for Metoyer  there is something spiri-
tual about this artistic pro cess of representing interplay between naming- 
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things and thing- things, but by that he does not have in mind traditional 
notions of material distinction and nonhistorically arranged modalities of 
operation. Rather, spirituality in his art involves aggressive coordination of 
material experience (i.e., the presence together of naming- things and thing- 
things) for which our language is inadequate to name and position. It is 
a system of material arrangements that push the bound aries of our per-
ception and our experience of  others, the world, and ourselves as pre sent 
to us (naming- things in relationship to thing- things responding to world 
as circumstances). Spirituality, then, speaks to a type of synergistic lay-
ering of thing- things that push beyond easy identification as one dimen-
sional and nonresponsive. In a word, spirituality is secular and marked by 
materiality.
With  Things
As has been the case throughout the presence of African  peoples in the Amer-
i cas, movement has defined something of their being. It has arranged them 
physically, populated their dreams and desires, and cast a shadow over their 
longings. Metoyer thinks about movement along historical lines. So for him, 
as is the case for many, the  Middle Passage marks a graphic and violent form 
of transition, but the pro cess continued long  after ships reached vari ous 
points along the eastern coast of North Amer i ca. Bodied naming- things re-
duced to blackness (more on this in  later chapters), while rendered somewhat 
docile through sociocultural codes and po liti cal pronouncement, still defied 
ele ments of this transition and exploited  others: desired movement from 
south to north, movement from east to west, movement across more local-
ized areas, and metaphysical movement from status as slave to that of  free 
person with recognition as fully  human. Shifting locations as time and space 
rub against each other is a theme of exploration for him.
Movement defines the age, the point in the “Modern Period” when 
worlds collide in a massive way— creating new populations and dismantling 
 others— changing the nature, scope, coding, and meaning of our visual signs 
and symbols. But is all done once the space Metoyer has fostered is left—on 
to the next event, the next eve ning out, the next exhibit and dinner— with 
 little impact on how  those events and activities are encountered, pro cessed, 
and stored away as another dimension of personal history?
What he offers is pre sen ta tion through versions of familiar and com-
fortable  things. But rather than a push  toward discovery, it is a covering 
of history with selected memories of  things as they have been and as they 
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“should” be. It is in this way that art speaks to and is an expression of bodied 
naming- things’ most ingrained codes as well as our most troubling circum-
stances and scenarios. Although memory is fragile and fractured, Metoyer re-
fuses to allow this to negate any requirement to re- member both the benefits 
and prob lems that mark our personal development and our relationship to 
 others. Art, then, is an articulation of the  human condition to the extent 
that naming- things produce and thing- things represent (and the opposite is 
also true) the interior and external markings of our existence. In this regard, 
Hans Belting is correct in saying that “the body is a place in the world.”9 The 
bodied naming- thing is entangled. In this context,  things are more than ob-
jects that speak nothing more than their appearance.
 There is something in what emerges that speaks both to the promise and 
pitfalls of existence as interplay. It communicates encounter consistent with 
the trickster figure bringing  humans in contact with themselves and  those 
 things shadowing the thoughts and actions of bodied naming- things. Pulling 
images, signs, and symbols from an African past and con temporary mark-
ers of cultural meaning, Metoyer arranges throughout the gallery a type of 
large- scale equivalent of the Vodou “Vévé”— markings that point to the con-
fluence of powers, the location where worlds merge—or perhaps the more 
Americanized cultural symbol of the “crossroads,” where worlds open, col-
lide, and where opportunities and challenges pre sent themselves.10 It is at the 
crossroads where one has the opportunity for alteration— a spatial arrange-
ment with implications for  those who, as Du Bois might put it, are born 
with the veil— the ability to see between worlds of activity and cultural me(an)
ing (i.e., the introspective and circumstantial nature or quality of knowing 
vis- à- vis modalities of presence together).11 Still, what then is the meaning 
of  things? Is  there more than a function for  things— and arrangements of 
 things—of images? Metoyer answers this question with an emphatic but still 
somewhat reserved yes.
Paint is not simply pigment composition that covers a surface. Feath-
ers, wood, and so on, thing- things in other words, are not captured simply 
through their first incarnation— their mode of utility speaking to initial use.12 
To the contrary, paint covering—or the layering of feathers or the reposition-
ing of wood over against other  things— actually exposes a visual heuristic for 
presenting and decoding our metaphysics as a  matter of open  things con-
fronting, merging, and separating. The canvas is coated by paint and other 
media, but in the pro cess, one is encouraged to uncover self in relationship 
to the work of art—to recognize that something about its repre sen ta tion of 
thing- things speaks to and about naming- things within time and space.
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Metoyer wrestles with pre sen ta tion of movement and the manner in which 
such “travel” connotes transformation or substantial change in how we per-
ceive larger arrangements of life. The inconclusive nature of interplay with 
other  things remains intact, unresolved by artistic expression. This is not to 
suggest that Metoyer is an absurdist artist, but rather that  there is a shared 
recognition that the world offers us only small comfort and that our know-
ing is only incomplete and  shaped by a learned “not- knowing.”
Yet  there is in Metoyer what I would describe as moralist recognition of 
the nature of our relationship to the world, or our circumstances, in that his 
art says something about the hy poc risy of our structuring of life as bonded 
and recognizes the inability of naming- things to find resolve through firm 
bound aries. Art hints at something it cannot fix, or as Camus notes concern-
ing absurd art and the concrete, “It [the concrete] cannot be the end, the 
meaning, and the consolation of a life.”13 Still, this porous and penetrable 
world is the one that intrigues Metoyer— the one he believes artistic expres-
sion opens.14 The need to continuously wrestle, to consistently pursue, I find 
in Metoyer’s art and philosophy of art, shares something with Camus’s real-
ism regarding the outcome of artistic production: “Creating or not creating 
changes nothing.”15 But still we work— despite all, we work.16 In certain ways, 
for Metoyer art marks out history, tells history, and pushes through the inte-
rior uncertainties of history. Or history, as Bill Brown reflects, “can unabash-
edly begin with  things and with the sense of which we apprehend them.”17
Placing  Things
 There is a complexity, a layering that already and always points to a deeper 
quality and significance to circumstances of interplay in which we find 
ourselves. Ritual items as thing- things used within Metoyer’s art operate 
consistent with Hodder’s analy sis: “Spiritual energies flow through icons 
and relics and awaken our devotion. Familiar  things are absorbed into our 
sense of identity; they become recognized and owned. . . .  Things stimulate 
our cognitive capacities, flowing through our neural pro cesses, leading to 
reflection upon reflection, creating pathways that stay with us.  There is a 
dependence of  humans on  things.”18 But this is only one dimension of the 
bodied naming- thing’s interaction with other  things, and it describes only 
one dimension of  things in that  things interact, shift, change, impact, and 
influence. Multidirectional- significance operating in numerous networks of 
contact is a way one might describe this understanding of  things beyond 
their initial use.19
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 There is a depth that pushes beyond what first meets the eye. Thing- things, 
in this sense, yield no certainty, no clear bound aries. They are  things with 
thingliness that take away clarity in the form of distinction. As Brown re-
marks, “The quest for  things may be a quest for a certainty, but  thing is a word 
that tends, especially at its most banal, to index a certain limit or liminality, 
to hover over the threshold between the nameable and the figurable and un-
figurable, the identifiable and unidentifiable.”20 Items serve in this way, and 
the gallery becomes for Metoyer the housing, or  temple, complete with 
ordinary items that when brought together and arranged, hold the capac-
ity to transform and transpose so as to make us aware. This, of course, is 
not to say that simply entering the gallery means a huge life transformation, 
revelations that radically change life. However, does any  temple guarantee 
such  things? No, it simply provides time and space, reminders or visual tools, 
and the rest is left to  those who encounter the exhibit. Art is a ritual appa-
ratus of sorts, and the gallery serves as an architectural harness for time and 
space. Perhaps the gallery is a location for introspection and interrogation—
to be alone to a certain degree while other wise getting lost in the existential 
midst of  others who are themselves alone in their own par tic u lar (but simi-
lar) ways. In a word, the gallery is a time- space set apart for a certain type of 
interaction between  things.
This is a portion of the angst of life noted and aestheticized in Metoyer’s 
artistic productions. He pulls from personal history and the collective his-
tory of the larger population of which he is a part to collect and de/code 
materials so as to make them available to  others—to offer the talisman that 
opens new worlds of challenge and possibility. And in this pro cess, viewers 
(or better yet, participants) are invited to pull from their own histories, to 
wrestle  those histories as it  were, in order to configure differently themselves 
and their interplay with the world of  things. This, on a fundamental level, is 
a mode of dis/covery.  Every work of art speaks discovery of the world as the 
artist encounters, interprets, and communicates it for public consideration. 
It is exposure— types of laying claim through greater focus and presence. 
Still, this is only one dimension of the ritualized encounter presented by the 
exhibit Wrestling History in that it also involves cover. This covering amounts 
to the layering of experience(s) as the viewer does the following: (1) reads 
the artist through the artist’s encounter with the world, and (2) reads the 
viewer’s self through the re/presented experience of the artist. Multiple per-
spectives are presented as a way of avoiding what is uncomfortable. Hence, 
the experience— the viewing—is multidimensional and multidirectional. It 
is arranged and guided by placement of the vari ous pieces of art, but it is also 
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an open space and time maneuvered as the viewer/participant sees fit. All 
this is conditioned by what the viewer brings into the  temple and what the 
viewer desires to take away from that encounter with works of art.  There is 
a hint of what I mean in the words of Marcel Duchamp. “All in all,” he said, 
“the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings 
the work in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting 
its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act.”21 
Thing- things have been placed in accordance with the wishes of the artist, 
but once situated they tell stories, urge questions, and so on. Within the con-
text of artistic production, thing- things communicate on a variety of levels 
that entail the presence of  things as well as the quality of their thingliness 
(e.g., what it communicates beyond its initial function or intent).22
 “Artful”  things
Art begins where other modalities of expression fall short. Artistic expression 
pushes against the bound aries established in an effort to compartmentalize 
existence and calls into question the integrity of the discrete categories we 
develop to marshal along our lives. Altars, totems, mirrors, moving images, 
and idols all point to the questions and fundamental concerns that sur-
round existence.23  These are items rendered symbolic and invested with 
such profound significance that we isolate them and make them more than 
mundane, more than ordinary.  There is something about what emerges 
through exhibits that speaks to both the promise and pitfalls of interplay, 
as well as the challenges posed by (and in) the pro cess of interrogating what 
we call life framed within the confines of our existential narratives as we 
know them. The messy nature of  human life and  human interactions is high-
lighted, framed, and signified. What is the role of the artist in this? What 
Danto notes regarding abstract expressionists might be said of Metoyer, for 
whom  there is a self- understanding as guide or shaman urging movement 
into the un/familiar as a way of gauging and coming to know the dynamics 
of interplay.24
Abp How do you determine the arrangement of items in your 
installations?
Am Based on moments, and the language they hold . . .  their 
 imbued nature. . . .  I think of it as a body.25
Shamans of all sorts shift through history marking out pathways and existen-
tial possibilities not other wise pre sent to us. In this way, the trickster figure is 
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a type of Sankofa experience that points forward and backward at the same 
time.26
From self- portraits to pieces urging introspection, Metoyer’s exhibits 
prompt confrontation with historical interplay between  things and offer tools 
for rethinking the embodied and porous (or what Metoyer calls “spiritual”) na-
ture of  human existence. In such a space the rituals and ritualization(s) of life 
are noted, visualized, expressed aesthetically, and interrogated for what they 
say about the embodied and more ephemeral dimensions of our existence— 
our occupation of time and space and our intentional manipulation of both 
as a way of wrestling with (or undertaking a pro cess of ) “exorcism” as fully 
as circumstances allow and as graphically as the geography of encounter can 
bring to bear on bodied naming- things and thing- things torn, fused, torn and 
left unfinished.  These bodied naming- things in transition are also in tran-
sit within a  limited occupation of that space called gallery. Within a finite 
amount of time they engage and are engaged by works of art. Such activity 
involves interaction with what Danto called the “Artworld”—as this “world” 
impinges upon and also pulls us away from the existential circumstances of 
our psyche- physical world(s).27 This is the situation for bodied naming- things.
Abp What do you want to achieve with your installations?
Am A space, a feeling of something  else. . . .  Achievement is that 
space for “something other” to be recognized.28
It is as if the space of the gallery, when framed by Metoyer’s work, takes 
on a diff er ent quality— something akin to what the African ancestors might 
note as a sacred space, or a space set apart. In this space, through the geog-
raphies of encounter presented on canvas, viewers are invited to discover 
something of themselves by discovering something of him (i.e., the artist). 
This is a pre sen ta tion of the self, exposed, pulled apart, and reconfigured. 
And in this pro cess the viewer is pulled in and exposed as well. The bodied 
naming- thing has history flexible and porous— marking the outline of devel-
opments that define the past, position the pre sent, and suggest something of 
what might be called the  future. But could it be any other way? Again,  every 
work of art speaks both a discovery and cover. Cover  here entails containment, 
a type of confinement that pushes into place the bodied naming- thing by 
limiting the grammar and vocabulary of expression available for signifying 
the dominant discourse and its theory of  wholeness (aesthetics). This dis/
covery also speaks to the material employed.
As Metoyer notes, “The materials I employ include ‘excrements of industry,’ 
such as coal, glass, oil, tar and gold dust. With  these tools I explore themes of 
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waste and destruction, and existential issues of life and death.”29 The covered 
materials— the coal, glass, and so on— allow Metoyer and by extension the 
viewers to discover something about themselves and the issues that concern 
them in this pro cess of interplay. This in a sense is the function of mirrors 
within his exhibits.  These mirrors often with an embedded image allow for a 
triadic encounter: the viewer with the thing- thing as art, the viewer with the 
embedded image as other, and the viewer with self. This interaction entails 
an exchange between naming- things and thing- things that affects and influ-
ences through interrogation and inspection. In this regard, Metoyer’s use of 
mirrors as framework for dynamic images (or the picture being an “image 
with a medium”) pre sents a mode of what Hans Belting claims in terms of 
images.30 “The image,” writes Belting, “is defined not by its mere visibility, 
but by it being invested, by the beholder, with a symbolic meaning and a 
kind of  mental ‘frame.’ ”31 One gets a sense of this in Metoyer’s Babies Walk on 
 Water: Pre sent,  Future and Time Travel exhibit in which, according to Steven 
Psyllos, “the weight of Metoyer’s work comes from the multitude of symbols 
brought together to interact before the viewer.”32
Abp Is  there a relationship between artistic production and our 
social conditions?
Am If  there was, then it would begin as early as illustration pro-
paganda. . . .  I feel as if art made for  people should be charged 
with power— something that inspires and something that has 
the power of refraction and reflection.33
The experience, the viewing, is multidimensional and multidirectional; it 
is arranged and guided by means of the placement of the vari ous pieces of 
art, but it is also an open space and time maneuvered and decoded as the 
viewers/participants see fitting in light of what they bring to the  temple 
and what they seek to take away. As Metoyer seeks to highlight, art speaks 
when, where, and how we cannot. Thinking in terms of the images populat-
ing Metoyer’s exhibits, one can argue that images say something about the 
“cultural history of the  human body.”34 Artistic expression pushes against 
the bound aries of our compartmentalized lives and calls into question the 
integrity of the discrete categories we develop to marshal along  those lives. 
From whom or what  were  these signs and symbols taken? To what do  these 
signs and symbols point? What is the frame of reference for  these signs and 
symbols, and how can they be re imagined and reassessed? And what be-
comes of us by means of this work? To what extent should the artist and the 
viewer of the work concern themselves with such considerations? Are such 
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concerns part of art’s nature, or a distraction from art’s motivation and in-
tent? Such questions point to a dynamic interaction between naming- thing 
and thing- thing in ways that push  toward further entanglement.35
Metoyer is not seeking a pure expression of consciousness devoid of con-
tact with the mundane that nags at us; rather, he concerns himself with en-
counters that inform and impinge upon us and upon which we assert some 
influence. The point of departure, the area of concern, and the geography 
of engagement is the mundane— the content of  human experience (direct, 
which means personal; and indirect, which means collective) rather than 
some type of transcendent encounter beyond the scope of communicative 
coding to address. “A work of art,” John Dewey reflects, “no  matter how old 
and classical is actually not just potentiality, a work of art only when it lives 
in some individualized experience.”36 Assumptions of use or utility are sus-
pended.  There is something about the thingliness of  things that allows art 
to express both what is familiar and what is foreign, and in this way  there is 
some thing shared within the experience cata loged and explored.
Related to this claim, take as an example Metoyer’s Self Portrait (1998). It 
is not simply one image of the artist as bodied naming- thing engaging the 
viewer (as naming- thing) straight on (see fig. 3.1). Rather, it is composed of a 
naked, cold figure with arms crossed looking at a blue figure that, holding the 
same body posture, returns the gaze. Between the two is a black “object” with 
an encircled cross at the top, the rest of the object bearing the marks and 
shape of an African ritual item (as thing- thing). The self is multiple, involving 
interrogation of location within and postures  toward the world. The back-
ground shows movement, variously positioned prints of the author’s feet, as 
if he has walked between his selves as part of the pro cess of de/construction. 
In addition,  there are blue shapes resembling African- derived signs and 
symbols, and pieces of paper having other signs and symbols, layered onto 
the canvas. Some of the symbols cover the genital area of the two figures, 
and in this way they speak to the cultural context of the self and perhaps 
the manner in which the gendered body is not the au then tic body to the 
extent symbolic constructions cover the genitals and thereby provide mean-
ing not fixed through sexual organs. Even deeper into the canvas,  behind the 
two selves, is a marked white background that both challenges and connects 
the two figures. The background both merges and disassociates the two be-
ings that anchor this painting. By so  doing, the background pre sents itself as 
having what might be called psychic and visual significance, as opposed to an 
assumption that the background is simply cleared space for pre sen ta tion of 
what “ matters” to the artist and what  will best help the viewer focus. When 
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the viewer attempts to see all that is on and in the canvas, movement is 
highlighted—as if to say the development of identity is not a static and fixed 
determination but rather is a fluid pro cess.
Abp What is art’s function or purpose?
Am In the function  there’s purpose. The medium is the message. 
Push and pull . . .  a space for creating awareness, exercise, based 
on being  human.37
Some might consider work like his self- portrait an indication that Metoyer 
holds to Afrofuturistic sensibilities, to the extent that Afrofuturism consti-
tutes a distinct interrogation of time and space.
Untitled #* demonstrates a similar layering of signs and symbols that shift 
notions of time and space as they mediate and blur distinctions between an 
African past and an American pre sent, and what this means for the plausibil-
ity of a  future marked by a difference (see fig. 3.2). The figure in this piece, 
a pale figure looking down with genitals covered by hands clasped in front, 
has an intense appearance— something of a grimace on the face as signs and 
symbols swirl around. The stern look and the covering of genitals speak to 
targets of racial vio lence— destroying emotional and psychological well- being 
and attempting to render docile the bodied naming- thing. It is impor tant to 
remember that the lynching of blacks often involved the removal of the gen-
itals as a symbolic statement concerning the power to control. In addition, 
 there are African images and spheres within spheres upon which the figure 
stands, combined with what appears to be a red branch of a tree pushing up 
and through the figure, who remains transfixed.
Within the inner portion of the background of Untitled #*,  there is a black 
spotted line coming out of the spheres and pushing  behind the figure to 
the top of the canvas. Coming out of the figure from the elbow to the top of the 
head are lines that resemble the visual pre sen ta tion of energy, an intensity 
that matches the facial expression, which speaks to the serious nature of the fig-
ure’s situation— stuck, still, but marked by transition.  These ele ments moving 
around and in the figure are not mere static  things. They speak to a depth, 
a shifting sphere of influence and perspective that take the viewer from 
some undisclosed period of Africanness to the pre sent moment in which the 
viewer engages the naked figure. The viewer is encouraged to think about 
the implications of the imagery, particularly the manner in which issues of 
being (as constituting a quality of “closed off from . . .”) are arranged in terms 
of types of thingliness unpacked and explored. This is done using a variety of 
imaginaries to both code and decode concerns and conditionings that fuel 
3.1  Self Portrait (1998). Used by permission of the Zi Koolhaas- Metoyer Trust and 
Angelbert Metoyer.
3.2  Untitled #*. Used by permission of Angelbert Metoyer.
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and inform  thing interplay. The naming- thing in Untitled #* and the naming- 
thing in the self- portrait are not simply repre sen ta tions of the physical form 
of naming- things but are also the gelling of cultural signs and markers (as di-
mensions of interplay).
speculAting on  things
I’m a cut out Life is not a mirror display, but it has a reflective quality to it. 
 Behind glass, the shadowlike figure seems deep in thought, with signs and 
symbols related to vari ous metaphysical concerns swimming around it 
(see fig. 3.3). And all this requires attention and speculation as to what their 
presence and arrangement entails for the artist. The color red that outlines 
vari ous geometric shapes is pronounced due to the rather subtle and faded 
colors of yellow, gray, and black that make up much of the background. On 
the left side is a quarter moon, and on the far right is a sphere. Letters and 
signs speak a symbolic language of meaning, one that is couched in embodi-
ment and unfixed by the gaze. The viewer has to decipher, in a sense,  things 
in that the marks are not without significance. They have a presence beyond 
their initial look; they have a depth that points to concerns and tensions. 
And Metoyer pre sents them in such a manner as to make the viewer probe 
and explore— pushing for impulses. His work is meant to question and ul-
timately challenge the fixity of  things as  things—as epistemologically one- 
dimensional “stuff.” Instead, they become passageways exposing markers 
that prompt us to view and respond to what confronts us and challenges our 
desired being as closed and  whole.
While not challenging the thingliness of the door in this piece,  Father 
(2000) pushes against the aesthetics of two worlds held apart. The piece cen-
ters around a male dressed in a black suit, shoes, and with a somber look. The 
expression is a bit difficult to read in that the face is marked and shaded. Yet 
around the head is an aura usually associated with the glow of divinity, and 
above that glow and seated on the figure’s head is a striped platform upon 
which rests a white bowl— somewhat resembling a christening container hold-
ing “blessed”  water (see fig. 3.4). The arms are folded  behind the back, with 
the item on the head held by the stoic posture of the figure. Cutting in front 
of the figure is a white “X”  running halfway through the painting, and con-
nected to this is an “X” that runs  behind the figure. The “X,” the unknown— 
graphically represented, for example, in the teachings of the Nation of Islam 
as replacement for the slave name, for slave mentality and culture— then 
cuts through the figure, marking the heart of the figure and cutting through 
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the back of the legs. The emotional and physical dimensions of the figure are 
marked by uncertainty. Symbols of an African divinity and other cultural 
codes are pre sent and arranged around the figure— including a star (perhaps 
noting insight) and a ladder (marking progression) to the figure’s right. Afri-
can symbols, with faint figures of persons, are on the left. Words and num-
bers are pre sent, but they do not demand the same attention as the African 
figures pasted onto the paper. They are recognizable but feed background 
concerns and considerations that do not figure so prominently in this work. 
Near the feet and  behind the figure is a black arch with white strips painted 
on it. At the right end of the arch— from the figure’s perspective—is a boat, 
3.3  I’m a cut out Life. Used by permission of the Zi Koolhaas- Metoyer Trust and 
Angelbert Metoyer.
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with the sail and flag raised high, and above that sail is the star mentioned 
 earlier. The star is often assumed to provide guidance, but in this instance, it 
is also connected to the bottom of the “X” that cuts across his chest— tying 
knowledge to lack of knowledge, and lucidity to a lack of awareness. The Eu-
ro pean aesthetic of the suit is countered by the aesthetic  shaped by an Afri-
can sensibility. A type of “fixity”  counters motion and is exposed as unfixed.
 There is a tension promoted by thing- things placed against each other. That 
is to say, thing- things noted for their thingliness point a way. They are in this 
sense complex and layered arrangements of signs and symbols— a conduit of 
sorts— that gathers some of their emphasis through contact within the gal-
lery space and contact between artistic “ things” and viewers who enter an-
ticipating that the art  will “speak” to them, or that it should speak to them 
and should be recognizable as art not for its own sake but for their sake.
Abp How do you pick items for your installations?
Am I’m  really comparing what’s  there. My real exhibition exercise 
is in the studio. This taxation results in a group morph ing that 
constructs something more than was initially pre sent. . . .  My 
practice propels me to be more like someone who tends to the 
work, like a gardener or farmer.38
 Things are and are not what they seem to be: They have a diff er ent and much 
more complex significance in that they come to be and represent multiple 
planes that extend beyond the  thing itself to what it signifies and what it 
transforms. As  things, and from par tic u lar perspectives, “ things” are opaque, 
or dense, but  there is another dimension to their import that renders them 
transparent—an opening by means of which we view larger considerations. 
This is the kaleidoscope effect of artistic expression.
Consider again the Vévé— the design made with  things but that is believed 
to speak to an opening to worlds beyond  those  things that cannot be accessed 
without the Vévé’s aid. This opening urges a certain range of questions as 
the symbol system is encountered: What are  those  things? What do they 
achieve when arranged in par tic u lar ways? In that, as Ian Hodder notes, 
“ things are not isolated,” and “ things are not inert.”39  These are the ques-
tions concerning the porous nature of  things that prompt and guide much of 
Metoyer’s work.  There is not a value judgment attached to this looking into 
 things as a  matter of artistic expression; rather, such simply is the nature of 
 things when they are arranged consciously in time and space and are available 
to be viewed deeply— that is, in the context of their openness. Or, as Heather 
Pesanti notes, “Angelbert Metoyer is another kind of storyteller, perhaps a 
3.4  Father (2000). Used by permission of Angelbert Metoyer.
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cosmological nomad interpreting the past, pre sent, and  future through an ar-
tistic lens. Fact and fiction weave together in the story of his life and work, 
hinting at existential theories and fragmented memories of personal experi-
ence through painting, installations, sculpture, video and  music.”40 Art, the 
conscious placement in time and space of thing- things that in turn reshape 
that time and space by means of their thingliness, opens rather than closes 
off, exposes rather than limits,  because “a work of art shows me the world I 
inhabit; it shows me what a world is.”41
This is certainly one way to think about Dear Sirius- A (2015). The top half 
of the piece is a gold- framed mirror— offering the viewer an opportunity to 
examine the naming- thing, to view it as centered against the other thing- 
things reflected by the mirror. The bottom portion, painted blue, contains 
the covered image of a Eu ro pean  woman with head bent. Between the mir-
ror and this image of the  woman is an African symbol. The image of self 
is viewed against the self, against a Eurocentric rendition of beauty and 
importance—or perfected self— and this is connected to the symbolism of 
Africa as artifact. The viewer also recognizes that  these three images emerge 
out of a door, which is a  thing opening space to other space— and inner space 
to outer space. The door is a passage between locations and in this way a 
means by which the self is transported and transfigured in relationship to 
other selves initially hidden from our gaze. This is a pro cess that begins di-
rectly  after birth when, as a baby, one interacts with and absorbs “material” 
from  others, while also reshaping  those same  people through contact.42 It is 
a mutual and existential shifting that takes place.43  There is in this pro cess a 
foreboding, a tension captured so well by Camus: “The contradiction is this: 
man rejects the world as it is, without accepting the necessity of escaping 
it. In fact, men cling to the world and by far the majority do not want to 
abandon it. Far from always wanting to forget it, they suffer, on the contrary, 
from not being able to possess it completely enough, estranged citizens of 
the world, exiled from their own country.”44 Such is a journey made pos si ble 
by the charged space of the  temple. Yes, again, the gallery is a  temple of sorts, 
in which time and space have a par tic u lar charge that urges recognition 
of connection to other naming- things and thing- things.45 The  temple, as 
Metoyer demonstrates, is a space defined by ritual movement and the mark-
ers of that movement— all drawn from us while drawing us to (and into) it. It 
highlights par tic u lar cartographies— entering diff er ent space marked by de/
construction of assumed cultural codes used to articulate and arrange the 
accepted technologies for socially authorized living.46 In other words, in a 
vein of thought not completely dissimilar from that offered by John Dewey, 
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“The product of art . . .  is not the work of art. The work takes pace when a 
 human being cooperates with the product.”47 Hence, one might say that the 
thingliness of  things has something to do with the transmutability of  things, 
which is the ability to transition, reflect, and mark.
Altars, totems, mirrors, moving images, and idols all point to questions 
that surround our existence, questions that have such profound signifi-
cance that we isolate them and make them more than mundane, more than 
ordinary— all in an effort to hide our porous/open nature by practices of 
distinction. However, as Metoyer’s work is meant to highlight, altars, totems, 
and so forth actually provide a passage to new dimensions by offering items 
that tug at bodied naming- things. Metoyer invites entrance in space framed, 
arranged, and outfitted with what is meant to foster a deeper view. Art and 
artistic display become prompts for exposure using vocabulary and grammar 
that privilege crafting of openness over against the descriptive properties 
of words to close off. Jade Buddha and I- AOI (Room Full of Mirrors) speak to 
the fluidity of identification as bodied naming- things and perception as the 
viewer confronts a mirror by means of which the viewer is also confronted 
by another image— a pre sen ta tion that is both foreign and familiar. It is this 
awkward position of knowing something about what the mirror offers while 
also having not experienced that “something” that enhances the dissonance 
framing alternate modalities of possibility. It is a confrontation with the 
world as it impinges upon the “me” and “us” it has formed incompletely. 
 There is in this gaze and the movement it prompts space for interrogation, 
for challenge, for desire. It is in this space that Metoyer wrestles with the dy-
namics of being a bodied naming- thing— a  thing at the intersection of time 
and memory; the overlap of personal and collective histories; technologies 
of self- understanding in relationship to larger, more “objective” consider-
ations of meaning; and all this in relationship to notions of knowledge 
and wisdom.48  There, according to Metoyer’s work, is no necessary or full 
distinction between the self,  others, and the world. The barrier is a  matter 
of awareness, of lucidity, rather than necessary ontological distinction. This 
involves a searching for ontological cover in a situation of epistemological 
exposure.
The viewer might expect to see herself and see herself reflected back— 
presenting a dimension of the self not normally realized and inspected. This 
would be the typical and comfortable experience, yet in Jade Buddha the mir-
ror exposes the faint image of the Buddha— and reflects back a disregard for 
the materiality of existence (see fig. 3.5). It positions the viewer over against a 
subtle quest for awareness that means a certain type of dismissiveness. The 
3.5  Jade Buddha. Used by permission of the Zi Koolhaas- Metoyer Trust and 
 Angelbert Metoyer.
3.6  I- AOI (Room Full of Mirrors). Used by permission of Angelbert Metoyer.
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viewer engages a mechanism of self- awareness and sees in that moment the 
reflected presence of one who taught rejection of desire as a certain mode 
of self- regard. Something of a reprimand is evident in the eyes, and the look 
of the Buddha is both gentle and piercing. Something about that expression 
calls attention to the viewer’s position and offers a soft call for introspection 
that goes deeper than the physical outline of one’s existence evident in the 
reflected self. The I- AOI (Room Full of Mirrors) does not contain the same 
type of stoic look back at the viewer, but rather the viewer is confronted by 
the stare of the artist. An intense and displeased gaze confronts the viewer, 
whose natu ral inclination might be to won der what occasioned this facial 
expression (see fig. 3.6). It probes subjectivity in relation to  others by urg-
ing par tic u lar questions: What has occasioned that look? Why does that 
look impact me? How long must I entertain that look? Do I ever have such 
a look, and if so, in relation to whom? What are the consequences of this look 
for  those to whom or at whom it is directed? How might they respond to this 
look, and what might that response mean to or do to me? The gaze sparks 
inspection and introspection, and the hope for Metoyer is that this pro cess 
produces greater clarity regarding oneself and one’s surroundings.
From self- portraits to pieces urging introspection, Metoyer’s work taken 
together prompts confrontation with (personal and collective) history and 
offers tools for rethinking the embodied and “spiritual” nature of existence 
beyond what the word can carry. And it thereby pushes into what the fluid-
ity of bound aries between  things (form and function) might entail. In such 
space the rituals of life are noted, expressed, and interrogated for what they 
say about the embodied and more ephemeral dimensions of our existence— 
our occupation of time and space as bodied naming- things in relationship to 
thing- things. In the next chapter, attention is turned away from the pre sen-
ta tion of thing- things, to the manipulation of the naming- thing as a way to 
speak openness— the fluidity of bound aries.
I think twenty- first  century should be art without objects.
— mArinA AbrAmovic, tv interview
Oh my body, make of me always a man who questions!
— frAntz fAnon, Black Skin, White Masks
The following scene is from The New Disciples, a novel I wrote a few years ago:
[Marina] Abramovic and [Kira] O’Reilly explore the ways in which pain 
and manipulation of the body allow interrogation of the limits of the body. 
 These artists we saw that after noon did that through cutting themselves 
with a series of knives and having it recorded. One of the artists was on a 
stage surrounded by the audience and the other was below the floorboards 
with a similar set of knives, and he mirrored the artist on stage by cut-
ting himself on the opposite arm for example, or leg. According to the 
posted information, the purpose was to demonstrate the links between 
the vis i ble body and the unconscious represented by the artist below the 
stage. The idea . . .  is to test the limits of the body, to unpack and expose 
the way the manipulation of the body is felt and perceived. The fact that 
both artists  were standing in what seemed awkward and perhaps pain-
ful positions was meant to increase the viewer’s awareness of the ways in 
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which pain is communicated and how it informs our thought and be hav-
ior. The body becomes both the means for understanding sensation and 
also the product of sensation. The body becomes fully aware of itself and 
known by  others.1
In this section of the story a professor provides context for questionable 
activity: She had used the manipulation (i.e., cutting) of bodies to fuel the 
creativity necessary to finish the book that would gain her tenure. In the quo-
tation above, she is discussing with a priest,  Father Ford, what first triggered 
her turn to the physical penetration of the bodied naming- thing. She comes 
to realize a deep connection between herself as a naming- thing and her cir-
cumstances. In her case, the cutting of other naming- things, and eventu-
ally herself, produced states of mind and being that entailed a reimaging 
of relationships: naming- thing— thing- thing— naming- thing— thing- thing, 
and so on. The knife (thing- thing) and the body (naming- thing) cut by the 
knife gave her sensations that made pos si ble the production of her manuscript 
(thing- thing).
Per for mance
My  limited encounter with Marina Abramovic inspired for me possibilities 
concerning the ways in which manipulation of bodied naming- things vis- à- vis 
exchange with other naming- things in relationship to thing- things might add 
perspective to my pre sen ta tion of religion as a technology.2 The vibrant en-
counter between time, space, naming- things, and other  things all entwined 
captures, reads, and thinks that mapping of interplay. Per for mance art, then, 
is always and already a  matter of interconnections to and between vari ous 
cultural codes and social programs.3 By extension,  there is, I argue, a symbiotic 
relationship between art—in this case per for mance art— and religion as a tech-
nology in that they enact the same consideration on what Amelia Jones in 
another context calls “a diff er ent register.”4 I would add that this alternate 
“register” includes a grammar and vocabulary that capture what religion 
as a technology exposes, and articulates it mindful of its inherent fluidity. 
While still entailing a mediated modality of expression, its permissive and 
provocative nature gives per for mance art a receptive quality that makes 
it ideal for exposing and naming openness and interplay.5 Per for mance art, 
as it is, implodes traditional arrangements of religious practices and teach-
ings in the form of traditions such as Roman Catholicism and Protestant 
Pentecostalism, but it is just the type of structuring of experience that can 
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enliven religion as I have sought to define and pre sent it— a theorization of 
religion that assumes no intentional forms, privileges no par tic u lar intent, 
and challenges the very nature of religion as a “something” as opposed to 
a method of seeing.6 This mode of artistic activity “embodies” the inclina-
tions advanced by this technology regarding the openness of  things in that it 
“has been a medium that challenges and violates borders between disciplines 
and genders, between private and public, and between everyday life and art, 
and that follows no rules.”7 The resulting and central questions are as fol-
lows: What are the limits of the naming- thing, and what are the limits of 
the naming- thing’s ability to “speak” through the manipulation of itself as 
thing- thing? What are the necessary (if any distinctions) between bodied 
naming- thing and thing- thing?
What I intend to portray in the following pages  will become clear. But for 
now, I simply point to an observation made by Allan Kaprow regarding the 
nature and function of art. He refuses to make a distinction between life and 
art, instead referencing “lifelike art” over against “artlike art.”8 The  latter as-
sumes art is a distinct modality of expression that is disconnected from mun-
dane experience in any significant way. However, the former reflects art as 
already and always connected to life. It is, in his words, “art in the ser vice of 
life.”9 It is this posture or function of “ser vice” that is significant  here. But 
rather than life in more general terms, I posit the benefit of understanding 
(and interrogating) art as the pre sen ta tion of the openness of  things. This is 
more than religious art, and more fundamentally lodged in the structuring 
of thing- things and naming- things than that. Or, as Kaprow notes regarding 
“lifelike art,” “It is not a ‘ thing’ like a piece of  music or a sculpture that is put 
into a special art container or setting. It is inseparable from real life.”10
On the Art of Per for mance
The development of per for mance art is tied to sociopo liti cal shifts and 
changes in cultural sensibilities ( toward collective life) during tumultuous 
years of the mid- twentieth  century. Old artistic postures and assump-
tions failed to capture the times. Hence, “work,” writes Lynn MacRitchie, 
“which came to be called live or per for mance art emerged most powerfully 
in Eu rope and the United States at moments of artistic or social crisis, when 
formal aesthetic or social structures  were perceived to be inadequate or had 
actually collapsed.”11 Marked by World War II and followed by the Vietnam 
War, the trauma of vio lence on an international level, in all its existential 
madness, could not be soothed or even explored using artistic practices that 
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maintained as stable the naming- things that  were in fact the fuel for world 
conditions. Per for mance art entailed confrontation so as to urge reconsidera-
tion of naming- things by, in a deep and significant way, linking what they do 
to what they are.
Hence, using per for mance art, I make a turn and consider how one might 
think about bodied naming- things manipulating themselves as thing- 
things and thereby blurring if not destroying distinction.12 This turn further 
shifts dynamics and creates awareness that neither naming- things nor thing- 
things have fixed meaning or function. Both are defined in a significant 
manner through their “li- ness”: naming- thingliness and thing- thingliness. 
 Here “li- ness” is meant to suggest a par tic u lar vibrancy that calls attention 
to the “qualities” of the naming- thing and thing- thing and in the pro cess 
draws viewers and artists into circumstances other wise invisible.13 The con-
flation of naming- thing and thing- thing fosters this move  because, again, 
it rejects the assumption of sustainable distinction.14 A clear example of 
this is Jim Dine’s The Smiling Workman (1960) in which, “dressed in a red 
smock, with hands and head painted red, and a large black mouth, he drank 
from jars of paint while painting ‘I love what I’m . . .’ on a large canvas, before 
pouring the remaining paint over his head and leaping through the canvas.”15
To the extent it concerns itself with the portrayal of life in its ordinary 
arrangements and activities, per for mance art often requires a “space” of ex-
change beyond the restrictions of the formal gallery. Artistic movements 
such as Pop Art, Neo- Expressionism, and so on raised questions concerning 
the proper form and content of art, yet the questions raised by per for mance 
art push through a refusal to allow firm bound aries between artist and 
viewer. It raises issues regarding the nature of art but pushes the boundary 
by not simply challenging the nature of a thing- thing as art (i.e., Pop Art) or 
the naming- thing as the proper story and source of art, but instead it blurs 
the line between naming- thing and thing- thing.16 I say this mindful of the 
manner in which per for mance art’s “in the moment” quality supports my as-
sertions but also poses a challenge noted by numerous scholars and artists: 
few are able to experience this mode of art “in real time” but rather come to 
know it through books, films, photo graphs, and so forth that reify it some-
what and move it at least a degree or two away from the initial expression 
of interplay. This work is of a  limited duration. “Live” per for mance destabi-
lizes by removing the opportunity to fix and reflect. The “work” of art takes 
place in “real” time and demands attention without the ability to hold and 
pro cess at a  later moment. It’s gone, done, and  there are memory and repre-
sen ta tions to provide a cartography of engagement and response. As Laurie 
the “stuff” of per for mance 87
Anderson says when reflecting on developments during the late twentieth 
 century, “Live art is especially ephemeral. Once performed, it tends to be-
come myth and a few photos and tapes.” It is, in a word, “an art form that 
resists documentation.”17 Still, this qualification notwithstanding, it offers a 
useful framework.  There is support for my argument regarding the  limited 
impact of this qualification in a thought offered by Laurie Carlos: “It is the ele-
ment of duration, of time, that is at the heart of a per for mance. But  there is a 
time of experiencing and a time of memory, of reliving in the imagination, and 
 there is no essential contradiction between the two.”18 Nonetheless, the “live” 
quality also demands the involvement of other naming- things; demands can 
be made of the viewer that cannot be made when the viewer leaves the space 
and enters back into familiar restraint. To directly encounter per for mance 
art in the moment is to be pulled and pushed, to have naming- things en-
gaged and challenged.19  There are more pointed examples of this, such as 
“do- it- yourself artworks” in connection to which the viewer might be given 
a series of instructions or invitations that involve her  doing the art by follow-
ing the prompts provided.20
The ability to buy per for mance art would entail a falling back into dis-
tinction between naming- things and thing- things that this modality of art 
intends to disrupt. It is not knowledge for purchase; instead, it is to be expe-
rienced. Nonetheless, this statement is accurate only if “owner ship” is un-
derstood in par tic u lar ways. When per for mance artists such as Yves Klein 
“sold” art, the transaction was simply symbolic and pointed to the inability 
to actually own the art with which he concerned himself. In other words,
Klein sought a way to evaluate his “immaterial pictorial sensitivity” and 
de cided that pure gold would be a fair exchange. He offered to sell it to any 
person willing to purchase such an extraordinary, if intangible, commod-
ity, in exchange for gold leaf. . . .  Gold leaf and a receipt changed hands 
between the artist and the purchaser. But since “immaterial sensitivity” 
could be nothing but a spiritual quality, Klein insisted that all remains of 
the transaction be destroyed: he threw the gold leaf into the river [Seine, 
February 10, 1962] and requested that the purchaser burn the receipt.21
Still, one should mea sure this act of commercialism against reflection on per-
for mance art by  others like Clifford Owens, who says the following when 
thinking about more recent developments: “ After all, dealers  don’t profit 
from per for mance art  unless they inflate the value of documentary photo-
graphs of per for mances; hustle performance- based videos on dvd a prac-
tice I find criminal and exploitative; or sell dumb per for mance objects as 
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 sculpture. And museums and institutions generally  don’t fund per for mance 
art events  because they are not willing to jeopardize federal funding or take 
curatorial risk.”22 The questionable ability to directly buy per for mance art 
as noted  here does not mean it is beyond containment, cannot be captured 
so to speak, or that it cannot be made a moment in the historical rec ord. 
Books, cata logues, interviews, articles, and so forth capture not the moment 
of performance— its quality of movement— but rather they allow an “artist’s 
print” or a shadow or still shot of the event. I say this merely to provide a bit 
of balance by acknowledging the temporality of per for mance art— its re sis-
tance to confinement— while also noting the manner in which it is unable to 
fully and fi nally escape re- presentation or repetition.23 On this point, keep 
in mind the words of Clifford Owens: “Copyrighting has never  really been 
about art. Copyrighting is about commerce, commodities. One reason 
I’ve always been interested in per for mance art is that it  isn’t easily com-
modifiable. Some  people are making a living at it. I’ve been fortunate enough 
to sell some work, but this practice was never intended as a moneymaker. In 
fact, it’s costing a fortune (laughter).”24
Drawing inspiration directly or indirectly from figures such as Dada art-
ist Duchamp and  housed most firmly in Northern California and New York 
City, some body artists or per for mance artists, as they  were called as of the 
1970s, understood the naming- thing as a material by means of and through 
which art was produced. That is to say, through Duchamp’s ready- mades or 
manipulations of the physical body, an artistic move developed that refused 
to distinguish the body over against other materials. Distinction between the 
naming- thing and thing- things— found or created— had  little significance 
 because product no longer was an impor tant dimension of art. To the ex-
tent the clothed naming- thing was often viewed at least aesthetically as a 
distinct  thing, par tic u lar modalities of per for mance art often involved the 
naming- thing without such covering, but instead the naked body became 
similar to any other uncovered  thing pre sent and open to manipulation and 
use— but also holding a certain integrity of form.25
Dada (and the early twentieth- century German school of “total” art called 
Bauhaus, for that  matter) manipulated the body and called for more attention 
to pro cess, as opposed to a finished and fixed “piece” that could be called art, 
but per for mance art— particularly in its more aggressive forms— interrogates 
the very distinction between naming- things and thing- things. Furthermore, 
it involves viewers in this questioning in new and at times disturbing ways.26 
The 1959 18 Happenings in 6 Parts by Allan Kaprow at the Reuben Gallery in 
New York City— with its slides,  music, readings, and so forth, all conducted 
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in three rooms— “changed the game,” so to speak, and marked a major shift in 
per for mance art  toward the practices with which we are most familiar.27 Still, 
the meaning of per for mance art— that is, what is captured (and excluded) by 
that concept— remained somewhat illusive. “Per for mance is dead! Long live 
per for mance! This [so it goes] declaration reflects the paradoxical situation 
in which we find ourselves when we consider a con temporary understanding 
of per for mance within the sphere of visual art.”28 Despite tensions between 
differing ideas of per for mance art’s content and meaning,  there seems at least 
one common  factor: naming- thing, as fixed, stable, and distinct, is troubled 
often in graphic and aggressive ways.29 “Per for mance art,” writes Dominic 
Johnson, “emerges as a means of testing how to live—to live more fully, more 
atypically, more perversely or more effectively than one might do without the 
sustaining practice of per for mance.”30 Any effort to sanitize art, to render it 
devoid of material consequence, to give it a purpose beyond the connotations 
of material life, was rejected as naming- things  were pushed to the point of 
breaking and  were exposed to pain and suffering. Thing- things and naming- 
things  were brought into a felt interrelationality.
The naming- thing is put on display in certain instances, and in this pro cess 
it is connected to thing- things in such a way as to reconfigure both— thereby 
becoming a way of filtering historical experience by absorbing par tic u lar di-
mensions of it and dismissing  others. Lynn MacRitchie, in reflecting on the 
function of per for mance art in the late twentieth  century, says, “The real 
and terrible destruction wrought by two world wars had made a mockery of 
any idealization of violent social change, however, and the development 
of live work post 1945 followed a dual path. While continuing to expand and 
explore its original premise of the critique of the position and purpose of the 
art object and the academic institutions, artists’ own bodies, their physical 
being, came to be considered as a site of knowledge and a vehicle for affect-
ing healing and transformation.”31 Conscious occupation of time and space 
took on a new significance with per for mance art.
Performing Art
In some per for mance art the porous nature of the bodied naming- thing is 
highlighted through manipulation— exposing it naked and hypervisible. With 
regard to vio lence inflicted, per for mance art chronicles the manner in which 
penetration speaks to levels of clarity and lucidity that are valueless other-
wise.32 A pro cess of mutilation and ritualized pain renders the naming- thing 
somehow more than itself. Outside such ritualized infliction known within 
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traditional modalities of religious systems, per for mance art in general and 
body art or live art in par tic u lar seek to make felt (through the testing of 
strength and endurance of interplay) the manner in which thingliness is vi-
brant.  Going back to Camus’s analy sis of Sisyphus, this heightened awareness, 
one would think, has something to do with the stress and strain— physicality 
as ritualized discomfort:33
As for the myth, one sees merely the  whole effort of a body straining to 
raise the huge stone, to roll it and push it up a slope a hundred times 
over; one sees A face screwed up, the cheek tight against the stone, the 
shoulder bracing the Clay- covered mass, the foot wedging it, the fresh start 
with arms outstretched, the wholly  human security of two earth- clotted 
hands. . . .  It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests 
me. . . .  That hour like a breathing- space which Returns as surely as his suf-
fering, that is the hour of consciousness.34
Think of Camus’s depiction of Sisyphus’s pain. This is not a theodical descrip-
tion in that it flies in the face of the gods as opposed to marking out an 
effort to justify them. Instead, it speaks to Sisyphus’s per for mance (art) as a 
means of framing a pro cess of exploration that urges a rethinking. Now com-
pare Camus’s depiction of Sisyphus and his stone to the description of the 
self- mutilation or living art of Ron Athey.  There are clear distinctions, but 
a shared perception of naming- thing in pain as source of lucidity— without 
a theodical twist. “In Athey’s work,” remarks Dominic Johnson, “the trium-
phant conversion of disaster into a type of agency perhaps relies on his ap-
propriation of body modification, as a troubled yet potent means of claiming 
agency over one’s own body.”35 Sisyphus and his stone pushed, and Athey and 
his body pierced, point to the working of the naming- thing as/with thing- 
things. Sisyphus, monitored by the  will of the gods, and Athey, always aware 
of the types of confinement that sociocultural codes of conduct mean within 
the West, offer body per for mance as response to authoritative demands for 
unity. In both instances, movement as per for mance of ritualized pain en-
tails an artistic tackling of experience without much regard for traditional 
entertainment quality.36 In a belligerent twist, both Sisyphus and Athey 
defy notions of the divine as distinct— Sisyphus through his defiance and 
Athey through his re- presentation of Christian my thol ogy (e.g., martyrdom 
of saints reenacted). Per for mance art emphasizes the manner in which the 
naming- thing and thing- thing do not simply connect but instead become 
indistinguishable over against traditional markers of difference or relation-
ship; the affective language of this is “pain” and “ecstasy.”
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Per for mance art amplifies activity over against the consequences of that 
activity (e.g., static work of art that exists  after the “happening”). By so  doing, 
it undercuts the ability to single out the naming- thing as that which produces 
thing- things— with the distinction lodged in the reified form of the thing- 
thing over against the active naming- thing. Still, the consequence remains 
somewhat consistent: per for mance art urges interrogation of  things for what 
they tell us about circumstances and relationships to  those circumstances. 
In its most graphic forms, per for mance art uses extreme manipulations of 
the naming- thing to bring to the fore a fluidity of form that in turn opens to 
increased awareness. For example, Metoyer’s exhibits bring viewers into play 
as they move around the works and are drawn into the conversations urged 
by the configuration of new and found thing- things, and in this way they 
are brought into a framework of questioning themselves as naming- things. 
Yet this is not the same as the manner in which per for mance art brings the 
viewer into the proj ect as part of the pro cess of artistic expression. What is 
Abramovic’s Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Pre sent without viewers sitting 
across from her, looking back into her as she sits motionless looking into 
them?37
Time and space remain the location, so to speak, for art, but neither is 
confined or cata loged in the same manner as when the traditional matrix of 
presence is used. That is to say, what “gallery” means alters through use.38 Per-
for mance art— with its emphasis on pro cess rather than product— configures 
time and space without concern with traditional thinking on artistic loca-
tions (in that the naming- thing and thing- things are the mobile location), 
but it is not ahistorical— for example, Ron Athey’s work reflects on church 
history and does so as theater. Referencing the shift to per for mance art, 
Henry Sayre says the following: “Art is no longer that  thing in which full- 
fledged aesthetic experience is held perpetually pre sent; art no longer tran-
scends history; instead, it admits its historicity, its implication in time.”39 
The activity or pro cess is hidden within other modalities of expression dis-
cussed in this volume. Only documentaries about the artists or their films, 
in the case of Metoyer, offer a glimpse into pro cess, but this is an aside 
easily distinguished from the product, which is the primary focus for the 
artist. With per for mance art, the name— although its descriptive quality 
 will ebb and flow— says so much about its focus: per for mance/pro cess. 
Perhaps  there is something about this arrangement, this commitment to 
pro cess over against old standards of product, that lingers in the words of 
Abramovic. “The hardest  thing,” she reflects, “is to do something which is 
close to nothing.”40
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Thing- things used by a naming- thing are typically covered or transformed 
in such a way as to hide their initial design and utility. For example, pieces of 
paper no longer serve to pre sent a complete image put in place by a naming- 
thing, and a refrigerator is no longer used to store foodstuffs. With per for-
mance art, thing- things and their initial function (e.g., knives are made to 
cut  things) are not hidden but highlighted, and what is changed or made less 
vis i ble are assumptions regarding the anthropology of the bodied naming- 
thing and its defined integrity. This is not the context of the surgery room, 
where naming- things use thing- things to maintain the distinct integrity of 
the naming- thing over against the tool used in the pro cess. Still, even a medi-
cal space can serve as the location for body art, or per for mance art. One need 
only keep in mind the per for mance of body pain used to speak the porous 
and troubling nature of the naming- thing as represented by French artist 
Orlan, who used plastic surgery as a method of “bio- art” by means of which 
public surgeries serve to, in the words of Amelia Jones, test “the integrity of 
the embodied self by literally slicing through its bound aries.”41 It is true that 
technological advances through artificial limbs and so on become means by 
which thing- things alter naming- things, but not in ways that speak to the 
same public display of a porous or penetrable quality that remains vis i ble 
rather than hidden. That is to say, the artificial limb is intended to be hidden; 
bio- art, as done by Orlan, is meant to keep vis i ble and in tension foreignness 
and sameness. With technological change, the idea is to hide the penetration 
of the thing- thing so as to enhance the naming- thing as unified.42 But this is 
not so with per for mance art.
Bringing Something to  Things
While the social coding layered on naming- things is discussed more fully in 
the final section of the book, it is impor tant to say at this point that some per-
for mance art— for example, as produced by  women and racial minorities— 
constantly reminds viewers that the sign of cultural penetrations marks  these 
naming- things even before the artist “marks” them. Issues related to the cul-
tural constructions of race, gender, and sexuality  were often explored using 
per for mance art, and  there is much to think about in such attacks on the con-
finements of cultural constructions.43 As Valerie Cassel Oliver reflects,
For black artists, the emphasis on “body as material” does not come with-
out its own historical tethers. The black body carries within it signifiers 
and markers that are deeply rooted in historical narratives. They embody 
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the evolution, transcendence, and complexities of that same body long 
ago unshackled, affirmed, self- determined, and now immersed in myriad 
discourses that encompass multiethnic heritages, gender, and queer and 
transgender identity, as well as uncharted otherness. The performing self 
is at times the embodiment of the collective, and at other times it is sim-
ply the liberated individual exploring the conundrum of his or her own 
multifaceted being.44
A graphic example that binds together race, gender, and sexuality is Sally’s 
Rape by Robbie McCauley and Jeannie Hutchins. It involves McCauley, an 
African American, on an auction block with members of the audience being 
directed by Hutchins, a white  woman, to bid on McCauley.45 One can add 
Spider  Woman Theater, Bill T. Jones, and Arnie Zane Com pany, who explore 
issues of cultural configurations of race and gender.46 Or  there is something 
of what I am suggesting in the words of Lea Vergine when reflecting on body 
art turns in the 1990s:
The use of the body as a language has returned to the scene of the world 
around us in new and diff er ent forms, and it speaks through altered dec-
linations. The body as triumphant, immolated, diffused, propagated, dra-
matic, and tragic. The po liti cal, social, and mystic body. The body as 
the site of the extreme. . . .  By way of tattoos, piercings, and citations 
of tribalism. Through manipulations of its organs. The instrument that 
speaks and communicates without the word, or sounds, or drawing. The 
body as a vehicle, once again, for declaring opposition to the dominant 
culture, but also of desperate conformism.47
Per for mance art by African Americans, like its counter parts (i.e., per-
for mance art by non– African Americans), pushes the naming- thing/thing- 
thing dynamic and does so within the context of a public. The encounter 
happens in a way that is reminiscent of what takes place within the context 
of white artists. The bodied naming- thing in both contexts— white artists 
and black artists—is supple, flexible, porous, penetrated, shifted, marked, and 
changed as it flows between what we have typically regarded as fixed catego-
ries of meaning: subject and object. Yet  there is another dimension to per for-
mance art by African Americans that is inherent. In a word,  there are other 
cultural codes (e.g., blackness, blackness and gender, blackness and gender 
and class) assigned to  those naming- things, other ways in which the blend-
ing of naming- thing/thing- thing is challenged, but in this case not for the 
benefit of African Americans. The challenges of being and  doing that have 
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 shaped the racial, sexual, and class (and, for black  women, gender) dynamics 
defining the discourse on bodies in the United States is not bracketed off by 
per for mance art. Yes, per for mance art provides a way of interrogating, but 
it does so from within epistemological frameworks and strategies that speak 
to and about naming- things even as artists challenge  these frameworks. This 
amplifies questions of what  these naming- things are  doing and what distin-
guishes them from other  things— both having been understood historically 
as valuable for their utility— “blackened” naming- things as tools of  labor and 
gratification and as references for white privilege. Perhaps this is one reason 
discussion of per for mance art from the 1970s to the pre sent has privileged 
culturally white bodies in per for mance. Yet this discursive shadowing, if not 
silencing in certain ways, does not speak an unquestionable truth. To the con-
trary, African American per for mance artists have used this genre of artistic 
expression to raise and wrestle with questions of fundamental importance. 
As Cassel Oliver remarks, black per for mance art “occupies the liminal space 
between black eccentricity and bodacious be hav ior, between po liti cal protest 
and social criticism.”48 With a par tic u lar focus on black  women per for mance 
artists, Uri McMillan speaks of “performing objecthood” as a way of express-
ing the manner in which black  women manipulate their bodies to constitute 
thing- things. Or for McMillan, “avatars” challenge common perceptions and 
assumptions concerning black  women as bodied naming- things and how 
they rightly occupy time and space. The development of alternate personali-
ties and performing  these personalities opened for artists such as Lorraine 
O’Grady ways to both represent and critique sociocultural codes.
In part, the impact of this method of expression involves the manner in 
which it challenges both traditional and more “progressive” depictions of the 
dichotomy of naming- thing/thing- thing by denying any totalizing properties 
for  either. The legacy of slavery and ongoing discrimination notwithstand-
ing, the latter half of that metaphysical equation can be presented— rather, 
performed— without having it reify a par tic u lar understanding.49 This, for 
McMillan, has been the art of body per for mance utilized by black  women 
for centuries. In a word, naming- thing/thing- thing relationships can in fact 
interrogate and expose restrictive and reifying sociocultural codes; it is not a 
necessary consequence that such per for mance can only reinforce the po liti-
cal status quo by means of art. Take, for example, Adrian  Piper as discussed 
by McMillan as a key and deeply influential conceptual and per for mance artist. 
The manipulation of her body (in Mythic Being: Cruising White  Women from 
1973) involves shifting markers of identity and hence of social meaning, as 
she dons a new “uniform”—an Afro wig, clothing, glasses, and other markers 
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of the 1970s— and performs a version of masculinity that signifies cultural 
codes of gender and consequently of agency.50 Thing- things in this case— 
glasses, a wig, facial hair, and so forth— gain the type of agency noted by Bill 
Brown and other advocates of  thing theory. Thing- things penetrate cultural 
identity, and shift and change it like the power of a talisman. Yet in this 
case they promote the transformation of gender, blurring thereby lines be-
tween the coding of masculinity and femininity. In addition, the Afro wig 
with its ties to black culture during the 1970s speaks a word regarding the 
embodiment of racial categorizations and discourse that have something to 
do with the metaphysical quality of cultural engagement. Still, this time, the 
tone and texture of that discourse and  those categorizations are signified 
through per for mance: female to male and thing- thing to naming- thing. Is this 
artist the black male as threat that one fears, or an exaggerated being that 
one mocks? Or might it be the exotic beauty one desires? Is “it” the despised 
mixed race being betwixt and between cultural worlds? In what ways can the 
difference be discerned if it is not fixed? Upon what bases is authenticity de-
termined and judged within a context of shifting  things? The transformed 
naming- thing glares at the passersby and in that gaze turns them (through 
recognition) into naming- things. In an essay related to Mythic Being,  Piper 
says the following, which speaks in significant ways to what we typically 
understand as totalizing properties and positionality of naming- things and 
thing- things: “I was trying to develop my arena by becoming an object in 
it. I now want to become the arena itself; I want to be, for a while, a con-
sciousness within which I view myself and other objects. I’m thinking of 
the ghostly spectator, eternally viewing, taking in every thing, recording and 
reflecting on every thing, but not being an object of refraction him- herself 
 because invisible.”51
For  Piper, the sociopo liti cal and cultural upheaval that marked the late 
twentieth  century could not be ignored, and artistic production, particu-
larly that which encompassed the primacy of the naming- thing, was a strong 
instrument for making statements regarding the racial, gender, and milita-
rized destruction of personhood and agency. For her, like Metoyer to some 
extent, this meant emphasizing the transient nature of the naming- thing as 
well as the ability of the artist who emphasizes the bodied naming- thing to 
think of artistic space beyond the confines established by the formal and 
formalistic art world. She, in a literal sense, would take her art to the streets 
and perform it in front of nontraditional audiences, but it was not simply 
the wearing of a diff er ent identity. No, something about the per for mance 
also entailed her recognizing and tapping into the complexity of her own 
96 chapter four
identity— the maleness of herself.52 This “mythic being” points to a meta-
symbol of cultural and social anxiety projected onto certain naming- things 
through discursive pronouncements  housed within a pro cess of interroga-
tion and spectacle. Something “unifying” about this perception of the raced 
naming- thing gives it a type of narrative strength and reach that could not 
be captured by simply calling it the “black” being, or the “cultural” being, or 
even the “raced” being.53 This conceptual strength allows the identity of the 
mythic being to penetrate, to impinge upon the artist in such a way as to 
blur lines of authority and agency. Put differently, as John Bowles recognizes, 
“ Piper alienates herself from her self- image and from her artwork. In the 
first case, she renders herself available for self- reflection. In the second, the 
Mythic Being embodies a ste reo type drawn from the popu lar imagination. 
 Piper’s earliest statements about the Mythic Being pre sent him as someone 
whom she imagines is performing her.”54 Naming- things, when performed, 
blend into each other, fostering in the pro cess new structuring(s) of cultural 
linkage with the capacity to short cir cuit social codes. Naming- things 
and thing- things are rendered fluid, and the social codes (e.g., masculinity 
and femininity) supporting structures of time and space are exposed and, 
through per for mance, questioned.
Such art, as represented by  Piper and Clifford Owens among many  others, 
arranges and confronts bodied naming- things/thing- things in such a way as 
to problematize social assumptions and predictable patterns of cultural en-
gagement. It is real-time encounter that, unlike with “flat” works of art such 
as paintings, cannot be held off and pro cessed  later in the safety and comfort 
of one’s inherited epistemology of life devoid of confrontation and conflict. 
Per for mance art, one might say, removes the cushion of distance and makes 
the encounter with naming- things/thing- things sustained, somewhat un-
predictable, and marked by an arrangement of time outside the control of 
the audience. Inherent in per for mance art, for both the artist and the viewer- 
participant, is vulnerability. Unlike looking at a painting hung meticulously 
on a wall, per for mance art’s shaping and  running of time is more unfixed and 
warped. Perhaps this is one reason  Piper’s thought- provoking and transfor-
mative work has been called such  things as “off- putting” and marked by an 
artist with a “morally bullying tone”— which is precisely the point.55 Con-
frontation with bias and symbols of racial- gender injustice cannot be com-
fortable and simply insinuated with cultural decorum if it is to have even 
the hope of being useful.  Piper produces an altered pre sen ta tion of naming- 
things, complete with them covered in a variety of cultural signifiers. In a 
word, she assumes “diff er ent personae (she’s a skilled and witty performer) 
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and changing her looks as if she  were herself a kind of malleable conceptual 
object.”56 And in this way, she forces viewers to recognize the characteriza-
tions of race, gender, sexuality, and class that promote their legacy. By play-
ing  these significations out, she offers an opportunity to dismantle them.
Discomfort is a tool used to disrupt thinking and the “ doings” of naming- 
things.  Piper disrupts social and cultural codes regarding gender play— for ex-
ample, expression of desire—by shifting the appearance of her naming- thing 
through costume and custom (i.e., who gets to actively observe and perhaps 
pursue partners). The fluidity of identity that marks the naming- thing in re-
lationship to thing- things grants opportunity to manipulate gender symbols 
and practices so as to short- circuit their internal logic and status. In that the 
costume is clearly a costume, observers on the street are unsettled epistemo-
logically by the individual per for mance that mocks social per for mance.
It is in ter est ing to note that Clifford Owens intends a similar type of work. 
Both  Piper and Owens indicate social awareness and commitment through 
per for mance.57 The script, so to speak, can be generated internally— coming 
from the artist and projected out. This is how Owens typically works. “I make 
art in my head,” he reflects, “from my heart, and through my body.” This is all 
to note the manner in which the naming- thing/thing- thing engagement and 
interplay for such artists moves from the naming- thing as artist to thing- 
things and naming- things as viewers and/or participants.58 However, for his 
2011 Anthology work for MoMA, Owens moved in another direction through 
an alternate highlighting of the naming- thing/thing- thing dynamic. He in-
vited other artists to provide a total of twenty- six scripts— arranged activi-
ties and performances— that he would then undertake as his work of art. For 
instance, artist Kara Walker provided the following: “French kiss an audi-
ence member. Force them against a wall and demand sex. The audience/
viewer should be an adult. If they are willing to participate in the forced 
sex act abruptly turn the  tables and you assume the role of victim. Ac-
cuse your attacker. Seek help from  others describe your ordeal. Repeat.”59 
Using photo graphs and other thing- things (e.g., food and urine), along 
with par tic u lar arrangements of time and space, with Anthology Owens per-
formed instructed movements in ways that reflect past activities by vari ous 
artists (a pro cess akin to what he has called “response” to “artists practices” 
over against reperforming).60 He interpreted their work in line with his 
own sensibilities by having his naming- thing manipulated per the instruc-
tions given— such as kissing an audience member and so on. In this way, his 
naming- thing/thing- thing dynamic was highlighted by the shadow of other 
naming- things arranging and determining the flow of presence and practice.
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The experience tugged at this naming- thing and in the pro cess used other 
naming- things as “tools” impacting and penetrating him. The sensations and 
discomfort produced said something about sociocultural codes of conduct 
as well as the markers of time and space framed by relationship between 
naming- thing and thing- thing. A full range of emotional and psychological 
pro cesses was enacted as part of this per for mance: Owens as naming- thing 
encountered the agency of other naming- things. Notions of community, of 
relationship, of the integrity and agency of the  human as a  matter of theo-
logical and cultural anthropology  were tested. In his words, “Audience mem-
bers kissed me, kicked me, slapped me, embraced me, dragged me, hoisted 
me, humiliated me, humbled me, befriended me, loved me, hated me, harmed 
me, hurt me, moved me, touched me, abandoned me, rescued me, stalked me, 
harassed me, intimidated me, frightened me, abused me, used me, exploited 
me, repulsed me, and some would  later fuck me.”61
The collaborative quality of per for mance art is made graphic vis- à- vis 
this pro cess, but also exposed is risk entailed through an ethics of mutual-
ity that leaves participants exposed (often literally) and open to what the 
 human mind can imagine as the business of naming- things/thing- things/
naming- things colliding both literally and figuratively. Within the space of 
the MoMA and expressed as interactive per for mance, Owens mapped out the 
movements and encounters that have  shaped the sociocultural context of life 
in the United States for centuries. And he did so in a way that highlighted 
what we have already known on some level to be central. More to the point, 
for Owens, blackened naming- things  matter, and through their work black 
per for mance artists enact the merit of this statement.  There is in this multi-
layered movement (that depends on numerous naming- things in coordinated 
flow) a blurring effect in that the end product holds only hints of this orches-
tration. The thing- things’ bare codes are transformed into ritualized actions.
One can interpret the work of  Piper and Owens through explicit atten-
tion to traditional religious- theological vocabulary and symbol systems. For 
instance,  Piper’s turn to costume might suggest something of the effort of 
religious figures such as Joan of Arc to morph identity through gender iden-
tification as a soldier. Or consider some devotees of Krishna who dress as 
 women in order to portray Radha, who is significant for Krishna, or devo-
tees of African- based traditions such as Candomblé who, when possessed, 
are changed into attire consistent with that par tic u lar divinity, which can 
involve men dressing as  women and performing (dancing) in ways that re-
flect social codes of femininity. While  Piper’s morph ing highlights shifts in 
active sexual desire performed, for Joan of Arc this shift of the naming- thing 
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highlights the rituals of aggression typically associated with males. Although 
diff er ent in significant ways, what both entail, or can be read as suggesting, is 
the manner in which signifying pre sen ta tion of the naming- thing has signif-
icant connotations that impact relationality to social ideals. Furthermore, 
at least one commentator has noted the manner in which the movement 
of Owens as bodied naming- thing by audience members around the per for-
mance space resembles the manipulation and transportation of the body of 
Christ in so many religious paintings.62
Such observations are intriguing, yet they map per for mance art on tradi-
tionally understood framings of the religious, while I want to point to a dif-
fer ent perception of the religious. Mindful of this, I note that without words 
but through pre sen ta tion and play,  Piper and Owens raise fundamental chal-
lenges to assumptions of closed and fixed “ things.” True, the per for mance is 
focused on disruption of par tic u lar codes of conduct; still, the dissonance 
created allows for much more expansive consideration. Owens reinforces so-
cial codes and body practices, but even in this he  causes disruption to the 
extent that the naming- thing is marked “black” and hence is already out of 
place and beyond the scope of its social freedoms. For instance, the script 
given him by Walker plays off centuries- old cultural assumptions regarding 
black men as sexual predators, but the per for mance seeks to disrupt agency 
and in the pro cess points out the complex nature of American sexual terrorism: 
“You,” as Walker instructs, “assume the role of victim.” Hence, the naming- 
thing both penetrates other naming- things and is penetrated by them, and 
through this complexity performed in alternate space and as public act, the 
coding of sexual relations in the United States is exposed and highlighted. The 
interrelated nature of naming- thing to naming- thing is highlighted through 
the interactive quality of the series of per for mances while also pointing out 
the manner in which some influences, some actors so to speak, are not vis i-
ble yet are still pre sent (i.e.,  those providing the scripts). Put simply, writes 
Christopher Lew, “audience members are invited to talk back, to step to the 
fore and interact with the artist or each other; food and objects are thrown 
about; articles of clothing are removed or exchanged; physical vio lence is im-
plied; rape and autocastration threatened.”63 Attentiveness to naming- things 
in action poses impor tant questions concerning care, empathy, sympathy, 
agency, identity, freedom, and other qualities of engagement and positioning 
that  matter.  Piper and Owen offer what was at an  earlier point in this chapter 
a par tic u lar “register” of  human engagement with circumstances.
This work, per for mance art by African Americans as well as other so- called 
racial minorities, is impor tant in that it says something about the sociocultural 
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coding that informs what we say and “know” about naming- things. How-
ever, while it is impor tant,  here I am not concerned with the psychological 
work of per for mance art; my focus is not on the nature and meaning of sub-
jectivity as articulated through per for mance art. Instead, my interest rests 
in this genre of art’s ability to speak what the naming- thing is (and is not) in 
light of deep connection to thing- things— and it does so without full restric-
tion of the spoken or written language. “Live work by artists,” Laurie Carlos 
makes clear, “unites the psychological with the perceptual, the conceptual 
with the practical, thought with action.”64 So conceived, one can easily rec-
ognize the manner in which per sis tent attention to naming- things within 
per for mance art pre sents the bodied naming- thing, at least in part, as an 
alternate and dynamic language employable for the articulation of a par tic u-
lar range of considerations.
Are They Beautiful or Ugly  Things?
As stated  earlier, my concern is not aesthetics— certainly not as under-
stood prior to the shift in artistic thinking and production marked by 
the mid- twentieth  century. Yet I am intrigued: Does per for mance art as 
discussed throughout this chapter further damage the reifying effects of 
beauty or theories of  wholeness by entangling naming- things/thing- things 
in a web of what is typically referenced as ugly? Ugly be hav ior? Ugly appear-
ance? Ugly surroundings?65 And fi nally, are  there ways in which discussion 
of race, gender, sexuality, and class are interrogated in per for mance art not 
always as they relate to sociopo liti cal justice, as is typically the approach, but 
rather through play with naming- thing/thing- thing in the domain of beauty/
ugliness and pain/plea sure assumptions that undergird and to some degree 
guide the more commonly addressed structures of sociopo liti cal justice?
I offer just a few thoughts related to  these questions before moving back 
into the general discussion of naming- thing/thing- thing implosion. And I 
begin with this statement from RoseLee Goldberg concerning troubling be-
hav ior as art:
Public display of sex and death and other private concerns was a statement 
of artistic solidarity against the conservative backlash of the 1990s. The 
material was unquestionably shocking to even the most emancipated of 
audience. Bob Flanagan, suffering from cystic fibrosis, endured hours 
of excruciating physical therapy in a hospital bed in Visiting Hours, an 
installation at the Santa Monica Museum of Art in California (1992). 
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Male strippers, drag queens and drug- abusers participated in Ron Athey’s 
Martyrs and Saints (1993), an hour- long work which included self- inflicted 
wounds so gruesome that several members of the audience passed out.66
As the naming of his per for mances more than suggests, an intriguing  ele ment 
of Athey’s work involves the interrogation of traditional religious rituals and 
practices that are meant to discipline and control bodied naming- things.67 
However, mindful of his early years in a deeply religious  house hold that claimed 
ministry as part of his  future, he amplifies the discipline and punishment of 
the body, tying it to plea sure and in this way exploding categories of reli-
gious repentance and purification. The fact that ritualization of naming- 
things in/as pain is conducted by a white male (at times over against a black 
naming- thing assistant) raises questions concerning the relationship be-
tween whiteness and the exercise of control vis- à- vis pain and discipline of 
naming- things as well as modalities of “confession” of whiteness that both 
makes vis i ble and renders undetected the plea sure of white privilege per-
formed.  These are impor tant considerations, but they are beyond the pur-
pose of this chapter in par tic u lar and this book in general.68 Instead, I want 
to resist my intellectual- political inclination to more fully interrogate race 
dynamics and the cultural power being performed, and instead consider 
implications in a general sense as they relate to what has been a traditional 
religiously motivated activity on/with naming- things.
What the graphic depiction of ritualized aggression, the blood, and 
the penetration and marking of the bodied naming- thing points out is the 
degree to which traditional modalities of religiously understood practices 
within spaces perceived “sacred”  really avoid the intended target— that is, the 
naming- thing. They symbolize attention to the body, but Athey creates a dis-
turbing ritual space in which  there is unflinching attention to the naming- 
thing marked out by thing- things and other naming- things. In so  doing, with 
all the discomfort and anxiety produced, ritualized aggression raises questions: 
What happens (and how does it happen) when the naming- thing is actually 
disciplined and penetrated as ritual practice? What is the look and texture of 
a naming- thing postritual, in the com pany of other  things? And what does 
such practice communicate to other naming- things?69
 There are ways per for mance artists— white artists— push against false cat-
egories of importance, but this is never done and cannot be done in a way 
that fully negates their whiteness. The privileges associated with white-
ness, in certain ways, make pos si ble and impor tant their manipulations of 
the naming- thing. But  these naming- things challenged, twisted, and altered 
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remain whitened with all whiteness entails. Such naming- things— even 
against the desire of  these artists— resist ugliness as a permanent, sociocul-
tural condition in that ugliness remains trumped by the salve of whiteness 
always applied to the ritualized wounds. Maleness has a similar effect as it is 
layered on the naming- thing performed and performing.
Per for mance art challenges but does not escape cultural codes that guide 
the structuring and speaking of life. This art is not the solution to issues of 
social justice, although through its history it has often been used as an alter-
nate language and per for mance of po liti cal issues. What it does is destabilize 
socially desired conditioning of the naming- thing, while also challenging the 
assumed distinction of the naming- thing and its relationship to thing- things 
premised on their utility. And all this has something to do with the embod-
ied grammar of ugliness. In a general sense,  there is something about ugli-
ness that “speaks” to unintended interaction— features as  running contrary 
to the preferred symmetry—or the use of bodied naming- things that runs con-
trary to desired perfection, and so on. Ugliness may not be the opposite of 
beautifulness in that they are both dimensions of the same intention— the 
same attachment to manipulated naming- things. Artists force encounter 
with the naming- thing, and the takeaway from that encounter is contextual 
and therefore not fixed.
Sally’s Rape depicts extreme circumstances that highlight and exaggerate. 
To be clear, I do not mean to overplay the tragic but rather to force a longer 
look into the tragic picking apart of naming- things. Compare Sally’s Rape to 
Orlan’s public plastic surgery that is meant to bring her visually in line with 
beauty as outlined in vari ous works of art. Both elicit strong reactions that 
mark encounter with the unintended.70 One, the former, does so through de-
piction of the ugly nature of the United States’ relationship to black  women 
as the “other” and the surgeries mark a radical transformation meant to shift 
the naming- thing  toward aesthetic “perfection.” Still, both entail violent en-
counter, both call for a strong response that blurs the line between beauty and 
ugliness, and in this way both point out the conflation of the two made pos-
si ble through certain genres of per for mance art. Both push against symmetry 
of form or static appeal to comfort by shifting the dynamics of the naming- 
things and rendering their relationship to markers of meaning unstable. Both, 
in distinct ways, aim to destroy beauty/ugliness as representative of anything 
substantive in relationship to naming- things/thing- things.
Graphically presented by Orlan and Athey, per for mance art blurs beauty/
ugliness as it plays out manipulations of the bodied naming- thing that stretch 
its form and content and, in the pro cess, render naming- thing/thing- thing 
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exposed and laid out. Kristine Stiles describes the situation with Orlan as 
such: “Among the most dramatic and troubling per for mances in the 1990s 
 were Orlan’s numerous cosmetic surgeries.  These operations, which increas-
ingly threatened the artist’s health and well- being, initially  were attempts to 
reconstruct and transform her face and body into a composite of the ideal 
Western art- historical notions of beauty, and  later became pure physical dis-
figurations.”71 Not beautiful, nor ugly— instead unsettling, an attack on Chris-
tian theological assumptions of  wholeness and perfection. The distinction 
between the frames of beauty and ugliness, to put it another way, is insig-
nificant  because both point to the function of per for mance art to conflate 
naming- things/thing- things in such a way as to nudge us in the direction of 
greater awareness of the “constructed” nature of meaning frameworks as 
fixed and bounded standards. One gets a sense of what I intend to high-
light when considering Guillermo Gómez- Peña’s description of the work of 
the per for mance artist. “Our job,” he says, “may be to open up a temporary 
utopian/dystopian space, a de- militarised zone in which meaningful ‘radi-
cal’ behaviour and progressive thought are hopefully allowed to take place, 
even if only for the duration of the piece. . . .  In this border zone, the dis-
tance between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ self and other, art and life, becomes blurry 
and non- specific.” And  here is the most telling statement: “We do not look 
for answers; we merely raise impertinent questions.”72 Continuing this idea, 
one might say with Athey that  there is a conceptual shift away from beauty 
or ugliness to “realness” and “atrocity,” for instance. “In my per for mance 
material,” Athey reflects, “I am guilty of enhancing my history, situation 
and surroundings into a perfectly depicted apocalypse, or at least a more vi-
sual atrocity.”73 He cuts; he penetrates. Blood flows covering him and other 
 things, pointing out as it oozes on stage the real ity of naming- things as ex-
posed, open, or—as Bakhtin notes— degraded.
What Athey offers is far more graphic and penetrating than what, for in-
stance, video artist Bill Viola provides in Inverted Birth— a large video screen 
within an other wise empty, dark room.74  There is no furniture, nothing upon 
which to sit other than the floor.  Those who enter hear the sound of liquid 
flowing. It is a dark liquid— which could be blood. Viola, the large image of 
the artist in only a pair of pants, stands staring at  those pre sent. He is covered 
with this liquid; it hits him, affecting his breathing, altering his posture as it 
pounds him, and limiting his vision as it enters his eyes. The vulnerability of 
the naming- thing— the manner in which this dark liquid impinges and alters 
the position, breathing, seeing, and so forth, of the naming- thing—is profound. 
Yet it is inverted birth in that the final stage is not the naming- thing emerging 
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into the world covered with a substance both associated with and foreign 
to the new naming- thing. With time, for viewers who are patient enough to 
wait, the dark liquid is replaced by a white liquid that does not obscure to the 
same extent. It moves from darkness to light, and in this way from death to 
birth. In other words, “the fluids represent the essence of  human life: earth, 
blood, milk,  water, air, and the life cycle from birth to death,  here inverted 
into a transformation from darkness to light.”75  After the shift from dark to 
light, the liquid flows up and away from Viola, eventually leaving him clean— 
shirtless, light paints unstained, and more closed off than at the beginning. 
Offered  here is the naming- thing affected and influenced by other  things (in 
this case liquids) that impinge and modify positioning in the world.  There 
is an affective component as the figure’s composure and comportment 
alter as the liquid changes from dark to light. This  thing— liquid— modifies 
the naming- thing by altering its perception of itself in relationship to other 
 things—as well as its ability to maintain its posture and stamina as the liquid 
pounds him. While done within the context of an individual  thing encoun-
tering another  thing, Viola’s The Raft (2004), extends the model of inter-
play by bringing multiple naming- things together. The piece involves the 
coming together of a diverse range of bodied naming- things. They arrange 
themselves— suggesting a par tic u lar type of interaction. And  after finding 
their places, they are bombarded by  water at a high pressure. It penetrates 
their grouping— pushing against and into them, moving them and rearrang-
ing them as they brace themselves with and against each other in order to 
withstand the  water pounding them.76 The porous, somewhat unbounded 
nature of the bodied naming- thing is further explored by Viola in his Royal 
Acad emy of Arts exhibit titled Life, Death, Rebirth. In it, Viola’s work is jux-
taposed to that of Michelangelo, and in this way, it wrestles with the spiri-
tual dimensions of mortality and transcendence across time— all marked 
out through the pre sen ta tion and exploration of the body. One piece, The 
Messenger (1996), in par tic u lar demands recognition of the open nature of the 
body, as the body of a man is viewed over time and over against  water (rep-
resenting for Viola both life and death) in which he is submerged. As one 
stands in front and waits, the viewer sees the body as it seems to blend into 
the  water, becoming  little more than the colored wave and movement of the 
liquid without bound aries secure and certain. This says something about 
the nature of the  human in relationship to other “ things”— a relationship 
that dismisses the utility of rigid distinction and thereby forces a rethinking 
of what we name with language and what that language falsely establishes as 
certitude of expression.77
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From the flow of liquid over the naming- thing and  water pounding 
naming- things, we move to the amplification of the bodied naming- thing 
as thing- thing in relationship to the work of Yves Klein, who abandoned the 
traditional tools of the painter. Klein’s practice, extending beyond that of 
Jackson Pollock, removes the brush from the canvas, rethinks what consti-
tutes the brush, and allows the body to hover above the canvas as something 
more akin to the unconscious guiding the work.78 Klein took the naming- 
thing as tool as he had naked bodies roll on canvas and in that way spread 
the blue paint. “They became living brushes,” he remarked. “At my direction the 
flesh itself applied the colour to the surface and with perfect exactness.”79
In addition, some per for mance artists use their work as a way to explore 
and critique dominant social sensibilities meant to close off naming- things, 
and they do so by highlighting segments of the population and their be hav-
iors typically critiqued and hidden from public view. Stuart Brisley, for 
instance, brought into per for mance art stigmatized addictions such as alco-
holism and  mental illness. In this way, he challenged societal assumptions 
concerning normativity of appearance, be hav ior, and conduct in ways that 
play off and challenge the grammar of ugliness and beauty. This time it was 
done through the per for mance of despised or feared personalities akin to 
becoming that which is despised in the manner of Orlan and Athey: What 
is this I am seeing, participating in? This becomes a central question that 
prompts interrogations both internal and in relationship to other  things.
Discomfort with  Things
Artists discussed thus far work with a level of anger, disappointment, and 
perhaps angst, and they express  these affective dimensions in their work. 
In more graphic and aggressive modes of per for mance art, bodied naming- 
things are violently encountered as thing- things open to manipulation and 
penetration (literally). Anger, disappointment, and angst are presented in a 
three- dimensional and vibrant manner. The audience, then, is pulled in as 
both a part of and a party to the emotional twists and turns of the performed 
naming- thing. One gets a sense of this interplay with the audience when 
considering per for mance artist Chris Burden, whose art has included cruci-
fixion not on a cross but on the hood of a car and crawling through broken 
glass— naked.80 His work is illuminating as it sheds further light (think in 
terms of Owens) on the false distinction between the active naming- thing of 
the artist and the assumed passively observing naming- things of the viewers. 
While to some extent the interplay depicted by  others in this chapter points 
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in the direction of active engagement, I find something particularly compel-
ling about Burden. As Cynthia Carr writes, “He denies any interest in  either 
pain or transcendence. As he explained in 1975, ‘when I use pain or fear in a 
work, it seems to energize the situation.’ That ‘situation’ was the relationship 
between him and the audience. It was their fear and distress as much as his 
that ‘energized the situation.’ Burden’s work examines physical phenomena 
in their natu ral context, the land of  human error.”81  There is interaction, a 
merging of sorts involving vari ous naming- things connected in tense ways 
and without full knowledge of this encounter. Turning to Burden again, 
Carr said the following concerning his 1972 piece titled Jaizu:
Burden sat facing a gallery door, wearing sunglasses painted black on the 
inside, so he  couldn’t see. Spectators  were unaware of this. They assumed, 
then, that he was watching, as they entered one at a time and faced 
him alone. Just inside the door  were two cushions and some marijuana 
cigarettes. As Burden described it, “many  people tried to talk to me, one 
assaulted me, and one left sobbing hysterically.” The artist remained pas-
sive, immobile and speechless— the blank slate to whom each visitor gave 
an identity: judge? shaman? entertainer?82
The action was not always so physically intense and challenging. For 
instance, Piero Manzoni’s Living Sculpture in Rome in 1961 involved naming- 
things he signed—in this way blurring the distinction between the naming- 
thing as producer of art and naming- thing as artistic thing- thing.83 “Man-
zoni’s Sculpture Viventi,” it was noted, “was completed by a declaration of 
authenticity. A red stamp certified that the subject was a  whole work of art 
for life. A yellow stamp  limited the artistic status to a body part, while a 
green one meant that the individual signed was a work of art  under certain 
circumstances (i.e. only while sleeping or  running). Fi nally, a purple stamp 
stuck on the receipt of authenticity meant that the ser vice was paid for.”84 
In  either Manzoni’s Sculpture Viventi or Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts, per-
for mance as an art movement marked a new pulling at the naming- thing so 
as to highlight its instability as a distinct “something” in relationship with 
thing- things, but still the slightest bit distinct. The audience did not simply ob-
serve this statement. “Kaprow,” observes RoseLee Goldberg, “issued invitations 
that included the statement ‘you  will become a part of the happenings; you 
 will si mul ta neously experience them.’ Shortly  after this first announcement, 
some of the same  people who had been invited received mysterious plastic 
envelopes containing bits of paper, photo graphs, wood, painted fragments 
and cut- out figures. They  were also given a vague idea of what to expect: 
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‘ there are three rooms for this work, each diff er ent in size and feeling. . . . 
Some guests  will also act.’ ”85 Something about the very contested nature 
of the concept “per for mance” supports the effort of art to trou ble the fa-
miliar and the distant—to demand attention to what is assumed regarding 
bound aries between naming- things and thing- things.86 This is an alternate 
way of communicating a concern with awareness of circumstances and the 
impingement of circumstances. Its bodied language is coded by a par tic u lar 
sense of muscle memory, so to speak.
Per for mance art as discussed  here is understood as seeking a blurring of dif-
ference between the naming- thing and the thing- thing, between the naming- 
thing  doing and the thing- thing to which it is done: Thing- things shift and 
change naming- things. The ability to distinguish between the two is challenged, 
if not removed altogether. This is more than to say, “ Humans and  things are 
stuck to each other,” and de pen dency does not capture sufficiently the nature 
of togetherness that marks the naming- thing/thing- thing in certain practices 
of per for mance art.87 The assumed integrity of the naming- thing is challenged 
as soon as the viewer is forced to wrestle with an emotive question: Who does 
that to the bodied naming- thing, and why would anyone do that?
By becoming much more vis i ble, the bodied naming- thing is blurred, and 
its porous condition is “named.” This mode of art pushes for a diff er ent re-
lationship between viewer and artist, one that places the question of art in 
the reaction of the viewer in that “the reception is as crucial as the creation 
of art.”88 Even when one thinks about thing- things as not inert but active 
within a range of circumstances (i.e., world),  there is still a relationship be-
tween naming- things and thing- things marked by even the smallest distinc-
tion between types. But  there are modalities of per for mance art that seek to 
challenge even this slight difference by making art what the bodied naming- 
thing is and what it does. Naming- things and thing- things and their rela-
tionship are given a par tic u lar charge through graphic, public acting. The 
porous nature of their borders is highlighted, and it is the blurred space in 
between to which per for mance art pushes viewers- participants.
We dare not speak about shit. But, since the beginning of time, no other 
subject— not even sex— has caused us to speak so much.
— dominique lAporte, History of Shit
For all our lofty philosophies and religious visions, we still have to shit.
— dAvid WAltner- toeWs, The Origin of Feces
Experiencing body art as per for mance of openness, like that discussed in 
the previous chapter in relationship to Athey, Owen, and  Piper, is only one 
method of encountering a “work” of art. Some other methods involve a type 
of participation requiring a wait.
I have spent my share of minutes queued up for every thing from the 
fine arts to my turn to relieve myself in a public rest room. During a trip to 
New York City,  these two moments of waiting  were brought together in 
an intriguing manner. I went to the Guggenheim to experience Amer i ca by 
Maurizio Cattelan.1 This exhibit— a not-so-subtle comedic critique/significa-
tion of consumerism, materialism, and the pretense of demo cratic ideals—is 
a functioning toilet.2  There is nothing unique, in a practical sense, about 
this toilet. And every thing  else in the rest room is typical— a pre sen ta tion of 
alter- functional “readymade” items of sorts. Yet this toilet is no readymade; 
it is a precious metal— gold— and therefore not purchased from an aver-
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age plumbing shop. One could think of this Guggenheim exhibit as reflecting 
the application of what Hal Poster called the “shit movement”3—or in more 
conversational language, artistic expression using one of the most common 
and despised of substances— human waste.4
A Par tic u lar Encounter
I was prepared to wait my turn in line for as long as it took, although I was 
uncertain what I would actually do when I fi nally entered.  There is something 
psychologically distasteful in following too closely on the heels of another 
who has left the seat warm, the paper disrupted, and unused toilet seat cov-
ers thrown about. But this was even more unsettling: it was a golden toi-
let with a long line of  people who might relieve themselves but who  were 
also assuming something artistic about this “crapper.” All this thinking was 
guided by social rules of decorum regarding  human waste— what it is, and 
where it is deposited as well as what we are to assume regarding that pro cess of 
disposal.5 Undergirding this situation is recognition of the bodied naming- 
thing as yet another  thing that produces . . .  things.6 Or as Michael Thomp-
son phrases it, “Bodily excretions serve as daily reminders of how our bodies 
are getting on with  things.”7
Amer i ca is more than a container for “refuse” displayed, unlike what one 
gets with the artist Justin Gignac, who collects New York City trash and 
packages it for sale.8 Gignac offers “one offs”— items that have been used or 
other wise associated with bodied naming- things. The arrangements in clear 
containers are safe—at some distance from the bodied naming- thing and 
therefore without the capacity to impinge upon it. What has been said con-
cerning trash collection and/as art elsewhere is applicable in the context of 
Gignac in New York City: “The ‘dark and unsanitary is transmogrified into 
the sublime and the beautiful.’ ”9 Growing out of the assemblage movement 
in the mid- twentieth  century, art such as what Gignac pre sents signifies— 
whether intentionally stated or not— the modern world by exposing what it 
wants hidden away. In short, collecting garbage exposes habits and desires. And 
this collecting of the hidden promotes a push against the art world and the 
larger social arrangements supporting that world.10 Such art says something 
about the need to inspect “stuff ” for what it says to and about life.11 Still, Gig-
nac’s work produces no discomfort and does not entail a source of anxiety or 
uncertainty. It is garbage of a certain form— captured and made manageable.
What I have in mind in this chapter, based on application of the technol-
ogy of religion, is a more intimate connection between naming- things and 
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thing- things. It is a connection that names openness in a more graphic and 
socioculturally troubling manner.
My time at the Guggenheim was in search of speculation regarding waste 
not so easily tamed and separated from the naming- thing. What could 
take place in/on Amer i ca could not be so easily managed away— not even 
within the white walls of one of the United States’ widely regarded muse-
ums. More than urine— another  matter of  human waste associated with the 
golden toilet— fecal  matter trou bles. And so, writes Gillian Whiteley, “we 
work constantly to remove dirt and  human waste from our everyday lives. 
The fear and disorder unleashed when it seeps out is palpable.”12 But for a pe-
riod of time at the Guggenheim, feces was not only anticipated—it was part 
of an installation.13 Producing it, then, had something of an artistic quality.
The golden toilet “malfunctioned” and needed repair. The amount of time 
necessary for the properly trained staff to assess and address the issue was un-
certain. As I waited, a series of questions came to mind: Are they plumbers 
or curators—or some unique combination of the two? Is the plunger used for 
the golden toilet the equivalent of a paintbrush, for instance? Is the waste 
that caused the malfunction not artistic?
Due to vagueness regarding the stated repair time, many left the line, and 
my projected wait of an hour was reduced (see fig. 5.1). The person ahead of 
me entered, and I thought of what was taking place in  there. Just looking? Tak-
ing pictures? Using it? Using it and taking pictures? I tried to guess based on 
my time calculations: how long to urinate over against the amount of time 
to . . .  do more than that. The door opened, and based on the time frame, I 
was confident I could move right in. I entered the small room and closed 
the door. It was all too familiar— a typical sink, soap, and a cloth for drying 
hands. Over to the left was the golden toilet— the artist’s repre sen ta tion of 
American- ness. And I, within reason, could do with it as I like— but even 
before making that determination, I had to throw toilet paper in it. I needed 
to produce a contrast to its shine and the luxuriousness it had no choice but 
to represent. The common paper served to regularize it. Only then could I be 
comfortable having my turn with Amer i ca.
In that small room, occupants are urged to encounter themselves as 
naming- things producing what they must surrender and hide. Of course, 
as noted above,  there is a critique of the art industry and U.S. consumer-
ism, but  there is also reflection— whether intended does not  matter—on the 
openness of the bodied naming- thing: the value, so to speak, of what it pro-
duces and its relationship to that waste. Simply put,  here I am interested in 
the lucid naming- thing’s interaction with material, a nonlucid item— shit.14 
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Questions, such as  those raised by Susan Signe Morrison, abound: “Why is 
the excremental body so threatening? Why  don’t we want to be near the 
person covered in shit? Why  don’t we want to be the person covered in shit? 
If society is a body, what is the role of excrement? Who or what is the ‘excre-
ment’ in a social context?”15
Waste . . .  No, Shit
 There is some discomfort in using this word— shit—in print, and many show 
a preference for excrement. Yet as some scholars argue, this is too general a term 
in that it can mean anything expelled.16 I have something more focused in 
mind; hence, shit is appropriate for making my point in that it, as David 
Waltner- Toews reflects, “storms successfully through all the artificial barri-
cades we have erected to block the streets and alleys between the deodorized 
proletariat and the sanitized ruling class, between popu lar and academic 
culture, between science and  every day.”17 This is not a reference to the meta-
phorical mess of “Shit happens” or “Cut the shit”; rather, I mean the physical 
 human waste.
5.1  Sign announcing the wait time for Amer i ca. Photo by the author.
112 chapter five
To know something of the bodied naming- thing requires attention to what 
marks it as alive and moving, what gives it something of its physicality and 
presence. It is to say something about its shit. Literally . . .  shit— the physical 




Noun 1. Feces 2. An act of defecation19
Polite conversation does not often include this terminology— not directly 
stated but often implied— but still it is widely recognized and utilized during 
our more commonly impolite exchanges.20 I use this descriptive term, shit, 
not to provoke discomfort, nor to be crude without cause, but  because it 
speaks in significant ways to the natu ral and yet uncomfortable character of 
this product that is both intimate and foreign to the bodied naming- thing. 
Shit connects us in ways that, like the other  things discussed in this volume, 
reveal something about the openness of  things and the interaction between 
 things.21
More to the point, the challenge with the porous bodied naming- thing 
is the perpetual threat of spillage: the bodied naming- thing, to maintain 
function, must consume calories; and food waste and other items must be 
omitted (see fig. 5.2). The bodied naming- thing lives, and the residue— the dead 
substance omitted— points to that continued living. Such residue— with its 
smell, look, texture, and location outside the bodied naming- thing— points 
to the thingliness of the naming- thing.
Shit forces confrontation with openness in that  there is wide- ranging ap-
plicability of shit as a mode of exchange, of shock, of spoiling normative 
sensibility, of denying and defying the beautiful through the imposition of 
the assumed impure:  human waste— dead bacteria, food remains, cells, and 
so on— evacuated. Or as Waltner- Toews defines it, “Excrement is what ever 
your body  doesn’t use of the food it takes in, plus millions of bacteria that 
grow in your gut, plus quite a few of the cells from your gut lining. More 
specifically, excrement is defined in terms of an anal sphincter; it is defined 
by the animal it is leaving  behind. Hence, we speak of cow dung and baby 
poop, otter spraints and dog turds.”22 Again, turning to Waltner- Toews, one 
is forced to recognize that before life  there was no shit.23 To physically “be” 
is to shit. That is to say, as a substance, shit is a type of rough cartography of 
the material art of porous being. Its ongoing use speaks to its chemical and nutri-
tional value as waste used to fuel (fertilizer and art, for instance) production 
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and creativity. In a variety of forms, shit symbolizes the naming- thing pro-
ducing  things it needs and despises— and the naming- thing’s reincorpora-
tion of this  thing (shit) into its constructions.24
Shit, in discussion (“language makes excrement manifest”), as well as 
through physical presence, promotes a par tic u lar type of discord and discom-
fort— a graphic effort to contain, place, and arrange it so as to make a sig-
nificant and verifiable distinction between it and the  things emitting it.25 
More than the familiar- foreign such as vomit, urine, and tears, or the famil-
iar such as blood, shit has use but is believed— despite the obvious—to have 
“no place” in relationship to bodied naming- things. This is also the case with 
vomit, urine, and tears, but traditionally  there is a more- graphic response 
to the presence of shit. Desire for  these  things is  limited— but the reaction to 
shit is perhaps stronger than it is to the other materials that naming- things 
eliminate from time to time. Yet despite all, the value— the importance—of 
shit to life is undeniable and too true. Notwithstanding its undeniable 
utility, it is a troubling substance— one that motivates a variety of ques-
tions, as noted by Waltner- Toews: “How and why has excrement— which is 
absolutely necessary for the resilient functioning of our planet, and which 
has, in fact, been a solution to a myriad of biological prob lems thrown up by 
the long haul of evolution— become, in the past mere few thousands of years, 
a prob lem to be solved?”26
 There is shit— the physical substance that speaks to the life of  things— its 
relationship to itself and other  things, and  there are the ways in which we 
are in a tangled network of relations named through a variety of technolo-
gies and mechanisms of collective cooperation related to shit. In a word, the 
pro cess of shitting is multidimensional and layered in that it addresses our 
perception of naming- things in addition to our practices as well as the larger 
frameworks through which we are placed in time and space. Desirable and 
undesirable terms of being are tied together through shit: it connects us to 
the world and also pulls us away from the “naturalness” of that world. It 
renders us material but also aware of our materiality through our effort to 
control and  counter materiality through the strategic hiding away of cer-
tain substances associated with our materiality. The open naming- thing is a 
“body” of gaps, of inconsistences, of tangibility, and of certain “fungibility.”27
Shit produces reaction through visceral challenges to bound aries of being 
that reflect life and death at the same moment: the blending of both into 
one foul substance posing a threat to the open bodied naming- thing. It can 
compromise other naming- things when they are put in contact with it, and 
it points out the uncomfortable activities of the naming- things producing 
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it. Shit is substantive death— dependent on texture, color, and so forth—or 
what  others call “dead life of the body” that can be a nonverbal articulation 
of normalcy and well- being.28 As St. Augustine is believed to have said so sar-
castically, we are born inter far em et urinam, that is, “between feces and urine.” 
One might add that aging involves changing control over both, and then 
we die within the bound aries of a similar arrangement. All the while, we 
fight this real ity.
Significant Shit
Historically, shit  shaped public be hav ior and infrastructure. And as a con-
sequence, it trou bles desire— encouraged through numerous ideological 
platforms such as traditional theological doctrine— for a fixed, closed, and 
“clean” spirit corresponding to a comparably closed body.29 To broaden this 
out in terms of a generic sense of “filth,” the despised substance and what it 
constitutes trou bles perception to the extent that “filth challenges the very 
dichotomy between subject and object.” Hence, filth is “object- making and 
subject- unsettling.”30 Corresponding to this, Mary Douglas speaks of the na-
ture of dirt as “disorder” marked by a troubling discontinuity between loca-
tion and utility understood broadly.31 Unlike Douglas, I am not interested 
in distinctions between the sacred and secular, or pure and impure; such 
bound aries,  whether false or true, are not my primary concern. And while 
one might question the assumption Douglas imposes regarding a universal 
sense of disgust related to wrong location,  there is something to be said con-
cerning the dissonance fostered by placement or proximity associated with 
what has been called filth. The naming of filth has something to do with a 
desire for  things to be where they belong.
Bodied naming- things want to believe and to act as if they are self- 
contained “vessels” promoting separation and a prophylactic quality of dis-
tinction. Through a narrative of two statuses— insider and outsider— emerges 
a wish for integrity tied to bound aries between the naming- thing and the 
 things in the world encountered.32 Yet the narrative is disrupted as  human 
waste, and the naming- thing’s relationship to it forces confrontation.33 
The categories of “pure” and “impure” speak a type of social delusion bro-
ken through rituals of elimination. The management and in/visibility of waste 
has sociopo liti cal and cultural ramifications. For example, rumors of  human 
waste thrown during protests or the smearing of bodies and walls with 
 human waste to amplify the degrading conditions of life within certain 
prison contexts speaks to the social role of  human waste as a mechanism of 
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confrontation.34 This, however, is not to say  human waste has a materiality 
that is undeniably po liti cal or social.
While not wanting to linger on the psychological dimensions of shit and 
naming- things’ relationship to shit, another way of getting at this situation 
is through Julia Kristeva’s sense of the abject. Kristeva discusses the abject 
in a way that notes at least a hope for purity over against filth or contami-
nation of some sort. One finds this, I would argue, in the response to the 
object loathed. “Loathing an item of good, a piece of filth waste, or dung,” 
writes Kristeva, “the spasms and vomiting that proj ect me. The repugnance, 
the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, 
sewage, muck.”35 In this act, the “retching,” the naming- thing seeks to ad-
dress the “presence” of a thing- thing—to separate itself from that which 
it finds problematic. This movement of the bodied naming- thing tied to 
“repugnance” suggests a response to openness that amplifies openness as 
traumatic. Shit, in this case, represents what exists on “the other side of the 
border,” and signifies “what life withstands.”36 Shit, and Kristeva uses this 
categorical term, sets out a distinction or what she references as marking 
“the place where I am not and which permits me to be.” Shit points to what 
the naming- thing must void in order to remain alive to or be in a par tic u lar 
way.37 Yet this is not a clean distinction in that the “I” who expels shit, in the 
act expels something of the “I”— that is, the naming- thing expels something 
that is constituted by and entails a “piece” of that bodied naming- thing. And 
to the extent that shit does not re spect distinction but demands to speak the 
openness of the naming- thing, it produces abjection— entailing a sense that 
this openness is perpetual, and in its ongoing nature it has consequences in 
that it corrupts or taints.38 My interest  here, however, is not with abjection 
per se, which I would label a psycho- ethical response. (I say more on this in 
the last section of the book.) Rather, I am intrigued by the manner in which 
shit provides a context by means of which we are better enabled to “name” 
the moment/pro cess of interplay between naming- things and thing- things. 
Such a concern is more  limited in scope than how that interplay is “felt” and 
responded to through practice. Still, to acknowledge the naming- thing is to 
acknowledge the necessity of shit.
The bodied naming- thing is “bounded” only in a slight sense; more to the 
point, it is vulnerable and penetrated.39 As Kristeva points out, the open-
ness of the body and what shit says about this openness need not constitute 
a source of worry or marginality to be avoided— a sign of compromise as if 
bound aries are more than an idea. And fecal  matter, as Douglas notes, is 
one of the  things that points out the vulnerability of the naming- thing— the 
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manner in which it is exposed. But this situation need not be a negative ar-
rangement to overcome.40 Rather, this naming- thing exposed through the 
shit it produces is not to be condemned. Fecal  matter is a story, a narrative 
of life and death—of bodied naming- thing and other  things interacting. Shit 
tells us something of what it means to be  human, and the  limited nature of 
that meaning. For instance, its content tells us of diet and well- being, and 
its location, scholars argue, says something about the nature of sociocultural 
codes as well as economic and po liti cal developments. What is more, the pro-
duction of waste raises questions regarding the ability to keep at a distance 
or bracket  things as it  were. What does “right place” or “wrong place” mean 
when the body produces the shit that challenges the fixed nature of margins 
and bound aries? Naming- things and thing- things are entwined— necessary 
partners continuously reproducing this de pen den cy.41 This is a relationship 
that keeps the bodied naming- thing exposed— penetrated by  things while 
also voiding  things. “We have remarkably intimate ties to waste and trash,” 
reflects Elizabeth Spelman. “They not only bear the stamp of our creation 
but figure prominently in accounts of the kinds of beings we are and in the 
crafting of our relations to each other.”42 Shit is a violation of sorts, a betrayal 
to a certain degree. It breaks the myth of boundary between naming- things 
and the  things it manufactures and, in the pro cess, exposes tension between 
5.2  While a hidden practice, elimination of waste is a topic of public discussion. 
This image is a screen shot of a tele vi sion guide. Photo by the author.
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relief/plea sure and filth/guilt. It is a throwaway but also a source of impor-
tance with its own wide- ranging utility.
A Shitty Story
Despite (or perhaps  because of ) the stigma, shit has received a significant 
amount of popu lar and scholarly attention. From  children’s books— for exam-
ple, Taro Gomi’s Every body Poops—to theoretically rich work, shit is despised 
but is also a widespread topic of conversation.43 Dominique Laporte, for ex-
ample, in his text History of Shit, pre sents a keen relationship between the 
individual and the management of  human waste.44 Using the Paris Edict of 
1539 as a launching point for discussion and speculation, he notes the con-
nection between waste recognition (e.g., disgust) and management and ties 
both to the physical structuring of communal space. The sight and smell of 
shit removed to a space of confinement, according to Laporte, speaks to the 
development of the “bourgeois”  family— one with the capacity for and sensi-
bility to find its waste disgusting and to manage it away. However, he points 
to the physical maneuvering of  human waste as a secondary and civilizing 
step, the first being the removal of waste from acceptable speech.45 The 
cultural implication of shit— particularly as it relates to smell and odor—is 
significant. Smells are not naturally determined; rather, they are socially and 
cultural coded. They tell us more about our values and views than they do 
the substance of that which by smell we believe offends or delights.46
I know you like to think your shit  don’t stank;
But lean a  little bit closer;
See that roses  really smell like poo- poo-oo.
— outkAst, “Roses”
Both in language and physicality, shit is handled in such a way as to separate 
the naming- thing from natu ral attachment. It is a  matter of intent to remove a 
burden of words or waste, of separating out that which has no added value but 
is simply useless bulk. That is, “in both policing of language and the politics 
of shit,” Laporte writes, “it is a  matter of uprooting oneself from the clinging 
‘remnant of earth,’ ” and in this pro cess to reflect par tic u lar practices of civi-
lized life.47 That is to say, the sociology of shitting tells us something about 
the cultural arrangement of individual and collective life— something with 
significant implications.48 Some have argued that the normalized arrange-
ments for shit speak about evolutionary and ecological changes but also our 
public life as citizens (see fig. 5.3). Laporte takes this further to connect shit 
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with the dynamic life of capitalism— constituting a departure from the realm 
of nature to the constructed conditions of societal organ ization and its trap-
pings.49 In an ironic twist, this connection is artistically presented through 
the Denmark- based group Ingen Frygt that consumed money for fourteen 
days then eliminated it— literally turning currency into shit.50
Over the course of history (and I reference  here the West), the ability of 
the state to mandate a relationship to shit and to arrange its collection and 
disposal/use suggest its ability to control the bodied naming- thing—to high-
light but also give the impression of closure to the open naming- thing. 
Mechanisms of the state such as religious and secular rituals give the 
illusion of concealment to  these bodied naming- things if by no other way 
than by determining how and where the most troubling moments of open-
ness take place. Exclusion is a consequence of this recognition; anything, if 
not every thing, associated with disgust (read difference) takes on something 
of a shitty quality and thereby merits confinement if not disregard.51 Yet shit 
poses a challenge. It is composed of  things in relationship to  things in 
relationship to naming- things. According to Rose George, “A gram of feces 
5.3  The toilet- supply aisle at Home Depot. Photo by the author.
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can contain 10 million viruses, 1 million bacteria, 1,000 parasite cysts, and 
100 worm eggs. Bacteria can be beneficial: the  human body needs bacteria to 
function and only 10  percent of cells in our body are actually  human.”52 In 
certain ways, then, growth into citizenship, like the infant’s maturation as a 
“self,” involves willingness to acquiesce to the rules for shitting— including 
aversion to its presence and smell.53
This, as Laporte demonstrates, involves how one speaks about waste as 
well as how one relates physically to one’s waste. In both cases— discourse and 
practice— one cannot escape a concern with shit for what it says about the 
bodied naming- thing and its interplay with other  things. It is not simply that 
the body has openings, places that eliminate substances and from which loca-
tions the naming- thing can be penetrated. It is the manner in which open-
ness challenges assumptions concerning completeness, in de pen dence, and 
full integrity— that is, the illusions of closed subjectivity. This openness in 
terms of defecation reminds us that bodied naming- things are alive and as 
a consequence are always already in the pro cess of  dying, and this is despite 
the manner in which the toilet has enhanced life spans.54 Shit and shitting 
open a range of interplay and interaction—as well as an overlap between 
 things. Both vis i ble and hidden qualities of naming- thing- ness can be mea-
sured in relationship to defilement, and this includes the degree to which 
the normal elimination of waste is evident on one’s embodied person: Does 
one smell of shit? Is it visibly splattered on one’s person or lodged  under one’s 
fingernails? Are one’s living conditions marred by the presence of shit?55 This 
is not to suggest the elimination of waste and all the evidence of this waste 
can be complete; to the contrary— waste remains pre sent and vital (fig. 5.4). 
Naming- thing waste entails both attraction and revolution— the enjoy-
ment of producing shit and the desire for socially recognizable “goods.” 
Waste pulls at both of  these desires.
Theologically considered, this pull of competing desires speaks to the 
religious depiction of the  human as torn— both of an evil disposition and ca-
pable of potential good. In some traditions, evil beings and spirits are as-
sociated with shit and the places used for defecation. Furthermore, in some 
religious traditions, places of defecation are associated with defilement and 
impurity.56 More literal Christians, for instance, might frame this in terms 
of original sin— the soiled nature of  human life based on a fundamental de-
parture from divine  will.57 That which is associated with the lower portion 
of the body, with its dank point of exit, is associated with what is undesir-
able and symbolically with a place of darkness, odor, and defilement— hell.58 
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Religion expands this dismissal by rendering not just distinguishable waste 
a sociocultural and po liti cal prob lem but by equating all ethical outreach of 
the body as waste—as excrement.
To carry forward this theological reasoning, to be removed from shit, is 
to be moved symbolically from contamination in a more general sense. And 
while both men and  women produce and are marked by shit, scholars have 
pointed out the manner in which gender figures into this to the extent, for 
instance, that menstrual blood occupies a similar place of disregard tied to 
a sexual nature; and this, combined with shit production, provides an addi-
tional physical and spiritual weight for  women. The open- bodied naming- 
thing, oozing with physical defilement, was translated religiously into the 
body prone to lasting immorality and distance from the divine.59 In such a 
case, “dung stinks less than moral stench.”60 Bodied naming- things that can 
produce such physical defilement must also be marked by a deeper, spiritual 
defilement. The defecating naming- thing is transformed theologically and re-
deemed only by a God that does not shit.
The waste produced speaks meta phor ically to this spiritual stain. “It would 
seem,” writes Laporte, “that  human excrement, like the soul, carries the 
5.4  Outside an apartment building in New York City. Photo by the author.
the art of elimination 121
‘noxious’ trace of the body it departs.  There is a wickedness in shit that 
must be given time to dissipate or it  will turn on man.”61 Yet, he continues, 
the places of deposit have a shrine quality to them in many instances, places 
“where civilized man deposited offerings and prayers to ward off the very 
awareness of his primordial organs.”62 In a word, as the removal of waste in 
London suggested, “the master of waste and the warden of souls are one and 
the same.”63 For Laporte this is a theological read of a biochemical pro cess of 
allowing  human waste to remain unused as fertilizer for a good period of time 
to allow the smell and harmful components to dissipate in power.64  There is 
a lingering truth: We remain tied to the waste we produce, and this truth 
both frightens and inspires.65 Knowledge of this sort lends itself to a negative 
theologizing of embodiment, as Morrison describes: “By analogizing sin— 
particularly sexually related sins— with filth, the Church  fathers attempted 
to control and shame the individual into socially constructive be hav ior. Our 
bodies are cause enough for us to be disgusted with ourselves. Excrement be-
came a means to control the body and to punish the soul.”66 The very sub-
stance and its symbolic channeling align shit and other naming- thing waste 
with damning theological pronouncements. Against this negativity, some 
have pointed out the theologically positive creativity Martin Luther enjoyed 
while on the toilet but, as William James highlights, shit language becomes 
a means by which to communicate the trauma that constitutes life.67 Such 
a view may not ground a posture  toward the world marked by an unwilling-
ness to bracket pain and misery (i.e., the sick soul), but it does say something 
about  those viewing the world from a perspective that seeks escape— such as 
James’s “healthy minded” who convert to the attitude that the world cannot 
be defined by misery. They want to hide shit, so to speak. But the “sick souls,” 
 those whom James actually  favors, are content with shit and shittiness as di-
mensions of life. Shit exposes the dynamics of existence and our relationship 
to  those dynamics. “Nothing in Catholic theology, I imagine,” James reflects, 
“has ever spoken to sick souls [ those individuals who are deeply aware of the 
pain and suffering in the world] as straight as this message from Luther’s 
personal experience. As Protestants are not all sick souls, of course reliance 
on what Luther exults in calling the dung of one’s merits, the filthy puddle 
of one’s own righ teousness, has come to the front again in their religion.”68
Responses within religious communities and within discourses assuming 
a theological normativity are not of concern  here. Hence, notions of defile-
ment or cleanliness, or dirt and purity, within such contexts are not the best 
geography upon which to map out my par tic u lar sense of the naming- thing’s 
relationship to shit. In certain contexts, it is vital for proper occupation of 
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spiritual space when it, as some have argued regarding the  Grand Lama of 
Tibet, is dried, “packaged in  little boxes or in small bags suitable for being 
carried around one’s neck. Some  were also used as condiments or snuff.”69
Mary Douglas speaks of cleaning, of reordering; however, none of this ad-
dresses the openness constituted by shitting. Shit is targeted, removed from 
view, but in a  limited sense, in that it is also consumed as the food for our 
food. That which is removed from private life can be used to sustain, liter-
ally, the agricultural arrangements of life. One way of thinking this situation 
through is to see the connection between waste and production (e.g., agricul-
ture). In this regard, waste makes life pos si ble; it rewards us with continuation 
and wealth conceived in a variety of ways. Yet this connection between shit and 
gold requires restriction on the locations for producing, placing, and using 
waste.70 In a crude sense, shitting— both symbolically and physically— tells us 
something about well- being, about the nature of porous embodiment; some-
thing about private space, about communal relationships and dynamics; as 
well as something about economic- political developments and concerns. 
To continue with this argument, whoever smells shit says something about 
the bound aries of intimate connection. Shit— its producing, placement, 
“reception”— tells us something about an individual naming- thing’s connec-
tion to larger structures of relationship; and while it points to connections, 
it also speaks to the bound aries of concern: one’s shit is one’s business. Still, 
shit  matters beyond the individual to the extent that its removal from its 
initial point of production, to its use as fertilizer, and to the collection of the 
food item nurtured by it involves  others. Beyond ingestion of what shit makes 
pos si ble, the long- held use of shit as a beauty aid when applied to the skin 
and the hair ties it yet again to the individual naming- thing.71
What is more, shit can be used to express outrage, to suggest intimacy, 
to promote recognition of the place and functions of naming- things, and so 
on. In the nineteenth  century, John G. Bourke chronicled this dynamic in a 
ritualized form when describing the “feast of fools,” during which religious 
authority was mocked as the ordinary donned the robes of clergy, and  others 
dressed as clowns riding in dung carts throwing shit on  those standing 
about.72 The tables are turned in this instance; authority is questioned and 
turned upside down, and the substance to be hidden from view is highlighted 
and used to publicly mark the private functions of the naming- thing. Even-
tually challenged by church hierarchy, the ritualized and symbolic value of 
shit as a sociocultural and po liti cal device of recalibration is exaggerated. In 
a word, filth is multidimensional. In William Cohen’s description, “filth 
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represents a cultural location at which the  human body, social hierarchy, 
psychological subjectivity, and material objects converge.”73
The Art of Shit
Shit  matters, and its mattering influences and informs overlapping dimen-
sions of individual and collective engagement. As Dave Praeger remarks, “It 
affects us psychologically, manifests social relations and hierarchy,  influences 
childrearing, and makes an impact on the environment, art, media, culture, 
and commerce. Few aspects of  human life escape the influence of its ubiqui-
tous and inevitably urgent presence.”74 I want to pull out of this statement 
one category: art.
In using shit, an artist urges viewers to reassess a par tic u lar boundary and 
thereby interrogate relationship between the naming- thing and the  thing pro-
duced. Turning again to Kristeva’s notion of the abject/abjection, one gains 
another way of situating the relationship between shit and art. Abjec-
tion, Kristeva argues, is tied to “religious structurings,” and in this way 
“exclusion” is tied to the “sacred.” The goal of religious engagement related 
to abject/abjection involves a mode of catharsis with a purifying function. 
And while this is the goal of religion, according to Kristeva, the most com-
pelling modality of catharsis is art or aesthetic (as a component of religion), 
by means of which openness is tested and explored, named and explained 
through what might be called, to borrow from Kristeva, “abject art.”75 And 
this, as some commentary on shit in art would suggest, is more than plau-
sible.76 Yet my concern is circumscribed to one dimension of art’s work— 
exposure through shit of the moment/pro cess of interplay.77
The idea that shit is not devoid of a certain artistic necessity is not a new 
notion. For example, Erhard Schon’s Peasant Wedding Cele bration wood carv-
ing shows a scene from a peasant festival complete with shitting.78 Yet my 
concern is not  whether shitting was being cautioned against or celebrated 
within this image; rather, the mere depiction of the act points to an intersec-
tion between art and shit.79 So it is not that attention to shit in the context 
of artistic rendering is novel: Schon did it, as did Rembrandt, and one could 
add to the list Alimentation Doctrinaire (1889) by James Ensor, in which vari-
ous persons of leadership— such as a military figure and a religious figure— 
are depicted shitting.80 Rather, it is merely the number of artists working 
along  these lines of openness displayed that increases in the modern period 
through the pre sent.81
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 There are, at times, economic- political and social intent  behind the 
art. For instance, work by Gilbert and George in 1982’s Shit and Shit Faith 
entails shit “coming out of four buttocks facing each other and of a man 
receiving shit in his mouth.” And in the 1990s, they continued this attention 
to the interplay of waste and bodied naming- things— disturbing the func-
tion of shit— through an exhibit titled The Naked Shit Pictures. This exhibit, 
according to Gilbert, is meant to disrupt moral assumptions by bringing into 
view a realm of interaction or exchange that is typically despised and hid-
den, and in this way they seek to “make a history of two thousand years of 
civilization and morals look like shit,  because it tried to inculcate into us 
that nakedness and faeces are bad.”82 This is an impor tant dimension of what 
shit in public can entail, as writers such as Jojada Verrips have stated. Yet 
while acknowledging  these circumstances, I want to better understand the 
manner in which art corresponds to a naming of the interplay between bod-
ied naming- things and thing- things as a more fundamental dimension of the 
work.83 Although it amplifies the effect, one need not see shit for it to have 
this impact. It is pre sent—at least potentially— nonetheless. But  whether 
physically pre sent or not, it remains vis i ble in our language; art exposes both 
through interplay and pre sents the porous margins of naming- things and 
thing- things through interaction.
My concerns, unlike Kristeva’s, do not entail psychoanalytical understand-
ings of the abject as it relates to separation from the  mother and the workings 
of gendered disregard. Rather, I am concerned with what shit and proximity 
to it might help us name. Yet  there is something of note in Kristeva’s com-
ment concerning the character of defecation and the fragile self. “It is as if 
the skin, a fragile container,” she writes, “no longer guaranteed the integrity 
of one’s ‘own and clean self ’ but, scraped or transparent, invisible or taught, 
gave way before the dejection of its contents.”84 Shit points to the already 
tainted self, in this case the open naming- thing portrayed through the open- 
and- closed nature of the anus. The anus as a point of betrayal practices the 
interplay of naming- thing and thing- thing as it releases into the world—as a 
marker of living and of demise— pieces of the bodied naming- thing (i.e., the 
food, bacteria,  etc., contained in it). “What goes out of the body,” according 
to Kristeva, “out of its pores and openings, points to the infinitude of the 
body proper and gives rise to abjection” to the extent that shit trou bles 
the nature and meaning of “I.” She continues: “Fecal  matter signifies, as it 
 were, what never ceases to separate from a body in a state of permanent loss 
in order to become autonomous, distinct from the mixtures, alterations, and 
decay that run through it.”85 Shit is from the bodied naming- thing’s border, 
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but more than this—it is from the naming- thing but is also foreign to that 
 thing, and this situating of shit points also to a rationale for its troubling 
effect on the illusion of fixity. Attention to shit is a type of recuperation.86
What Kristeva says concerning lit er a ture’s ability “through the crisis of the 
word” to expose the abject, I would extend to art more generally. That is to 
say, art entails an “unveiling” of the naming- thing’s openness— a pre sen ta tion, 
in this case, of the manner in which shit speaks to and also occasions reflec-
tion on this openness and its implications.87 Art provides a way of exploring 
this interplay between naming- things and thing- things, and particularly the 
manner in which the presence of a detested substance exposes (even signi-
fies) and encourages a diff er ent take on this interplay. “The body,” writes Jan 
Koenot, “is indeed omnipresent in the art of the 20th  century  whether fig-
ured or not, in all cases it is required; it collaborates and the work assigns a 
place to it even when bringing about a displacement, a letting go, a passage, 
an opening.”88 Even, for instance, Jackson Pollock’s effort to detangle the 
body and object so as to  free the subconscious to expression does not obliter-
ate the naming- thing/thing- thing biomancy at the heart of expression.
To step away from shit for a moment, the porous or exposed nature of the 
naming- thing is highlighted through body fluids such as blood flowing from 
this nonfixed and sealed  thing.89 Blood, a red substance of life, speaks to the 
vitality of the body—or the loss of that vitality when its confinement to the 
formal body is disrupted or spilled. Ron Athey’s performances— his body art— 
draw from his Pentecostal background and contemplation of death. They 
pre sent blood and the ways in which it exposes the naming- thing— marks 
it as open and penetrated. Blood speaks to the flow of life, the energy of the 
naming- thing; hence its ability to interplay with other naming- things and 
thing- things.90 Blood (and I would argue shit as well) speaks to the per sis tent 
intersection of creation and destruction as at least a potentiality, which is 
to say at its most forceful impingement on the naming- thing and its re-
lationship to other  things. Some have bled for or in front of audiences as 
per for mance meant to tackle deep  human inclinations, attitudes, and be-
hav iors. Spilled outside bodies, blood points to the end of vitality, the end 
of flow and life. But as in certain ritualization, the flow of blood outside the 
confines of embodiment can also serve as an offering of sorts, a marker of 
potential restitution and gain.91
Artists have used other body fluids such as urine to make sociopo liti cal 
statements, often with a node in the direction of religious imagery. Examples 
include the 1986 photo graph by Andres Serrano titled Piss Christ— the Christ 
on a cross, submerged in the artist’s very own urine.92 Some critics responded 
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by noting the depth of pre sen ta tion, the “beauty” of the image. Through ap-
plication of religion as a technology, one might also express the manner in 
which it brings Christology to the body by degrading it, to use Bakhtin’s con-
cept; it highlights the embodied nature of the Christ event, the manner in 
which it points to the intimacies of the bodied naming- thing and seeks to 
pre sent what is most metaphysically significant about our sense of ourselves 
as already connected to our presence and omission. In this case,  there is in 
this degrading another way to reflect on life presented twice already: we 
are born (perhaps born again) between feces and urine.93 We are located 
 existentially and epistemological within the realm of that which we disre-
gard.  There is no escape from that which we despise. We are intimately con-
nected to that which we, as naming- things, reject.
Prior to Piss Christ, the early twentieth  century was marked by the denied 
presence of  human waste. One need only think of Dada artist Duchamp’s 
“readymade” of the urinal displayed—to the dismay of many. Brought into 
the art gallery, it was seen by  those who challenged its presence as a mass- 
produced item, without scent or sight of waste yet still reminiscent of it.94 
More than half a  century since its first pre sen ta tion, I saw the Fountain— the 
urinal—on display at London’s Royal Acad emy of Arts. It was set  behind glass 
next to a variety of items from both Duchamp and Dali.95 Beyond reach, it 
was carefully placed on a gray platform, and as a consequence it lost some-
thing of its quality of thingliness. It is sterile: one cannot imagine it painted 
with urine. It is a  thing penetrated in only a  limited sense, with potential 
for full openness unfulfilled. It is no longer readymade. It is shiny— glossy, 
 really— with openings where I imagine in another context it would be con-
nected to the pipe rendering piss invisible and to the  water removing any 
vis i ble evidence that bodies are open and proj ect a stream of waste.  Here it 
is just exposed without a use.  There is a concern for the naming- thing, but 
its quality is only erotic—by which I mean it is concerned with the affec-
tive dimension of openness. Readymade—or already made? The transfer of 
the  thing impacts perception and alters the manner of interplay. Further-
more, the inscription on the side— “R. Mutt”— suggests this alteration by a 
naming- thing onto a thing- thing. Perhaps this is what Duchamp meant in 
saying that bringing it into display and signing it “created a new thought for 
that object.” This is both disgust and design.
This points to waste through a device meant to help us remove it, but what 
of machines made to bring waste into full view? Of course, shitting can be 
artificially depicted— mechanized— and rendered the work of machines. For 
instance, artist Wim Devoye’s Cloaca— New and Improved involves an electronic 
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device that simulates the production and elimination of waste.96 The color, 
odor, and even the shape mimics that produced as the naming- thing purges 
itself from itself. That is, “electronic and mechanical systems play the part 
of the enteric ner vous system, regulating food’s passage through glass jars 
acting as Cloaca’s stomach, small intestine, large intestine, and rectum. . . . 
Hours  later, out the other end comes poop.”97  There is much that could be 
made of this within the context of transhuman or posthuman studies or 
even animal studies, pushing them to explore the nature of shitting as a chal-
lenge to distinctions of being.
Does this machine somehow sterilize shitting— remove from it the ele ment 
of cleanliness or privatization regulation intended to instill? In removing from 
the biological naming- thing, the pro cess of production and expulsion of 
shit, does this artwork tell us about the dynamics of embodiment and the 
degree to which we can decentralize and deprioritize certain functions? If 
we could have such devices shit for us, perhaps we could remove all disgust 
and a deeply troubling sign of openness? However intriguing,  these ques-
tions are not my interest  here. In a word, I intend to examine what this piece 
of art (and the $1,000 samples of its shit collectors purchased) tells us about 
the vacuous nature of shitting.
Shit  matters, and its mattering is expressed artistically.
It is hard to think of shitting as a  matter of cultural evolution, but artistic 
expression based on and showing shit makes this realization more aestheti-
cally confrontational. Shit in a gallery is still shit, but it has a distinction from 
that deposited in the gas station rest room. The former one might buy for 
display, but the latter is a source of shame. In  either case, shit exposes the 
naming- thing as having the capacity to produce what it would rather deny. 
In this regard, shit is a  matter of insult but also cele bration.
Take conceptual art, for example. This mode of art signifies dimensions 
of the aesthetic and removes a quality of artistic meaning and production. It 
ties art to the mundane in ways that challenge the very substance or mean-
ing of art. As Dave Praeger writes, “Poop is the ultimate tool for conceptual 
art— because nothing is aesthetically less appealing than poop.”98 Further-
more, this statement, I believe, is akin to what Jojada Verrips had in mind 
when saying, “By painting (with) shit(ting bodies) and/or smearing what 
is inside their bodies on their outside, artists express a specific view of the 
very fragile nature of our capacity to always remain the civilized creatures we 
think we are.”99
A prime example of this turn to shit, one documented and explored in nu-
merous articles and books, is Artist’s Shit (Merda d’Artista), produced in the 
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early 1960s by Piero Manzoni. Photo graphs related to this “work” of art 
show the artist smiling and holding one of the cans containing a “piece” of 
him. Like Pop Art, which questions the difference between  things natu ral and 
 things intentional, Manzoni challenged the distinction between the ordinary 
and art. In fact, he took this to its biological extreme by positioning ninety 
small cans of his shit as art to be sold at the price of gold per ounce.100 His 
shit is not seen in  these cans— one of which I viewed at MoMA in New York. 
As art critics have noted, one must assume the artist’s statement is matched by 
his defecation and storage of that waste, sealed, numbered, and presented.101 
In this regard, Manzoni highlights the ever-pre sent nature of shit, while also 
noting the manner in which even when it is invisible it is still with us— 
marking us and forming a sense of what we are as bodied and open. Mindful 
of this, one could say that Manzoni takes the bodied naming- thing as pro-
ducer of waste and turns that production into art. That is to say, it is, in this 
case,  because the bodied naming- thing is open that it can produce art. Or as 
Martin Engler says, “What is provocatively radical in this sense are not the 
faeces he declares to be art, but the pro cess of artistic- physical transforma-
tion that turns the (artist’s) body into a producer of works of art operating 
along the interface of biology and aesthetics.”102
Manzoni was not alone in using shit to make metaphysical and existen-
tial statements. The 1960s and 1970s in a more general artistic sense (in the 
Western world) is marked by the pre sen ta tion of  human shit.103 This might 
have something to do with the cultural- political and social concerns that pen-
etrated Western society during this time— concerns that  were best noted 
and challenged through the exposing of what “should” be hidden and that 
by being out of place spoke a power ful word to the political- social- cultural 
and economic connotations of being in place.104 By extension, and in a very 
impor tant way, this work with shit deconstructs the naming of  things as being 
“in” or “out of ” place  because interaction and mutuality, or connection, be-
tween naming- things and thing- things means  there is no predetermined lo-
cation or “place.”
Turning back to the exhibit with which I started, Cattelan is missing ex-
cept for the golden toilet he leaves  behind. He demonstrates the openness of 
all naming- things to the extent that all shit, and in this shitting all bodied 
naming- things exist in a state of interplay with internal/external  things. The 
idea of the artist remains intact, but all else— the turning of a toilet into some-
thing else—is left to other naming- things. Can what is said about Manzoni 
be applied to the patrons taking advantage of Cattelan’s exhibition? “ Here 
the body becomes a medium for the ingestion, production and  excretion of 
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art.”105 Hence, it is not shit that is for sale  here at the  Guggenheim; rather, 
patrons purchase an opportunity to contribute something of “substance” to 
the proj ect. Cattelan privileges biological pro cess, and Manzoni privileges 
product. Yet on some level, both artists are concerned with the ability to 
name and observe interplay outside its normal arrangements and constitu-
tion.  There is hidden in the larger ethos of shit- based art another concern— 
one that trou bles. By its very nature, it disrupts the ability to judge “qual-
ity” in terms of traditional markers of “good” or “bad” art.106 The normative 
standards of reflection do not function in the realm of shit.
I disagree with  those who argue for a secular theological platform for Man-
zoni’s work and who do so by casting it in terms of Communion and other 
Christian ritualization. I suggest that it is more fruitful to think in terms 
of shit for sale, for example, outside the framework, say, of the Eucharist. 
Christian ritual entails a pull beyond  human historical experience and in-
volves attention to a diff er ent modality of knowledge. I argue that the more 
significant impact of Manzoni’s work— and  others like it—is the very decon-
struction of such efforts to seal off the body through divine impingement and 
to maintain the realization of openness. Eucharist, for instance, maintains 
a rather narrow sense of defilement and purity, which I argue Manzoni and 
 others, through the pre sen ta tion of shit, seek to dismantle. To cast their 
work in terms of theological ritual in a strict sense is to downplay the value 
of its grotesque quality.107
For both Cattelan and Manzoni, art is a (fecal)  matter of distinction 
denied by repositioning the naming- thing and what it produces. For 
 Cattelan, Amer i cas invites participants to acknowledge their shit by having 
it si mul ta neously celebrated and denounced. Amer i cas is a toilet that hides 
waste, like all toilets, yet it is in a museum and thereby celebrates the “once 
was and still is” quality of the  human connection to the  thing called shit. 
Manzoni’s attention to naming- thing and thing- thing is more mobile and 
requires more of the participant. It is one  thing to pay to take a shit—as is 
the case with the cover charge for Amer i cas. But is this the same as paying 
for another’s shit? Buying one of Manzoni’s cans is not simply an acknowl-
edgment that shit  matters and that we produce this  matter, but that open 
naming- things are not hidden and cannot hide this substance. It also points 
to a certain type of utility of shit— not as fertilizer but as a reminder of mutu-
ality. That is to say, Cattelan and Manzoni, among  others, point out through 
the pre sen ta tion of shit/shitting the manner in which engaged naming- 
things share agency as a  matter of productive interactivity with other 
 things.108 The significance of this artwork is the manner in which it serves to 
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highlight a common but undervisualized pro cess of engagement based on in-
tentional naming. Or as Kristina Wirtz notes in terms of Cuban popu lar re-
ligion, rubbish (I would specify shit) “acts on us as much as we act on it, but 
does so without drawing our conscious attention most of the time.”109 The 
difference is this: while Wirtz is thinking in terms of the transfer of spiritual 
emphasis through touch, I am concerned with a more standard pro cess of 
mutuality vis- à- vis porous naming- things and thing- things. Wirtz, that is, 
gives consideration to the spiritual vitality of  things, and I suggest that this 
is to see  these  things for what cannot be seen— for the manner in which their 
importance is genealogically beyond them. Ritual waste is not just waste in 
that the ritualization  either exposes or invests it with a potentially danger-
ous quality of “more.” Contrary to this position, I want to see the importance 
of waste, in this case shit, for itself as a porous  thing whose materiality is and 
is not the naming- thing.110
Manzoni loses something in the process— the body surrenders a piece of 
itself, which another buys and in a sense makes his or her own.111 The open-
ings, the most porous locations of the body, connect us. In this case, the con-
nection takes place through the passing and collecting of shit. The goal is 
not simply to shock, but rather to expose and to mediate that exposition, 
perhaps, by means of what Stella Santacatterina references as “the continual 
mutability of art” by means of which the patron participates in the “active 
realization of the artistic event.”112 In the case of Manzoni, buying his shit 
is more than buying art; in the case of Cattelan, the “active realization” in-
volves evacuating the content of the open naming- thing into the artistic 
context provided by the Guggenheim. In  either case, the intersection be-
tween viewer and artist is blurred in the same manner that naming- things 
and thing- things are open and involved in a pro cess of interplay. Both modes 
of artistic shitting involve ritualization of a naming- thing function pointing 
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 Things are not inert.
— iAn hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships  
between  Humans and  Things
Mikhail Bakhtin assumes that the grotesque body (or what I have labeled the 
bodied naming- thing) is coded in par tic u lar ways. And this raises a nagging 
question associated with an accompanying dilemma: What happens when 
the social coding imposed on the bodied naming- thing serves to hamper its 
openness?
Taking further the significance of shit discussed in chapter 5, in part 3 I 
explore the nature of this dilemma— one that might be phrased in a manner 
reminiscent of David Marriott’s question: “What of  those subjects whose 
rule of life is to endure life  under the owner ship of another and consequently 
are said to live as objects?”1 Or, as Judith Butler announced,  there are mecha-
nisms, strategies, and practices by means of which some naming- things are 
collapsed or repressed into representing despised thing- things. Stated sim-
ply,  there are ways in which, on the sociocultural and po liti cal level, some 
naming- things “become shit.”2 Marriott might call this situation “corpsing.”3 
I would simply add that it involves not the interplay between naming- thing 
and thing- thing but rather the corruption of interplay through an effort to 
close off par tic u lar bodies coded as raced, gendered, and classed, for instance. 
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In other words, interplay between naming- thing and thing- thing is warped, 
as the former and the latter are misnamed through effort to constitute 
sociopo liti cal, cultural, and economic bound aries rehearsed as narratives of a 
biohistorical tenor. In  these pages, I point out that naming- things and thing- 
things are named and positioned even prior to their involvement. That is to 
say, they are constructed and involved through a pro cess of interpretation.
Art as Protest, or What Does Art Do?
Art and life bleed into each other, and in certain intriguing ways the vehicle 
for this interplay is the naming- thing that does the work in the first instance. 
And for the artist explored in this chapter,  there is also the naming- thing 
consumed in and by the art. The artist “thinks” this work but is also guided 
through it by the social realities that have  shaped his relationship to other 
 things. In this regard, art has a function that pushes beyond art for art’s 
sake, to a sense of art as fostering experience (understood as moments of in-
terplay) that is “po liti cal and instrumental.”4 This is another way of noting 
what many have referenced as the po liti cal function of art, and this function 
is sensitive to the details of the historical moment in which  things and bod-
ied naming- things interact.
For some time, thinkers and activists within African American commu-
nities have argued the importance of artistic expression for shifting sociopo-
liti cal perceptions of African American naming- things. In this regard, art 
is something of an aesthetically sophisticated “picket sign.” What sermons, 
lectures, and po liti cal protest of a physical kind could not accomplish—it has 
been argued by many advocates of racial equality— could be captured through 
the symbols and poetics of art in all its forms.  Earlier slave narratives such as 
 those produced by Frederick Douglass intend to position African American 
naming- things for full rights in part through their pre sen ta tion as open— for 
example, the pain experienced by them and their right to full participation. 
Writers tackled the angst of black life as racialized naming- things rendered 
truncated and closed through racial vio lence.5 Poets such as Countee Collen 
spoke the stuff of life encountered by embodied  people of African descent, 
but he did not leave it with this; instead, he spoke of the supple nature of the 
blackened naming- thing. Musicians such as Bessie Smith and Billie Holiday 
sang the depth of black life in ways that pushed against the presumption 
that black naming- things are one- dimensional, and they did this by celebrat-
ing the degrading, to appeal once again to Bakhtin (or bluesy quality), of 
black naming- things. In this way they repositioned racialized naming- things 
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through a shift in how they occupy time and space as well as how they inter-
act within that time and space.6
But in that the primary concern  here is with the visual arts, I offer 
 these examples simply as context before turning to the manner in which 
the blackened naming- thing projected outward, beyond itself, through vi-
sual art, speaks a depth denied within the flat and bounded circumstances of 
our race- biased social circumstances. The creative pro cess captured by the 
arts and the involvement of racialized naming- things in the arts speak to a 
depth of relationship, one that signifies assumptions of inferiority through a 
poetic quality challenging the assumption of African Americans as naming- 
things constituted by a fixed, a reified, and an ontological limit. The key  here 
is not necessarily the production of plea sure but rather the transformative 
potentiality of discomfort— the requirement to view and to reevaluate held 
assumptions concerning the meaning of certain naming- things. The key, the 
purpose, is multidimensional.
To what is art so conceived responding? What is the history, the cartog-
raphy of sociopo liti cal, economic, and cultural markings of life for African 
American naming- things that informs how the visual arts are made and read? 
The answer is  simple but does not entail a simplistic framing of collective life. 
Art, by racialized naming- things, speaks to the significance and value of a 
collective group whose history has been written to suggest something other 
than their value and relationality. Art is a rich rejection of dehumanization 
and other modalities of ontological vio lence. Furthermore, in a fundamental 
sense, it speaks to a collective identity, but one must exercise caution not to 
reify this shared history.
Reflecting on the definition of “black” in “black popu lar culture,” Richard J. 
Powell notes that shared experience of “racial and cultural discrimination, 
segregation, recognition, and identification— should not be viewed as a lit-
mus tests for blackness per se, since many  peoples of African descent have 
experienced  these to varying degrees.”7 Looking at this not from the perspec-
tive of art historian, phi los o pher of art, or art critic, I push a par tic u lar di-
mension of this discussion, one that notes the significance of artistic think-
ing and the pre sen ta tion of openness.8 The artistic production of African 
American naming- things frames existential considerations through a visual 
re- presentation of worth and interplay celebrated— and presented in exhibits 
such as Soul of a Nation: Art in the Age of Black Power 1963–1983.9 Pulling together 
a variety of ontological and epistemological concerns is significant  here. The 
“desire to visualize something racial and cultural,” notes Powell, “yet also con-
ceptual and metaphysical, found the ideal subject in black religion.” It is only 
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the case in  these pages that religion is pushed beyond the typical terrain of 
doctrines and creeds and instead is understood as a technology.10 As Powell, 
among  others, cautions, this is not to assume a “black aesthetic.” Such a sin-
gular or unified approach is not necessary in order to appreciate a shared 
range of concerns encountered due to blackness” and what it means within 
the grammar and vocabulary of life in the United States. The openness of 
blackened naming- things is not dependent on approval from white Ameri-
cans. Hence,  there is something about the artistic production of African 
Americans that suggests a stating of the known but denied— not a creation 
of ontological meaning, but rather a cele bration of meaning as openness or 
Bakhtian degradation in such a way as to cause discomfort for  those who have 
denied it.
Still,  there is no intention  here to assume through omission that only 
 people of African descent must (or should) wrestle with the nature and mean-
ing of interplay. No, this is a concern for “white” Americans as well, but the 
privilege of whiteness also entails a certain in/visibility that makes  matters 
of thingliness curiosity as opposed to necessity. So  here attention is given to 
the thingliness of “white” Americans. Yet this is done through attention 
to how whites relate to the visualization of blackened naming- things inter-
acting and performing openness. This is not to reify the latter, to make the 
latter objects for speculation, but rather the opposite. This move is made to 
demonstrate the manner in which whiteness is dependent on blackness. In 
other words, the effort of whites to promote a narrative of distinction or dif-
ference based on clear bound aries requires the presence of blackness.
White bodied naming- things occupy time and space to a significant de-
gree over against the manner in which blackened naming- things occupy time 
and space. In this regard, “right” occupation has significant socioeconomic, 
po liti cal, and cultural ramifications. In  either case, subjectivity is pieced 
together. If naming- things, in fact, occupy numerous social spaces si mul ta-
neously, is not this to be expected? Perception of life, cartographies of what 
the experiences of life entail, would then need to be patched together from 
the stuff we can gather, from the ele ments of life we can arrange and hold 
long enough to note their significance. In a sense, then, artistic production— 
the visual arts in this instance—is a poetic rehearsal of the fact of ontologi-
cal significance, which is colorful, vibrant, challenging, and compelling in 
its pre sen ta tion. Done from within the very cultural worlds that question 
this ontological given, significance is much harder to hide and deny. Black 
naming- things once flattened are given depth through signifying their trun-
cated presence.
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Changing  Things
The pre sen ta tion of self over against pre sen ta tions by  others marks the start 
of this ontological shift to the already and always openness of African Amer-
icans. Such a move was presented to the art world, in the case of Romare 
Bearden, through manipulation of scraps of  things often used for another pur-
pose. In this way, the purpose of “ things” is recast, reshaped, and magnified. 
 These  things— scraps of paper, pieces of wood, letters, and so forth— have 
their thingliness transformed and used to mirror other and deeper realities.
What stories do  things tell when arranged by this artist? And what is to be 
made of his stories when disconnected  things are brought into relationship 
through application— through an intentional push to place them differently?
 Things  matter in multiple, overlapping ways in his art.  There is the 
naming- thing manipulating  things in order to tell stories.  These naming- 
things  doing work say something about the structuring of life in a society 
marked by suspicion concerning openness and interplay. Added to this is 
the manner in which such art depicts the performative and plastic nature of 
identification— the manner in which  things can be pressured and manipu-
lated and “worn” so as to produce something other than their first and most 
vis i ble intent.11  There is something significant about the shaping and massag-
ing of “ things,” and Bearden speaks to this situation. His art is dimensionally 
visual, but this seeing does not render it fixed, rigid, or easily held. Through 
pre sen ta tion of  things, Bearden also points to absence, and through this fos-
ters alternate possibilities of interplay. For some, this type of pro cess points 
to a prob lem, but  there is another perspective pos si ble. What Powell notes 
when discussing “a homoerotic gaze on the black male body” through pho-
tography can be read for its larger relevance:
The black body as a photographed object of desire, while unquestionably 
nuanced, elicited what author Alice Walker pronounced in her novel 
Meridian (1976) as the ultimate sin: turning of real, thinking and feeling 
 people into Art. Yet one could also argue that, at this moment of an ex-
panded black consciousness [the 1970s], it was precisely this sense that 
blacks could be both objects of artistic contemplation and actors in their 
own aesthetic discernment, that made  these works provocative and cen-
tral to a revised art history of transgressive, radical black images.12
The metaphysical and existential content of this work, by means of a variety 
of styles, was meant to dislodge racialized naming- things and their concep-
tual counterpoints from the confinement of white supremacy and aesthetic 
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dominance spoken through it. Art, in this regard, was already and always 
engaged— either implicitly or explic itly— with the configuration of interplay 
marked up and/or out.
Designations and artistic styles changed to reflect the ebb and flow of per-
ceived interaction within geographies of altered socioeconomic and po liti cal 
discourses and arrangements. In describing the presence of race, Michael 
Harris articulates an applicable sensibility. “Racial discourses, though they 
are discourses of power,” he writes, “ultimately rely on the visual in the sense 
that the vis i ble body must be used by  those in power to represent nonvisual 
realities that differentiate insiders from outsiders.”13 By extension, Harris 
notes, “the individual physical body eventually symbolized in vari ous ways 
one’s membership in a par tic u lar social body or body politic.”14 If, as African 
American visual arts at least implies, visual repre sen ta tion can be used to 
reify and fix racialized naming- things, visual arts can be used to challenge 
and signify such constructions and thereby foster a new sense of openness. 
In a word,  things are linked and manipulated through visual markers to alter 
cultural worlds, and such a shift is pos si ble  because rules of the social hier-
archy are written, spoken, but also presented on and through  things. The 
ways in which bodies occupy time and space says something about the merit 
and worth of par tic u lar  things. The implicit and explicit manner in which 
this plays out can be captured in the language and moves of the visual arts. 
“Pictures and words,” notes Arthur Danto, “may be grossly distinguished in 
terms of how they represent their subjects, and they exemplify, again grossly, 
the two chief systems by which we represent the world.”15
What Danto argues in terms of Robert Irwin’s sense of art’s function as 
meant to “heighten awareness” is applicable in this context as well. “Not to 
heighten awareness of art as art,” writes Danto, “but of the dimensions and 
features of life that art raises to the highest powers of enhancement while 
remaining invisible directing the viewer’s sensibilities with a kind of aesthetic 
Hidden Hand.”16 Yet for many, this use of the visual arts became the norma-
tive and required intent of the artist: African American art was a po liti cal 
act of reenvisioning ontological and existential meaning through the proc-
lamation of openness. And this visual proclamation worked to adjust the 
perception of a par tic u lar context in that—as Hans Belting argues regard-
ing par tic u lar types of images and I extend to visual images more broadly 
developed— images have contextual significance in that they speak to and 
from a par tic u lar cultural world, and “it is in this place that they exert their 
effect.”17 Naming- things create art so as to speak to and about the world, and 
in so  doing this art massages the manner in which viewers think of themselves, 
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 others, and worlds in light of the artist’s visual monologue. The work of 
naming- things can change minds and encourage modalities of be hav ior and 
perceptions of what all this means to a sense of being.
Art involves something made, a transposition and transformation of place 
and function. As Elizabeth Grosz says with re spect to Australian art, “Art is 
created, always made, never found, even if it is made from what is found. 
This is its transformative effect—as it is made, so it makes.”18 It is not simply 
that art intensifies and makes more vibrant “life.” No, the work of African 
American artists brings into question the very content and form of life and 
the bodies that map out “life.” The certainty of the past and the comfort of 
the pre sent as structured through the dominant narrative of the meaning 
of “American” life is challenged and exposed for the warped take on the real 
it  really is.
Bearden’s Collages
Romare Bearden (1911–1988) shifted the position, and hence meaning, of ra-
cialized naming- things by challenging dominant aesthetic standards and 
consideration that surround if not engulf them. He spoke a new “word” about 
the nature and meaning of black naming- things by shifting the pre sen ta tion 
of discourse— new aesthetics, new stylistic consideration, and new ontologi-
cal, epistemological, and existential insights. This was an artistic shift riddled 
with potential consequences that move against the intended reification of 
blackened naming- things.  There is the racialized naming- thing of the artist 
that represents and pre sents the meanings of racialization and truncation 
signified. This complicates  matters: Which body is signified, and does the em-
bodied artist’s presence say something that is not countered by the presence 
of the art? Is the artist an extension of the “sign” or the deconstruction of 
the “sign”?19
Abstract Expressionism ended in the 1960s, and Pop Art emerged as a means 
by which to blur the line between art and the ordinary. During that same pe-
riod, Bearden began an alternate creative pro cess by piecing together scraps 
to create collages portraying diff er ent dimensions of African American expe-
rience.20 Bearden had spent a good number of years working in light of the 
premises of Abstract Expressionism, but this changed.21 It was not simply 
the end of Abstract Expressionism as such, but rather his need to respond to 
issues of identity in a way that required forceful reconstruction of contex-
tualized meaning. Having spent time employed as a social worker, Bearden 
had a sense of “real” life— its complexities, its thickness, and the way in 
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which it informs, shapes, and pre sents naming- things. Hence, collages mark 
Bearden’s wrestling with identity and interplay— the reenvisioning of mean-
ing in light of the sociohistorical framing of experience encountered and 
known by African Americans.22 Perhaps something of the layered nature of 
 human life— the occupation of numerous social spaces si mul ta neously—is 
portrayed through the collage pro cess informing work such as Projections, 
collage- styled pre sen ta tions of moments of interaction called black life that 
 were first exhibited in 1964.
The manner in which African Americans entail a blending of cultural 
worlds to foster identities that sustain and enliven is presented artistically 
through the layering pro cess of the collage, whereby pieces of  things are 
brought together to form frameworks of meaning and relationship.23 For 
Bearden, the construction of identity had to involve attention to memory, 
but memory funneled through con temporary structures and frameworks of 
experience. Such was of concern to Bearden as he shifted away from his  earlier 
stylistic commitments. He gave ample attention to the role of the artist in 
the construction of new ontological and existential possibilities for African 
Americans during and  after the civil rights strugg le.24 History mattered to 
Bearden, and history— its tone and texture— had to be represented. Yet this 
history had to involve the layered nature of  human experience, the intersec-
tions and connections between the individual’s encounter with the world 
and the larger framing of life of which  those more focused encounters are a 
significant part.
The pieces pulled together to produce an imperfect image of life lived 
contain in their roughness something of the “earthy” nature of life, the in-
consistencies and “fits and starts” that constitute movement through the 
world. Bearden’s social work, his time in the military, and his movement 
through the South and the North only fed this approach to understanding 
life.  These personal experiences  were something of a bridge to the macrore-
alities of African American life; they feed, in par tic u lar ways, lucidity and 
sensitivity to the moments that mark out existence.  There is something cha-
otic about life so conceived, and then art might be said to involve, as Bearden 
notes, the artist attempting to “or ga nize chaos.”25
Bearden recognized the ability to define, name, and pre sent the bodied 
naming- thing through the manipulation of  things— flattened out in order 
to interrogate what pieces brought together tell us about the nature and 
meaning of life. I have in mind the collage series produced in the 1960s by 
means of which Bearden depicted personalities and religious- spiritual fig-
ures and scenes through the manipulation of images and words intended for 
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another purpose. His collage work demonstrated the layers of meaning that 
constitute our perception of life and living. In both cases, the socially im-
posed structuring of blackness through the body is rethought, pushing against 
the assumption that such blackened bodies hold no  great worth or value— 
and say nothing to and about life meaning in substantive ways. This restruc-
turing away from restriction “paints” blackened naming- things as “signs” of 
 great importance and worth. The complexities of life are forged in light 
of “ things” and experiences arranged and rearranged—so as to be used to 
construct new possibilities.
American imagination involves a certain spin on the substance of African 
American cultural life, a type of simplification of African American experi-
ence so as to think it less significant than that of white Americans. However, 
Bearden builds African American cultural life anew, out of vari ous pieces of 
experience, and in this retelling or remaking Bearden challenges poetically 
truncated depictions of African American life by showing the stuff of which 
it is made and by encouraging viewers to recognize the layered and complex 
nature of cultural systems constructed by African Americans.
The Prevalence of Ritual: The Baptism, part of the Projections series of 1964, 
takes the practice of Christian baptism so impor tant to African American 
Christians and pushes beyond dull depictions by including pieces in the col-
lage that speak to an African past (i.e., images resembling African ritual 
masks). In so  doing, it ties this  water ritual to a richness of cultural life that 
extends beyond the confinements of North American slavery.  There is a 
church structure in the background, but it is of minor concern as it sur-
renders to the vitality, the energy, of bodies in the act of ritualization. The 
 people, the bodied naming- things, involved in the ritual are highlighted and 
placed in the foreground so that the viewer is forced to see and recognize 
them. In this way, the tendency within the larger society for the invisibility 
of African Americans is controlled and negated through a layered presence 
that constitutes bodies demanding consideration. Pieces of images, pieces of 
life so to speak, might be said to represent the manner in which the vio lence 
of the United States pulled black lives apart and did vio lence to them that 
was meant to render them unrecognizable as fully formed, embodied bodies of 
merit. Through the collages, Bearden chronicles the manner in which Afri-
can Americans have pulled  these pieces together and constructed worlds of 
meaning. The cuts and tears necessary to produce  these bodies are graphic, 
not hidden in the art, and something about  these marks,  these lines, speaks 
to the marking of black bodies during the period of slavery and ongoing 
structured discrimination— the markings of discrimination the civil rights 
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movement sought to address. Think of  these collage images, the sharp edges 
and rips pronounced in light of the scars on black bodies imprinted by means 
of a whip or other devices marking a trail of suffering, or the hardships im-
printed on black bodies by the harsh realities of Jim and Jane Crow. The 
viewer has to focus, to train the eyes to seek the pieces and to see that the 
pieces constitute a greater (but imperfect) arrangement forming naming- 
things active and vibrant. As numerous scholars have noted, that  these col-
lages reflect the times is no accident when one considers the fact that civil 
rights leaders asked Bearden and  others to give some thought to how artists 
might contribute to the strugg le for justice. The conversations generated 
Spiral, a group of artists committed to art with public meaning, so to speak. 
The objective, as Gail Gelburd notes, was to “find a way to fulfill their so-
cial responsibility without turning their art into mere propaganda, to be a 
part of their times without relinquishing their commitment to aesthetics.”26 
As Bearden shifted away from Abstract Expressionism, thing- things pushed 
their way forward; constructed of pieces of “ things” each with its own stories 
that merge into a structure of grouped vibrancy,  these composite and in-
teracting  things dominate and demand attention— requiring consideration. 
 These  were bodies unlike his  earlier bodies painted and drawn.
Beginning during the turmoil of the civil rights efforts of the 1960s, the 
collage pro cess would remain Bearden’s mode of pre sen ta tion. The piecing 
together would alter over time and not necessarily contain the same sharp 
edges and the jerking intensity, but the layering of realities remained vital.27 
Perhaps the softening had something to do with the sociopo liti cal shifts and 
cultural nuances of diff er ent decades— shifting per for mances of interplay? 
The pre sen ta tion of the bodied thingliness of African American life had to 
be expressed, but with a diff er ent energy and emphasis. Bearden’s collage work 
exposes the inner workings of bodies to the extent that  these bodies, as he 
pre sents them, are composed of pieces pulled together. In this pro cess  there 
is the whole— the composite— but the viewer also sees the bits and pieces that 
compose this  whole. All this suggests the nature of interplay— vari ous  things 
penetrating, layered, interacting.
Through the layering of substances that constitute the collage style  there 
emerges a situation thick and vibrant with complex meaning. Parts are some-
what exaggerated, extended, and their distinctions pronounced, but all this 
adds to the visual depiction of embodiment that gives cultural- historical 
weight and importance, and that gives a certain degree of significance to 
naming- things as open. Full, layered, repre sen ta tion wins out for Bearden, 
and he uses it to discuss the nature and meaning of life for African Americans 
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and by extension what it means for African Americans to be naming- things 
interacting with and through the world. Naming- things show their complex-
ity; they are made vis i ble, their “inners” exposed, so to speak. The complexi-
ties often hidden in other circumstances are highlighted and brought to the 
fore. This artistic move was not a full departure from  earlier sensibilities; 
rather, Bearden came to understand that concern with universals required 
equal attention to the local and the specific. For him, this meant a solid, 
graphic, and vibrant turn to his experience— including the damaging effect 
of economic hardship and white supremacy fueled by structured discrimi-
nation that marked his North Carolina homeland, as well as the turmoil 
of world wars, the  Great Depression, the Harlem Re nais sance, and the or ga-
nized strugg le for civil rights— and that of the larger collective of African 
Americans.28
 There is a visual “double- talk,” so to speak, in that  there are pieces within 
this series drawn from other proj ects, other artistic traditions, and they are 
put to a diff er ent work.29 The energy of African American life— its sharp and 
ragged edges— speaks to the manner in which this despised but gifted com-
munity has had to rip away pieces of itself in order to construct signs of 
and spaces for identity. While Bearden at times used a photostat pro cess to 
downplay the roughness of the cuts and layering (as in life  people might try 
to decrease “difference” so as to highlight their sameness with social stan-
dards), the effect was never complete.30 The edges, the roughness of the tears 
and cuts,  were always pre sent.  These collage images  were not produced on 
an easel as one might imagine paintings positioned; rather, they  were made 
flat on a  table.31
Each piece perhaps is unrecognizable alone, but together they shape and 
offer contour to the mechanics of African American being and meaning. Con-
jur  Woman, also from Projections, speaks to the African American  engagement 
with the rest of the environment— relationship to and manipulation of plant 
life so as to foster new possibilities of life. Animals, plants, and  humans inter-
act, expressing an overlap of engagement and relationship that transforms 
all involved. In this, Bearden highlights the thickness of African American 
experience, its layered connotations, and its ability to speak to the nature 
and meaning of life within the larger U.S. urban and rural contexts as well 
as life on the microlevel. The conjur  woman depends on the plants and 
the animals pre sent, and the animals and plants are impacted by the conjur 
 woman’s careful engagement.
What serves to hold  these vari ous geographies of meaning together is 
the configured naming- things occupying and manipulating time and space. 
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“Bearden and his peers,” writes Leslie King- Hammond, “sought to create 
aesthetic voices that would give visual meaning and presence to ordinary 
 people— living ordinary lives, in ordinary environments—in an extraordinary 
era of modernist invention.”32 Bearden pre sents the poetic quality of African 
American experience within vari ous social realms, and in this way he exposes 
the vitality of embodied black life over against what are often truncated and 
reified assumptions concerning what it means to be black and alive— shifting 
through time and space.
Of course,  there are the most readily apparent and easily recognized mark-
ers of this quest for meaning. Think in terms of conjure, baptism, and other 
ele ments of African- based traditional practices and Chris tian ity that have for 
an extended period marked the landscape of African American metaphysi-
cal concern. Still  there are more, less easily registered modalities of interplay 
presented through  these collages. Bearden maps out the soul—or genius of 
African American engagement with the world.  These collages make a state-
ment concerning meaning that is impor tant to note: meaning is not found 
 whole but is constructed in an imperfect manner by consciously selecting 
bits and pieces of experience and pulling them together for what they can 
say about larger systems of concerns. What is more, this pro cess of intention-
ally constructing involves also a pro cess of destruction, a privileging of cer-
tain experiences (or moments of interplay) and the ignoring of  others, as 
Bearden selects par tic u lar pieces of images from Life magazine and  others 
for inclusion and dismisses  others. And once selected, the images must be 
dismantled— their initial intended meaning ripped apart—in order for them 
to point to something beyond themselves. Or as Ralph Ellison notes when 
describing Bearden’s Projections series, “The work of the arts is a  matter of 
destroying moribund images of real ity and creating the new.” What is more, 
“it is of the true artist’s nature and mode of action to dominate all the world 
and time through technique and vision.” This is tied to a task, an objective 
which is “to bring a new visual order into the world, and through [the art-
ist’s] art he seeks to reset society’s clock by imposing upon it his own method 
of defining the times.”33
Fish Fry (1967) pre sents activity that is not spectacular or extraordinary 
but still speaks to the depth of  human meaning expressed through embodied 
activities. Cooking together and sharing food and conversation or preparing 
for the day as the sun signals a new beginning, or sitting over coffee, when 
presented by Bearden, speak in diff er ent ways to a shared concern for con-
nection, for relationship, and for a way to interrogate experience. Within the 
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ordinary activities of communal existence, Bearden distills through his col-
lages the depth of meaning of vibrant vision that marks embodied life.
Interplay.
The distinctions between  these vari ous forms of life are evident, while they 
also merge with and depend on both the presence and absence of “ others.” 
Presence and absence overlap and point in the direction of the other. The 
local points in the direction of larger commonalities, and shared markers 
of ritual life also push back to local activities and concerns.  There is fluidity 
 here that is epistemological and existential in nature. Or as Gail Gelburd 
notes when reflecting on Bearden’s collages, “Our perception of space is then 
psychological as well as visual, and we are reminded that no perspective, 
myth, ritual, or memory is ever fixed.”34 It is not simply the explicit religious 
themes such as Of the Blues: Carolina Shout (1974) that speak to Bearden’s lay-
ered depiction of interplay as embodied and vibrant. The scenes of mundane 
activities and cele bration speak to the significance of embodied bodies en-
countering  others as the outline of history, the content of experience, and 
the sign of identity formation.
Of concern in the 1960s, collage work is not blackness per se but rather 
the arena of ontology that gives shape and meaning to blackness as a cover 
for certain naming- things.  There is complexity to Bearden’s depictions of 
life within African American contexts, and in certain ways the collage pro-
cess itself speaks to this complexity and depth of meaning. However, it is 
also expressed through the range of activities presented by Bearden that 
mark out the richness of relationship and the world not fully captured by 
opposition to whiteness— scope of experience, depth of meaning, lucidity— 
expressed with a fluidity of form and visualized movement within  these cap-
tured moments.35
 These cut and ripped pieces call to the viewer, but in such a way as to sig-
nal their presence— but their presence in relationship to other pieces that 
form something of a  whole. Robert G. O’Meally captures this pro cess using 
musical meta phor: Bearden constructs through a blues and jazz aesthetic— 
improvisation.36 Another way to put this, one centered within a concern for 
religion, is that Bearden’s collages point to the microexperiences that blend 
to form a more unified sense of meaning— but as a sense of complex meaning 
that is always part of the incomplete and fractured nature of life: Complex-
ity. While scholars such as O’Meally see Bearden as a jazz or blues figure, one 
could just as easily perceive him as a conjurer— one who pulls from the famil-
iar to produce a par tic u lar type of work. One might be familiar with the use 
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of roots, herbs, and other plants by traditional conjurers, but  doesn’t Bearden 
use “ things”— the scraps of paper from magazines— which, at their core, are 
drawn from  those same woods and other environments? Using  these captured 
and manipulated ele ments, he pushes viewers to confront the commonali-
ties of  human experience as they also observe the spaces of activity marking 
out African American experiences within time and space. The imperfection 
is itself transformative. Ele ments of the collages are proportionate, and each 
ele ment demands a certain level of attention in part determined by size. Yet, 
 isn’t it the case with experiences that some are more graphic, “larger” so to 
speak, and therefore more prominent and more prone to demand attention?
Pieces are impor tant  here in that they point to the value of our images 
of life, while also pointing out that  these images are incomplete. When 
layered, when joined, they tell us something more and point to the signifi-
cance of presence. Bearden pulls and pushes history in an effort to expose 
its content, contours, depth, and aesthetic qualities— the interplay of vari-
ous  things that constitutes experience.37 Bearden’s collages in the Projec-
tions series visualize the pro cess of exploration, interrogation, analy sis, and 
mapping. In terms of identity, of being and meaning, the conjur  woman, for 
instance, represents the blending of traditions, the harnessing of worlds— 
African,  Eu ro pean, and North American—to stabilize African American 
being through a study of the construction of bodies. The collage structuring 
of  things creates a type of epistemological dissonance that brings into ques-
tion assumptions concerning what a blackened naming- thing constitutes and 
how it is constituted. The exaggerated features and limbs signify the ste reo-
typical depiction of African Americans as having no aesthetic value in that 
their features, such as lips and noses, are too large, too broad— too unlike 
that of Eu ro pean Americans. In a word, ste reo typically depicted black bod-
ies do not survive the normative gaze, as Cornel West names Eu ro pean fea-
tures understood as signifying totalizing standards of beauty, worth, and in-
telligence.38 Ralph Ellison captures what is taking place through the layering 
of materials: “Bearden knows that the true complexity of the slum dweller 
and the Tenant farmer requires a release from the prison of our media- dulled 
perception and a reassembling in forms which would convey something of 
the depth and won der of the Negro American’s stubborn humanity.”39 All 
this metaphysical work is pre sent in the collages produced.
The features of  these bodies are extended, enlarged, often out of propor-
tion.  These bodies are active; they have depth manifest as they engage the 
story of the collage and the viewer. What Bearden offers, then, is a study 
in anthropology as ontological mosaic. This series, the collage series, was a 
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work of memory, an effort to capture the tone and texture of life familiar to 
Bearden growing up, and that marked out the form and content of life for 
many African Americans in the North and the South. It humanized, so to 
speak,  those who— like the conjur  woman— protected the integrity of em-
bodied life. Collages, like pictures with a poetic quality, forced a rethinking 
of embodied bodies through the reconstruction of bodies by means of other 
materials.  These collages speak to how bodies occupy time and space in ways 
that manipulate the unseen and produce the unintended. In other words, 
contends Gelburd, “the meta phors and the myths that he visualized are not 
merely a description of the scene but a mirror of life’s experiences.”40 So 
much of what constitutes  these collages involves an experiment with what 
naming- things do by means of their porousness— how they occupy space and 
how they produce meaning through ritual, cele bration, and everyday activi-
ties in the com pany of  others.41
If  there is anything universal about  human beings, it is that given a largely iden-
tical biology, they  will represent the world differently from stage to stage of the 
histories in which they participate.
— Arthur dAnto, The Body/Body Prob lem
Moving from Romare Bearden’s collage work as signifying the interplay of 
 things over against efforts to foster racialized bound aries and modes of con-
finement, this chapter pre sents the second of three scenarios in which the 
racialization of certain naming- things is used to foster the illusion of cul-
turally coded bound aries over against the openness exposed by religion as 
a technology. In this instance,  these are bound aries resting on racial narra-
tives of distinction; but it should not be forgotten that bound aries impact 
both  those who seek to establish them and  those against whom they are 
drawn. Hence, attention to racialization of bound aries does not assume 
one- directional activity, nor is this push  toward (and against) confinement 
to be understood over against some pure and universal sense of the  human.
The Situation
How do the once despised and subjugated enter into (and interact within) 
places in ways that alter  those spaces and give new depth and vitality to black-
ened naming- things? I explore the nature and significance of blackness as 
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a categorization of certain naming- things in relationship to this question. 
In so  doing, I am committed to sketching par tic u lar examples of blackened 
naming- things in a way that involves loose movement through periods and 
locations, ultimately coming to rest on the work of Jean- Michel Basquiat— 
explored in connection to the politics and production of art in response to 
race as a cultural sealant applied to naming- things.1
Basquiat’s work and bodied history mark out the movement between 
 Africa and the American hemi sphere in ways that speak to ele ments of a 
shared experience of the world framed by a politics of whiteness. Put dif-
ferently, I use Basquiat to mount a push for openness that does not re spect 
national bound aries but instead cuts across cultural geographies and con-
structions of naming- things. That is to say, the diasporic, as so many schol-
ars have remarked, has a quality of openness played out that can be just as 
vital as its po liti cal and economic markers.2 In a sense, and I reference this 
phrase rather frequently, the art  under consideration  here involves a smash-
ing of idols (as Alain Locke described the work of the Harlem Re nais sance) 
in that it entails a working against staid depictions of the blackened naming- 
thing— its cultural shape and physical significance.3
Connection One: African Aesthetics  
and the “Saving” of Western Art
The postcolonial environment involves a strugg le over ontology as well as the 
meaning of aesthetics as once racially subjected naming- things seek to recon-
stitute themselves through an alternate cultural reading. Involved in this 
pro cess is a signifying of the rules and assumptions of the art world, tied 
as they have been to dominant discourses of Eu ro pean superiority.4 With-
out doubt, cultural discourses and related geographies of interaction  were 
played out and  housed for observation in so many galleries and museums. In 
the words of Rasheed Araeen, “Art institutions in the West . . .  have not yet 
abandoned the concept of art history and its ‘ Grand Narrative’ that was es-
tablished as part of the colonial world view.”5 Markers of inferiority extended 
from the verbal to the visual  because the art world served as a mechanism 
for bestowing aesthetic significance on philosophical and po liti cal notions 
of difference as negative. The need to fix black naming- things in comforting 
ways—to control, display, “own” them— had to involve more than verbal dis-
course and accompanying written regulations and justifications.
Cultural production— visual and expressive dynamics of creativity— also 
played a role in that through it, aesthetics became the handmaiden of 
150 chapter seven
po liti cal, economic, and social arrangements privileging whiteness. This, of 
course, did not require a complete erasure of the African– African American 
naming- thing, but could instead involve demonstration of power through the 
ability to manipulate cultural production of the “other” and put it into ser-
vice for the validation of a certain Western aesthetic sense of the proper 
and properly positioned naming- thing (read white). Think, for example, 
of the manipulation of African aesthetics represented by the mask and co- 
opting of this style of artistic pre sen ta tion by Picasso, or the accumulation 
of  things from the “other” found within British museums: the colonial 
power artistically inspired by the colonized— “Modernist Primitivism.” In 
this regard, the museum and/or gallery might be said to have replaced the 
colonial government agency as the symbol of control and power.6 The racial-
ized naming- thing had long been a subject of aesthetic concern— arranged, 
studied, displayed so as to investigate its nature and meaning. In this regard, 
the display of enslaved bodied naming- things, the march of South African 
workers, and the display of blackened naming- things within the work of 
con temporary artists all speak to this preoccupation with the materiality of 
existence. The intention of such display is to access the dynamics of this ma-
teriality and trou ble the openness of black naming- things— for example, the 
ability to relate to other  things.
 There are ways in which fascination with an African aesthetic marked an 
effort to address the angst of aggressive industrial and technological advances 
in the Western world.7 I should provide a note of context  here: While the use 
of African art shifted over the course of the twentieth  century, I am less con-
cerned with  these vari ous points of use as discrete markers— use of the for-
mal art versus interest in the implications of the art vis- à- vis angst regarding 
Western culture— and more concerned with the manner in which African art 
is utilized within the larger framework of twentieth- century colonialism as a 
general conceptual paradigm.8 And I am intrigued by the ways in which late 
twentieth- century artistic production by the “ children of Africa” works over 
against this early manipulation of cultural forms.  Whether through the me-
dium of painting, sculpture, or photography, art became a means by which to 
explore both existential and ontological issues not disconnected from sociopo-
liti cal developments— including both the strength and decline of colonial 
power and authority as the marker of collective, national identity as well 
as individual and communal identity formation within the context of a 
changing world in which the power of racial dynamics is growing less fixed 
and certain.9 It was an aesthetic, an artistic, consumption of the “other”— 
that is, racialized naming- thing—in ways meant ( whether conscious or not 
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is of  little consequence) to fix a certain type of superiority couched in the 
ability to create and name— and have that naming “ matter.” This was done 
through reconstruction (consumption) of the African continent along colo-
nial lines as well as similar pro cesses in the Amer i cas, and through develop-
ments within the context of the gallery and museum matrix of expressed 
and displayed cultural (and po liti cal) coding.
Eu ro pe ans and Americans sought to signify, if not enliven, Western modes 
of interplay through the energy of an African aesthetic unleashed within the 
imaginaries of Western artistic expression. In this way, this aesthetic was re-
made in the image of the colonizer to the extent the colonizer controlled the 
location and context for display—as well as the interpretation of the items 
displayed. The initial meaning or purpose of  things— such as masks— was con-
sumed by the exotic quality bestowed on them by their new arrangement 
and a “Western” gaze. And they  were to be fixed, or tamed, by means of this 
gaze. Furthermore, capture of  these items marked fascination with them, 
but the altered purpose and place assigned them also demonstrates a certain 
type of discomfort with them: they cannot be what their initial creation by 
racialized naming- things intends. An item is emptied of one code and given 
another through its circumscribed location. It can then be marked by display 
not interplay. But all of this takes place within the confines of certain lan-
guage games, marked out by a set of signs and symbols drawing on, while also 
critiquing, the queue of modernity.
Artists involved in this pro cess are not involved in a turn to postmodern-
ism; they appreciate the subject too much for that. However, they want to 
strip the blackened naming- thing down to the most basic precepts and as-
sumptions. It is a manipulation of time and space, one that hopes to draw 
new codes and bound aries for and placements in both so as to revitalize the 
Eu ro pean bodied (and cultural) naming- thing. This goal involves effort  toward 
integration for certain (whitened) naming- things as opposed to isolation for 
 others (blackened naming bodies) and from troubling dimensions of world. 
This is not a surrender to an “other”; an African aesthetic could not be given 
that type of importance without jeopardizing the inner workings of Eu ro-
pean superiority. One needs, however, to be able to touch the markers of 
this aesthetic without defilement: one had to use Africanness without being 
consumed by it. This was a seek- and- rescue mission, a concern with the pres-
ervation of the subject as aesthetic entity over against the mechanical na-
ture of modern life. Coming as no surprise, this turn to African art was also 
meant to  free Eu ro pean culture to a fuller embrace of a less “managed” (but 
still controllable) energy of life over against restrictive modalities of reason.10 
152 chapter seven
By posing with African art, by using it as an artistic hermeneutic, they “went 
native.”
 These masks (thing- things), for instance, could be owned and presented 
in a manner consistent with the nature of power within the more explicit di-
mensions of twentieth- century colonialism. Efforts to hide this connection 
served only to reinforce it, to demonstrate the inevitable linkage between 
sociocultural politics and artistic production. Museums and other “con-
tainers” for artistic production displayed are not devoid of such consid-
erations, and the works they hold are also charged in the same manner and 
with the same cultural- political dilemmas.11 Are  these pieces repre sen ta tions 
of art or artifact?12  Whether they  were in museums or less public spaces, the 
ability to move between  these possibilities entailed some of the power to 
proscribe significance inherent in the claiming, displaying, and use of Afri-
can art— that is, racialized  things— and the sensibilities entailed by that art. 
In some ways, however, this co- optation of African aesthetics served to pro-
mote a less brutal stylized use of blackness and black naming- things marking 
the colonial enterprise.  After all, it was the globalization marked by colo-
nial endeavors and American empire that gave occasion for more contact 
with African art and its under lying stylistic qualities. Whereas missionary 
interest in Africa and similar efforts in the American context  were meant to 
exercise the otherness of African- related approaches to thought and action, 
artists consumed this otherness as a way of enlivening their sense of meaning 
and purpose and as a way of revitalizing Western aesthetics. With the former, 
Africanness needed the ser vice of a redeemer (i.e., embrace of Western Chris-
tian ity), and with re spect to the latter, Africanness in particular— and other-
ness in general—as an aesthetic served to “save” Western art from/to itself 
while also damaging its epistemological connection to its context of origin.13
Not only was aesthetics, the nature and meaning of creativity, “saved,” 
but attention to blackness in the form of an African artistic aesthetic was 
also consumed by individuals and groups outside the confines of galleries and 
museums. Take, for example, Paris during the early twentieth  century. Draw-
ing from France’s colonial contacts, “blackness,” writes Archer- Straw, was a 
sign of a Pa ri sian’s “modernity, reflected in the African sculptures that scat-
tered their rooms, in the look of natu ral furs that fringed their coats, and in 
the frenzy of their dancing that mimicked the black bottom.” But, as should 
come as no surprise based on the logic of colonialism, “only rarely are black 
 people depicted in this world. They and their mystique are the invisible pres-
ence.”14 The concern, rather, was the place of white bodied naming- things in 
time and space deeply damaged by war and marked by the penetrating signs 
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of optimism gone wrong. The dangers associated with colonial and imperi-
alistic impulses that eventually destroy are covered over by the materials of 
artistic production, and what remains is a type of hopefulness that does not 
deny the colonial pro cesses but seeks to redeem the West (e.g., Western art). 
Africa is not the source of fear in this case, but rather a means by which to 
enliven the aesthetics of the West.15
 There are two sides to modernism— content (economics/politics of co-
lonialism) and form (Western versus African aesthetics). Regarding  either 
side,  there was a sense of superiority over Africanness and the accompany-
ing racialized naming- things in vari ous configurations and incarnations. 
For instance, it was uncommon in the “art world” for  there to be surprise 
that this aesthetic comes from the “dark” continent— the implication being 
a “colonialized” take on the capacities of the colonized for intellectual 
greatness and artistic depth. Yet this very conversation was couched in 
manipulation of the achievements of the very  peoples disparaged. For the 
colonizer, the benefits  were many— including economic expansion and 
cultural voyeurism.16 Western artists  imagined and romanticized a certain 
simplicity of expression over against the suffocating environs of modern 
technology, economic expansion, and the delicate nature of twentieth- 
century po liti cal arrangements.  Whether through photo graphs displayed, 
museums, galleries, private collections, and so on, this artistic consump-
tion of African art (i.e., thing- things) as a source of a “fresh” aesthetic said 
something about the creativity of Africa ( either as art or craft), but it said 
more concerning the reach of colonial intent and need. Yet in other ways, 
the art became something of a talisman for the Western viewer, housing a 
certain type of power— a power to rethink the Western world. But it was a 
confined and  limited power in that it did  little to change or significantly alter 
the discourse of belonging or sociopo liti cal and ontological coding of black-
ened naming- things.  These  things  were rendered vis i ble, although  those cre-
ating them  were invisible— rendered irrelevant in the same way colonialism 
as an economic and po liti cal proj ect makes the  labor of the colonized vis i ble 
but denies their depth of meaning beyond this one dimension. “Museums,” 
writes Svetlana Alpers, “turn cultural materials into art objects. The prod-
ucts of other cultures are made into something that we can look at. It is to 
ourselves, then that we are representing  things in museums.”17 History— the 
events, meanings, and so on associated with  things—is lost, and replacing it 
are signs of a “fantastic” cultural trans/figuration.
 Those who embody this blackness (as racialized naming- things) are re-
stricted to what one interpreter calls “a history of  silent meaning,” but even 
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this realm of ontology was marked by a per sis tent sense of blackness as some-
thing to be consumed or worn at  will.18 In short, the African masks, for in-
stance, authorized a certain covering pro cess whereby the benefactors of 
cultural colonialism (and racial- difference philosophies) could critique the ar-
rangements of modernity from inside its structures without having to fully 
acknowledge the contradiction. Moving from African art to the blackness of 
naming- things, the exotic persisted as a creative alternative to the cultural 
death that is modernity. “The very sense of modernism’s beginning in a 
Western primitivism, an alterity that also allowed modernism to declare itself 
an alternate to modernity,” writes  Will Rea, “is denied to the African modern 
artist, a denial entirely based upon Western appropriation of the notion of 
the primitive, which is si mul ta neously coupled to a total denial of the  people 
and culture of Africa.”19
Desire to “Be” the Other: Bridge Ideas
Movement is the paradigm of significance in the above pre sen ta tion of black-
ness coding certain naming- things. One would expect this to be the case in 
light of the nature and meaning of colonialism and conquest. In this regard, 
movement— the fluidity of epistemological and ontological geography—is 
not  limited to the nature and function of art and aesthetics, but it also says 
something about the general identity of bodied blackness— black material 
bodied naming- things. African Americans signified depictions of African-
ness in par tic u lar and blackness in general. According to some scholars, the 
Harlem Re nais sance’s push for a new aesthetic encapsulates one of the early 
and clear efforts of African Americans to recast the cultural world and pro-
duction of the African continent as their own and as something other than 
the visual residue of colonial politics. This cultural matrix of movement is 
played out across vari ous locations and has a significant role in the relation-
ship of Africa, Eu rope, and the Amer i cas. Segments of the art world during 
the twentieth  century positioned blackness as a custom of sorts that could 
be adorned and displayed, and in this way, both express a certain type of ontol-
ogy while denying another. Blackness became a critique of par tic u lar aspects 
of modernity in the West— the nastier ele ments of colonialism, for example.
My concern does not rest with the “negritude” debates, but rather with 
the manner in which artistic expression wrestles with existential and onto-
logical issues raised by appropriation of an African aesthetic (aesthetic as 
 wholeness and beauty). While  there are a variety of ways to tackle my inter-
est, I want to use this as an opportunity to interrogate this pro cess from 
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within my own context— one indebted to Africa and Eu rope, fueled through 
a centuries- long blending of both within the Amer i cas. My question is some-
thing along  these lines: What is the look of artistic production that seeks to 
acknowledge, signify, and restructure interplay within the context of shift-
ing, coded geographies?
At times, cultural surveyors also embodied this Western angst and African 
corrective— for example, the fixing of blackened naming- things so as to pre-
serve the integrity of white naming- things through the illusion of bound aries. 
A clear example of this is found in the work and life of Dada artists— such as 
Man Ray, who played a major role in the pre sen ta tion of blackness as correc-
tive—in Paris during the early twentieth  century. “They,” writes Archer- Straw, 
“rejected civilized bourgeois values, and styled themselves instead as primi-
tives.” And what is more, “Dada’s instinct for the regressive, and its open display 
of hostility,  were the outward expressions of negative artistic sentiments that 
 were already an undercurrent of modernist thought.”20 The self and “other” 
are altered, creating something along the lines of a new aesthetic ontology: the 
other self, blackened and diff er ent.  Others also saw the benefits in this pro cess 
in that the “African” represented the “other” for whites and many African 
Americans. Numerous figures, including Aaron Douglas, turned at some 
point to an African aesthetic as a way to reconfigure African American ar-
tistic production and the “rhythm” informing it. Yet they seem to have done 
so in ways that still reflect a somewhat respectful glimpse at modernity— 
and with “ limited,” so to speak, anger. And while I find the work of Douglas 
compelling— pieces that demand one linger— more to the point of this chapter 
is the short but intense period of naming offered by Jean- Michel Basquiat.
Basquiat draws on the mindset and posture  toward the world promoted 
by the emergence of hip- hop culture and uses it as a conceptual paradigm 
and language.  There has been attention given to a blues aesthetic and a jazz 
aesthetic— with the latter often used in reference to Basquiat— but I suggest a 
hip- hop aesthetic, one that draws from  these  others but invests them with a 
unique restlessness that was only pos si ble for racialized naming- things in the 
nadir of civil rights rhe toric and the birth of crack cocaine.21 For  those seek-
ing per for mance of life in this par tic u lar age, the construction is along the 
lines of a labyrinth. By pulling viewers through this existential maze and by 
forcing a confrontation with a thick and complex association of codes, Bas-
quiat promotes a messy and alternate depiction of blackness— one not easily 
borrowed by whites to the extent it seeks to maintain a sense of openness over 
against racially formed bound aries. That is to say, Basquiat’s arrangement of 
 things involves a depiction of interaction, of overlap, and engagement chaotic 
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and intense— words written and crossed out, figures drawn with jagged lines 
to depict intensity, vibrant colors spilling out beyond outlines. Embedded in 
and oozing out is a rebellious aesthetic through which an awareness of domi-
nant social codes (e.g., beauty, agency, and meaning) is known but undone. 
While I have some difficulties with the terminology of primitivism,  there is 
something in the following statement that speaks to my point:
Primitivism as practiced by Pablo Picasso and other white artists early in 
this  century, in the late- colonial heyday of Modernism, was a  matter of white 
culture imitating the products of non- white culture. To white  Eu ro pe ans 
and Americans of the time, generally speaking, white culture was the 
norm and nonwhite cultures  were aberrations. To borrow from them 
showed not the impoverishment of white culture, its need for vital input 
from outside, but its imperial generosity in recognizing the nonwhite. This 
was a kind of royal slumming, as it  were, like the visits of downtown white 
esthetes to upper Manhattan during the Harlem Re nais sance. Basquiat’s 
practice of primitivism was an ironic inversion of all that.22
Thomas McEvilley, from whose analy sis of Basquiat the above quotation is 
drawn, believes Basquiat’s engagement with notions of the artistically “prim-
itive” serves to do deep damage to the colonial holdovers in the art world. It 
does so by denying ontological distance between black and white. Basquiat’s 
art, McEvilley argues, serves to foster exchange (i.e., interplay on a  grand 
scale) between worlds, to signify both the nature and meaning of whiteness 
and blackness through a pro cess of artistic double- talk based on a language 
marked by a grammar of fluidity.23 He sees justification of his position in an 
image of Basquiat. And in unpacking this image, McEvilley suggests a poetic 
and noble quality, but he also betrays a misperception:
His feet  were bare. Yet he wore an expensive Giorgio Armani suit— which, 
however, was soiled with paint. The dirty Armani brought up the cliché of 
the primitive who comprehends use value but not exchange value, the bare 
feet similarly suggested a denizen of preurbanized culture. . . .  Carelessly 
yet carefully enthroned, he evoked the mood of spressatura, the feigned or 
studied casualness cultivated by the Italian nobility of the Re nais sance.24
He continues, and this makes the point:
This ambiguous or double self— image- barefoot in Armani— embodies the 
paradox that W. E. B. DuBois described.25
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I think McEvilley’s stance is both existentially and ontologically naive in that 
it fails to grasp the troubled and troubling nature of what W. E. B. Du Bois 
understood of twoness or double consciousness. McEvilley assumes falsely 
that one can artistically toy with twoness without suffering long- term con-
sequences; this assumes that the discourse of power and being is rearranged 
and modified artistically without effect for  those promoting the effort. He 
seems to believe one can step outside this twoness and describe, revise, and 
play with it. However, the demons haunting Basquiat— strugg les with iden-
tity and meaning as artist and as blackened naming- thing who names while 
also being named for the benefit of collectors— would suggest other wise. His 
strugg le with the notion and attainment of fame speak to the damaging 
consequence of twoness within the art world, a doubling that both exposes 
and seeks to hide the power of naming. Basquiat is aware, deeply lucid re-
garding this pro cess but without the ability to break  free, so to speak. He 
is no longer a tagger working outside the recognized art world; now he is 
captured by the gallery space as a type of confinement despite his wild life as 
an attempt to live beyond that space.
I argue a diff er ent read of Basquiat, one that is not as postmodern in 
that it does not reject the naming- thing as it names. Instead, it simply trou-
bles the ability to know or hold the naming- thing even within the context 
of artistic production. Basquiat questions the West; on this point I agree 
with McEvilley. However, he does so from within the West— hopelessly tied 
to the West— loving and hating that binding together, and speaking this 
love/hate using the tools given him by the Western art world. As Michael 
 Harris remarks, “Like the hip- hop expression he emerged from, Basquiat 
sampled fragments from a variety of sources, and his own identity sug-
gested hybridity with its roots in Puerto Rico, Haiti, and lived middle- class 
experience in Brooklyn.”26 Perhaps  there is something of negritude or Haiti’s 
indigenist in Basquiat’s work—an effort to reconstitute blackness and bod-
ied blackness for racialized naming- things as a rejection of the tragedy of 
modernism’s proclamation of the primitive filtered, of course, through the 
pulse and texture of hip- hop culture.27 In this regard, hip- hop serves as a 
type of signification—an exposing and manipulation of social practices and 
codes through a poetic turn, and by poetic I mean the destruction of signs 
and symbols so as to  free them to make alternate claims. This effort to tame 
if not dismantle racism- laced primitivism and its kin does not begin with 
Basquiat— such a qualification should not be necessary— but  there are ways 
in which Basquiat’s cultural ontology, combined with his hip- hop posture, 
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provide a rather in ter est ing dimension of this challenge to modernism. Is his 
alleged primitive aesthetic their primitive?
In some ways, it might be said that I am attempting to trace a par-
tic u lar line of coding through artistic production involving the African 
American artist signifying blackness, signifying the question above, and 
 doing this through a re- presentation of the bodied naming- thing exposed. 
More to the point, with Basquiat one gets a graphic example of an effort to 
re/constitute the naming- thing as an act of art- based rebellion. But he does 
so not through an effort to jettison the discomforts of life that seek to reify 
the blackened naming- thing as idea. This effort is apparent in the work 
of figures such as Henry Ossawa Tanner with his The Banjo Lesson, through 
which he seeks to give visual repre sen ta tion to the affective quality of the 
narrative (written) tradition whereby black life is reconstituted as mimetic. 
Instead, with Basquiat, one gets a visual repre sen ta tion of subjectivity 
much more akin to the writing of the embodied black body offered by 
figures such as Lorraine Hansberry.28 In Hansberry’s writing, subjectivity 
does not involve fixity, by which I mean a sense of being associated with 
full distinction from other  things; rather, a sense of self is determined 
through connections forged over against social forces seeking to pull  things 
apart.
One has to be able to see and read in order to unpack Basquiat’s work. 
By this I do not mean the ability to decipher letters and arrange them into 
words that signify certain actions or ideas. Instead, I mean having a sense 
of the sociohistorical, po liti cal, and economic interplay informing his 
strugg les—to understand the implications of the age of crack on percep-
tions of life and death for racialized naming- things—as well as the power 
dynamics informing interaction. And I mean the ability to gather in the hid-
den, to decode the vari ous signs and symbols embedded within signs and 
symbols; this requires a hip- hop sensibility to the extent coded and artisti-
cally arranged messages are the hallmark of graffiti. This style of expression 
is the effort of despised naming- things to maintain their ability to name 
despite circumstances. So from tagging through which names of naming- 
things are embedded in designs, to complex portraits that are layered with 
multiple stories and meanings, hip- hop culture’s artistic language exposes as 
much as it hides. Mindful of this function, it is impor tant to keep in mind 
that Basquiat’s identity, his presence in the world of visual language, is first 
tied to graffiti:
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henry geldzAhler  Did you work in the streets and subways 
 because you  didn’t have materials or 
 because you wanted to communicate?
jeAn- michel bAsquiAt I wanted to build up a name for myself.29
 There are ways in which painting, the act of creating visual repre sen ta tions, 
speaks to the rhythm of his life— the per for mance of interplay as he under-
stood it. He touches  things, bringing them into his realm of expression, and 
in the pro cess  these  things impact him and serve to shift his sensibilities so 
that the idea depicted in the work is dependent as much on thing- things as 
on Basquiat as the naming- thing. And to remove or reposition any of the 
thing- things produces consequential changes to the depiction and, by exten-
sion, response to the visual. Creativity, or creation, in this way is dynamic 
and multidirectional. Artistic expression chronicles or maps his movement 
through the world, not disconnected from his bodied experience of the world 
but rather as static moments within that larger arena of engagement.
henry geldzAhler  Do you feel a hectic need to get a lot of 
work done?
jeAn- michel bAsquiAt  No. I just  don’t know what  else to do with 
myself.30
Life is layered for him, and this is represented in the layered quality of his 
work. (More interested in sells than finished work, dealers often moved 
his canvases before he was done.)
In some instances,  there is a minimal quality, a way in which Basquiat 
seeks to more directly capture the tone and “feeling” of bodied thought and 
movement— with less paint the more direct the idea expressed with fewer 
filters. In  these cases,  there is a type of starkness that amplifies the cir-
cumstances he addresses— less to distract the viewer, less to “cover” the 
fundamental interactions.
Connection Two: Basquiat and the Signifying of Aesthetics
 There is a picture of Basquiat in his New York City studio dated 1987.31 Like 
images from an  earlier period (e.g., pictures of artists taken by Man Ray), Bas-
quiat is situated next to his art supplies— brushes, paints—as well as an Afri-
can statue and African drums.  Things are layered upon  things, situated next 
to other  things— all playing off each other and, in this way, offering a mosaic of 
motion and entanglement that casts  these  things as more than functional 
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but also repre sen ta tional. In contrast to containers full of paintbrushes used 
to depict without themselves representing, as well as containers of paints 
with the same limitation (presenting without representing),  there is an Afri-
can carved figure and drums, which serve to both embody and communicate 
a range of meanings. Perhaps  these last items speak to a sense of cultural code 
and historical origin, or inspiration, as they entail  things that point beyond 
themselves both backward (e.g., the ancestors and the ability to call to them) 
and forward (e.g., ongoing generations of descendants within con temporary 
contexts). Both are of a firm substance— wood— carved so as to speak par tic-
u lar significance. But  there is also fluidity to them in that their importance 
spills out through contact with other  things— thoughts of eyes that have taken 
in  these images, hands that have beaten the drum, and ears that have soaked 
in the sound. The naming- thing breaks  free from it at points, but not fully. 
Basquiat, the naming- thing, is distinguishable from the thing- things around 
him, yet he cannot be fully understood apart from them and the work they 
do.  There is Basquiat, who situates both  things by positioning himself in rela-
tion to them, while also over against them. His flesh and the wood are physi-
cally diff er ent, yet they are  things in relationship— speaking something of a 
common history and geography of engagement with the West. Both  those 
wooden  things and Basquiat (a naming- thing) are touched by gallery space, 
and in a certain way are defined by that encounter. The social meaning of 
the gallery as Western framing for containment is further represented by the 
sweater and tie worn. But the tie seems not fully tied, and the sweater is 
ripped around the shoulder, and Basquiat’s hair defies Western standards of 
beauty. A stylistic limitation on the artist—in the form of a Western clothing 
aesthetic and grooming— cannot confine and cannot define the blackened 
naming- thing. Instead, this aesthetic as a boundary is exposed and negoti-
ated. That is to say, while Basquiat’s reshaping of clothing points to a type of 
fluidity, a form of boundary compromised, it does not wipe out bound aries 
and does not make openness complete and sustained. Both bound aries and 
openness are exposed for their limitations. The surroundings are chaotic, 
nothing seems arranged, and the points of contact appear random; but Bas-
quiat’s face is calm— his look fixed and without emotion. Nonetheless, what 
is telling is not so much  these items or the look on Basquiat’s face; rather, it 
is the wooden cut- out of a gun he holds to his head. This effort to fix him, 
to truncate interplay, threatens to end him by simplifying his occupation of 
time and space—to kill and render docile Basquiat as a naming- thing and by 
extension other racialized naming- things like him.32
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One might argue that the presence of African  things spoke for white artists 
and white patrons of the arts to a certain critique of modernism, an embrace 
of the exotic related to the nature and meaning of the embodied West. But 
for Basquiat, the image is more demanding and less romanticized. For the art-
ist, the presence of  these items reflects both creativity and an effort to con-
fine the significance of the racialized other. On one hand,  these  things speak 
to an African aesthetic, an African framing of the world in ways meant to 
represent themselves in the world. Yet the ability to  handle  these items, to 
rearrange them, to transport them (as Africans  were transported) suggests a 
certain reduction of meaning  shaped by the plea sure of  those manipulating 
the items. The pulling of this blackness out of him, placing it beside his body 
for visual consumption and artistic use, does damage.
This image of Basquiat offers a diff er ent take on blackness and an African 
aesthetic within artistic production. It affords another and less pacifying 
look at identity formation when race cannot be ignored and when it pushes 
the dilemma of existence to the forefront.  There is something po liti cal about 
much of his work, both as an overt discourse on the history of  human en-
gagement and also as the mandatory rhythm of life as a blackened naming- 
thing within racialized society. Put differently, much of Basquiat’s work defies 
easy engagement; it pushes the viewer to confront a type of creative chaos 
that envisions something both familiar and foreign. The pre sen ta tion of fa-
miliar items such as pieces of wood, connected by common words drawn 
using standard  things like paint and pencils, confirms a common sensibility; 
but then they are layered and overlapped, put in contact, in a manner that 
pulls them beyond what the viewer understood as first “use” and instead calls 
attention to new possibilities when  things affect  things.  There is ruggedness 
to Basquiat’s work (e.g., words written in what appears a haphazard manner, 
and colors spilling outside the drawn lines) by means of which he pre sents 
interaction between  things as frenetic.
Par tic u lar forms of artistic production— and I would include this fascina-
tion with an African aesthetic or the artistic appeal of “blackness”— were 
meant to enliven, to maintain the meaning of embodied and thought life over 
against its draining away. In other words, it was intended to end porousness. 
But the late twentieth  century removed some of the allure and prevented 
some of the optimism. Postmodernism did damage to assumptions of inevi-
table pro gress. This raises a question, one borrowed and placed in a diff er ent 
context, that I believe the work of Basquiat seeks to answer. “What,” writes 
Peter Halley, “could fill the role once served by art as vanquisher of death, 
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as beacon in the void?”33 What is to be made of art as symbol of openness 
in a context marked by a push for closure— a commitment to exposure over 
against social- coding privileging bound aries?
In certain ways, the pre sen ta tion of skeletal figures, innards exposed, 
speaks to life closer to the core and life as structures of interplay based on 
openness.34 One might argue that it is a push to more fundamental circum-
stances based on the removal of easily recognized sociocultural codes and 
constructions. Henry David Thoreau, for instance, also recognized the sig-
nificance of life close to its inner core, but for him this is where it is sweetest. 
For Basquiat, such comfort is not pos si ble.  There is no transcendentalism in 
Basquiat, just the existential angst of the rebel open to the world.35
henry geldzAhler Is  there anger in your work now?
jeAn- michel bAsquiAt It’s about 80  percent anger.
henry geldzAhler But  there’s also humor.
jeAn- michel bAsquiAt  People laugh when you fall on your ass. 
What’s humor?36
Near the core, with layers of imposed sociocultural codes stripped away, is 
where life is intense and graphic but also unstable and macabre.  There is only 
a basic design that is both firm (bone) but fluid (a frenzied “something” ex-
plodes from the skeletal figures). Related to this, consider the skull images 
presented in works such as Basquiat’s Untitled (1982).37
Art critic Jonathan Jones captures something of the skull’s energy, the in-
ability to contain through traditional means of denoting space configured— 
for example, outlines— but also the manner in which the frenetic energy in 
this painting says something about the condition of certain naming- things 
within the sociopo liti cal world of the United States: “Like the work of an-
other heroin user, William Burroughs, his art, with its feeling of being cut 
and hacked into the canvas rather than daubed, its electric sense of pain 
in  every nerve, shows every one what’s  really in their lunch. He serves up 
American history with all the worms crawling out of it. This painting of 
a skull is not just about his own morbidity— it’s about being killed by Amer-
i ca.”38  There is intensity in the eyes of this skull— piercing white dots concen-
trated on what it views and pulling on the viewer at the same time. The 
eyes are focused, unlike the wildness marking the rest of the skull. Yet they 
look to the side, away from the viewer who approaches it head-on. The gaze 
seems directed at the mass of white paint blurred with shades of pink (and 
penetrated by a small arrangement of stripes of color emerging from it) along 
the far side closest to the skull. The skull is distinct from the white mass but 
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connected by an arrangement of thin white lines  running from the top of 
the mass of white to the side of the skull, close to one of the piercing eyes. 
The two are distinct  things, yet connected, engaged, attached by thick white 
lines that seek to blot out letters (perhaps words) and other markings.  There 
is a roughness but also carefulness in this marking of white over words that 
does not fully cover a black undercoat suggesting interaction that shifts and 
changes perception.  There is a single and thin black line farther down the 
image that rests on, but also serves as, a point of connection. This pulsating 
connection makes for difficult concentration  because  there is too much ac-
tivity requiring movement and new thinking.  Things, as Basquiat demon-
strates, are not distinct in a fixed manner; they interact in both bold and 
refined ways.  Things— whether they be acrylic paint and oil paint, or black 
and white naming- things— impinge upon each other often in a chaotic fash-
ion that exposes as much as it hides.
The black lines that produce something of an outline for the skull com-
pete and win against the white markings that also try to give some shape to 
this head, offering some type of framework or border that makes evident the 
nature of this  thing. The skull is an open  thing— both defining and being 
defined by the background. On top of the skull are markings, something re-
sembling a game of tic- tac- toe, providing a calming effect in that the game 
requires some thought, a stoppage of action long enough to plan and plot 
moves. Yet this state of reason does not penetrate the skull and so ultimately 
does not distract from the graphic rage emanating from the skull. In fact, the 
game might just reflect language games; the relationship between marks that 
we “read” as words with set meanings is jumbled and manipulated. As Rich-
ard Marshall reflects, “To Basquiat the meaning of a word was not necessarily 
relevant to its usage  because he employed words as abstract objects that can 
be seen as configurations of straight and curved lines that come together to 
form a visual pattern. The visual and graphic impact of printed letters was 
sufficient enough to stand alone as an artistic expression.”39 The mouth is 
open and crowded with marks and colors as if it is about to spew out a ver-
bal dimension of the skull’s rage. But the mouth is disassociated from the 
markings— the words are not clear; they are not fully expressive in a tradi-
tional sense. Rather, the chaotic interaction is expressive— with aggressive 
and “ free” lines.
Basquiat paints and draws skulls that have a hint of the African mask. 
But whereas advocates of primitivism capturing an African aesthetic for 
the sake of a revitalized West seek to pacify the African mask, Basquiat 
invests  these skulls with wild energy that cannot be tamed. The colors are 
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vibrant, pulsing outside any lines that might serve as bound aries.  These 
skulls have a piercing look that renders the viewer uncomfortable and con-
trolled by the skull. The energy that  earlier white artists sought to take away 
from the African aesthetic as represented, say, by the mask- thing in order 
to make them tame is reinscribed by Basquiat through his pre sen ta tion of 
skull- things. He, and this is also reflected in the urgency of his painting, as-
sumed the tragicomic nature of life, as did characters such as Cross Damon 
and Bigger Thomas from the work of writer Richard Wright.40 Basquiat, 
then, was to the visual arts what Richard Wright was to lit er a ture— both 
maintained a sense of realism, if not absurdist moralism. Both worked from 
an understanding of the consequences involved in claiming time and space, 
while recognizing that racial dynamics always inform and shape  these deci-
sions made and the content of our life stories.
With Man Ray, for example, the mask is subdued, becoming the  thing 
dominated by the photographer and the white naming- thing holding it.41 
 There was an effort to remove the tragic to the extent that it served as a re-
minder of modernity’s failures. Yet with Basquiat this is not pos si ble: only a 
comparably wild energy can maintain contact with this passion, angst, and 
discomfort that is the Untitled (1982) skull.42
Interplay.
As wild as he sought to be in thought and action,  there are still ways in 
which Basquiat reflected  earlier, modern sensibilities: How could this not be 
the case considering the influence of figures such as Picasso on his painting? 
He drew inspiration and ideas from what he labeled the “masters” as well 
as from other sources of identity discourse that shape our understanding of 
our embodiment as naming- things. Still, as a racialized naming- thing, he 
projected them through the turmoil and pleasures of blackened embodiment 
and folded them upon themselves through a rhythm he associated with the 
irreverent creativity of jazz.
Basquiat consumed culture— history books, anatomy books, other artists, 
guide books, and so on— that are symbolic of the constructions of the West 
and that worried the consumers of African aesthetics.
henry geldzAhler  I like the drawing that are just lists of 
 things.
jeAn- michel bAsquiAt  I was making one in an airplane once. I 
was copying some stuff out of a Roman 
sculpture book. This lady said, “Oh, what 
are you studying.” I said, “It’s a drawing.”43
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He consumed this culture (its dread and possibilities), signified it, and pro-
duced an alternate perception of the bodied naming- thing made black. In 
this regard, he is both scapegoat and conjurer, with the signified and signifier 
revolving around the category of race as antimeaning. He is both naming- 
thing involved in a pro cess of naming but,  because he consumes the culture, 
through his art he is also transformed.  Others promoted the ordinariness of 
life but in ways that rendered them extraordinary, markers of something more 
significant and penetrating  behind, under neath, and through the  thing— the 
yearning for grandeur. Basquiat breaks through this, allowing the ordinary 
to shift locations but remain simply mundane. Take, for example, his Boxer 
Rebellion (1982–1983). While it is much too layered and complex for sufficient 
discussion  here, brief comments give some sense of his naming and use of 
cultural moments and codes. Framing two boxers, one throwing a punch, 
is an intense arrangement of words, some crossed out, or with some of the 
letters blackened. The words “name” boxers (“suGAr rAy rOBinsOn”), 
body parts (e.g., “eLBOW”), another form of “boxing” (the “CHinese BOXer 
reBeLLiOn”), scientific exchanges (i.e., “teCHnOLOGy”), the language of 
capitalism (“per CApitA”), a segment of the creation account from the He-
brew Bible’s book of Genesis, beginning with “And the earth was form-
less . . .”44 Not all of  these markings are in En glish, as  there are words drawn 
using what appears to be Mandarin in connection to the Chinese Boxer Re-
bellion.  There is also Japa nese employed, although the word Japan is crossed 
out (but still vis i ble).  These words, drawn from a range of cultural contexts, 
are distinguished and distinctive to some degree, but mindful of Richard Mar-
shall’s observation,  there are ways in which Basquiat pulls words from their 
traditional meanings and makes them speak a diff er ent social sensibility. That 
is to say, the words as  things are positioned to interact differently—to sug-
gest a diff er ent range of concerns and possibilities by means of which he 
exposes the conditions of collective life. Cultures collapse onto each other as 
they collide vis- à- vis language. On some level they are bounded languages— 
couched within a larger pattern of cultural coded systems meant to keep them 
intact and “uncontaminated,” yet such efforts at safeguarding  things are futile. 
Basquiat, as a naming- thing, claims use of  these linguistic codes for his own 
purposes; they express and explain alternate realities. This is not restricted 
to codes understood as expressing more secular modes of interaction; the 
biblical text becomes a  thing penetrated, a diff er ent set of concerns that 
grants  those theological- religious linguistic sensibilities no more space than 
their secular rivals. The anti- Christian intent of the Chinese Boxer Rebellion is 
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read with and against the biblical text— one  thing (one worldview) is brought 
into exchange with another (Judeo- Christian sensibilities).
Basquiat merged the visual image and the written text, positioning both 
with re spect to bodies. In this way, he brought into play, challenged, and af-
firmed the tools of discourse in ways meant to disrupt their unity by chang-
ing their content and target. In light of the way power functions even within 
the realm of cultural aesthetics, Basquiat was consumed in spite of his best 
efforts to signify and deconstruct.
Significance is not found in the transformation of the ordinary into 
something  else; rather, it is lodged in the ordinary as it is— defiant, bound-
ary questioning, and also docile and proscriptive. In a word,  things have 
significance, impactfulness, as  things. From my perspective, this is particu-
larly true with re spect to Basquiat’s first phase— pieces not easily divested of 
their intensity are not easily rendered neutral and accessible. The question 
is this: How are you prepared to view the work of art with re spect to the im-
pact of aesthetics on the picture and content of bodied and thought life?45 
What are the ways in which  things collide, inform, and shift each other? Art 
and the viewer are in relationship.
Like  others would do  after him, Basquiat calls “attention to slippery re-
lationships between revelation and concealment, visibility and invisibility, 
and presence and absence.” In the pro cess  there is an act of subversion, “trick 
and play with audience expectations to challenge tendencies  toward objec-
tifying black female and male bodies.” Again like  others  after him, he takes 
“the juxtaposition of text and image of  earlier artists even further to invert 
power dynamics and foreground the relationship between black bodies and 
erasure.”46 The sealant of race is ever pre sent, and not even his ac cep tance in 
the art world could prevent the impact of racism on his sense of open self as 
a naming- thing and his sense of belonging to the pro cess of interplay. This, 
at least in part, accounts for the intensity of his images— the energy of the 
skulls and the bodies drawn inside out.
Lodged in his paintings over the nine years of his  career is a public/ private 
wrestling with embodiment in a troubled world, where identity is unstable, 
and all has something to do with economics and politics cast within the 
language of culture. Regarding this, Basquiat, according to Robert Farris 
Thompson, forced an aesthetic confrontation with the felt nature of urban 
life. “His,” Thompson writes, “is a quest for a sharper, ecumenical assess-
ment of the troubling— yet promising— configurations of our urban destiny 
and predicament.”47  There is a thickness to this pro cess: Basquiat’s work 
added to the destruction of artistic sensibilities by also critiquing the racial 
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assumptions embedded in both artistic production and the spaces housing 
this art.
He ripped apart the assumptions of how and what one knows about 
the nature of interplay between  things through the unmasking of blackness 
as subtext— bodied  things inside out,  things as both text and context. It had 
been the case  earlier in the twentieth  century that Western artists found 
blackness— particularly Africanness— appealing, but they wanted it sanitized, 
comforting and comfortable. Basquiat’s work signified such safeness, but in 
an ironic twist he fed off this voy eur is tic desire, and the effort to mold his 
life accordingly was deadly. Perhaps he sought, as Thompson remarked, to 
achieve a type of existential and ontological  wholeness through his work, 
an identity in opposition to Western desire to rip apart and consume black-
ness—if quarantining off blackened naming- things for isolated engagement 
and use could not be managed.48
He pulls the bodied naming- thing apart to uncover and discover anew 
its openness, and in this way he seeks to speak differently the nature of the 
culturally arranged naming- thing as unfixed and unfinished. In the pro cess, 
Basquiat does not discount the significance of the “degraded” naming- thing 
as grotesque in that deconstruction of his own body as naming- thing (e.g., 
through drug use) has direct impact on what can be captured artistically. All 
this work, this wildness, entails contradiction—an effort to deny (and in the 
pro cess reinforce through the romanticizing of the “streets”) his middle- class 
roots. It is both the framework for the artist and the makeup of the artist in 
some instances. His paintings are deceptive; they are not easy to read or com-
fortable to feel. They require work, an unraveling of the layers in the same 
way identities are layered, marking life’s meaning from within overlapping 
realms of interaction and exchange. Blackness as a container for a par tic u lar 
aesthetic many in the Western world considered salvific was presented as a 
complex signifier— both negative and positive, needed and feared. Basquiat 
signifies this framework, and rather than examining blackness— outside/in 
he conceptualizes and pre sents it inside/out. As Jennifer Clement rec ords 
in her book  Widow Basquiat: A Love Story, “Every thing was symbolic to him. 
How he dressed, how he spoke, how he thought, and  those with whom he as-
sociated. Every thing had to be prolific or why do it and his attitude was always 
tongue- in- cheek. Jean was always watching himself from outside of himself 
and laughing.”49 By so  doing, he also speaks to the fractured and overlapping 
nature of identity— unfixed, fluid, troubled, thick. “A frequent motif in Bas-
quiat’s work— the ‘see- through’ man— not only responded meta phor ically 
to this period’s fascination with expose and destroying  people’s facades,” 
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writes Richard Powell, “but also spoke to the notion that anatomy had a 
theatrical quality that, when paired with blackness, was a radical attack on 
society’s superficiality and deep- seated racism.”50 That is to say, Basquiat 
repositions blackened naming- things in a way that pushes against ste reo-
typical discourses by speaking them differently in an energetic and dismissive 
manner— what some have called Neo- Expressionism.
Created in both his personal and aesthetic choices, “he tried to make  people 
notice him, wake them up, by using a symbol out of context. This occurred 
in his paintings and in his actions.”51 At times Basquiat approached the West-
ern art world and its “sacred” spaces (e.g., museums) in ways that pull at the 
diasporic threads of life in the Amer i cas, and in the pro cess shaved away 
the integrity of  these spaces— redirecting their energy and signifying their 
meaning through what he as a naming- thing can do and produce. “At the 
museum [MoMA] Jean- Michel takes a  bottle of  water out of his coat and 
walks through the halls sprinkling the  water  here and  there around him. ‘I’d 
piss like a dog if I could,’ he says, as they wander past paintings by Pollock, 
Picasso, Kline and Braque. Suzanne [his girlfriend] does not even ask what 
he is  doing. She knows this is one of his voodoo tricks.”52  There is in his re-
sponse some recognition of the distinctions between himself and  these other 
figures and the manner in which race and class shape the construction and re-
ception of himself as a blackened naming- thing and what it produces. “But, 
in the end,” one writer says, “the differences between Picasso and Basquiat— 
the diff er ent relations they adopt to the ethnographic gaze leveled from the 
West on traditional African art, the diff er ent investments they make in the 
construction of their own celebrity— are more pronounced than any formal 
affinities in their work.”53 His action in MoMA tames the impulse of the mu-
seum, removing its sanctity and in the pro cess shifting the perception of 
what can take place in that space. Blackness is not on display as he moves 
through the halls, but instead blackness taints the space and trou bles the 
racial profile of comfort within a race- based world. And for blacks viewing 
 these same images,  there is a diff er ent question: Is  there anything of me in 
this?  There is a bit of the tragic in this situation, as Michael Harris insightfully 
notes. Basquiat, Harris reflects, “had to assume a par tic u lar social position 
to play to the bright lights. As happened with the primitivist fascinations 
in France in the first three de cades of the twentieth  century, and  those in 
New York, white interest in black expression came at a price for Basquiat. His 
works  were colored by  these realities, and his life was stained by them.”54 I 
believe  there are ways in which Basquiat as artist is also trickster, the figure 
who moves between worlds, crosses ontological and existential geography 
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and in the pro cess allows them to open to new meanings. This involves the 
forcing of a diff er ent set of questions and presuppositions: What is the place 
of this blackness? What is the reconfiguration of meaning pre sent? What 
is the materiality of identity over against efforts to fix form and solidify 
bound aries?
Basquiat calls on the plastic nature of interplay as alternate aesthetic and 
uses this to tell an existential and ontological story. He signifies the signifier 
and exposes the complexity (and open nature) of blackened naming- things, 
a thickness denied by an early appropriation by the likes of Man Ray. As 
many interpreters have noted,  there are ways in which Basquiat seeks to cri-
tique Modernist art. The language of colonialism and otherness— with a vo-
cabulary functioning like glue to close off and fix—is signified, shifted, and 
transformed through a new owner ship and use against its use. Yet this pro-
cess is never complete. Discourse on blackness and power accommodates the 
change and restores balance through embrace.
Basquiat’s aesthetic, as critical as he wanted it to be, promoted a critique 
of Modernism, but one that the art establishment embraced: the signifier was 
signified. The basic conceptual paradigms  were tweaked, but they persisted 
nonetheless: “Once the work was done, the dealers became very possessive 
of it, and tried to control it. Jean [Michel Basquiat] used to say, ‘it’s like feed-
ing the lions. It’s a bottomless pit. You can throw them meat all day long, and 
 they’re still not satisfied.’ ”55 What is even more telling, however, is the la-
ment Basquiat offered on several occasions: “I wanted to be a star, not a gallery 
mascot.”56 “Some,” says Marc Miller in a 1982 interview with the artist, “saw 
Basquiat as some sort of primal expressionist.” Basquiat responded, “Like an 
ape? . . .  A primate?”57
Blackness was consumed, the masked  thing— although less passive in 
construction and placement— could still be used to cover or shift the na-
ture and meaning of aesthetics in relationship to blackness and whiteness. 
Basquiat sought, it seems, to alter the dynamics of artistic production in 
relationship to race and class and to do so from within the belly of the beast. 
But Michel Foucault is correct that the power we seek to fight, to own, to 
use, is always and everywhere. It cannot be controlled in that manner to the 
extent it flows in and through us, makes and unmakes us, is constructed 
by us. The words (and erasures) within Basquiat’s paintings speak to the in-
evitability of discourse and its ability to shape time and space. One sees a 
graphic example of this in Pegasus (1987). From military might as represented 
in the British airborne forces’ use of the winged  horse image during World 
War II to popu lar culture references, Pegasus has marked a certain mode of 
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might and creativity— for example, a blending of  things such as a  human 
and another animal, science and cultural codes, and desire and shortcom-
ing. Basquiat applies the name and its cultural connotations— with perhaps 
a nod in the direction of the programming system bearing the name that 
takes in  human language and produces code—to a large work consisting of 
an overwhelming arrangement of words, phrases, and images that provide a 
geography of expressed meaning. Words and symbols compete for space. They 
are meaningful to a degree in that they represent something if one isolates 
them, but they also overlap in significance to the degree that they bleed into 
each other, sharing space and changing meanings. Some of the words and 
symbols are crossed out, and in this way they are both pre sent and absent— 
and they stand out  because of the dark and energetic strokes used to sub-
due them. Yet the black paint in the right corner of the large canvas poses a 
challenge of space and time. Are the words consuming and thereby changing 
space, or is the “blank” space of black paint slowly wiping out the cultural 
codes? In  either case,  there is contact between expression and a type of silence, 
between presence and absence, between “something” and “nothing” (both ex-
press “ things”). Even during this last phase of his life, Basquiat was aware of 
racial- cultural dynamics related to symbolic forms.  There is also something 
about this painting that speaks to the instability of symbols and codes of the 
West— their inability to fully capture and contain, to fully inscribe what they 
encounter.
Gold Griot (1984) is marked by interplay of materials— slabs of wood upon 
which is painted (using acrylic paint and oil stick) a figure with a large and 
expressive head that is more than skeletal in part  because of its aggressive 
markings. The head is confined within a white outline, but something about 
the look on its face suggests the confinement is not complete. One thin arm 
points up and the other down, situating the figure between spaces—or better 
yet holding together two spaces by occupying a  middle location. This being 
knows something viewers do not and has contact with  things that transform. 
 There is gleefulness in the expression— a wide smile full of teeth, a nose with 
nostrils wide like a deeply satisfying breath is being taken, and almond- shaped 
eyes (one red and the other white), suggesting a devious contentment. It has 
only a torso holding it up, with a spine shown inside a dark box, which speaks 
to the harnessing of language so as to express par tic u lar codes. The figure is a 
bridge of sorts, something along the lines of Eshu, the African god who opens 
and controls lines of communication between  humans and the gods, or the 
griot, as the title of the work announces, whose stories connect the past and 
the pre sent.
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Basquiat would have certainly encountered cultural codes and stories 
about such figures during his early years in Brooklyn, and  these African an-
cestral figures that made the trip from Africa to the Amer i cas, and from the 
Ca rib bean to North Amer i ca, would have found the trip from Brooklyn to 
Manhattan of  little challenge. And so Basquiat’s awareness of this alternate 
world would not have faded in Manhattan, where even hip- hop would have 
encouraged a similar blending of  things. But this is a  matter of manipula-
tion, not fundamental control. It might be the recognition of this dilemma 
that marks for him the significance of jazz and the blues, and the legacy of 
 Mississippi (land of the blues) as a location of the tragic nature of suppressed 
opportunity turned into artistic triumph.
Perhaps his artistic production was Basquiat’s effort  toward, in Foucault’s 
language, the fostering of spaces for the practice of freedom—or at least spaces 
of exposure and interplay. Ultimately, artistic expression exposes issues of 
depth. It provides a means by which to strugg le both with and for bodied 
naming- things and  things occupying time and space as well as the sociopo-
liti cal, economic, and cultural ramifications of that occupation. It might 
just be the case that some of art’s appeal and terrifying ramifications are 
played out on the geography of belonging that is, in this case, the blackened 
naming- thing.
How does it feel to be a prob lem?
— W. e. b. du bois, The Souls of Black Folk
What did I do to be so black and blue?
— fAts WAller, “(What Did I Do to Be So) Black and Blue”
Bearden and Basquiat can be said to raise the question of racial  stereotyping 
and “cata loging” as a means by which to foster bound aries and regressive 
openness, and they do so through the innovative use of biographically in-
formed modalities of artistic production— collage for Bearden and hip- hop- 
influenced Neo- Expressionism for Basquiat. Furthermore, it is impor tant to 
note they work in the wake of  earlier efforts to frame philosophically and 
so cio log i cally this pro cess of racialization as fixing. Perhaps the most com-
pelling example of this intellectual exercise is found in the work of W. E. B. 
Du Bois, who set in motion a diagnosis of black life circumstances with 
an under lying consideration of naming- thing and thing- thing interaction 
framed by a cultural climate (as a prophylactic) of disregard.
In this chapter, I highlight a par tic u lar text— The Souls of Black Folk—
not  because I want to suggest Du Bois’s thinking is not organic and does not 
change over times. My focus on a single Du Bois volume is not meant to 
suggest anything along  these lines. His corpus is rich and complex, and it 
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demonstrates evolving opinions and theories, which are mindful of shifting 
sociopo liti cal circumstances. Yet I limit my attention to this 1903 volume 
 because of the manner in which it outlines a theoretical point of departure 
for Du Bois regarding the nature and meaning of black being, and it does 
so in (implicit) conversation with a range of his influences (e.g., William 
James). The text explicates epistemological and ontological concerns that, 
while altered in terms of application, continue to inform and influence the 
conceptual considerations haunting his writings afterward. Still, my con-
cern in interrogating this text involves what it lends readers regarding the 
nature and meaning of racialized naming- things, not the sociopo liti cal, in-
tellectual, and economic mechanism one might employ to restructure their 
relationship to the United States. On this latter point, mechanisms for ad-
vancement, Du Bois’s thinking differed over time; for instance, he wrestles 
with the elitism embedded in his early depiction of the “talented tenth.” 
However, I would argue that his sense of a racialized ontology at work in 
the structuring/restructuring of certain naming- things remained somewhat 
consistent. That is to say, while the prob lem of concern to him remains in 
place, the mechanisms he advances for addressing it shift over time.
The Souls of Black Folk entails Du Bois’s most widely recognized effort on 
this score, and that volume begins with a question: “How does it feel to be a 
prob lem?”1 By this question and his explication of it, Du Bois points in the di-
rection of openness denied—to bounded naming- things. It is helpful to keep 
in mind that before Du Bois described the double consciousness of African 
Americans, he first announced the cultural climate, or prevailing ethos, 
shaping the historical moment.2 “The prob lem of the Twentieth  Century,” 
he writes in the forethought to The Souls of Black Folk, “is the prob lem of the 
color- line.”3 Reiterated numerous times throughout the book, this short but 
forceful line captured the racial logic of the post– Civil War United States and 
 shaped the public imagination of and expectations for the nation moving for-
ward.4 It articulated a sense of bodied experience (i.e., moments of interplay) 
as wrapped in the garb of racial animosity, and the book’s prophetic quality 
spoke what millions knew but could not articulate safely.
This color- line theory jibed so well with documented activities of a perva-
sive antiblack racism that it became a frequently employed hermeneutic in 
both popu lar and academic analy sis. While undeniably impactful and consid-
ered by many a complete framing of post- Reconstruction development, what 
the color- line pronouncement points to, however, is only one dimension of a 
dualism, what Du Bois references as the “Negro prob lem.” At the start of the 
first essay in Souls, “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” Du Bois reflects,
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Between me and the other world  there is ever an unasked question: un-
asked by some through feelings of delicacy; by  others through the difficulty 
of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me 
in a half- hesitant sort of way, eye me curiously or compassionately, and 
then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a prob lem? they say, I 
know an excellent colored man in my town; . . .  or Do not  those South-
ern outrages make your blood boil? At  these I smile, or am interested, or 
reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To the real 
question, how does it feel to be a prob lem? I answer seldom a word.5
How does it feel to be a prob lem? With this question, Du Bois highlights 
the second dimension of the dualism, what I  will call the prob lem soul. It is the 
naming- thing pre sent within a context defined by effort to racially close off 
and deny active openness; furthermore, the prob lem soul is marked by a sensi-
bility regarding or posture  toward the U.S. cultural climate defined by a vicious 
logic of racial difference as dangerous.6 My read of Du Bois suggests not that 
double consciousness  causes the prob lem soul (as a prob lem of interplay), but 
rather it is prior to the Negro prob lem.7 The prob lem soul involves position-
ing of intent expressed through the African American’s existential movement 
in the world as a troubled and troubling bodied naming- thing trapped by 
conflicting identities articulated in terms of discourses of bound aries and a 
certain type of fixity. While impor tant to the larger argument, the prob lem 
soul has received  limited consideration, and as a consequence our under-
standing of Du Bois’s aim within Souls, his most popu lar text, is truncated.
The Negro prob lem, framed as a cultural ontology of twoness, is addressed 
in terms of social, material, and po liti cal alterations to public and private life 
bent on making African Americans  whole and functioning citizens— that is, 
open naming- things.8 The prob lem soul, the diagnostic of concern, however, 
entails a web of psychological, philosophical, social, theological, and affec-
tive vantage points constituting a posture that seeks to trou ble such violent 
closing off and reaction against openness. Hence, understanding the prob-
lem soul requires a diff er ent framing. I suggest adaption of William James’s 
“sick soul” as heuristic for exploring sensitivity to the par tic u lar posture 
 toward the world Du Bois intends by the prob lem soul as marker of interplay 
fought against. Suggesting the possibility of such a link does not push an 
unreasonable intellectual connection.9 To the contrary, Du Bois’s “prob lem” 
viewed in relationship to James’s “sick soul” merely tags a connection that 
extends beyond more widely recognized overlap. My effort entails unpack-
ing what biographers Arnold Rampersad and David Levering Lewis note 
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in terms of Du Bois’s use of the popu lar psychological category of twoness, 
which is shadowed by James’s “hidden self,” or “subconscious.” Both the for-
mer and the latter escape our full grasp— just as Du Bois’s duality avoids our 
efforts at unification.10 Ross Posnock puts it well: “With his poetic genius, 
Du Bois turned skepticism of stable selfhood into an indelible image of the 
black Americans’ anguished psychic striving.”11
Before moving on, I want to first acknowledge a point that  will come up 
again and that relates to the “anguished striving” noted by Posnock. Simply 
put, the prob lem soul, at first read, might be thought to advise a nihilistic or 
fatalistic turn. However, this is far from what Du Bois intends. Rather than 
that, Du Bois operates consistent with moralist- absurdist sensibilities  later 
exhibited by writers like Nella Larsen and Richard Wright and theorized by 
Albert Camus.  There is no surrender, no nihilism in statements by Du Bois 
such as this: “. . .  the travail of souls whose burden is almost beyond the mea-
sure of their strength, but who bear it in the name of an historic race, in the 
name of this land of their  fathers’  fathers, and in the name of  human opportu-
nity.”12 The “No!” to demands associated with the cultural climate marking 
this description of postslavery life is echoed in the “No!” to false promises of 
redemption recorded by writer Nella Larsen’s character Helga Crane in Quick-
sand; in the “No!” to racial terror written by Richard Wright in terms of his 
life and that of his character Fred Daniels in “The Man Who Lives Under-
ground,” and in the perpetual  labor of the absurd hero, Sisyphus, endorsed 
by Camus. This consideration is impor tant  because attention to a moralist- 
absurdist sensibility helps clarify the nature of the prob lem soul and aids in 
our surfacing the call for perpetual strugg le (i.e., perpetual openness) rather 
than nihilism central to Du Bois’s diagnosis of “strange experience” summed 
up in Souls.13
Double- Consciousness
According to Du Bois, the system of slavery resulted in global cooperation 
premised on material need and resource, and guided by metaphysical stip-
ulations. One proviso marked Africans as inferior (e.g., fixed and bounded) 
in  every re spect, and another extended the correctness of this argument 
through violent coercion of African Americans into believing themselves 
inferior (and confined with  limited opportunity for interplay).14 The goal 
of this debased epistemology and dwarfed ontology is control over docile 
naming- things, tame minds, and the nation’s sociopo liti cal and economic 
infrastructure.
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Freedom trou bles this logic in that it disrupts what  were once assumed 
stable cultural identities by forcing a rethinking of the African American’s 
occupation of time and space. A consequence of this rethinking is double- 
consciousness— two warring cultural identities African Americans attempt 
to hold together (as a  matter of interaction) in a historical context ill- equipped 
to grasp and appreciate such complexity.15 That is to say, against societal 
wishes, African American naming- things seek interplay between themselves 
and other  things so as to maintain openness over against bound aries limiting 
interaction on par tic u lar sociopo liti cal and economic fronts.16 This dilemma 
is the birth of the existential Negro prob lem— framed by life within a context 
of close but troubled proximity without old methods of regulation— played 
out on geography of entitlement and opportunity, marred by exclusionary 
borders.
In the essay “Of the Dawn of Freedom,” Du Bois offers a question capturing 
this prob lem: “What  shall be done with Negroes?”17 First addressed in an expan-
sive and systematic manner through the Freedmen’s Bureau, the answer to 
that nagging question involved judicial structures, economic opportunity, 
po liti cal involvement, educational organ izations, and social maneuver-
ing.18 This approach entailed an assumption that double- consciousness is 
addressed best through integration and material intervention— thereby 
tackling the basis of disregard, countering assertions of inferiority, and 
opening access to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Nonetheless, 
the failure of this tactic is clear in that for so many the African American 
had not been reconstituted but simply and incon ve niently repositioned. In a 
word, the formerly enslaved  were vis i ble in an altered way, but this did not 
constitute a substantial change in sentiment  toward them. “For this much 
all men know,” writes Du Bois, “despite compromise, war and strugg le, the 
Negro is not  free.”19 He outlines this situation by vivid so cio log i cal and his-
torical narratives regarding life in par tic u lar regions of the nation where he 
believed the Negro prob lem most graphic.20
Effort to foster a “better and truer self ” produces frustration in that it 
involves what Du Bois references as the “contradiction of double aims.”21 
Appealing to a religious vocabulary, he expresses  these wasted efforts as 
“wooing false gods and involving false means of salvation.”22  There is a 
relationship  here to tragic- soul life by means of which Du Bois pre sents, 
through the musical form of the spirituals and religious rituals, an African 
American theological response to  these existential conditions.23 Impact, if 
any, is short- lived, as Du Bois hints at through the fiction undergirding the 
prob lem  things 177
spirituals.24 Creating synergy between past and pre sent,  these songs wish for a 
 future that does not come. Hence, they are for Du Bois sorrow songs, haunt-
ingly beautiful sorrow songs. The spiritual communities in which  these 
songs  were  housed primarily and the ministers who led  those communities 
failed to impact the cultural climate that suffocated their aspirations. While 
Du Bois might have known something of the genre before this transforma-
tion, he knew nothing of their context of creation— nothing of the hush 
arbors, nothing of the traumas of enslavement that provided the affective 
quality of the narratives, and he believed  little of the theological assump-
tions embedded in their lyrical content. What he did know and what he did 
experience is this: each attempt to demand something of the world is met 
with frustration, and so the Negro prob lem persists.
What should be done with the Negro presupposes a prior consideration: 
How does it feel to be a prob lem? It is with re spect to this question that Du 
Bois pre sents the prob lem soul, which, again, is conditioned, informed, and 
 shaped by a par tic u lar cultural climate, or what Du Bois references as a “new 
philosophy of life” associated with the technologies and strategies of racial 
deep disregard.25 It is this philosophy that articulates the “soul- life” of the na-
tion in which by definition African Americans participate.26
Sick Soul
As claimed  earlier, William James’s description of the sick soul lends it-
self to framing the prob lem soul. In suggesting this exploration, I am con-
cerned to apply this category beyond the world he describes, beyond his 
framing of religion, and beyond the individual concerns that mark The Va-
ri e ties of Religious Experience.27 In appealing to James’s sick soul within this 
larger context, my aims are to highlight the details of this posture named 
the prob lem soul, and thereby capture something of its sensibility and the 
cultural climate of exclusion it stands against.
I imagine this language  will hit some ears wrong. Perhaps it is too clini-
cal, suggesting illness of some sort. However, while to limit the analy sis to 
clinical and medical diagnosis would miss the point, Du Bois does suggest 
the psychological as a dimension of the situation he describes, and James 
proposes a philosophical reading. One hears this, for instance, in his naming of 
the most widely borrowed notion from Souls (double- consciousness), which 
entails Du Bois suggesting African Americans suffer from cultural personal-
ity dissociation—or a type of metaphysical and cultural disorder, perhaps 
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cultural schizo phre nia, or even a type of cultural dissociative identity dis-
order. Yet this rendering of the situation, the historical moment, is tied to 
so cio log i cal, historical, and cultural consideration and pronouncements. 
Using a heuristic of the sick soul, against what might be initial re sis tance 
on the part of  those who are more comfortable with a type of heroic quality 
lodged in a sense of tragedy overcome in Du Bois, allows for a diff er ent range 
of questions, a diff er ent sense of the prob lem plaguing Du Bois, and the con-
nection of this prob lem to death.
Prior to the sick soul, James described a healthy- mindedness marked by 
optimism regarding circumstances, seeing them as generally good despite all. 
This stance takes two forms. The first, which is involuntary, defines an im-
mediate emotion of happiness regarding the conditions of life. The second 
is systematic healthy- mindedness and entails conceptualization of life in 
a general sense as good.28 Despite what the term “healthy- minded” might 
suggest, it is a narrow approach that works with a  limited range of experi-
ences.29 As Charles Taylor notes, the terminology used by James— “morbid,” 
“sick,” and “healthy”— suggests a preference for the “healthy- mindedness.” 
However, this is not the case. “James,” Taylor writes, “identifies with the 
sick  here. Not just that this is where he classes himself, without, of course, 
explic itly saying so . . .  but also in that he sees the sick as being more pro-
found and insightful.”30 As a religious attitude, healthy- mindedness is prac-
ticed as we, according to James, “divert our attention from disease and death 
as much as we can; and the slaughter- houses and indecencies without end 
on which our life is founded are huddled out of sight and never mentioned, 
so that the world we recognize officially in lit er a ture and in society is a po-
etic fiction far handsomer and cleaner and better than the world that  really 
is.”31 Therefore, it is a willful determination to bracket off what is unpleasant 
and to pre sent the world through a hermeneutic of harmony and comfort. 
For the healthy- minded, through the exercise of a childlike happiness, the 
world is projected, as one needs it to be— marked by progression that is not 
inevitable but that is harnessed to a deep sense of possibility. James finds 
examples of healthy- mindedness in “New Thought” camps known to high-
light the good by preaching potentiality and possibility while, in his words, 
“deliberately minimizing evil.”32 The healthy- minded, in a religious sense, 
experience conversion as the once born—an easy attention to happiness and 
goodness.
Over against this posture is one in which evil is recognized and con-
fronted—to the extent evil is understood as being constitutive of the world. 
The soul that views evil as pervasive and fundamental is the sick soul. It is 
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sensitive to the troubling real ity of the universe and our relationship to it. 
In other words, it is content to be open to entanglement with and interplay between 
 things. And in a philosophical sense, it offers a deeper knowledge of ex-
istence as porous. Despite the tone of this description, James highlights a 
positive dimension to the perspective offered by the sick soul. The lucidity, 
a penetrating and guiding awareness, marking it is not to be dismissed and 
should be valued over against the “fragile fiction” embraced by the healthy- 
minded— that is, a fiction of unity or  wholeness with clear borders that 
mark off certain dimensions of engagement with  things.33 (Think in terms 
of my depiction in  earlier chapters of theistic approaches meant to close 
off naming- things.) The sick soul, unlike the more restricted view of the 
healthy- minded, probes the world and recognizes that “the self is a battle-
ground.”34 Still, this is no reason to turn away and take an easier path. “Let 
us not simply cry out, in spite of all appearance,” cautions James, “ ‘Hur-
rah for the Universe!— God’s in Heaven, all’s right with the world.’ Let us 
see rather  whether pity, pain, and fear, and the sentiment of  human help-
lessness may not open a profounder view and put into our hands a more 
complicated key to the meaning of the situation.”35 Framed in terms of 
the individual and her contact with the world, the healthy- minded seeks 
a sustainable happiness in the face of its contradiction, while the sick soul 
finds no benefit in such a delusion and does not seek a “higher unity.”36 The 
sick soul knows, in James’s words, “back of every thing is the  great specter of 
universal death.” What appears good is equally and quickly matched by its 
negation.37
This is not to suggest sick souls are without the possibility of conversion—
of a turn  toward closure desired.  Those deeply sensitive to a world of suffer-
ing can be twice born, that is, they can change to a diff er ent perspective on 
engagement with the world— one marked by consciousness affording new 
consideration of the good and happiness as bound to fixity outside “pen-
etration” by the Divine. However, conversion is a mere possibility not a 
probability,  because the sick soul need not surrender or collapse in the face 
of misery.38 As James remarks, some  will not be converted  because they are 
never so “exhausted with the strugg le of the sick soul” that they give up in 
the face of crisis.39 Some have, James proclaims, “drunk too deeply of the 
cup of bitterness ever to forget its taste.”40 Furthermore,  there is an extreme 
pessimism that can prevent conversion due to a “pathological melancholy.”41 
This is a psychological sense of loss blocking optimism, whereby “the subject 
of melancholy is forced in spite of himself to ignore that of all good what-
ever. For him it may no longer have the least real ity.”42
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The sick soul as a heuristic sheds light on the prob lem soul, but the two 
are far from identical. For example, while James speaks of figures such as 
Tolstoy living in a universe “two stories deep,” by which he means a response 
to and interplay with the universe that entails embrace of good within the 
shadow of a per sis tent sadness, the moralist- absurdist tendencies of Du Bois 
suggest even this stance as a surrender to illusion and a denial of the per sis tent 
effect of disregard that overwhelms all  else. As witness to this, one need only 
call to mind the figure John, found in chapter 13 of Souls, who returns home 
from college with lucidity regarding the plight of African Americans, only 
to be met by a per sis tent disregard from whites and re sis tance from his com-
munity, which selects religious delusion over mature analy sis and confron-
tation. In the end, neither his lucidity nor the religious encasement chosen 
by the African American community provides protection from the racial dy-
namics in the town.43
For James, religious conversion, as one way of addressing the sick soul, in-
volves a binding of the once “divided self”— a resolution, we might say, of dou-
bleness, through the centrality of certain ideals once neglected.44 If conver-
sion is substantial resolution— wholeness away from openness— Souls rejects 
its likelihood. Instead, Du Bois proclaims that the two warring ideals defining 
double- consciousness never merge successfully; a truer self never develops, but 
instead a “longing,” a “wish” for meaning as  wholeness, might endure.  There 
is a clear goal— “to be a co- worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both 
death and isolation”— but it remains unfulfilled in that openness, the porous 
nature of  things, prevents such escape— always life and death.45
The problem- soul posture shares with the sick- soul personality a vision 
of the world that lacks easy comfort vis- à- vis distinction and bound aries be-
tween  things, and this way attention to James helps to clarify the perception 
of the world as marked by racial disregard Du Bois seeks to highlight through 
the prob lem soul. This positioning against the world in and of itself has not 
fostered a negative response in that for critics such as Cornel West proper per-
spective does not involve denial of the tragic quality of life. To the contrary, 
it is vital; however, what West finds missing is a creative tension between the 
tragic and the comic. Du Bois’s perception of the  human condition is lacking 
 because he does not consider sufficiently the current context in which even 
“ultimate purpose and objective order” are called into question, and he does 
not fully grasp what West calls the “sheer absurdity of the  human condi-
tion.”46 West assumes a type of fatalism in Du Bois stemming in part from his 
failure to engage adequately— instead of paternalistically and dismissively— 
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the life and resource of the larger African American community. He is outside 
the circle of concern, so to speak, and therefore lacks a robust safeguard. With-
out “ritual, cushioned by community or sustained by art,” West cautions, “we 
are urged  toward suicide or madness.”47 Yet this community is not foreign to 
Du Bois. More to the point, however, this “community,” complete with the 
resources West names, has also produced redemptive- suffering models of re-
sponse to the absurdity of life that challenge per sis tent strugg le and instead 
promote a radical sense of the  future that easily sacrifices the pre sent and 
“kills,” so to speak, the possibility of a robust anthropology by diminishing 
 human responsibility and accountability in the world as well as by giving 
misery high status. The ritual and artistic expression within African Ameri-
can communities, as Du Bois knows, is not always inclined  toward self- care 
and collective advancement.
On closer inspection, the under lying issue for West seems not a lack of 
attention to the absurdity of the world—or a disciplined diagnosis of the his-
torical moment. Instead, he challenges what he perceives as Du Bois’s fail-
ure to find comfort and resolution within the collective life of the “least of 
 these.”48 Du Bois, if one ignores changes to his thinking and reflects only on 
his early work, appears elitist and “exceptionalist” in orientation, and this 
“inability to immerse himself fully in the rich cultural currents of black ev-
eryday life” constitutes the issue  because without this immersion a sense of 
the tragi comic quality of life is impossible to grasp.49 Hence, reflecting on 
his early thinking in isolation, a turn to classical education was betrayed 
by the theory of the talented tenth; economic inclusion was marred by the 
tenacious nature of white supremacy; cultural production as Du Bois pre-
sented it within his early  career failed to do more than offer an apology for 
African American genius; and po liti cal participation was short- circuited by 
an Enlightenment worldview championing yet another form of elitism as 
the “impulsive and irrational masses”  were guided into public life by their 
superiors.50
I argue, however, that the cultural world of “everyday” interactions is not 
foreign to Du Bois and that the elitism critiqued by West is  later challenged 
by Du Bois himself; the difference with West is Du Bois’s unwillingness to see 
in this resource a sustainable aid.51 This disagreement notwithstanding, even 
 limited attention to West’s critique points in the direction of the sensibility 
I want to highlight. While not framing absurdity in the moralist- absurdist 
manner I have in mind, West does promote implicitly the utility of this vo-
cabulary in connection to Du Bois’s perspective in Souls.
182 chapter eight
Prob lem Soul
Consideration of the Negro prob lem, particularly in theological terms, en-
tails a sense of hope funneled through faith in cosmic assistance, while the 
prob lem soul connotes “a hope not hopeless but unhopeful.”52 Du Bois men-
tions this unhopeful posture in relationship to death as physical demise, but 
it is just as applicable to the depth of disregard—or ontological irrelevance— 
also marking encounter with the cultural climate associated with the world.53 
To be unhopeful within this cultural climate raises the question of pain and 
suffering, but not as a  matter of theodicy. Rather, the problem- soul posture 
rejects  grand unity of purpose, and this entails a stance much more in line 
with a Camusian sense of strugg le (as interplay) and life without appeal. Paul 
Taylor points  toward this sense of strugg le without resolution in Du Bois prior 
to his departure for Ghana: “Du Bois offered to a friend what we might take 
as his final assessment of the prospects of social justice. ‘Chin up and fight 
on,’ Du Bois says, ‘but realize that American Negroes  can’t win.’ ”54 Sharing 
West’s desire to avoid passivity or fatalism, Taylor makes an effort to recast 
this statement not as a general denouncement of strugg le as having a useful 
outcome; rather, he reads it as an endorsement of pan- African striving for 
justice as opposed to the more geo graph i cally  limited push for civil rights in 
the United States. Taylor argues, yes, Du Bois says American Negroes  can’t 
win, but he  doesn’t say Negroes (as a global population)  can’t win. The more 
expansive framing of the global African American community involves rejec-
tion of Amer i ca as the standard and embrace of pan- African allegiances— a 
diff er ent type of interplay to be sure.55
Beside the mode of revision offered by Paul Taylor, melancholy as response 
to loss is a manner in which some have attempted to capture the tone of Du 
Bois’s diagnosis.56 Jonathan Flatley, for whom it can be a positive, argues mel-
ancholy is produced for Du Bois through white supremacy. Flatley discusses 
melancholia in relationship to Du Bois as a means of disclosure— a look into 
the sources of melancholia thereby producing a historical sense of the source 
of loss and an interest in the world. Yet I am not convinced this is the best 
way to frame the prob lem soul. What would constitute the prior  thing, an 
initial situation, against which the new situation is mea sured? Loss involves 
a change in posture, mood, and perception of experience premised on some-
thing desired and once pre sent, now gone and therefore mourned. What Du 
Bois articulates has  little if anything to do with properly or improperly ad-
dressing loss.
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If anything, the African American is culturally constituted by a mode 
of misplaced nostalgia, consistent with the manner in which Camus cap-
tures U.S. self- understanding more broadly. As such, African Americans, 
at least as culturally or discursively constructed, are without a capacity for 
loss. The assumed sense of longing or loss is better described as existential 
disruption— affective, geo graph i cal, and physical ramifications tied to the fail-
ure of Reconstruction. Du Bois does not point to an original moment of 
 wholeness, a location once beyond the grasp of racial disregard, a space set 
aside and set apart. No, he poses the question of unendingly warring identi-
ties within a cultural climate of violent difference,  shaped by a vivid awareness 
of absurdity, akin to this consideration marking out naming- things set apart 
as thing- things: What do  things of history lose or gain?
It is true the spirituals, or sorrow songs, as Du Bois names them, hint 
at what may be thought of as a sense of longing. Of course,  there is indi-
vidual loss through the tactics of white supremacy and Jim Crow, but even 
this is not connected to a remembered past of equality in the United States 
that is longed for. Jim Crow over against enslavement produces not melan-
choly but a deep sense of racial disregard as already and always, speaking 
not to loss but to the overwhelming presence of white supremacy imping-
ing on  every dimension of collective life. Furthermore, religious melancholy, 
as James defines lost meaning, does not apply  either. Melancholy as a mode 
of personal sin or as fear generated by the radical evil marking the world as 
lacking  grand significance and devoid of meaning— presented in a “modern 
style,” as Charles Taylor frames it— does no better a job of capturing the sensi-
bility of the prob lem soul.57  These two— personal sin and fear— suggest long-
ing for an alternate, a diff er ent relationship to the world that is missing but 
plausible. This is more consistent with what was said in the second chapter 
regarding Yates’s reading of Bakhtin through a Christian theological herme-
neutic which privileged (over against degradation as Bakhtin understands it) 
 wholeness and bound aries. Yet by means of the posture known as the prob-
lem soul, personal sin is moot, and fear is an intimate dimension of disregard. 
 There is no ritualization of loss and no effort to end openness.58 Available to 
the prob lem soul are only thought and habits of revolt without resolution— a 
resolve only to recognize the absurdity of encounter with the world— while 
maintaining an interplay with/between  things.
Charles Long might be said to come closest to offering a useful way to 
position Du Bois in relationship to melancholia. In his 1975 William James 
Lecture, Long reflects on Va ri e ties and questions the ability of James’s “once 
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born” and “twice born” framework to, as he puts it, bear “the weight of the 
cultural experiences of the Amer i cas, much less the experience of human-
kind.”59 The values and meanings accorded life within a context of racial 
disregard require recognition of a diff er ent source for the “twice born” soul. 
It is this diff er ent source Long means to address through his discussion of the 
negative ele ment of religious experience. Moreover, through religious expe-
rience the oppressed push back  toward “primordial experience and histories” 
that critique modernity and its metaphysical categories used to re- create the 
“other.” This second creation, or reinvention, is for Long what Du Bois in-
tends by double- consciousness.
Furthermore, unlike the dread experienced by James and his  father, the 
dread Du Bois chronicles in the essay “On the Faith of the  Fathers” might 
be said to involve reevaluation of, or better yet, the compromised stability of 
this second creation opening the possibility of a prior meaning—as the per sis-
tent separateness of conflicting identities impinges.60 Religious experience 
within the context of a new formulation of community addresses a sense 
of first creation— the self prior to the logic of modern racial disregard—as a 
“new form of  human consciousness.” And the po liti cal strugg les within  these 
newly formed communities speak to the forging of space in which to exercise 
this new consciousness regarding openness— the porous quality of interac-
tion.61 It is a crawling back for Long, away from the second creation to a first 
creation— which is loss of destructive significations of identity and meaning. 
This loss, then, is rejection of the second creation, the modern articulation 
of  limited metaphysical black worth.
Despite Long’s modifications, a feeling of loss assumes an integrity of past 
experience foreign to African Americans as a consequence of antiblack racism 
and its structuring of discourse. Perhaps this is why the Cargo cults to which 
Long points entail unfulfilled resolution sought through material acquisi-
tion. The religion of the oppressed, as I read Long, offers conversion— one 
grounded in the historical consequences of American culture, but conver-
sion nonetheless. Yet for Du Bois,  there is no possibility of conversion;  there 
is no salvation (i.e., a reliable end to openness and interplay), not even the 
type to which Long points. And as described in Souls, the religion of African 
Americans involves not a crawling back but rather an embrace of the second 
creation, an unwillingness to confront structures of disregard but instead a 
thinking theologically about second creation as a mode of theodicy resolved 
through address of personal sin and the mysteries of God’s  will. Herein closure 
is sought to the degree that only divine presence penetrates the naming- thing: 
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all interplay is of  limited worth when one considers the interplay with the 
Divine.
On the microlevel, with the death of Du Bois’s son,  there is a poetic qual-
ity offered through personal pain and angst that lends a softer meaning to the 
misery of disregard. Du Bois says, “I saw his breath beat quicker and quicker, 
pause, and then his  little soul leapt like a star that travels in the night and left 
a world of darkness in its train.”62 Still, this brief glimpse of transcendence 
through removal from the cultural climate by means of death is more often 
silenced by Du Bois the scientific thinker, who, as he acknowledges, “longs 
for work” and who “pant[s] for a life full of striving.”63 With this example in 
place, what James says about evil is applicable. The normal arrangements of 
life are filled “with moments in which radical evil gets its inning and takes its 
solid turn.”64 However, as Du Bois outlines the cultural climate, and the on-
going push to render black naming- things fixed and bounded— marginalized 
and  limited— this “turn” seems perpetual.
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This book was to pick up the study of religion where Terror and Triumph: The 
Nature of Black Religion ends. To be precise, I intended it as an extension of 
Terror and Triumph’s theory of relational centralism applied to a wider range 
of cultural production.1 Through that approach I meant to urge scholarly un-
derstanding of the relationship between religion and culture beyond explo-
ration of dominant theological symbols embedded in culture, beyond the 
assumption that religion must constitute a unique mode of thought or expe-
rience, and beyond a narrow range of cultural resources. It was intended to 
bring greater depth and richness to the study of religion and to understand-
ings of culture— its origins, impact, and longevity—as well as the “ things” 
populating cultural worlds.2
This book was to frame cultural “assemblies” in a manner consistent with 
what I labeled my theory of religion (i.e., religion as the quest for complex 
subjectivity— a pro cess of meaning making). The rationale was  simple: the 
relationship between religion and cultural production, for example, has been 
a source of much fruitful discussion. In recent years impor tant books have 
effectively shifted attention to the connection (making more readily recog-
nizable appropriate subfields) between cultural production and religion. In 
part this has involved an under lying rationale that the religious is where you 
find it, so to speak. In other words, the religious is embedded and encoded in 
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the cultural workings of  human life. And while  these books are vital, my vol-
ume was to provide a more expansive investigation than is offered in many of 
them in that it would not assume a framing of the religious determined and 
defined in terms of institutional forms, doctrines, or theological vocabulary 
of par tic u lar traditions.
Prequel: From Complex Subjectivity  
to Religion as a Technology
I soon realized the proj ect I intended to write required a theoretical step I 
had not yet made.3 Terror and Triumph outlined a response to par tic u lar mo-
dalities of dread resulting from effort to fix black bodies. It is not a theory 
of religion; rather, it is a theory of ethical formulation— a psycho- ethical re-
sponse to what religion exposes in relationship to certain modalities of dis-
regard. Time to reflect on Terror and Triumph and what it proposed, sparked 
in part by conversation with colleagues, students, and friends, brought me 
to a realization: While Terror and Triumph maintains a sense of the religious 
as a means of “ doing” something against the belittling of collective and indi-
vidual markers of humanity, this sensibility and ethical frame did not con-
stitute a theory of religion. I needed, then, to go  behind Terror and Triumph’s 
ethical impulse. And so the book could not be as initially outlined; it had to 
be a prequel— the theory of religion Terror and Triumph assumed. That book, 
Terror and Triumph, in a way, worked backward— and in the pro cess assumed 
what I now make explicit.4
As argued throughout  these pages, religion as a technology, in relation-
ship to strategies such as art, exposes naming- things and thing- things as 
porous— open and thereby allowing interplay. This realization flies in the 
face of normative theological narratives of  wholeness or fixity made pos si ble 
through “true” bound aries. And as was discussed in part 3, certain popula-
tions of naming- things are discursively warped and culturally marked off so 
as to maintain the illusion of being closed off. Still, such efforts fall short, 
and as one might imagine, this realization is not without its trauma— a type 
of destabilization that does not go unaddressed. This claim highlights the ma-
teriality of this fixing in terms of an effort to render vertical, to draw from 
Bakhtin,  things’ relationship to other  things.
While it is a mislabeling of religion to call it a response to this situation of 
openness, its work does promote responses. That is to say, porousness is tack-
led in a variety of ways: hide the problematic (rituals of affirmation); cover 
the problematic through moral and ethical pronouncements; embrace the 
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problematic as theologically necessary; ignore the problematic as a  matter of 
blind faith. Much of what is produced in light of  these possibilities involves 
an effort to fill the openings, to stabilize bound aries, and to assert the integ-
rity and distinctiveness of  things. All of this, as should be clear at this point, 
I find problematic.
In the final pages of this volume, I propose an alternate psycho- ethical 
(or affective- active) response to the openness of  things illustrated through a 
Camusian moralist sensibility and a caustic framing of absurdity as, perhaps, 
an artistic rendition of the catchphrase “Shit happens.”5 Camus’s stating of 
the case regarding the “absurd man” offers applicable insight. “For the ab-
surd man,” he reflects, “it is not a  matter of explaining and solving, but of 
experiencing and describing.”6 Even more to the point, he reflects directly 
on art and the absurd: “The absurd work requires an artist conscious of  these 
limitations and an art in which the concrete signifies nothing more than 
itself. It cannot be the end, the meaning, and the consolation of a life.”7 The 
nature and meaning of the absurd, and its connection to religion as a tech-
nology, as I want to understand and employ it involves to some degree a sense 
of limitations and possibilities. But this is not the agape love– driven “impossi-
ble possibility” of neoorthodox thinkers, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, resolved 
through divine intervention— for example, God filling the gaps as the  human 
languishes between history and eternity, between her capacities and the re-
straints of her nature.8 Such thinking promotes a theory (and practice) of 
religion very diff er ent from what I work to theorize and follow in this book.
Religion as I have theorized it actually ends where their “hope against hope” 
begins. That is to say, religion as a technology— a method or what might be 
called a technique of exposure— affords perspective or at best recognition of 
circumstances along the lines of what Camus labels “lucidity” or awareness. 
Hope, I argue, involves not  simple recognition of circumstances but also— and this 
is an impor tant distinction— reflection on more appropriate arrangements of cir-
cumstances.9 In this way, hope involves “vertical” thinking that frames and 
privileges par tic u lar outcomes as not simply plausible but pos si ble through 
proper orientation and a defined posture— submissive to the Divine and defi-
ant  toward the world.
The Deception of Closure
Even when seeking to do other wise, as in the case of Yates discussed in chap-
ter 2, many of the dominant narratives regarding openness cast it as a prob-
lem to solve. In fact, it is depicted as a prob lem that can be solved through 
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a range of prescribed patterns of thinking and  doing that tend to pull away 
from the world and the more “unpleasant” realities and functions of life in 
the world. However, moralism points out the fictive nature of such psycho- 
ethical responses.10 Collision between naming- things and other  things 
does not entail a firm epistemological structuring of being. And more to 
the point, such structuring is not my interest  here, nor does Camus offer 
it to readers. Rather, interplay points to unanswered questions— tension be-
tween naming- things and other  things. This is not a mode of transgression 
of bound aries  because the bound aries are a fiction to begin with. Offered by 
moralism simply is recognition of porousness and a naming of ongoing pen-
etration or presence of  things in each other, or, as I have referenced through 
the book, in Camus’s terminology, “their presence together.” Anything  else 
might be a deception.
Herein, psycho- ethical response as “rebellion, without claiming to solve 
every thing, can at least confront its prob lems.”11 To continue thinking with 
Camus, this is not to end absurdity as a marker of openness, nor to  control 
openness, but rather it is a pro cess of “holding”  things close. Over against this 
pro cess, the effort to end absurdity and thereby close  things off vis- à- vis 
“unity” is a futile attempt to banish the angst caused by the threat of the 
unknown. It is futile in that complexity in the form of contradiction is a de-
fining ele ment of absurdity.12 While Camus makes this assertion concerning 
the nature of absurdity as a “rule of life” marked by contradiction within a 
philosophical discussion of murder and suicide, I think the general episte-
mological point extends beyond that par tic u lar context.13 Think in terms of 
his reflections on Sisyphus published just a  little  earlier than his reflections on 
the “rebel.” In both the case of the former and the nameless latter figure, absur-
dity is characterized by effort but a lack of resolution— a denial of assertion or 
“unity.” Regarding Sisyphus, he writes, “the lucidity that was to constitute his 
torture [the awareness of his eternal plight] at the same time crowns his vic-
tory.”14  There is no transcendence, not even the pretense of transcendence— 
that is, as a closing off of that which is porous and penetrated.
This thinking is a substantial difference in that normalizing narratives— 
such as theological systems of tradition— work to enhance distinction by paint-
ing it as having a transcendent quality. Take, for example, the story of Job 
from the Hebrew Bible. This is a narrative about the relationship of naming- 
things to thing- things along a negative loop. Thing- things— whether cre-
ated by naming- things or not— impinge upon Job and damage his existential 
and ontological sense of bodied integrity.  Whether the loss of his  children 
(naming- things) when the house— a  thing— collapses on them, or the loss of 
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wealth captured by possession of  things, or the betrayal of his naming- thing 
through illness, this story centers on the destruction or contamination of 
 things as a marker of existential and ontological separation.
Thy sons and thy  daughters  were eating and drinking wine in their eldest 
 brother’s  house and, behold,  there came a  great wind from the wilderness, 
and smote the four corners of the  house, and it fell upon the young men, 
and they are dead.15
But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he 
 will curse thee to thy face. And the LOrd said unto Satan, behold, he is 
in thine hand; but save his life. So went Satan forth from the presence of 
the LOrd, and smote Job with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his 
crown.16
The resolution to the narrative of Job, to the extent  there is one, centers on 
naming- thing epistemological uncertainty as acquiescence to divine prerog-
ative. Such surrender is matched by existential renewal to the extent theo-
logical dissonance is eased through availability of other  things— such as new 
wealth. Anchoring resolution in this case is the proper ordering of naming- 
things, thing- things, and the cosmic “ tHinG” called God. Camus seems 
aware of this deception, and the notion of ongoing rebellion speaks to this. 
Bodied naming- things crave a unity that does not exist, and so the illusion 
of the unity must be created and protected. Camus points to a determined 
lucidity regarding our existence, while the rest are details we construct.17
Camus and Openness
The psycho- ethical impulse in the book of Job is controlled if not neutral-
ized through contentment with “life without appeal” despite  whether such a 
life is actually pos si ble or not. (If nothing  else, this psycho- ethical response is 
a soft and muted assumption.) In what Job is granted  there is appeal— but the 
appeal is to the subject’s subjectivity over against the object and the abject 
between them. This is to suggest  there is “ground” so to speak upon which 
to stand distinct. It is to attempt resolution through surrender of “one of the 
terms of the opposition”—in this case a surrender of some subjectivity for 
the sake of the subject. Yet contrary to this, Camus seeks revolt, not aspira-
tion. Abjection speaks, I argue, to the residue of aspiration. “That revolt is 
the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that  ought to ac-
company it.”18 Such thinking asserts, at least softly, a comfort with porous 
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 things presented to the world. Hence, it is a mode of naming by naming- 
things without the fallback of wishing for more stability and bound aries held 
with true integrity. With abjection, vulnerability is a negative, a threat. But 
for Camus, vulnerability speaks to our existential condition and relationship 
to the world— a world that impinges and enters us, that we impinge upon and 
enter. Still, this interplay does not manifest answers to our questions of exis-
tence posed by this arrangement of  things. The narratives we often tell our-
selves in the context of this silence constitute an effort to fortify ourselves. 
However energetic the telling, they, to a large degree, are pointless in that 
 these narratives produce nothing that did not exist without them.
I see in this perception of the naming- thing’s interplay with thing- things 
something of what Camus notes as the “triumph of the carnal” without  grand 
“consolation” to be found or created.19 Differentiation is at the end fictional, 
which leaves lines of “distinction” porous and always compromised. Hence, 
 there is art.
This is the reason for art; if differentiation, meaning, subjectivity, and other 
tropes for  wholeness  were pos si ble, the world would be “clear, art would not 
exist.”20 To explicate what I have in mind, I return to W. E. B. Du Bois, Nella 
Larsen, Richard Wright, and Orlando Patterson.
The Value of Openness
While absurdity and the challenge of the open- bodied naming- thing perverted 
with bound aries of social difference (e.g., race) informs The Souls of Black Folk, 
it is presented graphically much  later in Dusk of Dawn, where Du Bois writes:
It is as though one, looking out from a dark cave in a side of an impend-
ing mountain, sees the world passing and speaks to it; speaks courteously 
and persuasively, showing them how  these entombed souls are hindered 
in their natu ral movement, expression, and development; and how their 
loosening from prison would be a  matter not simply of courtesy, sympa-
thy, and help to them, but aid to all the world. One talks on evenly and 
logically in this way, but notices that the passing throng does not even turn 
its head, or if it does, glances curiously and walks on.21
For Richard Wright, it is not a cave but rather the underworld, the sewer. 
Still, the sentiment is the same. In the short story “The Man Who Lived 
Under ground,” the sewer is where the protagonist finds himself  after a con-
frontation with the police reinforces his status as prob lem  thing.22 From the 
sewer, he sees but is not seen; he discovers and observes the be hav ior of  those 
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who live above him; and in the pro cess he recognizes the futility of their en-
deavors and the pervasive misery that marks their lives. Du Bois notes the 
cave as a tomb, and Fred Daniels, the protagonist in Wright’s story, sees and 
feels death around him— from the baby floating by, to the work of the funeral 
parlor, the dead animals in the butcher shop, and the suicide of the security 
guard. What  humans seek, they cannot have. This is evident for Daniels as 
he watches  people in a type of church worship ser vice also familiar to Du 
Bois (and Nella Larsen for that  matter). Observing them was painful, more 
penetrating than the ache of his body  because he knew what they refused 
to acknowledge. “A deeper pain,” Wright narrates, “induced by the sight of 
 those black  people groveling and begging for something they could never get 
churned in him.”23  There is no comfort, no assurances offered.
Lucidity, like other conceptual maps offered in Souls, is doubled. In addi-
tion to lucidity regarding the workings of the world in general, Du Bois also 
alludes to lucidity in terms of a type of clairvoyance allowing African Ameri-
cans to see both their context and that of whites. The latter is a deep observa-
tion. The most telling pre sen ta tion of this lucidity is in “The Souls of White 
Folk,” an essay in Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil (1920).  There he writes, 
“I see  these souls undressed and from the back and side. I see the working of 
their entrails. I know their thoughts and they know that I know. . . .  And 
yet as they preach and strut and shout and threaten, crouching as they 
clutch at rags of facts and fancies to hid their nakedness, they go twisting, 
flying by my tired eyes and I see them ever striped— ugly,  human.”24 Rejection 
of a source of appeal deconstructs the workings of the “religion of white-
ness” and exposes its  human inner workings.25 A theodical formulation 
of collective life advantaging whiteness is replaced with an anthropodicy 
of fragility. Du Bois concludes, “We looked at him clearly, with world- old 
eyes, and saw simply a  human  thing weak and pitiable and cruel, even as 
we are and  were.  These super- men and world- mastering demi- gods listened, 
however, to no low tongues of ours, even when we pointed silently to their 
feet of clay.”26
Nella Larsen’s central character in the novel Quicksand, Helga Crane, 
consistent with a moralist posture  toward the trauma of effort to close off 
openness through coding of gender and race, finds strength in the awareness 
of the absurd. “Never could she,” Larsen acknowledges to the reader, “recall 
the shames and often the absolute horrors of the black man’s existence in 
Amer i ca without the quickening of her heart’s beating and a sensation of 
disturbing nausea. It was too awful. The sense of dread of it was almost a 
tangible  thing in her throat.”27 Nausea for Larsen does not connote merely a 
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biological discomfort, but rather  there are larger considerations tied to meta-
physics. Crane names the absurd. I want to frame this naming in terms of 
Camus, who understands a similarity between Jean- Paul Sartre’s sense of 
nausea and what he, Camus, means by absurdity. Think of Crane’s response 
to  others and herself in light of Camus’s framing. He writes, “This discom-
fort in the face of man’s own inhumanity, this incalculable tumble before 
the image of what we are, this ‘nausea’ as a writer of  today calls it, is also the 
absurd.”28  There is no  grand unity capable of providing meaning within a 
cold world. “The cruel, unrelieved suffering had beaten down her protective 
wall of artificial faith in the infinite wisdom, in the mercy, of God,” writes 
Larsen. “For had she not called in her agony on Him? And he had not heard. 
Why?  Because, she knew now, He  wasn’t  there.  Didn’t exist.”29 But what is 
sacrificed in order to pretend an answer when none is given by the world, 
when  there is no God to aid the inquiry?
Crane is open and lucid to life marked only by confrontation and a “No!” 
to her circumstances— that is, societal efforts to close and fix her. This is her 
situation— her entanglement in a cultural climate of contempt presenting 
a world that is foreign, hostile, violent, death dealing. In her words, “only 
scorn, resentment and hate remained— and ridicule. Life  wasn’t a miracle, a 
won der. It was, for Negroes at least, only a  great disappointment. Something 
to be gotten through as best one could. No one was interested in them or 
helped them. God! Bah!”30 Her  family, her community, and her country offer 
Crane rest, not resolution—no sustainable respite from the threat of death. 
“We see,” writes Kristin Lattany, “that Amer i ca is not a glamour queen but 
a grisly skeleton, her only product death . . .  her only lessons how to kill and 
how to die.”31 Nonetheless, for Larsen through Crane (and Du Bois before her) 
the ever- present threat of death does not stimulate a sense of melancholy. In-
stead, death is simply a dimension of what it is to live within the context of 
the cultural climate of the post– Civil War United States. All this Du Bois 
captures with the question “How does it feel to be a prob lem?” and Larsen 
with a proclamation— “God! Bah!”32
Deeply aware of the manner in which the physical can betray— things, in-
cluding our bodies, can forsake us, and life can entail a challenging quality— Du 
Bois, Wright, and Larsen respond to (but cannot undo) the threat of death. Du 
Bois, particularly in terms of double- consciousness, can tend to romanticize 
this body— highlighting its “dogged strength” over against the destructive 
qualities of the cultural climate. Still, he recognizes with nineteenth- century 
religious leader the Reverend Alexander Crummell and Burghardt, his son, 
the fragility of embodied bodies.33 The body, a compromised form, is subject 
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to death— the final moment of interplay as the naming- thing is dissolved 
and returned to the world as “food” for other  things— and the prob lem soul 
never loses sight of this. Awareness of circumstances in the world helps to 
avoid what Daniels laments as he views— unobserved by them— people in a 
movie theater. Watching them laugh at the screen, he recognizes they are un-
aware of the manner in which they mock themselves— “shouting and yelling 
at the animated shadows of themselves.”34 To the extent they lack awareness, 
they are “ children, sleeping in their living and awake in their  dying.”35 All 
Daniels encounters as well as the items he steals offer life no meaning. In his 
hands, money becomes wall paper, watches wall ornaments, and diamonds 
floor covering in his hole below the surface. Life, death, and the material 
trail between them do not constitute a relationship to the world, certainly 
not one offering resolution or final comfort.36 While not exactly “sleeping in 
[her] living and awake in [her]  dying,” Crane does wrestle with metaphysical 
and existential dilemmas posed by the intertwined structures of being and 
not being.37 That is to say, both Crane and Daniels, like Du Bois, are sensitive 
to physical demise (“sleeping in their living”) as well as metaphysical death 
(“awake in their  dying”)—or ontological irrelevance— tied to the cultural cli-
mate guiding the historical moment.
Traditional framings of religion as “something” worth speaking and  doing, 
and its theological probing of the world, for Larsen through Crane, Wright 
through Daniels, and for Du Bois through at least the story of John, offer noth-
ing final. Theological arguments do not wrestle meaning from a  silent world 
and do not offer a way to close off naming- things from the world. Instead, 
religion as a “some thing” prompts what Wright calls “eternity anxiety.” The 
secret to existence, despite the efforts of the religious folks encountered, is 
not found in the workings of relationship to a cosmic some thing. John, facing 
 those in his church, knows this, and the religious leadership of even a cultural 
 giant like Crummell fares no better.38
One might think of the situation this way: the wish against wishes found 
in some spirituals—at least as they have come to us—is quickly countered by the 
response of the blues. Both speak a word regarding relationship— connection 
between questioning  humans— that acknowledges the individual but in as-
sociation with  others also confronting (and confronted by) the world. This, 
one could say, is small and cold comfort.39 Life is drowned in suffering, and 
it is marked by interplay—at times uncomfortable but always unavoidable.40 
Crane, who is slowly  dying as she gives life to child  after child, Wright’s hun-
ger unfulfilled in a hostile world, and Camus’s championing of the absurdist 
elucidate Du Bois’s diagnosis discussed in chapter 8.
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Embracing Openness
In Camus’s narration, as Sisyphus prepares to continue his unending task of 
rolling his stone as punishment from the Greek gods, he reaches a point at 
which the stone is rolling down the hill and he is turning to follow it so 
as to undertake his task yet again. He knows the  labor ahead of him and its 
perpetual nature, but this does not break him; rather, this awareness is 
his resolve and fixes his posture  toward the cultural climate marking his ex-
istential situation. Sisyphus’s stance and the posture called the prob lem soul 
are similar. He has his gods to challenge through his per sis tence, although 
this does nothing to change his lot; he gains no quarter in the pro cess. The 
lucidity, the awareness of his condition and the nature of his relationship to 
what is beyond him, speaks the prob lem. It is his posture  toward the world. 
In the telling, both Camus and Du Bois are sure.
This posture is not  limited to the challenge of socially coded open- bodied 
naming- things within a given geography, as some might read my attention to 
the contextual arrangements of openness in the United States. Mindful of this, I 
end with some attention to Orlando Patterson’s The  Children of Sisyphus.41 With 
this novel, one gets Camusian moralism tied to grotesque realism through the 
travails of the vari ous characters— residents of the “Dungle,” which is an area 
of Jamaica marked by refuge and open- bodied naming- things exposed to and 
exposed by waste out of which they crave life. In a word, something of this 
book has the energy, the presence, of the carnivalistic impulse described by 
Bakhtin. The situation for  these garbage dwellers is horizontal—no time or 
resource for vertical thought and endeavors. They are grounded in the filth 
the city would like to deny. They are marked out by a degrading quality that 
pulls nutrition and vitality from relationship to despised thing- things of the 
world.
As one of the garbage men responsible for bringing city waste to the Dun-
gle reflects, they  were “creatures” that “ weren’t  human. If anyone told him 
that they  were  human like himself he would tell them that they lied.”42 This 
was not  because he, as a bodied naming- thing, was not open,  because he 
was— all are. No, he reacted to the values embedded in life with trash and 
needed to distance himself in order to maintain the illusion that he, as a 
naming- thing, was private and not exposed publicly to the piled waste of life. 
Shit ties together the  people of the Dungle and the land. The naming- thing 
to thing- thing, naming- thing to naming- thing, and thing- thing to thing- thing 
connections are constituted by social engineering and cultural placement 
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of shit out of sight. Yet something of the interplay was intriguing; it pulled 
at him:
When he had almost reached the road the garbage- man,  under some 
strange impulse, looked back at the scene he had just left. Something about 
it frightened him.  There was, he  imagined, a freakish infernal beauty in 
the oddly graceful way the mounds of filth undulated  towards the unseen 
shore, in the way the sea murmured and sighed and lashed the shore at in-
tervals with the breaking crack of a crocodile’s tail, in the way the crystal 
blueness of the frightfully near horizon  rose sheet  behind the debris as if 
in flight from the menace of the sea.43
Bodied naming- things are open and troublingly so. They are penetrated by 
their surroundings, consumed by and consuming of the waste around them.
The world, as Bakhtin might observe, is defined by bodied presence and 
activities.  There is no distinction to be made in that life, or better yet, the 
circumstances of life, are horizontal. The grotesque reigns for  those with gro-
tesque bodies— those who are constructed within the troubled and troubling 
world of the Amer i cas. As I have remarked numerous times in this book, the 
marginalized are often projected as shit.44 One gets a sense of this in what 
Dinah encounters  after she has departed from the Dungle to live with her 
new man. In a scene as she is leaving their room to clean the chamber pot, 
Patterson writes, “In a moment she felt as if they had stripped her of all her 
being and was tearing it to pieces, searching into  every last crevice of it, as if 
it was the muck the garbage- cart deposited at the Dungle.”45
Like Sisyphus, residents of the Dungle strugg le to move. Sisyphus was 
punished to strugg le eternally, but the shit of the Dungle held the residents 
bound. For instance, Dinah wanted to exit the Dungle even if it meant cruelly 
leaving her son  behind just as Helga Crane, from Larsen’s Quicksand, wanted to 
leave the preacher’s house— and in so  doing  free herself from the pull of the 
 children consuming her, forget the hateful neighbors, and push beyond the 
circumstances that destroyed her. In  either case, unlike Sisyphus, we cannot 
even imagine them happy,  because certain grotesque bodies are so heavi ly 
coded with social trappings that the pull on them eventually kills them, or at 
least compromises them severely.46 Dinah is pulled back into the Dungle and 
lives  there  until her death; for Crane, the naming- thing/thing- thing interplay 
when coded by race, gender, class, and spirituality create obligation and con-
nections that shape and determine a psycho- ethical loop of terror. Crane plans 
her move away from the interplay of other naming- things— children— who 
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impinge upon her. However, as Larsen writes, “hardly had she left her bed 
and become able to walk again without pain, hardly had the  children re-
turned from the homes of the neighbors, when she began to have her fifth 
child.”47
To attempt closure of  these bodies is to render them stable and workable 
within the larger framework of social logic. This is the case with Dinah’s 
purification— when she is bathed and her body anointed with oil—or when 
the purifying blood of a pigeon is poured on her and it “was like a razor glid-
ing through her flesh. For one long, excruciating moment she was sure that 
it was her own blood that flowed.”48 In more charismatic traditions, the role 
of religious ritual is not to close off the body, but rather to restrict its open-
ness and its receptivity to divine presence only. That is to say— “in the world 
but not of it”— cosmic forces penetrate the open- bodied naming- thing, and 
through this penetration safeguard it from impact by other forces. It becomes 
a new bodied  thing by means of which its material nature and connection to 
the world is downplayed by a new cosmic state of being— “behold old  things 
have passed away, all  things become as new” or “put on the full armor of 
God.”49 This armor, however, serves only to block the body, to hide it and deny 
it— and in so  doing to deny the supple nature of life.
This does not mean within the Dungle that open- bodied naming- things 
necessarily surrender to the absurdities of life coded by social signifiers that 
attempt to fix bodies and reduce openness. Some in the Dungle turn to Ras-
tafarianism, but even this more humanistic tradition begs the question of life’s 
par ameters and prospects: Is  there life without appeal, and how does one live 
it? For  those in the Dungle, yes, life is pos si ble, but it is a life of justi-
fied punishment  until God says other wise. This is the delusion of a distinct 
 future. It is a redemptive suffering formulation premised on a life in/on/of 
shit. Obeah  here in the Dungle, as in Chris tian ity in Wright and Larsen, is 
projected as a means by which to close off the body—to end its openness— 
through cosmic strategies of disappearance entailed by a par tic u lar ritual-
ization of naming- thing/thing- thing interplay. In this case, site- specific dirt 
“out of place” and out of its original “time” shift nature and meaning—or close 
the naming- thing to objects and assumed technologies of contact. But, like 
Chris tian ity, it fails in this regard. The question is this: What is made of that 
radical openness?
For Wright, Larsen, Patterson, and Camus, it is a life of strugg le, but lu-
cidity prevents the assumption  that there is merited suffering— for example, 
painful attempts at closure— premised on a cosmic logic. According to  these 
four,  there is no  grand unity around which such logic can rest. Perpetual 
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strugg le to remain open is the victory. The cele bration and perseverance of 
degraded life, to borrow again from Bakhtin, is this moralist impulse.
 These texts taken together and read through moralism offer a moral- ethical 
response to openness. The response is lucidity— awareness of circumstance 
and re sis tance to effort to close off the body. “To perceive the truth of 
existence,” a character in The  Children of Sisyphus announces, “is to perceive 
an unutterable tragedy.”50 But it is a tragedy only if one assumes bodied 
naming- things should be sheltered from impingement, as if well- being is 
premised on  wholeness and completeness.
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notes
introduction
 1 In Terror and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2003), I argued that religion is a quest for complex subjectivity. It is a response 
to the fundamental questions of  human existence: Who are we? What are we? 
Why are we? When are we? It is a quest, I noted, but one that is unfulfilled and 
that gives rise to a perpetual rebellion against efforts to deform and dehumanize. 
The epilogue provides more information concerning the move from religion as 
a quest for complex subjectivity to religion as a technology.
 2 Thank you to one of my proj ect reviewers for  these: Susan George, Religion 
and Technology in the 21st  Century: Faith in the E- World (Hershey, PA: Information 
Science Publishing, 2006); Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: 
Knopf, 1964). My goal  here is not to provide a discussion of work related to 
technology and religion, but rather to simply point out examples of how my 
efforts in this book differ from much of what constitutes the academic discus-
sion of technology and religion. In  doing so, I want to provide a sense of how 
readers might contextualize my theory of religion.
 3 George, Religion and Technology, vi–ix.
 4 See George, Religion and Technology, chapter 1. The distinction holds true 
in vari ous ways regarding other texts related to religion and technol-
ogy: Brenda E. Brasher, Give Me That Online Religion: Churches, Cults and 
 Community in the Information Age (San Francisco: Jossey- Bass, 2000); David F. 
Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention 
(New York: Penguin, 1999); Scott Midson, Cyborg Theology:  Humans, Technology 
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  and God (London: I. B. Tauris, 2017); Nancey Murphy and Christopher C. 
Knight, eds.,  Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion 
(New York: Routledge, 2010); Jeremy Stolow, ed., Deus in Machina: Religion, 
Technology, and the  Things in Between (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2013); Sam Han, Technologies of Religion: Spheres of the Sacred in a Post- Secular 
Modernity (New York: Routledge, 2016).
 5 George, Religion and Technology, ix.
 6 George, Religion and Technology, chapters 5–9.
 7 George, Religion and Technology, xi– xii.
 8 Regarding this he writes, “Technique certainly began with the machine. It 
is quite true that all the rest developed out of mechanics; it is quite true also 
that without the machine the world of technique would not exist. But to 
explain the situation in this way does not at all legitimize it. It is a  mistake 
to continue with this confusion of terms, the more so  because it leads to the 
idea that,  because the machine is at the origin and center of the technical 
prob lem, one is dealing with the  whole prob lem when one deals with the 
machine. . . .  Technique has now become almost completely in de pen dent of 
the machine, which has lagged far  behind its offspring” (Ellul, Technological 
Society, 3–4).
 9 Robert K. Merton, foreword to Ellul, Technological Society, vi.
 10 Ellul, Technological Society, xxvi.
 11 Ellul, Technological Society, 14–15, 22. Ellul also offers a third division related to 
economic techniques dealing with  labor and the arrangement of related plans 
(22).
 12 Ellul, Technological Society, 4–12. I also share with Ellul a reluctance to 
offer resolutions, to propose a fix to the dilemma to which this book 
points. On this reluctance, Ellul says, “In this study no solution is put 
 forward to the prob lems raised. Questions are asked, but not answered. 
I have indeed deliberately refrained from providing solutions. . . .  I do 
not say that no solutions  will be found; I merely aver that in the pre sent 
social situation  there is not even a beginning of a solution, no breach 
in the system of technical necessity” (xxxi). It is in relationship to a similar 
perspective that I employ the thought of Albert Camus and W. E. B. Du 
Bois.
 13 Ellul, Technological Society, 33.
 14 Ellul, Technological Society, 34.
 15 Ellul, Technological Society, 34–36.
 16 He sees a relationship between scientific investigation— particularly as 
reflected in the eigh teenth and nineteenth centuries— and technique, which 
subordinates the former to the latter.
 17 Ellul, Technological Society, 48–49.
 18 Ellul, Technological Society, 49.
 19 Ellul, Technological Society, 128.
 20 See Ellul, Technological Society, chapter 5.
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 21 It differs in terms of disciplinary locations for each as well as having  little 
concern for the larger debate regarding the positive or negative connotation 
of machines and machinery within sociopo liti cal and economic realms, and 
fi nally without playing technology off modalities of humanism as a foil.
 22 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar (Amherst: University of 
Mas sa chu setts Press, 1988), 16–49, 18; Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1995). A detailed discussion of Foucault’s 
formulation and use of the hermeneutical method of technology is beyond the 
scope of this book. For information on the development of Foucault’s thinking 
on technology, see, for example, Michael C. Behrent, “Foucault and Technol-
ogy,” History and Technology: An International Journal 29, no. 1 (2013): 54–104. 
Behrent notes that as of the 1970s Foucault used technique and technology 
interchangeably, although, he argues,  there remained nuanced distinctions 
between the two. When I use the two terms, I mean in both cases the method 
noted above, while recognizing that religion in this function is a basic feature 
of our social arrangements.
 23 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, 18.
 24 Related to this, power dynamics are most explic itly addressed in the final sec-
tion of the book.
 25 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, 18.
 26 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, 19.
 27 Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1993); Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1977).
 28 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develop the idea of the assemblage in A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo phre nia (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987). For secondary commentary, see, for instance, Thomas 
Nail, “What Is an Assemblage,” Substance 46, no. 1 (2017): 21–37; Jane Bennett, 
Vibrant  Matter: A Po liti cal Ecol ogy of  Things (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010), chapter 2.
 29 Foucault, Technologies of the Self, 45.
 30 At most the religion as a technology urges lucidity or awareness of our  human 
condition(s) and our place within such condition(s).
 31 It is pos si ble that my effort to provide clarification  will enhance the under-
standing of certain dimensions of my argument (e.g., what I do not mean 
by religion as technology) while confusing  others (e.g., the structures and 
sensibilities serving as a precondition for my theorization of religion—or a full 
explication of what this theory of religion contains). Questions remain. As a 
consequence, additional work  after this book  will require more attention to 
this dimension of my theory.
 32 See, for example, Talal Asad’s discussion and critique of transhistorical 
and universalizing definitions of religion: Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and 
Reasons of Power in Chris tian ity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1993), chapters 1–2. While a full engagement with Asad is beyond 
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the scope and purpose of this book, I do want to note that my thinking on 
religion entails recognition of its constructed nature and its ties to the con-
ceptual category of a certain intellectual geography. Investigation of the 
implications of  these disciplinary (e.g., anthropological) realities is in ter est ing 
but extends beyond the pre sen ta tion of religion necessary for this par tic u lar 
proj ect.
 33 “Genealogies of Religion, Twenty Years On: An Interview with Talal Asad,” 
Bulletin for the Study of Religion blog, https:// bulletin . equinoxpub . com / 2015 / 11 
/ genealogies - of - religion - twenty - years - on - an - interview - with - talal - asad.
 34 It does this in relationship to the body and “ thing.” Readers should keep in 
mind that I am not concerned with defining the  human— what constitutes 
the  human; rather, my focus is narrower than that. I am interested in the 
body. In addition, I am interested in better understanding the “ things” used 
within the context of artistic production and utilized in the work of religion.
 35 I am not concerned with the biological “origins” or workings of this technol-
ogy called religion, but rather in how it has been arranged and deployed and 
in how it has functioned.
 36 I say this in part in conversation with and in response to a depiction of Albert 
Camus’s categorization of religion over against personal existence and rebel-
lion as suggesting “some positive value” that is not “given.” In outlining The 
Rebel, Herbert Read says it is the “trick played by religion or philosophy” to 
offer  these values as given. See Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in 
Revolt (New York: Vintage International, 1991), vii. This also points to my 
disagreement with Danto regarding art as “embodying meaning.”
 37 Examples include David Morgan, The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in 
Theory and Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Morgan, 
The Embodied Eye: Religious Visual Culture and the Social Life of Feeling (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2012); Colleen McDannell, Material Chris tian ity: 
Religion and Popu lar Culture in Amer i ca (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1995); Bruce David Forbes and Jeffrey H. Mahan, eds., Religion and Popu lar 
Culture in Amer i ca (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Gordon 
Lynch, Jolyon Mitchell, and Anna Strhan, eds., Religion, Media and Culture: A 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 2012); Kathryn Lofton, Oprah: The Gospel of an 
Icon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Lofton, Consuming Religion 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017); David Chidester, Au then tic Fakes: 
Religion and American Popu lar Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005).
 38  There is some repetition in this introduction regarding the nature and func-
tion of religion. However, I believe this is necessary in order to reinforce my 
movement beyond my  earlier thinking and to make clear the way in which 
religion operates implicitly throughout the book.
 39 As  will become clear, religion as a technology not only tells us something 
about the interaction of  things, but it can also use art as a way to address or 
“manage” the openness of  things exposed through this interrogation.
 40 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013), 2.
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 41 Braidotti, Posthuman, 3.
 42 Braidotti, Posthuman, 37. While I am opposed to Enlightenment notions of 
humanism for reasons including the manner in which it supported tragic ide-
ologies and practices of racial disregard, I have spent some of my professional 
life rethinking humanism in the form of an African American humanism 
that, I believe, short- circuits many of the most significant prob lems reflected 
in  earlier modalities of Eu ro pean humanisms. See, for example, Pinn, African 
American Humanist Princi ples: Living and Thinking Like the  Children of Nimrod 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Pinn, Humanism: Essays on Race, Reli-
gion and Cultural Production (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).
 43 See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982).
 44 This is not to suggest a departure from my ethical realism related to the 
 human presented in my work on humanism. See Pinn, African American 
Humanist Princi ples; Pinn, The End of God- Talk: An African American Humanist 
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Pinn, Humanism.
 45 I find this definition of humanist thought too tied to an uncritical embrace 
of Enlightenment optimism. And in this way, it fails to account for disre-
gard and belittlement used to establish the hierarchy of being upon which 
it draws; instead, it proj ects metaphysics of the  human being that is false as 
such. I find no need to articulate the value of  human life along  these lines, 
and instead I am content to think about the  human in relationship to other 
life forms— the  human tied and dependent always on other modalities of 
life. And in this mutuality is embedded a recognition that agency is not a 
defining characteristic of the  human  thing. So we think and experience the 
 human as unique  because we approach life forms from our vantage point, but 
the  human is dependent upon the activities and impingements of other life 
forms.
Agency is a shared real ity of  things. Even when  human, naming- thing, 
create or construct this is not without the re sis tance of  those  things em-
ployed. For example, the heat of the flame not only shapes and melds  things 
as desired but also destroys; the working of wood demands careful effort, or it 
resists through breakage, and other animal naming- things resist  human com-
mand. (Keep in mind that refusal to be used or work as intended is a mode of 
re sis tance.)
 46 To talk about the subject along the lines preferred by liberation theologians, 
for instance, is to cover this confluence with nostalgia for the pretense of 
bounded agents “liberated” into a transformed world. Certainly this is one 
way to read the nature of personhood and liberation within the work of figures 
such as James H. Cone (e.g., A Black Theology of Liberation [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1986]); Dwight N. Hopkins (e.g., Being  Human: Race, Culture, and Religion 
[Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005]); Kelly Brown Douglas (e.g., Stand Your 
Ground: Black Bodies and the Justice of God [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2015]).
 47 Karen Barad raises in ter est ing questions concerning what has been the as-
sumed significance of discourse and language in ways that have downplayed 
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the importance of  things themselves. See Barad, “Posthumanist Performa-
tivity  toward an Understanding of How  Matter Comes to  Matter,” Material 
Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan J. Hekman (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 120–54.
 48 One might think about this in terms of animacy, although my concern 
 here  isn’t the function of the  human pro cess of naming but rather a way of 
thinking through the presence of vari ous  things without a hierarchical em-
phasis. Readers interested in thinking through the concept of naming- things 
in relationship to the linguistic framing of animacy should see, for example, 
Mel Y. Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2012), chapter 1. It is particularly intriguing to 
read Chen in relationship to chapters 7–8 and the epilogue in this volume.
 49 Bennett, Vibrant  Matter, viii.
 50 Bennett, Vibrant  Matter, 4.
 51 Bennett says, concerning her proj ect, “My claims  here are motivated by a 
self- interested or conative concern for  human survival and happiness: I want 
to promote greener forms of  human culture and more attentive encounters 
between people- materialities and thing- materialities” (Vibrant  Matter, x). 
Bennett, for example, does not assume that such effort ultimately solves the 
prob lem, but for her the conceptual shift points to the value of  things in such 
a way as to point out the ways in which we live “in a knotted world of vibrant 
 matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be to harm oneself ” (13).
 52 Paul Rekret argues that new materialism fails to give adequate attention to 
the sociopo liti cal contexts in which the separation of mind and  matter takes 
place. While new materialism rejects this distinction through its ontological 
turn, Rekret argues this failure hampers its ability to maintain its position. 
See Rekret, “The Head, the Hand, and  Matter: New Materialism and the 
Politics of Knowledge,” Theory, Culture and Society 35, no. 7–8 (2018): 49–72.
 53 I would suggest that injustice is not so logical and the desire to uphold per-
ceived social advantage is often expressed at a group’s own peril. Think, for 
example, of working- class whites voting for Donald Trump.
 54 See notes 37 and 41. In addition to texts noted elsewhere in this introduc-
tion, for information on new materialism see, for example, Rick Dolphijn and 
Iris van der Tuin, New Materialism: Interviews and Cartographies (London: 
Open Humanities Press, 2012); Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt, eds., Carnal 
Knowledge:  Towards a “New Materialism” of the Arts (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); 
Vicki Kirby, What If Culture Was Nature All Along (Edinburgh: University of Ed-
inburgh Press, 2017); Elizabeth Grosz, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the 
Limits of Materialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017; Catherine 
Keller and Mary- Jane Rubenstein, eds., Entangled Worlds: Religion, Science, and 
New Materialisms (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017).
 55 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost frame attention to materiality in this way: 
“It is now time to subject objectivity and material real ity to a similarly radical 
reappraisal. Our respective researches have prompted our own interests in 
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changing conception of material causality and the significance of corpo-
reality, both of which we see as crucial for a materialist theory of politics 
or agency. We now advance the bolder claim that foregrounding material 
 factors and reconfiguring our very understanding of  matter are prerequisites 
for any plausible account of coexistence and its conditions in the twenty- first 
 century.” Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New Materialism,” in Coole and 
Frost, New Materialisms, 2.
 56 Camus’s notion of the absurd lends itself to the interplay I have in mind: “the 
absurd has meaning only in so far as it is not agreed to. . . .  A man who has be-
come conscious of the absurd is forever bound to it.” Albert Camus, The Myth 
of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 30, 31.
 57 Hence, it is that which underlies the psycho- ethical impulse highlighted in 
my  earlier work. The  earlier theoretical work allowed ethics to bleed into my 
theorization— a holdover perhaps from my work as a constructive theologian.
 58 This turn to Camus provides a useful way to connect this thinking about 
the nature and meaning of religion to a pro cess of a complex arrangement of 
“ doing”—or ethics, not simply what one “ ought” to do but what this  doing 
 won’t achieve (i.e., what cannot be done).
 59 See Pinn, Terror and Triumph.
 60 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984).
 61 While some bound aries are meant to safeguard against par tic u lar forms of 
abuse— such as laws against physical vio lence or sexual assault— they have not 
functioned fully and consistently in a way that actually safeguards  those most 
vulnerable. This is in part due to the manner in which even  these bound aries 
are tainted by embedded notions of disregard.
 62 Stelarc, a science- inspired per for mance artist, provides an intriguing depic-
tion of the body— what he calls “an evolutionary architecture.” He explores 
modification of the body vis- à- vis technology that forces a rethinking of the 
nature and meaning of body over against machine as well as requiring an 
altered theorization of flesh. In this way, he uses it as a method of foster-
ing alternate conceptions of embodiment, and by extension the nature and 
meaning of the embodied  human. See, for example, “Zombies, Cyborgs 
and Chimeras: A Talk by Per for mance Artist, Prof Stelarc,” YouTube video, 
August 5, 2014, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = TqtiM1hK6lU.
 63 The religion as a technology’s interrogation of  human experience points out 
death, but not as an isolated “something” or situation; instead, it is already 
always attached to the devices of its exploration— the body and objects. The 
religion as a technology in essence uncovers death in all its multidimensional 
modalities and repre sen ta tions.
 64 My focused attention on the material body is not meant to suggest  there is 
only the physical body. My previous work argues against this reductive ap-
proach, and at least one chapter in this volume— dealing with Du Bois and 
the prob lem soul—at least hints at the affective and constructed realm(s) 
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of the body. Yet my argument is that it is the physical, material body that is 
more rarely centered in the study of religion, and so I work to view the theori-
zation of religion from its vantage point so as to fill a gap rather than based on 
the assumption that it is only the physical/material that “ matters.”
 65 I would argue that Marcella Althaus- Reid’s indecent theology is an example 
of a theological text pushing against easy closure and advocating for openness 
as an erotic quality. See Althaus- Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions 
in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000).
 66 In understanding ritualization in this manner, I am referencing the thinking 
of Ronald Grimes and  others in ritual studies. See, for example, Grimes, The 
Craft of Ritual Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
 67 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World.
 68 For background information and artistic context on Angelbert Metoyer, see 
his website: https:// www . angelbertmetoyer . com.
 69 Dominique Laporte, History of Shit (Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 2000).
 70 See, for example, W. E. B. Du Bois, The Suppression of the African- Slave Trade to 
the United States of Amer i ca, 1638–1870 (1896); Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro: A 
Social Study (1899); Du Bois, Black Reconstruction: An Essay  toward a History of the 
Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in Amer i ca, 
1860–1880 (1935); Du Bois, Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil (1920); Du Bois, 
Dusk of Dawn: An Essay  toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept (1940).
 71 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Vintage Books/Library of 
America, 1990).
 72 Works discussed include Camus, Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays; Camus, Rebel; 
Nella Larsen, Quicksand, in Quicksand and Passing (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1986); Richard Wright, Native Son (New York: Harper Peren-
nial Modern Classics, 2005); Richard Wright, Black Boy (American Hunger): A 
Rec ord of Childhood and Youth, 60th anniversary ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 
2005); Richard Wright, “The Man Who Lived Under ground,” in Eight Men: 
Short Stories, 3rd ed., by Richard Wright (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Classics, 2008); Orlando Patterson, The  Children of Sisyphus: A Novel (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Com pany, 1964).
 73 As the epigraph at the start of the introduction suggests, one could also 
explore openness through the writings of Alice Walker in addition to Larsen 
and Wright, for whom connectedness and interplay are dominant motifs. 
However, something of the absurdist moralism would be lost with Walker. 
 There is in her work a sense of the tragi comic nature of life; however, I read 
her as still committed to the idea of resolution. This is my read, for example, 
of Anything We Love Can Be Saved: A Writer’s Activism (New York: Random 
House, 1997), as well as Living by the Word: Selected Writings, 1973–1987 (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988). And  whether it is  human centered 
or not ( there is something humanistic about much of her writing), I want 
to tame this appeal to resolution through the absurdist moralist take on 
the psycho- ethical impulse. In this way, I want to maintain the tragicomic 
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quality of life as already and always— and without “appeal” to conceptual 
frameworks of substantive transformation.
1.  things
 1 Daniel Miller, introduction to Materiality, ed. Daniel Miller (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2005), 5; Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Con-
sumption (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
 2 Ian Hodder labels this the “thingness of  things.” See Hodder, Entangled: An 
Archaeology of the Relationships between  Humans and  Things (Malden, MA: Wiley- 
Blackwell, 2012), 32.
 3 Hodder, Entangled, 7.
 4 The economic and po liti cal ramifications of bodiness are even stronger in my 
more liberation theology– related work in large part  because a theologizing of 
socioeconomic and po liti cal circumstances is the raison d’être of black libera-
tion theology.
 5 It is not a pressing concern  here, but the formal question of distinction be-
tween  things and objects is resolved in this proj ect, to the extent it surfaces, 
by means of two notions: (1) the  human is a body- thing in relationship to 
thing- things. A twofold epistemology of thingliness is thereby constituted 
through the idea of multidirectional relationship, and much of this is worked 
out through moralistic awareness and lucidity, as described in this and the 
next chapter. For brief discussions of subject- object in material studies, see, 
for example, Michael Rowlands, “A Materialist Approach to Materiality,” in 
Miller, Materiality (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 72–87; Webb 
Keane, “Signs Are Not the Garb of Meaning: On the Social Analy sis of Mate-
rial  Things,” in Miller, Materiality, 182–205; and Christopher Pinney, “ Things 
Happen: Or, From Which Moment Does That Object Come,” in Miller, 
Materiality, 256–72.
 6 Rowlands, “Materialist Approach to Materiality,” 72–87.
 7 Hodder, Entangled, 7.
 8 This should not be read as even a passive endorsement of the objectification 
of African Americans or  others as consistent with who they are.
 9 Peter Schwenger, “Words and the Murder of the  Thing,” in  Things, ed. Bill 
Brown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 138.
 10 John Frow, “A Pebble, a Camera, a Man Who Turns into a Telegraph Pole,” in 
Brown,  Things, 355.
 11 Bill Brown, A Sense of  Things: The Object  Matter of American Lit er a ture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 4.
 12 Hodder, Entangled, 49.
 13 I am not a Heidegger scholar, nor am I a phenomenologist. I make only 
mention  here of Heidegger’s work on  things in order to attempt to briefly 
acknowledge a long- standing tradition of thinking about  things. Readers 
 will note (and some undoubtedly  will find it problematic) that I give no real 
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consideration to primary materials related to  things authored by phi los o phers 
such as Heidegger— although he has provided philosophical commentary 
on the nature and meaning of  things (e.g., in Being and Time)—or, in France, 
Maurice Merleau- Ponty (e.g., in Phenomenology of Perception and The Vis i ble 
and the Invisible). This is  because I am less interested in presenting or refin-
ing a theory of  things as related to phenomenology of  things, and I am more 
interested in an engagement and practice of  things as presented by  those who 
have developed  thing theory and applied it to vari ous areas of the humanities 
and social sciences.
Hence, I find the texts and authors discussed more useful in light of my 
par tic u lar intentions and my concern to think about the nature of religion 
through a more multidisciplinary approach. For instance, Bjørnar Olsen 
(In Defense of  Things: Archaeology and the Ontology of Objects [Lanham, MD: 
 Rowman and Littlefield, 2010], 70n16) remarks that one can think about 
 Heidegger’s take on  things as being first concerned with the relevance of a 
 thing for  humans. My interest in thinking about  things in relationship to 
religion as a technology through art is concerned on one level with this take 
on  things  because art involves the placement and manipulation of  things. 
Still, I find attention to Camus and  thing theory over against Heidegger use-
ful in that I am also concerned with the question of what  else  there might be 
to say or understand about  things. In short, my concern is restricted for the 
most part to  things within the context of artistic production as opposed to a 
sweeping discussion of  things in a more general sense, which accounts for my 
se lection of conversation partners.
 14 Something about this idea and this phrasing might bring to mind Heidegger’s 
Dasein (“being  there”) and “being- in- the- world.” However, I make this argu-
ment not in light of his phenomenology and existentialism but instead in 
light of Camus’s moralism, which I believe challenges some of the intellectual 
infrastructure of existentialism—at least as it is presented within the context 
of France— and in light of how figures such as Sartre read Heidegger. My 
interrogation of the nature and meaning of religion to the extent it concerns 
itself with the body- thing in relationship to thing- things framed by circum-
stances (world) prompts a concern with what this situation means, what it 
produces, and for that par tic u lar set of concerns I find Camus of par tic u lar 
importance.
 15 On this topic, see, for instance, Olsen, In Defense of  Things.
 16 Raymond Malewitz, The Practice of Misuse: Rugged Consumerism in Con temporary 
American Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 2–3. I do not 
have the same economic and po liti cal concerns as Malewitz does in fram-
ing his rugged consumerism, but  there are insights in this volume regarding 
materiality and materials that I find useful as I think through my par tic u lar 
concerns with  things and religion.
 17 This is related to what Malewitz notes as “misuse” and, with his economic 
and po liti cal interests (explored primarily through lit er a ture and theater), 
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discusses within the context of what he calls “rugged consumerism.” He gives 
the example of Apollo 13 astronauts needing to reconfigure and “misuse” 
equipment in order to develop a system that would reduce carbon dioxide 
levels. What this gets at is the ability of body- things to manipulate and alter 
 things in order to create new  things for use. “For the rugged consumer,” he 
writes, “the desired outcome of creative misuse is a renaturalized world in 
which artificial objects become raw materials for postproduction reproduc-
tion” (23). This, it appears, highlights the flexible utility and purpose of  things 
that is not my primary concern. What I have in mind might not be consid-
ered repurposing  because it raises questions concerning the nature of purpose 
and how it is represented and displayed. I am more interested in the way 
artistic creation and placement of  things raises questions concerning the na-
ture of  things and by extension the nature and meaning of body- things. That 
is to say, I am interested in what the creation/placement of  things within art 
says about  things as  things over against their physical utility. Such questions 
become a “tool,” so to speak, of religion as a technology. See Malewitz, Practice 
of Misuse, chapter 1.
 18 Antony Hudek, ed., “Introduction//Detours of Objects,” in The Object (Cam-
bridge, MA: mit Press, 2014), 16–17.
 19 Bill Brown, “ Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 1–22.
 20 Hudek, “Introduction//Detours of Objects,” 17.
 21 Arthur Danto, Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post- Historical Perspective 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1992), 136.
 22 My interest  here, which of course is not the only approach to the general 
topic of the theory of religion, is with the naming— naming that moment 
in which religion as a technology is applied and interplay between types of 
 things is exposed.
 23 This is not a necessary limitation—as if only the  human bodied naming- thing 
 matters— but I find it a useful restriction. I want to acknowledge a more 
expansive category for naming- things, as one might find in work related to 
transhumanism, posthuman studies, animal studies, or material studies, while 
framing this proj ect in terms of openness related to only one of the many 
types of agential “naming”  things. (See my comments on posthumanism and 
new materialism in the introduction.)
 24 My goal, as my par tic u lar use of  thing theorists  will make clear, is not the 
pre sen ta tion of a  thing theory. Instead,  thing theory, in conjunction with 
other theoretical frameworks, affords a range of questions and considerations 
that help me better frame my own questions and concerns regarding bodies, 
 things, and religion as a technology.
 25 Frow, “Pebble, a Camera, a Man,” 361.
 26 This sense of a moralistic sensibility over against an existentialist sensibility 
marks my turn to Albert Camus in much of my recent work, including this 
book. This moralist posture  toward the world is played out in both his fiction 
and nonfiction. It certainly informs the books found in the notes for this 
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chapter and the next (The Rebel in par tic u lar). However, I would also like to 
call attention to the manner in which his journalistic writings speak to this 
moralistic perspective. For an example of this, see Camus, Algerian Chronicles 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). In his depictions of  human 
suffering, structural injustice, colonialism, and war, one gets a sense of the 
moralist’s challenge to existentialist notions of agency and freedom, in part 
through his aggressive turn to absurdity and love.
 27  Future work might necessitate a turn, for example, to Merleau- Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, as some I have been in conversation with have 
suggested, by means of which to interrogate the dynamics of that body- 
encountering world (a body he suggests is not simply an object). However, 
my first effort is to frame this moment of contact through the earthiness 
of moralism in that it also contains more than an explicit assertion already 
regarding the religious connotations of this contact without presupposing 
an answer— this is found in the question of life without appeal. This is not to 
say that Merleau- Ponty promotes thinking along religious lines that involves 
endorsement or theological assumption. Rather, mine is the argument that 
moralism’s logic is consistent with my objectives as they currently stand.
 28 Frances S. Connelly, introduction to Modern Art and the Grotesque, ed. Fran-
ces S. Connelly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15. See my 
comments concerning Julia Kristeva and my proj ect found in the introduc-
tion, where I also provide a rationale for my turn to Bakhtin over against 
other thinkers such as Kristeva and Georges Bataille.
 29 Rina Arya is correct to warn against too “open” a use of the term abject. As 
she notes, it is not simply a feeling of disgust, nor is it simply a signifier for 
shit and other  things frowned upon. Rather, the abject has to do with bound-
aries between the subject and other “ things.” The inadequacy of boundary stirs 
up abjection as a sociocultural pro cess by which to protect or keep “clean” the 
individual. Abjection is a response to the ever- present subject’s connection and 
response to the abject. The relationship of the body- thing to shit plays off this 
sense of the abject, but the abject/abjection is not restricted to this example. 
See Rina Arya, Abjection and Repre sen ta tion: An Exploration of Abjection in the 
Visual Arts, Film and Lit er a ture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
 30 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1984); James Luther Adams, Wilson Yates, and Robert Penn Warren, 
eds., The Grotesque in Art and Lit er a ture: Theological Reflections ( Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1997). In this text, I am most interested in Yates’s “An 
Introduction to the Grotesque: Theoretical and Theological Considerations,” 
which in its scope and detail provides something of a theoretical framing for 
the overall proj ect. In addition to this turn to Bakhtin, Ola Sigurdson argues 
 there are ample examples of the grotesque within the Christian tradition 
from which one can draw. See Ola Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies: Incarnation, 
the Gaze, and Embodiment in Christian Theology ( Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 2016). Sigurdson argues that within the Christian tradition even 
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the historical and felt presence of God is framed by the grotesque (493). In 
this  there is also a turn to a modified Bakhtinian sense of the grotesque, but 
like with Yates, it is sanitized by the needs of Christian logic: “The point of 
the grotesque as a theological category is not to deny the genuine insights 
of the theological tradition, but rather to attempt, like Barth, to reach a 
more critical view of  these conceptions on the basis of the cross” (503). What 
I find problematic with Yates’s discussion applies  here as well. The appeal in 
this book to a theologized sense of the demonic takes away from the sense 
of the grotesque I want to follow in that it trou bles— casts as negative— the 
openness, the multiple sides of the body to the extent it limits description to 
theologized language of good and evil. It also highlights the individualization 
of the body. What this book calls the grotesque regarding Julian and  others, 
I argue is better described as the suffering body, the body in pain seeking 
wholeness— not the open body content in itself. Talk of a healing function for 
the grotesque betrays all this I critique.
 31 I have no argument with much of what Yates writes regarding Bakhtin’s fram-
ing of the grotesque as a positive assessment of life, one that, through carnival 
for example, celebrates much of what social norms despise.
 32 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 40.
 33 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 47.
 34 I am unable to provide images in the text. However, photo graphs of the ex-
hibits are available at https:// kunsthalcharlottenborg . dk / da / udstillinger / tori 
- wraanes and https:// kunsthalcharlottenborg . dk / en / exhibitions / ovartaci - 2.
 35 Kunsthal Charlottenborg Exhibit, viewed on November 9, 2017.
 36 Museum of Con temporary Art Kiasma, “Ars17— Ed Atkins,” YouTube video, 
May 9, 2017, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = F3vDyaZXx28. A por-
tion of the audiovisual is available at Erich Mülla, “Ed Atkins— Ribbons, 
2014,” YouTube video, January 11, 2015, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v 
= 3EkqVWXBVOQ.
 37 Ed Atkins, “Ribbons,” a 2014 installation (channel 4:3 in 16.9 Hd video with 
three- channel surround soundtracks). Louisiana Museum, “Being  There,” 
Copenhagen, viewed on November 11, 2017. The quoted text is drawn from 
the statement provided by the museum in relationship to the Atkins proj ect.
 38 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 49.
 39 A turn to the grotesque (through Nietz sche) is also found in African 
American constructive theology. See, for example, Victor Anderson, Beyond 
Ontological Blackness: An Essay on African American Religious and Cultural Criticism 
(New York: Continuum, 1995).
 40 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 47.
 41 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 51.
 42 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 52.
 43 Yates, “Introduction to the Grotesque,” 52.
 44 Coco Fusco, The Bodies That  Were Not Ours: And Other Writings (London: 
 Routledge, 2001), 42.
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 45 See, for instance, Deuteronomy 23:11–15.
 46 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 318.
 47 This is Yates’s thinking, but I argue that it is also pre sent in the work of 
other theologians who frame life in terms of the “image of God.” See, for 
example, M. Shawn Copeland, Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being (Min-
neapolis: Fortress Press, 2010); James H. Evans, We Have Been Believers: An 
African- American Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). The 
same could be said of theologians such as Karl Barth and Jürgen Moltmann.
 48 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 363–68.
 49 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 10.
 50 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 10.
 51 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 19.
 52 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 281.
 53 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 322.
 54 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 19–20; emphasis added.
 55 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 26.
 56 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 317. While not my primary concern, it is 
worth noting that this interplay has affective markers to the degree that uri-
nating involves discomfort and relief, and the same can be said for defecating. 
This link between two responses speaks to the manner in which defecating 
involves both a leaving the open naming- thing and an entering into the world 
of a new thing- thing (335).
 57 Still,  there is a romanticization ele ment in Bakhtin that I resist: “Cosmic ter-
ror is the heritage of man’s ancient impotence in the presence of nature. Folk 
culture did not know this fear and overcame it through laughter, through 
lending a bodily substance to nature and the cosmos; for this folk culture was 
always based on the indestructible confidence in the might and final victory 
of man” (Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 336n9).
 58 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 335.
 59 Connelly, introduction to Modern Art and the Grotesque, 2, 4, 5.
 60  These images are part of the Yoko Ono exhibit at Kunsthal Charlotten-
borg, “Transmission,” which I viewed on November 9, 2017. See https:// 
kunsthalcharlottenborg . dk / en / exhibitions / yoko - ono - transmission / .
 61 The connection between a “banquet” and a toilet, I argue, speaks well to the 
carnivalistic impulse highlighted by Bakhtin.
 62 Related to this, I appreciate Kirsten A. Hoving’s pronouncement: “As the tra-
ditional site of the grotesque, the body and its norms  were the starting point 
for the blurring of distinctions between  things, leading to misshapenness, and 
even to complete disintegration.” Kirsten A. Hoving, “Convulsive Bodies: The 
Grotesque Anatomies of Surrealist Photography,” in Connelly, Modern Art and 
the Grotesque, 221.
 63 Nella Larsen, Quicksand, in Quicksand and Passing (New Brunswick, NJ: Rut-
gers University Press, 1986); Richard Wright, Native Son (New York: Harper 
Perennial Modern Classics, 2005).
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 64 In  future work I  will take up the issue of African American moralism using 
Du Bois, Larsen, Wright, and several  others. In so  doing, I  will read African 
American thinkers- activists with and over against Albert Camus.
 65 For additional information on Nella Larsen, see George Hutchinson, In Search 
of Nella Larsen: A Biography of the Color Line (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006); Thadious M. Davis, Nella Larsen, Novelist of 
the Harlem Re nais sance: A  Woman’s Life Unveiled (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1994); and Charles R. Larson, Invisible Darkness: Jean Toomer 
and Nella Larsen (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1993).
 66 For more information on Wright, see, for example, Hazel Rowley, Richard 
Wright: The Life and Times (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2001); Michel 
Fabre, The World of Richard Wright (Jackson: University Press of Missis-
sippi, 1985); Fabre, The Unfinished Quest of Richard Wright, 2nd ed. (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1993);  Virginia Whatley Smith, ed., Richard 
Wright: Writing Amer i ca at Home and from Abroad (Jackson: University Press 
of Mississippi, 2016); Abdul R. JanMohamed, The Death- Bound- Subject: Richard 
Wright’s Archaeology of Death (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).
 67 Richard Wright, Eight Men: Short Stories, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2008).
 68 Richard Wright, Black Boy (American Hunger): A Rec ord of Childhood and Youth, 
60th anniversary ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Wright, Native Son.
 69 Paul Gilroy, “Introduction to the Harper Perennial Edition,” in Wright, Eight 
Men, xiii.
 70 Gilroy, “Introduction to the Harper Perennial Edition,” xv.
 71 Richard Wright, “The Man Who Lived Under ground,” in Wright, Eight Men, 20.
 72 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 21.
 73 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 25.
 74 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 32–33.
 75 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 33–34.
 76 Keep in mind Bakhtin’s perception of the mouth as of  great importance for 
the grotesque body as an opening to the world.
 77 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 20; Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 
30.
 78 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 31.
 79 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 32.
 80 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 84.
 81 Larsen, Quicksand, 113.
 82 Larsen, Quicksand, 113.
 83 Larsen, Quicksand, 121.
 84 Nella Larsen’s concern with sexuality in Quicksand can be read as a racialized- 
gendered pre sen ta tion of the grotesque body— the open body. However, I am 
most concerned with Helga Crane from the point of her turn to the church 
in that it is the most graphic depiction in the novel of the open body— the 
penetrated and penetrating body.
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2. the Art of plAcement
 1 Robert C. Fuller, Spirituality in the Flesh: Bodily Sources of Religious Experience 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.
 2 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body (Prince ton, NJ: 
Prince ton University Press, 2011), 11.
 3 Belting, Anthropology of Images, 3, 5.
 4 Belting, Anthropology of Images.
 5 Belting, Anthropology of Images, 37.
 6 I draw from the work of Jean- Pierre Warnier, “Inside and Outside: Surfaces 
and Containers,” in Handbook of Material Culture, ed. Christopher Tilley, Webb 
Keane, Susanne Kuechler- Fogden, Mike Rowlands, and Patricia Spyer (Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 186–95. However, it is impor tant to 
note that my approach to the body is not anthropological in nature and is not 
Warnier’s thinking on the body. I do not share Warnier’s take on defining the 
techniques of the body used to pre sent itself over against an ability to actually 
know the body as such. Yet  there is some overlap in terms of a shared interest 
in the nature and pre sen ta tions of subjectivity.
 7 Warnier, “Inside and Outside,” 186.
 8 Bill Brown, “ Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 4.
 9 Brown, “ Thing Theory,” 4.
 10 Arthur Danto, What Art Is (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 128.
 11 Arthur Danto, The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art, 21st ed. 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2003), 139–42.
 12 Danto, Abuse of Beauty, 142.
 13 Danto, What Art Is, xii.
 14 I offer  here what might be an obvious point of clarification. My concern is not 
with what is labeled “religious art,” in that it assumes the conclusion, assumes 
the meaning, which intends a par tic u lar outcome. It assumes, first, that 
religion is a something— that religion is established in light of rituals, deeds, 
creeds,  etc.
 15 Barbara Johnson, Persons and  Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008), 61.
 16 Ian Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between  Humans and 
 Things (Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2012), 41.
 17 Arthur Danto, Remarks on Art and Philosophy (Mount Desert Island, ME: Aca-
dia Summer Arts Program, 2014), 21–141.
 18 Danto, Remarks on Art and Philosophy, 23.
 19 Danto, Remarks on Art and Philosophy, 29.
 20 Danto, Abuse of Beauty, 4–5.
 21 In  earlier work I brought Danto’s philosophy of art at the end of art into 
religious studies and constructive/humanist theology so as to “find” cartogra-
phies of religion, and I concerned myself with the manner in which the very 
question of a difference between the box in the store and Warhol’s box pro-
vides a way of gauging the structuring of the religious. I framed it in terms of 
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the “stuff ” of religious traditions and to what it might point— the stuff  behind 
the stuff. Such a question and answer points in the direction of  things. In this 
proj ect, I have related questions with which to contend.
 22 Danto, What Art Is, 28.
 23 Danto, What Art Is, 36.
 24 As  will become clear in  later chapters, art as such and religion as a technology 
are in my mind probed by an awareness that something must be said about 
the absurd as Camus hauntingly explores and explains it— “the desperate 
encounter between  human inquiry and the silence of the universe.” The 
concept of the absurd and its contextualization as the silence of absurdity 
hold me in certain ways and by extension my theory of religion; and as a 
consequence, the uncertainty demanded has some bearing on what religion 
probes and what art can offer regarding that probing. In this way, my discus-
sion of religion as a technology and artistic expression is tied to my interest 
in the moralist position and its target called absurdity (more on that  later). 
I use Camus to soften some of the optimism of Danto, for example, and to 
better ground the un/certainty over against meaning endemic to this tech-
nology of religion’s engagement with art and overall proj ect. Camus does 
not negate the need to act, to do, but rather questions the plausibility of 
success. Obligation and opportunity are not removed for him by absurdity, 
but rather the ramifications of our push, our “No!” to the absurd are  limited 
in impact and scope.
 25 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 82.
 26 Camus, Rebel, 253.
 27 Danto, What Art Is, 19.
 28 Danto, What Art Is, 49.
 29 Danto, What Art Is, 49.
 30 Danto, What Art Is, 38.
 31 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 53–54.
 32 Stephen Greenblatt, “Resonance and Won der,” in Exhibiting Cultures: The Poet-
ics and Politics of Museum Display, ed. Ivan Karp and Steven D. Lavine (Wash-
ington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 42–67.
 33 Greenblatt, “Resonance and Won der,” 49–51.
 34 Being mindful of Camus’s cautions, this potentiality is of  limited conse-
quences. What I propose, if any thing, is only small comfort— not hope—in the 
same way a time/space for arranging the stuff of life provides something of a 
reprieve for the figure fixated on order, but it is not a final resolution by any 
means.
 35 The Cameron notion of the gallery as  temple is referenced in Steven D. 
Lavine and Ivan Karp, “Introductions: Museums and Multiculturalism,” in 
Karp and Lavine, Exhibiting Cultures, 3; Carol Duncan, “Art Museums and the 
Ritual of Citizenship,” in Karp and Lavine, Exhibiting Culture, 90, 91.
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 36 Member: Pope.L, 1978–2001, Museum of Modern Art, New York City, viewed 
on January 3, 2019. For additional information on Pope.L, see, for example, 
Nathan Taylor Pemberton, “Crawling through New York City with the Artist 
Pope.L,” New Yorker, November 22, 2019, https:// www . newyorker . com / culture 
/ culture - desk / crawling - through - new - york - city - with - the - artist - pope - l ? verso 
= true; Adrian Heathfield, Adrienne Edwards, Andre Lepecki, Malik Gaines, 
Martha Wilson, Naomi Beckwith, Thomas Lax, et al., member: Pope.L 1978–2011 
(New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2019); Mark H. C. Bessire, ed., William 
Pope.L: The Friendliest Black Artist in Amer i ca (Cambridge, MA: mit Press, 
2002).
 37 Daniel Miller, Stuff (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 53.
 38 Elaine Heumann Gurian discusses some of the pedagogical and experien-
tial limitations to gallery display imposed by “producers of exhibitions.” See 
 Gurian, “Noodling Around with Exhibition Opportunities,” in Karp and 
Lavine, Exhibiting Culture, 176–90. Of course,  there are race, gender, and 
 sexuality considerations related to the production of exhibits and access to space 
that merit consideration.  Those are beyond the focus of this par tic u lar book, 
but  those interested in such considerations should see, for instance, Lonnie G. 
Bunch III, Call the Lost Dream Back: Essays on History, Race and Museums (Wash-
ington, DC: American Library Association Editions, 2011); Amy K. Levin, ed., 
Gender, Sexuality and Museums: A Routledge Reader (New York: Routledge, 2010).
 39 Svetlana Alpers, “The Museum as a Way of Seeing,” in Karp and Lavine, 
Exhibiting Culture, 27.
3. Artistic expression of trAnsience
 1 Metoyer’s  family’s history is in Louisiana and Texas, tied to landownership 
and business success.
 2 For information on Houston’s Proj ect Row House, see https:// 
projectrowhouses . org.
 3 Deborah M. Colton, introduction to Angelbert Metoyer: Babies Walk on  Water: 
Pre sent,  Future, and Time Travel, by Angelbert Metoyer (Houston: Deborah M. 
Colton Gallery, 2013), 1.
 4 In an email exchange on April 18, 2016, he listed the following as his influ-
ences: “ People, Jesse Lott, Ornette Coleman, and Anthony Braxton.”
 5 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016.
 6 In conversation, Metoyer raised the question of  whether or not his work 
had an Afrofuturistic “feel” to it  because of its attention to the past/present/
future in ways that pull on science (particularly physics), African American 
cultural forms that speak to history as a fluid concept, and so on. Metoyer, 
Babies Walk on  Water, and the corresponding gallery show (November 16, 
2012– January 26, 2013) serve as an example of this Afrofuturistic sense of 
time and space. For information on Afrofuturism, see Ytasha L. Womack, 
Afrofuturism: The World of Black Sci- Fi and Fantasy Culture (Chicago: Lawrence 
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Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2013); Alondra Nelson, ed., “Afrofuturism,” 
special issue, Social Text 20, no. 2 (2002); Mark Dery, ed., Flame Wars: The Dis-
course of Cyberculture (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994); Reynaldo 
Anderson and Charles E. Jones, eds., Afrofuturism 2.0: The Rise of Astro- Blackness 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016); Mark Bould and Rone Shavers, eds., 
“Afrofuturism,” special issue, Science Fiction Studies 34, no. 2 (July 2007).
 7 This exhibit took place at the University of Texas Warfield New Gallery, 
May 12– December 12, 2016.
 8 A shorter and revised version of this statement was found on the wall of the 
gallery space housing the exhibit.
 9 Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body (Prince ton, NJ: 
Prince ton University Press, 2011), 37.
 10 Useful discussions of Vodou include Karen McCarthy Brown, Mama Lola: A 
Vodou Priestess in Brooklyn, updated and expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001); Maya Deren, Divine Horse men: The Living Gods of Haiti 
(New Paltz, NY: McPherson, 1983); Leslie Gérald Desmangles, The  Faces of the 
Gods: Vodou and Roman Catholicism in Haiti (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992).
 11 See W. E. B. Du Bois, “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” in Du Bois, The Souls of 
Black Folk (New York: Vintage Books/Library of Amer i ca, 1990).
 12  These and other interrogations of thing- things in this chapter and much 
of the larger text are inspired by my reading of  thing theorists such as Bill 
Brown. See, for instance, Brown, “ Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 
(2001): 1–16; Brown, A Sense of  Things: The Object  Matter of American Lit er a ture 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
 13 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 97.
 14 This is something along the lines of what historian of religions Charles Long 
discussed in terms of “crawling back through history” to our first creation. 
The distinction  here is that I do not intend to suggest  there is such a point 
of origin, but rather just greater clarity concerning what we are not. See 
Charles H. Long, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of 
Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1986).
 15 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 97–98.
 16 I find something of this sentiment expressed by Metoyer in conversation. 
With Camus, I think it plays out in the story “The Artist at Work,” in Camus, 
Exile and the Kingdom (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 110–58.
 17 Brown, “ Thing Theory,” 2.
 18 Ian Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between  Humans and 
 Things (Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2012), 38.
 19 Hodder, Entangled, 58.
 20 Brown, “ Thing Theory,” 4–5.
 21 Marcel Duchamp, “The Creative Act,” Session on the Creative Act, Conven-
tion of the American Federation of Arts, Houston, Texas, April 1957, included 
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as the appendix to Calvin Tomkins, Duchamp: A Biography (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1996), 510.
 22 John Frow, “A Pebble, a Camera, a Man Who Turns into a Telegraph Pole,” in 
 Things, ed. Bill Brown (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 353–54, 357–58.
 23 Eric N. Mack’s exhibit Lemme Walk across the Room at the Brooklyn Mu-
seum of Art used textiles (e.g., shirts and pieces of fabric) to force a similar 
recognition— the points of contact and impact between bodied naming- 
things and other  things. For Mack, the arrangement of  these items in the 
main hall of the museum allowed for interaction with viewers— a per for-
mance of artistic space as dependent on viewers as on artistic “objects.” 
The location of pieces within this exhibit encouraged movement but also 
disallowed movement to the extent that pieces of fabric hung and draped 
across rope produced soft barriers that made viewers mindful of their bodies 
through imposed limitations, while also pointing out the fabricated nature of 
 these restrictions. I viewed the exhibit on April 20, 2019.
 24 Arthur Danto, What Art Is (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 14.
 25 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016. I have edited the pre-
sen ta tion of our conversation to clear up prose so as to move the conversation 
from a casual email exchange to book form.
 26 Sankofa is a Ghanaian word indicating “Go back and get it,” suggesting the 
importance of the past for a proper working pre sent and  future. It is typically 
symbolized as a bird with its head turned backward, as if its moving forward 
is guided by its gaze to what is  behind it.
 27 He first discussed “Artworld” as a way of philosophically working through 
the impact of Andy Warhol’s 1964 exhibit on his thinking. See Arthur Danto, 
“The Artworld,” Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (October 1964): 571–84.
 28 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016.
 29 Quoted in Michael Agresta, “Angelbert Metoyer at Co- Lab Proj ects,” 
Arts + Culture, November 10, 2015, http:// artsandculturex . com / life - machine 
(accessed July 2018).
 30 Belting, Anthropology of Images, 10.
 31 Belting, Anthropology of Images, 9.
 32 Steven Psyllos, “Angelbert Metoyer,” in Metoyer, Babies Walk on  Water, 4; 
emphasis added.
 33 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016.
 34 Belting, Anthropology of Images, 17.
 35 Although I draw from Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art as opposed to other 
possibilities, I have in mind the line from John Dewey’s Art as Experience: “If 
 there is justification for proposing yet another philosophy of the esthetic, it 
must be found in a new mode of approach. . . .  But, to my mind, the trou ble 
with existing theories is that they start from a ready- made compartmental-
ization, or from a conception of art that ‘spiritualizes’ it out of connection 
with the objects of concrete experience” (Dewey, Art as Experience [New York: 
Minton, Balch and Co., 1934], 11).
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 36 Dewey, Art as Experience, 108.
 37 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016. While  there are 
significant differences and contrasting perspectives,  there is something of 
Metoyer’s intent in the words of John Dewey regarding art. “The work of art,” 
Dewey notes, “is complete only as it works in the experience of  others than 
the one who created it” (Dewey, Art as Experience, 106).
 38 Email exchange with Angelbert Metoyer, April 18, 2016.
 39 Hodder, Entangled, 3, 4.
 40 Heather Pesanti, “Strange Pilgrims,” in Strange Pilgrims (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 2015), 11.
 41 Barbara E. Johnson, Persons and  Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008), 63.  Here Johnson is providing her take on Heidegger’s work related to 
 things.
 42 This statement should remind readers of the work done by Julia Kristeva 
related to the abject and abjection.
 43 See, for instance, Metoyer, Babies Walk on  Water.
 44 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 260.
 45 Works by phi los o pher of art Arthur Danto are helpful with re spect to 
the metaphysical content and considerations of the visual arts. See, for 
instance, Danto,  After the End of Art (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton University 
Press, 1998); Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
 46 See Marcus J. Guillory, “The Meta: On the Artwork of Angelbert Metoyer,” 
in I— AoI (LU— X proj ect) (Houston: Angelbert’s Imagination Studios, 2008), 
49–50.
 47 Dewey, Art as Experience, 214.
 48 Colton, introduction to Metoyer, Babies Walk on  Water, 1.
4. the “stuff” of per for mAnce
 1 Anthony B. Pinn, The New Disciples: A Novel (Durham, NC: Pitchstone Pub-
lishing, 2015), 215–16.
 2 See Matthew Akers, dir., Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Pre sent ( Music Box 
Films, 2012). The impact of Abramovic’s work is far reaching, and this in-
cludes a turn  toward conscious per for mance art in hip-hop culture. I have in 
mind Jay Z’s video for the song “Picasso Baby.” I would also suggest that many 
of the videos produced in relationship to Missy Elliot involve a blending of 
a surrealist aesthetic with a per for mance art quality. For an example of this, 
see Missy Elliott and Da Brat, “The Rain (Supa Dupa Fly),” YouTube video, 
 October 26, 2009, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = hHcyJPTTn9w. In 
a way that Metoyer would appreciate  there is also an Afrofuturistic qual-
ity to some of her work, including Missy Elliott and Da Brat, “Sock It 2 
Me,” YouTube video, October 26, 2009, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? 
222 notes to chapter four
 v= 9UvBX3REqSY. Margarita Simon Guillory has done intriguing work on 
Missy Elliot. See “Intersecting Points: The ‘Erotic as Religious’ in the Lyr ics 
of Missy Elliot,” Culture and Religion 10, no. 1 (March 2009): 81–96, reprinted 
in The Hip Hop and Religion Reader, ed. Monica R. Miller and Anthony B. Pinn 
(New York: Routledge, 2015).
 3 Amelia Jones, “The Now and the Has Been: Paradoxes of Live Art in His-
tory,” in Perform, Repeat, Rec ord: Live Art in History, ed. Amelia Jones and Adrian 
Heathfield (Chicago: Intellect Books/University of Chicago Press, 2012), 11–13. 
Scholars have connected per for mance art to a variety of practices, and  these 
practices have been explored from vari ous disciplinary perspectives, including 
psy chol ogy, gender studies, media studies, and anthropology.
 4 “Performativity, Cultural- Politics, and the Embodiments of Knowledge: An 
Interview with Amelia Jones Conducted by Jonathan Harris,” in Dead History, 
Live Art? Spectacle, Subjectivity and Subversion in Visual Culture since the 1960s, ed. 
Jonathan Harris (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 91. The essays 
in this book, including this interview, provide intriguing discussions of what 
per for mance art entails and how it has been documented within scholarship.
 5 Laurie Carlos, “Introduction: Per for mance Art Was the One Place Where 
 There  Were So Few Definitions,” in Per for mance: Live Art since 1960, ed. 
RoseLee Goldberg (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1998), 13.
 6 I give  limited attention to an expansion of this idea  later in the chapter when 
discussing artists such as Ron Athey. On a related note, readers may find 
the following book in ter est ing: Christopher Braddock, Performing Contagious 
 Bodies: Ritual Participation in Con temporary Art (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, 2013).
 7 Carlos, “Introduction: Per for mance Art Was the One Place,” 30.
 8 Allan Kaprow, “The Real Experiment,” in Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, by 
Allan Kaprow, ed. Jeff Kelly (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 202.
 9 Kaprow, “Real Experiment,” 201.
 10 Kaprow, “Real Experiment,” 205.
 11 Lynn MacRitchie, “Introduction: The Sincerity of Events,” in A Split Second 
of Paradise: Live Art, Installation and Per for mance, ed. Nicky Childs and Jeni 
Walwin (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1998), 21.
 12 The definition of per for mance art is widely debated within the lit er a ture. 
Numerous configurations have been considered, but as far as I can tell 
 there is a shared sense of the body as impor tant within “per for mance” art 
despite disagreement over its more detailed intents and forms. Within this 
chapter, how per for mance art is defined entails a very  limited concern in that 
I provide a definition in terms of par ameters simply through the rather fixed 
range of artists discussed.
During an  earlier period (some of which is covered  earlier in this volume), 
the context justified the argument that the gallery place involved a conscious 
manipulation of time and space for the purpose of par tic u lar and orches-
trated modalities of exploration. The naming- thing came into contact with 
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thing- things in ways that raised questions concerning the significance and 
agency of both. However,  there  were still assumptions of distinction—at least 
some distinction— that per for mance art is out to destroy.
 13  There is no “outside” in that even the writing of this chapter (and the next) 
involves per for mance on my part— a relationship between body- thing and 
thing- things— that is meant to reflect upon the per for mance art of  others 
through the illusion of reification long enough to see this art without seeing 
it.  There is no way around, at least in the context of this text, participa-
tion in performance—an embodied naming- thing/thing- thing interaction 
that speaks to the mutability of both for the purpose of exploration and, 
as I suggest throughout this book, moralistic awareness and lucidity of 
circumstances.
 14 Henry M. Sayre, The Object of Per for mance: The American Avant- Garde since 1970 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 2.
 15 RoseLee Goldberg, Per for mance Art: From Futurism to the Pre sent (New York: 
Thames and Hudson, 2001), 131.
 16 Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 7–9.
 17 Laurie Anderson, foreword to Goldberg, Per for mance, 6.
 18 Anderson, foreword to Goldberg, Per for mance, 34.
 19 Andrew Quick, “Taking Place: Encountering the Live,” in Live: Art and Per for-
mance, ed. Adrian Heathfield (London: Tate Publishing, 2004), 93.
 20 Anna Dezeuze, “Do- It- Yourself Artworks’: A User’s Guide,” in Harris, Dead 
History, Live Art?, 187–207.
 21 Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 147.
 22 Clifford Owens, “Notes on the Crisis of Black American Per for mance Art 
(2003),” in Radical Presence: Black Per for mance in Con temporary Art, ed. Valerie 
Cassel Oliver (Houston: Con temporary Arts Museum Houston, 2013), 36.
 23 For a discussion of per for mance art in relationship to art history and to tem-
porality and repetition or capture, see Jones and Heathfield, Perform, Repeat, 
Rec ord.
 24 Nick Stillman, “Clifford Owens,” in BOMB; New Art Publications, no. 117 (Fall 
2011): 56.
 25 Marvin Carlson, Per for mance: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2004), 110–11.
 26 I highlight the twentieth  century, but Marvin Carlson notes that more recent 
developments, what he labels “avant garde” per for mance art, are tied to a lon-
ger history of per for mance that merits consideration for context. See Carlson, 
Per for mance, chapter 4.
 27 Carlson, Per for mance, 104–5.
 28 Jens Hoffmann and Joan Jonas, “Entrance: On Per for mance (and Other Com-
plications),” in Hoffman and Jonas, Art Works: Perform (New York: Thames and 
Hudson, 2005), 11.
 29 Gavin Butt’s edited volume on art criticism and the place of the critic in that 
work is in ter est ing in light of my phrasing above— “of most interest to me”—in 
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that it provides context and offers a way of thinking about my concern and 
my relationship to my discussion of per for mance art and the other develop-
ments discussed in this book. Butt, ed.,  After Criticism: New Responses to Art and 
Per for mance (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).
 30 Dominic Johnson, The Art of Living: An Oral History of Per for mance Art 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3.
 31 MacRitchie, “Introduction: The Sincerity of Events,” 28. For a concise discus-
sion of the history of this art movement, see Goldberg, Per for mance Art.
 32 Readers should not assume that my comment entails an embracing of 
redemptive suffering strategies. I remain opposed to them in all their forms. 
 Here I am simply describing the use of the naming- thing by a par tic u lar genre 
of artists, and I do so without theological judgment.
 33 Camus experienced the early phase of per for mance art. For instance, RoseLee 
Goldberg tells the story of Camus’s presence at Yves Klein’s exhibit The Void, 
in which the  actual exhibit space was blank and the color blue appeared on 
the exterior of the gallery and the doors, the princi ple being the “real” blue 
was pre sent in the impression— the life— brought into the gallery space. In 
response, in the guest book, Camus wrote, “With the void, a  free hand.” See 
Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 145. Scholars also note thematic connections with 
existentialism in per for mance art as it emerged in the years  after World War II.
 34 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 120–21.
 35 Dominic Johnson, “Intimacy and Risk in Live Art,” in Deirdre Heddon and 
Jennie Klein, eds., Histories and Practices of Live Art (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 136.
 36 Examples of Athey’s work, such as St. Sebastian and Body Art, are available 
on YouTube. The commentary provided with the Body Art per for mance on 
YouTube is particularly helpful in that it places his work within the context 
of traditional Pentecostal penetration by the Holy Spirit. See also an inter-
view with Athey: Walker Art Center, “In Conversation: Ron Athey,” YouTube 
video, April 8, 2015, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = zURUN4GdXBo.
 37 Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Pre sent. MoMA, 2010. It involved eight hours 
each day for almost three months— sitting across from attendees, looking at 
them as they looked at her.
 38 For a short, in ter est ing essay on how “live art” (and by extension per for mance 
art) wrestles with time, see Beth Hoffmann, “The Time of Live Art,” in Hed-
don and Klein, Histories and Practices of Live Art, 37–64.
 39 Sayre, Object of Per for mance, 4.
 40 See the poster for the film Marina Abramovic: The Artist Is Pre sent: https:// www 
. imdb . com / title / tt2073029 / .
 41 See Orlan’s website, http:// www . orlan . eu / , and Stuart Jeffries, “Orlan’s Art of 
Sex and Surgery,” The Guardian, July 1, 2009, https:// www . theguardian . com 
/ artanddesign / 2009 / jul / 01 / orlan - performance - artist - carnal - art. Amelia Jones, 
“Survey,” in The Artist’s Body, ed. Tracey Warr (New York: Phaidon, 2006), 
notes to chapter four 225
32. For examples of Orlan’s work as related to the commentary above, see diy 
artem, “OrLAn, Omniprésence, 1993. Extrait,” YouTube video, February 14, 
2014, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = jN1teX2xzh0. This concern with 
pain as strategy is central to the novel with which I open this chapter. In that 
book it is a strategy for interrogating and collapsing theological assumptions 
regarding righ teousness and sin over against a par tic u lar mode of humanism. 
See Pinn, New Disciples.
 42 Consider this argument in relationship to the work, for example, of Susan 
Bordo: Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body, 
10th anniversary ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); and 
Bordo, The Male Body: A New Look at Men in Public and in Private (New York: 
 Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000).
 43 Cherise Smith provides an impor tant discussion of the manner in which 
per for mance tackles issues related to cultural construction of identity. See 
Smith, Enacting  Others: Politics of Identity in Eleanor Antin, Nikki S. Lee, Adrian 
 Piper, and Anna Deavere Smith (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).
 44 Valerie Cassel Oliver, preface to Cassel Oliver, Radical Presence, 10.
 45 Cynthia Carr, “Talk Show,” in On Edge: Per for mance at the End of the Twentieth 
 Century, by Cynthia Carr (Hanover, NH: University Press of New  England, 
1993), 200–205.
 46 Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 210–15.
 47 Lea Vergine, Body Art and Per for mance: The Body as Language, 2nd ed. (Milan: 
Skira, 2000), 289.
 48 Valerie Cassel Oliver, “Putting the Body on the Line: Endurance in Black Per-
for mance,” in Cassel Oliver, Radical Presence, 14.
 49 Uri McMillan, Embodied Avatars: Genealogies of Black Feminist Art and Per for-
mance (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 7.
 50 See Adina Rivera, “Adrian  Piper, Mythic Being 1973,” YouTube video, 
April 30, 2017, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = jVcXb8En _ Tw; Kennedy, 
Peter, dir., “The Mythic Being.” excerpt from Other Than Art’s Sake, AprAF 
Berlin, 1973, http:// www . adrianpiper . com / vs / video _ tmb . shtml; and John B. 
Bowles, Adrian  Piper: Race, Gender, and Embodiment (Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2011).
 51 Adrian  Piper, “Preparatory Notes on the Mythic Being,” quoted in McMillan, 
Embodied Avatars, 125. Also see Adrian  Piper, Out of Order, Out of Sight, vol. 1, 
Selected Writings in Meta- Art 1968–1992 (Cambridge: mit Press, 1999).
 52 John P. Bowles, “ ‘Acting Like a Man’: Adrian  Piper’s Mythic Being and Black 
Feminism in the 1970s,” in Signs: Journal of  Women in Culture and Society 32, no. 3 
(2007): 621.
 53 Smith, Enacting  Others, 727–77.
 54 Bowles, “ ‘Acting Like a Man,’ ” 633.
 55 Ken Johnson, “Art in Review; Adrian  Piper,” New York Times, November 17, 
2000, http:// www . nytimes . com / 2000 / 11 / 17 / arts / art - in - review - adrian - piper 
. html.
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 56 Holland Cotter, “Adrian  Piper: A Canvas of Concerns— Race, Racism 
and Class,” New York Times, December 24, 1999, http:// www . asu . edu / cfa 
/ wwwcourses / art / SOACore / piper - art - review . html.
 57 Clifford Owens, “Notes on the Crisis of Black American Per for mance Art,” in 
Cassel Oliver, Radical Presence, 36.
 58 Christopher Y. Lew, ed., Clifford Owens: Anthology (New York: MoMA ps1, 
2012), 8; emphasis added.
 59 Kara Walker, “Instructions,” in Lew, Clifford Owens: Anthology, 5.
 60 Stillman, “Clifford Owens,” 52.
 61 Clifford Owens, introduction to Lew, Clifford Owens: Anthology, 8.
 62 Christopher Y. Lew, “Trust Me: Anthology from One Perspective,” in Lew, 
Clifford Owens: Anthology, 46. See Clifford Owens, “Anthology (Maren Has-
singer) 2011,” YouTube video, March 5, 2015, https:// www . youtube . com / watch 
? v = AojNZxEOnuI.
 63 Lew, “Trust Me,” 43.
 64 Laurie Carlos, “Introduction: Per for mance Art Was the One Place Where 
 There  Were So Few Definitions,” in Goldberg, Per for mance, 9.
 65 I make  these remarks in part through my encounter with the work of Stephen 
Bayley. See Bayley, Ugly: The Aesthetics of Every thing (London: Goodman Fiell, 2012).
 66 Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 212.
 67 Ron Athey is discussed again in the next chapter, which deals with body- 
thing/thing- thing configurations through body fluids and per for mance art.
 68 For in ter est ing texts related to issues of race and gender in per for mance art, 
see Catherine Ugwu, ed., Let’s Get It On: The Politics of Black Per for mance (Se-
attle: Bay Press, 1995); Smith, Enacting  Others; Cassel Oliver, Radical Presence.
 69 Still, it must be noted, this takes place within cultural worlds— always within 
 these worlds— that mark bodies in par tic u lar ways, allow or force rather body- 
things to speak certain social structures of place and meaning. See Dominic 
Johnson, ed., Pleading in the Blood: The Art and Per for mances of Ron Athey (Chicago: 
Intellect Books/University of Chicago Press, 2013); Johnson, “Perverse Marty-
rologies: An Interview with Ron Athey,” in Johnson, Art of Living, 195–218.
 70 For a sense of Orlan’s thinking on the body, see Science Gallery Dublin, “The 
 Future of the Body with Per for mance Artist Orlan,” YouTube video, July 1, 
2014, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = PjxEWPAnxDc.
 71 Kristine Stiles, “Quicksilver and Revelations: Per for mance Art at the End 
of the Twentieth  Century,” in Per for mance Artists Talking in the Eighties, ed. 
Linda M. Montano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 481. 
One could think of early acts as representing protoper for mance art. So 
self- mutilation by Vincent van Gogh— the cutting off of his ear— while associ-
ated with other issues that should not be downplayed, also spoke a par tic u lar 
performed message.
 72 Guillermo Gómez- Peña, “In Defense of Per for mance Art,” in Heathfield, Live: 
Art and Per for mance, 78–79.
 73 Quoted in Johnson, “Perverse Martyrologies,” 195.
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 74 I saw Inverted Birth at Copenhagen Con temporary (Copenhagen, Denmark): 
http:// cphco . org / en / exhibition / bill - viola.
 75 Bill Viola, “Inverted Birth,” Copenhagen Con temporary program brochure. 
Installation viewed November 9, 2017.
 76 I saw The Raft at Copenhagen Con temporary (Copenhagen, Denmark): http:// 
cphco . org / en / exhibition / bill - viola.
 77 I viewed this exhibit on March 17, 2019, in London at the Royal Acad emy of Arts.
 78 Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 164–65; and TheMACBelfast, “Meet the Artist: 
Stuart Brisley Interview,” YouTube video, February 9, 2015, https:// www 
. youtube . com / watch ? v = t54I3QABGWY.
 79 Quoted in Goldberg, Per for mance Art, 145.
 80 See, for instance, LagunaArtMuseum, “Chris Burden— Through the Night 
Softly,” YouTube video, October 27, 2011, https:// www . youtube . com / watch 
? v = OB6gg1i2hc8; and New York Times, “Shot in the Name of Art | Op- Docs | 
The New York Times,” YouTube video, https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v 
= drZIWs3Dl1k.
 81 Carr, On Edge, 17; this quotation includes commentary from Burden. For more 
of Burden’s description of his work, see Linda M. Montano, “Chris Burden,” 
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8. prob lem  things
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Oxford University (November 17, 2017), and as the annual American Journal of 
Theology and Philosophy Lecture held at the American Acad emy of Religion’s 
2018 meeting.
 3 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 3.
 4 My goal is not to interrogate, nor describe Du Bois’s praxis, but rather to better 
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introductory and closing materials of Souls, see Shamoon Zamir, “The Souls 
of Black Folk: Thought and  After Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
W. E. B. Du Bois, ed. Shamoon Zamir (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 7–36.
 5 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 7; italics added.
 6 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 8.
 7 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), 142.
 8 Arnold Rampersad notes about Du Bois that “enumeration is crucial to his 
style.” And so  there is no reason to believe the importance of duality is  limited 
to double- consciousness. Instead, it is useful to recognize that tension is vital 
to his pre sen ta tion: twoness related to consciousness, secular over against re-
ligious, liberal arts over against industrial training, and so on. See Rampersad, 
The Art and Imagination of W. E. B. Du Bois (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1976), 73; Shamoon Zamir, Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and American 
Thought, 1888–1903 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 116. Such a 
reading of the category informs, for instance, the thinking of Robert Gooding- 
Williams, who remarks, “Given his understanding of the Negro prob lem, we 
may suppose that Du Bois took ‘How does it feel to be a prob lem?’ to be asking 
‘How does it feel to be excluded from the group life of American society?” 
Gooding- Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro- Modern Po liti cal Thought in 
Amer i ca (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 71.
 9 David Levering Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, Biography of a Race: 1868–1919 (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1993), 96. Lewis also suggests a connection to Goethe 
and Chesnutt, who make use of a similar construction (282). Shamoon Zamir 
argues for a Hegelian turn in Du Bois’s work, which accounts for the use 
of twoness. See Zamir, Dark Voices. Also see Ross Posnock, “The Influence of 
William James on American Culture,” in The Cambridge Companion to William 
James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
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327–40; and James’s discussion of the “Hidden Self ” in Robert Richardson, ed., 
The Heart of William James (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 
79–100.
 10 Rampersad, Art and Imagination of W. E. B. Du Bois, 74.
 11 Posnock, “Influence of William James on American Culture,” 338.
 12 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 14.
 13 Like Camus, Du Bois notes hy poc risy, and exposes values that actually 
promote disregard. Even his attention to the Negro prob lem speaks to this 
moralist posture in that it offers a jeremiad— i.e., a clear vision of cir-
cumstances and a warning regarding their outcome. Souls discusses  these 
circumstances and draws attention to socioeconomic, cultural, and po liti-
cal approaches of redress. In this way, Du Bois calls for consistency between 
the best of the Reconstruction aims and an ongoing commitment to radical 
change. West, American Evasion of Philosophy, 142.
 14 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 68–69.
 15 Cornel West represents double consciousness as the cause of a prob lem soul 
and ultimately critiques it in terms of dissatisfying structures of communal 
leadership.  Others critique him for the inherent limitation of doubleness, 
which fails to consider the variety of ways in which African Americans are 
rendered foreign. Gender, sexuality, and a host of other constructions shape our 
presence in the world, but they are not captured by the black- white dichotomy, 
which binds Du Bois’s souls. Yet this twoness and accompanying insight has 
served as a signifier for the marginality, the “otherness” of African Americans. 
Although critiqued, the per sis tent application of this signifier suggests its util-
ity depends on the intended approach  toward otherness.
 16 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk says the following on page 72, which speaks to the 
Negro prob lem as the context for the  earlier narrative he provides regarding 
the three moments: “Yet  after all they are but gates, and when turning our 
eyes from the temporary and the contingent in the Negro prob lem to the 
broader question of the permanent uplifting and vacillation of black men in 
Amer i ca, we have a right to inquire, as this enthusiasm for material advance-
ment mounts to its height. . . .  Is not life more than meat, and the body more 
than raiment?” Du Bois is  here critiquing the Washingtonian model of educa-
tion for African Americans.
 17 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 16.
 18 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 28.
 19 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 34.
 20 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk: “What is thus true of all communities is peculiarly 
true of the South, where, outside of written history and outside of printed 
law,  there has been  going on for a generation as deep a storm and stress of 
 human souls, as intense a ferment of feeling, as intricate a writhing of spirit, 
as ever a  people experienced. Within and without the somber veil of color 
vast social forces have been at work— efforts for  human betterment, move-
ments  toward disintegration and despair, tragedies and comedies in social and 
economic life, and a swaying and lifting and sinking of  human hearts which 
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ment and unrest” (131–32).
 21 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 9.
 22 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 10.
 23 Terrence Johnson, Tragic Soul- Life: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Moral Crisis Facing 
American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6.
 24 Johnson, Tragic Soul- Life, 38–39.
 25 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 143–44.
 26 Lewis, W. E. B. Du Bois, Biography of a Race, 280.
 27 William James, The Va ri e ties of Religious Experience: A Study in  Human Nature 
(New Hyde Park, NY: University Books, 1963).
 28 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 87.
 29 Martin Halliwell, “Morbid and Positive Thinking: William James, Psy chol ogy, 
and Illness,” in William James and the Transatlantic Conversation: Pragmatism, Plu-
ralism, and Philosophy of Religion, ed. Martin Halliwell and Joel D. S. Rasmussen 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 101.
 30 Charles Taylor, “Twice- Born,” in Va ri e ties of Religion  Today: William James Revis-
ited, by Charles Taylor (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 339.
 31 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 90.
 32 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 130.
 33 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 137.
 34 Pericles Lewis, “James’s Sick Souls,” Henry James Review 22, no. 3 (2001): 251.
 35 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 135.
 36 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 144.
 37 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 139.
 38 Halliwell, “Morbid and Positive Thinking,” 101; Lewis, “James’s Sick Souls,” 252; 
Gary T. Alexander, “William James, the Sick Soul, and the Negative Dimen-
sions of Consciousness: A Partial Critique of Transpersonal Psy chol ogy, 
Journal of the American Acad emy of Religion 48, no. 2 (1980): 200.
 39 As found in Jill L. McNish, “ ‘Failure, Then, Failure!’ Shame and William 
James’s ‘Sick Soul,’ ” CrossCurrents 53, no. 3 (2003): 393. A similar sense of ex-
haustion and surrender marks early African American conversion accounts.
 40 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 187.
 41 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 144–45.
 42 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 145.
 43 One could read the story of John as a not- so- subtle critique of higher educa-
tion as a mechanism for countering racial disregard. What John encounters 
instead suggests that antiblack racism does not bend to logic and is not 
subdued by reasonable argument.
 44 James, Va ri e ties of Religious Experience, 189.
 45 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 9.
 46 Cornel West, “Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization,” in The Cornel West 
Reader (New York: Basic Civitas, 1999), 89.
 47 West, “Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization,” 89–90. Arnold Rampersad 
offers a diff er ent perspective. He suggests that Du Bois maintained a certain 
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mode of optimism over against the pessimism of the masses. Whereas West 
seems to sense an embedded hopefulness, a strategic optimism premised on 
the disruptive cultural practices of African Americans, within the larger 
community of African Americans, Rampersad notes a deep pessimism. See 
Rampersad, Art and Imagination of W. E. B. Du Bois, 86.
 48 West, “Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization,” 89–90. Also see, for ex-
ample, the discussion of the “talented tenth” isolated in Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
and Cornel West, The  Future of the Race (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).
 49 West, “Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization,” 89. Also see Cornel West, 
Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro- American Revolutionary Chris tian ity (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1982).
 50 West, “Black Strivings in a Twilight Civilization,” 93.
 51 Ultimately, West is concerned with the outcomes of this attachment to 
community and ritual, whereas I am concerned with the description of a 
 par tic u lar posture  toward the world as opposed to resolution of the challenges 
presented by that view.
 52 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 188.
 53 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 151.
 54 Gerald Horne, 1986, 345, in Paul C. Taylor, “What’s the Use of Calling Du 
Bois a Pragmatist? Metaphilosophy 35, nos. 1–2 (2004): 101.
 55 Taylor, “What’s the Use of Calling Du Bois a Pragmatist?” 101.
 56 Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia and the Politics of Modernism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
 57 Charles Taylor, “The Twice- Born,” in Taylor, Va ri e ties of Religion  Today, 340, 342.
 58 I find Julia Kristeva’s discussion of melancholy more compelling than most 
accounts, par tic u lar the framing of a “living death.” Yet its affective and psy-
chological dimensions, for my mind, do not capture Du Bois’s sentiment. See 
Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1989). Also see Sanja Bahun, Modernism and Melancholia: Writing as 
Countermourning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 59 Charles H. Long, “The Oppressive Ele ments in Religion and the Religions of 
the Oppressed,” Harvard Theological Review 69, nos. 3–4 (1976): 401. This global-
izing of the issue is impor tant. Du Bois understood the Negro prob lem as a 
localized dimension of a larger world prob lem. See Du Bois, “The Color Line 
 Belts the World,” in W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader, ed. David Levering Lewis (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1995), 42.
 60 See Richard Rorty, “Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility, and Ro-
mance,” in The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. Ruth Anna Putnam 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For what this personal experi-
ence of dread might say concerning issues of masculinity and domestic space, 
see Jessica R. Feldman, “A Shelter of the Mind: Henry, William, and the 
Domestic Scene,” in Putnam, Cambridge Companion to William James.
Long, “Oppressive Ele ments in Religion,” 407. This is also not the dread 
chronicled by Kierkegaard in that he collapses into God in the face of 
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dread and fear, but not so for Du Bois. See, for example, Søren Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling (n.p.: Merchant Books, 2012), and read this against Du Bois, 
Souls of Black Folk, and Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay  toward an Autobiography 
of a Race Concept (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), for instance.
 61 Long, “Oppressive Ele ments in Religion,” 409, 411.
 62 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 152.
 63 Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, 152. A similar and per sis tent sense of the world as 
suffering emerges, for example, with Richard Wright through  family. “My 
 mother’s suffering,” he writes in Black Boy, “grew into a symbol in my mind, 
gathering to itself all the poverty, the ignorance, the helplessness, the painful, baf-
fling, hunger- ridden days and hours; the restless moving, the futile seeking, the 
uncertainty, the fear, the dread; the meaningless pain and the endless suffering.” 
Richard Wright, Black Boy (New York: Harper and  Brothers, 1945), 111.
 64 Quoted in Robert D. Richardson, William James: In the Maelstrom of American 
Modernism: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 399.
epilogue
 1 Anthony B. Pinn, Terror and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2003).
 2 I initially framed the book in relationship to three tasks pointing to (1) 
enhancement of the study of religion by expanding the forms of cultural 
production interrogated; (2) pushing the study of religion’s engagement with 
culture beyond the relationship of or ga nized religious traditions and their 
cultural signifiers to a more expansive sense of the religious; and (3) contrib-
uting to an impor tant and growing discourse on religion and embodiment 
through a framing of religion and culture in terms of bodies and what bodies 
construct (and “arrange”) in time and space. I believed working  toward  these 
three would add greater complexity and richness to the study of religion by 
highlighting the “ordinary” nature of the religious in relationship to  human 
experience within the context of material history.
 3 I understood religion as a quest for complex subjectivity to involve meaning 
making. In that  earlier work, in that phrase “meaning making,” what was 
most impor tant was the meaning. Now the central dimension is “making”—
as in the interaction between  things.
 4 Much of Terror and Triumph involves a subtle embrace of dimensions of 
Camus’s sense of the  human and/in the world.  Here I make this conversation 
partner an explicit figure.
 5 Camus is aware of shit, noting in The First Man the impact of its odor: 
“Camus, The First Man: This night inside him, yes  these tangled hidden roots 
that bound him to this magnificent and frightening land, as much to its 
scorching days as to its heartbreakingly rapid twilights, and that was like a 
second life, truer perhaps than the everyday surface of his outward life; its his-
tory would be told as a series of obscure yearnings and power ful indescribable 
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sensations, the odor of the schools, of the neighborhood stables, of laundry on 
his  mother’s hands, of jasmine and honeysuckle in the upper neighborhoods, 
of the pages of the dictionary and the books he devoured, and the sour smell of 
the toilets at home and at the hardware store, the smell of the big cold classrooms 
where he would sometimes go alone before or  after class, the warmth of his 
favorite classmates, the odor of warm wool and feces that Didier carried around 
with him, of the cologne big Marconi’s  mother doused him with so profusely 
that Jacques, sitting on the bench in class, wanted to move still closer to his 
friend . . .  the longing, yes, to live, to live still more, to immerse himself in the 
greatest warmth this earth could give him, which was what he without know-
ing it hoped for from his  mother” (italics added). This is from the New York 
Times Book Review, and I accessed it as quoted in Gabriel P. Weisberg, “In Deep 
Shit: The Coded Images of Travies in the July Monarchy,” Art Journal 52, no. 3 
(1993): 36–40.
 6 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 94.
 7 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 97.
 8 For Niebuhr’s thinking on theological anthropology and issues of justice, see, 
for example, Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Poli-
tics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002); and Niebuhr, The Nature 
and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox, 1996).
 9 More compelling than Niebuhr for me, although still a perspective I do not 
embrace, is the thinking of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. While  there is still a vertical 
framing, he does also acknowledge in a more “earthy” and engaged manner 
the horizontal nature of interplay. What I find most appealing about his work 
is the much stronger sense of the tragic quality of life and work— reflecting to 
some extent, although perhaps in a  limited way, the realities of the marginal-
ized through his involvement with Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem. 
Involvement in/with the world comes with a more significant cost and entails 
a more “costly” ethical outreach. In a word, he promotes a modality of ethics 
with dirty hands. See Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (New York: 
Touchstone, 1997); and Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (New York: Touch-
stone, 1995). Mindful of this, I find it less difficult to read Camus and Du Bois 
theologically in light of Bonhoeffer than in relationship to most theologians/
ethicists.
 10 It is not only his nonfiction that speaks to  these conceptual frameworks of 
concern to me. Although not addressed in this chapter, The Plague by Camus 
speaks of the open body—in fact, the book’s action is impossible if bodies are 
not open, are not porous. The rats, the bite of fleas, the presence of blood and 
other tainted body fluids speaks to this openness. However, for Camus in this 
book, the open body compromised and changed prompts philosophical and 
theological questions regarding suffering by means of which he interrogates 
psycho- ethical frameworks for life (or the plague, as the two are the same for 
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his characters). My primary interest  here is not the psycho- ethical response 
to inadequate philosophical- theological claims regarding suffering, but 
rather the shit of life, literally the shit of life, marking the presence of open 
bodies. That is to say, I focus on the naming of that initial moment of contact 
between body- things and thing- things— and body waste, such as shit, as a 
mark of this openness—an openness that speaks to the nature of the body and 
the body as device within religion as a technology.
 11 Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt (New York: Vintage Inter-
national, 1991), 305.
 12 Camus, Rebel, 8.
 13 Camus, Rebel, 9.
 14 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 121.
 15 Job 1:18–19 (kJv).
 16 Job 2:5–7 (kJv).
 17 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 19.
 18 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 54.
 19 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 97.
 20 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 98.
 21 W. E. B. Du Bois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay  toward an Autobiography of a Race Con-
cept (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940), 130–31.
 22 This is the second story in the collection titled Eight Men. The story was 
first published in 1942 in the journal Accent. A longer version was published 
two years  later in Cross Section: A Collection of New American Writing, edited by 
Edwin Seaver (New York: L. B. Fischer, 1944). The version of the story refer-
enced in this lecture is the 1944 version (pages 58–102).
 23 Richard Wright, “The Man Who Lived Under ground,” in Eight Men: Short 
Stories, 3rd ed., by Richard Wright (New York: Harper Perennial Modern 
Classics, 2008), 25.
 24 W. E. B. Du Bois, “The Souls of White Folk,” in W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader, ed. 
David Levering Lewis (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1995), 453. Du Bois 
might be said to turn to the mystical dimensions of capacity— the manner 
in which the mystical might open the hidden passages marking the subcon-
scious self. This would serve to elevate the “blindness” regarding  others noted 
by William James. See James, “On a Certain Blindness in  Human Beings,” in 
The Heart of William James, ed. Robert Richardson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 145–63.
 25 Du Bois, “Souls of White Folk,” 454.
 26 Du Bois, “Souls of White Folk,” 456.
 27 Nella Larsen, Quicksand, in Larsen, Quicksand and Passing (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 1986), 82.
 28 Camus, Myth of Sisyphus, 15. Camus, of course, is referring to existentialist 
Jean- Paul Sartre’s novel Nausea.
 29 Larsen, Quicksand, 130.
 30 Larsen, Quicksand, 130.
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 31 Kristin Hunter Lattany, “Off- Timing: Stepping to the Diff er ent Drummer,” in 
Lure and Loathing: Essays on Race, Identity, and the Ambivalence of Assimilation, ed. 
Gerald Early (New York: Penguin Press, 1993), 164.
 32 Slavery, as sociologist Orlando Patterson has aptly noted, involves a social 
death— the surrender of  will or authority for the sake of physical life. This 
certainly has  shaped the context and content of African American existence 
in the Amer i cas, but I have in mind a diff er ent dimension of this situation. 
What Patterson describes so vividly entails the existential arrangements of 
“life,” the experience of living within a context of race- based discrimination. 
One should not ignore ontological considerations— ways in which the very 
being of African Americans is defined by the presence of demise. An African 
American body is a social construct meant to signify and speak of the end of 
being as subject.
 33 Materials related to Crummell include Crummell, Destiny and Race: Selected 
Writings, 1840–1898 (Amherst, MA: University of Mas sa chu setts Press, 1992); 
J. R. Oldfield, ed., Civilization and Black Pro gress: Selected Writings of Alexander 
Crummell on the South (Charlottesville: University of  Virginia Press, 1995); Wil-
son Jeremiah Moses, Alexander Crummell: A Study of Civilization and Discontent 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
 34 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 30.
 35 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 30.
 36 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 51, 54.
 37 W. E. B. Du Bois was familiar with Quicksand. In fact, he named it one of the 
best works of fiction by an African American since Chesnutt. Deborah E. 
McDowell references this in the introduction to Larsen, Quicksand and Passing, 
ix; Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 30.
 38 Wright, “Man Who Lived Under ground,” 60, 61.
 39 Robert Zaretsky, A Life Worth Living: Albert Camus and the Quest for Meaning 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 10, 16.
 40 Zaretsky, Life Worth Living, 8.
 41 Orlando Patterson, The  Children of Sisyphus: A Novel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1965).
 42 Patterson,  Children of Sisyphus, 20.
 43 Patterson,  Children of Sisyphus, 26.
 44 Butler quoted in Rina Arya, Abjection and Repre sen ta tion: An Exploration of Abjection 
in the Visual Arts, Film and Lit er a ture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 72.
 45 Patterson,  Children of Sisyphus, 71.
 46 This is a reference to a line from the short essay on Sisyphus found in Camus, 
Myth of Sisyphus: “One must imagine Sisyphus happy” (119–23).
 47 Larsen, Quicksand, 135.
 48 Patterson,  Children of Sisyphus, 156–58, 160.
 49 2 Corinthians 5:17; Ephesians 6:10.
 50 Patterson,  Children of Sisyphus, 63.
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